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On February 28, 2006, members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations reserve in southern 
Ontario physically occupied and halted construction on a housing development bordering 
their reserve.  The Haudenosaunee claimed that the site was part of a larger tract of land 
that they had never surrendered, and they vowed to remain on the land as long as 
necessary prevent the planned development from taking place.  When police had still not 
removed the Haudenosaunee protesters almost two months later, some 2,000-3,000 local 
non-Native residents began voicing their frustration and anger in regular anti-protest 
rallies.  On some occasions, these rallies escalated to the point of what one local 
politician called “intense, irrational anger” and even “near riots.”  This Sociological study 
examines some of the factors motivating both the 2006 protest, and the reactions to it by 
local non-Native residents and their federal, provincial and local government officials.   
     Based on legal, archival and ethnographic research; media analysis; GIS mapping; and 
45 interviews with residents of the town of Caledonia and the Six Nations reserve, as well 
as with local government officials, a few conclusions are reached. In examining the 
motivations for the 2006 protest, the results of the legal and archival research suggest that 
the Canadian government violated its own Supreme Court of Canada rulings, as well as 
 v 
its binding international legal commitments regarding the human rights of indigenous 
peoples. This research also suggests that these violations of the rights of indigenous 
peoples have long constituted the norm in Canadian society, producing a climate in which 
Native peoples are regularly dehumanized and dispossessed.  In examining the various 
responses to the protest, the dissertation pays particular attention to the ways that non-
Native residents and government officials constructed and acted upon various settler-
colonial narratives when seeking to justify their responses to the protest.  The dissertation 
argues that both these narratives and the legal violations can only be understood within a 
broader context of problematic patterns of thought and behavior that have long been 
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I first became interested in the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest and the related conflicts 
in Caledonia in June 2006, when a friend forwarded a couple of news articles about the conflict 
to me.  At the time, I was studying for my oral examinations in the areas of Trauma, Privilege 
and Imperialism, and I was immediately fascinated by the tales these articles told about the 
events of a single May weekend: Native protesters had been blocking a main highway running 
through a small Ontario town for months in protest over land they said had been illegally taken 
from them, and in direct disobedience to Canadian and provincial laws they say did not apply to 
them.  On this particular weekend, Non-Native residents, furious at the months-long road 
blockade gathered en masse in the road and were throwing bread and cheese at Native protesters, 
screaming at them to “go home.” The Ontario Provincial Police stood in formation between the 
two groups, desperately struggling to keep them apart, but repeatedly failing as one side or the 
other broke through the police line in a series of mass fistfights.  Eventually, Native protesters 
took down their road blockade in what they said was an effort of good will.  But non-Natives 
who had been demanding an end to the blockade for months reacted angrily, setting up their own 
road barricade against Native people attempting to enter the town and in the process trapping one 
car of Native people in a sea of angry, yelling, non-Native residents. The trapped passengers 
were eventually rescued (without their car) by police, but in the process several more fistfights 
broke out between Natives and non-Natives. Native protesters responded by re-barricading the 
road and, in the case of one Native protester, digging up the highway with a backhoe (until he 
was quickly stopped by Native Clan Mothers).  By the end of the day, a car had been crashed 
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into the local power station (by persons still unknown), causing an explosion that left everyone in 
the area –and surrounding areas—without power.1
     As perhaps any Sociologist and/or activist would be, I was quickly hooked on reading stories 
about the conflict.  It was a case study involving all of the elements I had thought were present in 
many important conflicts in the world, all of the elements I was studying: competing claims to 
sovereignty, underlying dynamics of privilege and oppression, and histories of imperialism and 
trauma.  To me, the reasons behind the Haudenosaunee protest seemed fairly straight forward: 
Haudenosaunee protesters believed that the land belonged to them and that it was wrongfully 
taken from them, was being developed all around them, and legal avenues for stopping the 
development of their lands hadn’t worked.  Regardless of the accuracy of the Haudenosaunee 
claims (which I could not judge when I started out on this project), what interested me most was 
the reported behavior of non-Native people: throwing bread and cheese, yelling “go home,” and 
reportedly circulating KKK flyers in opposition to the protest.
   
2
     As I started looking further into the conflict, as is generally the case with any conflict in the 
real world, the more I read about it, the more complexity I found.  There was a wide range of 
reactions to the protest among local non-Native residents, with many residents exhibiting 
outright support for the protest, many vehemently opposed to it, and perhaps the majority being 
 These are the things that 
fascinated me, I didn’t know what they meant, but I wanted to know. 
                                                 
1 The bread and cheese was being thrown on what the Haudenosaunee Six Nations refer to as 
Bread and Cheese Day, celebrated on Queen Victoria’s birthday, when the rest of Canada 
celebrates Victoria day.  The Haudenosaunee holiday originates in treaty agreements with Queen 
Victoria through which the British Crown made annual presents to the Haudenosaunee.  Though 
the practice ended around 1901 with Victoria’s death, it was revived in 1924 by the Six Nations 
Band Council, which celebrated the occasion by distributing bread and cheese to all Six Nations 
members. 
2 The KKK flyers were later said to have likely been a hoax –i.e., flyers advertising a fictional 
KKK meeting and attributed to fictional KKK alleged members that were created and distributed 
around the Haudenosaunee reserve to stir up anger, fear, resentment or so on. 
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somewhere in between.  This range from support to opposition was perhaps even more faceted 
and complex among the Haudenosaunee, who had two forms of government (traditional and 
colonially-imposed) and an even wider range of views on the acceptability of protests, on 
politics, on religion, on community, on responsibility, and on ways of being in the world.  Yet, 
through this complexity and confusion, some things became more clear.  One is that the 2006 
protest was a conflict between the Haudenosanee Six Nations and the Canadian and Ontario (as 
well as, to a lesser extent, Haldimand county) governments. Another is that some non-Native 
residents (in fact, quite a few) were extremely angry about the Haudenosaunee protest, 
responding in a manner that one local politician referred to as an “intense, intense, irrational 
anger.”3
                                                 
3 Former Ontario Premier (1985-1990) David Peterson (quoted in: Harries and Rusk, 2006) was 
talking about the displays of anger on the May weekend, briefly discussed above.  Peterson 
elaborated, explaining that the anger was at least in part due to a complete failure on the part of 
non-Native governments at all levels (local, provincial federal) to communicate with non-Native 
residents: 
  A third was that many residents, the media, local government officials and (always 
unnamed, anonymous) provincial and federal government officials repeatedly insisted that there 
was no validity whatsoever to the Haudenosaunee claims on the land, and thus grievances in 
their protest. In fact, this latter point was repeated so often in the media --by reporters speaking 
on their own, or quoting the above-mentioned people— that I began my research convinced that 
this must be partially true, that there were two sides to the story, and that the Native protesters 
may be right about some things, but were wrong about others.  Fourth, there appeared to be a 
correlation (though not an explanation) between this belief and the intensity of non-Native anger.  
And finally, verbalizations of this anger were most often focused on dismissing and negatively 
characterizing Haudenosaunee protesters and their government(s) in various negative ways, such 
The people are totally in the dark on all sides, other than there’s communication from the 
confederacy chiefs.  If you want to know what is going on, you listen to Ohsweken [Six 
Nations] radio.  You don’t get it from your government. 
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as: liars who simply made the story up for attention; criminals who delighted in breaking the law 
at any opportunity; exaggerators who were unable to let go of an unfortunate past and thus made 
mistaken and delusional claims in the present; sore “losers” who were resentful that their 
ancestors made poorly informed or corrupt decisions in the past and now wanted some sort of 
compensation for done deals from long ago; greedy opportunists who expected to get something 
for nothing by playing upon the white guilt of bleeding heart Canadians for personal financial 
gain; or angry “terrorists” who found joy in inconveniencing/ “terrorizing” non-Natives 
whenever possible. 
     After pouring over media articles and various reports that I found online, and finding these 
same patterns again and again, I decided that if I was really going to understand the dynamics of 
the conflict, or the motivation behind the intense non-Native anger, I needed to figure out what 
parts of the Haudenosaunee protesters’ claims were true and what parts were not true.  To this 
end, I set off on what I thought would be a very brief sidestep into the historical facts 
surrounding the land in question by consulting the few existing secondary sources that had 
anything at all to say about the Haudenosaunee’s Haldimand Tract land and how this land moved 
from Haudenosaunee hands bit by bit over a 40-50 year period, starting just after the land was 
declared to belong to the Haudenosaunee “forever,” in 1784.  But these secondary sources, 
including the seminal work on the topic (Johnston, 1964) to which all other sources referred, fell 
short of providing answers to many of the questions that I had, and even left me with many new 
questions.  For example, the map in Johnston’s book only acknowledged some of the parcels 
within this Haldimand Tract land, while a map that was allegedly leaked from the Department of 
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Indian and Northern Affairs Canada4 marked out many more parcels, but I had no other source 
with which to verify the shapes in this map.5
     Soon, I moved on to primary sources, expecting to find maps in old treaties or land share 
agreements
 
6 that would help me piece together the story behind both the specific piece of land 
under protest, and perhaps the rest of the contested lands in a 950,000-acre stretch along southern 
Ontario’s Grand River.  To my surprise, there were no maps connected with any of the purported 
surrenders by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations of the Grand River, and there appeared to be a 
number of other irregularities pertaining to these alleged surrenders. Even more surprising was 
the fact that the primary document the Canadian government had been holding forth as “proof” 
that the land under protest in 20067
                                                 
4 Later renamed the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, and most recently 
renamed the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. 
 had been surrendered to Canada did not prove this surrender 
at all.  On the contrary, this document is proof both of coercion on the part of government 
officials who were intent on getting the rest of the Haudenosaunee lands, and of Haudenosaunee 
resistance and refusal to cooperate with the government’s plans (see chapter 1). Further, the two 
other documents which are often cited as supporting evidence of this surrender by the Canadian 
and Ontario governments are, likewise, not at all what they have been presented to be 
5 The map was leaked to the September 13, 2006 edition of the Tekawennake newspaper.  (See: 
Windle, 2006j).   
6 These are generally referred to as documents of “Surrender,” though there is considerable 
evidence suggesting that Native nations –including the Haudenosaunee Six Nations—neither 
permitted the alienation of land through their own laws, nor believed that they were alienated the 
land in these “surrenders.”  Instead, as McNeil (2001-2002), Hutchins (2009), Linden (in 
Ipperwash Inquiry, 2007) and others point out, the Native intention and understanding of these 
agreements was that these were not land alienation agreements, but were land share agreements -
-or even friendship agreements unrelated to land entirely (see chapter 4).  
7 See the 1841 “General Surrender” found in Canada (1891: 119-123). Canada has repeatedly 
cited this document as full evidence that more than 1/3rd of the Haudenosaunee Grand River 
lands were surrendered to Canada in 1841 by a meeting of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in 
full council.  However, this is an entirely false representation of the document and the events 
surrounding it (see chapter 1). 
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(particularly when considered in the broader context of Haudenosaunee Six Nations history), and 
do not appear to corroborate the stories of the these governments at all (see chapter 1).  On the 
contrary, these documents all appear to corroborate the stories told repeatedly by Haudenosaunee 
Six Nations protesters and both of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations governments that the land in 
question was never surrendered and never intended to be surrendered by any Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations people.  This point is worth repeating:  As of this date, the Canadian and Ontario 
governments have failed to provide any additional evidence that the lands under protest in 2006 
were ever surrendered by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations.  In addition, it seems doubtful that 
any such evidence exists.8 Yet, despite their failure to prove their ownership of the land, or to 
provide evidence in support of their claims, the Canadian and Ontario governments have 
continued to behave as if this land belongs to them and can be used however they please without 
any consideration of real or potential outstanding Haudenosaunee interests on the land.9
                                                 
8 This statement is made based 1) on personal searches at both the Ontario Archives and the 
Library Archives Canada, which revealed no additional evidence to support the Canadian and 
Ontario governments’ story, but did produce even further evidence supporting the statements, 
assertions and community memories of the Haudenosaunee, and 2) on the Canadian and Ontario 
government’s longstanding resistance to a 1995 lawsuit brought against them by the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations.  The lawsuit is merely requesting an accounting of all 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations lands, resources and trust funds, how the Canadian and/or Ontario 
governments allegedly came to possess them (in terms of lands and resources) and/or what the 
Canadian and/or Ontario government did with them (in terms of trust funds managed by the 
Canadian government).   
  By 
acting in this fashion, both governments are persistently and egregiously violating Canada’s own 
Supreme Court rulings mandating consultation and accommodation with Native nations prior to 
planning development projects on lands under claim by Native nations –regardless of whether or 
not these claims have been proven in court (see chapters 1 and 4).  Together, these violations, 
plus the existing evidence, plus the Canadian and Ontario governments’ ongoing antagonistic 
9 Here I am using the legal terminology, “interests on the land” to denote outstanding title or 
rights claims that may exist on the land. See, for example, Wilkins (2003). 
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approach to all Haudenosaunee requests for information relating to their lands, resources and 
trust funds, all point to a disturbing trend of dispossessing Native peoples from their lands, 
resources, and trust funds, as well as their domestic constitutional rights and international human 
rights that Canada is legally bound to honor, uphold, and promote. What’s even more disturbing 
is the fact that this ongoing dispossession and violation of constitutional and international human 
rights is not an incident unique to the Haudenosaunee; on the contrary, it appears to be the 
standard operating procedure for the Canadian and provincial governments in their one-sided, 
coercive relations with Native peoples across Canada.10
     These realizations substantially changed the focus of the dissertation. As with any complex 
conflict, this conflict involves multiple stories, all of which deserve to be told, though they 
cannot all be told here.  Thus, I hope that this dissertation is just the first in a series of stories that 
I tell in relation to this conflict.  Though this dissertation is concerned with non-Native 
(government officials and residents, alike) responses to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, the 
non-Native story is not told here (though I plan to tell it in the future, and have already done 
numerous interviews with non-Native residents to this end).  Further, this dissertation does not 
provide a detailed reconstruction of the events of the conflict (something that I am halfway 
through writing), nor does it provide a detailed examination of historical Haudenosaunee-non-
Native relations (something I would like to write in the future), nor does it explore the historical 
   
                                                 
10 Numerous international and constitutional legal scholars, as well as international human rights 
monitoring bodies have already repeatedly attested to this fact (Amnesty International Canada, et 
al., 2012), as has the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD).  Recently, in its Concluding Observations and Recommendations for Canada (2012), 
CERD has once again called on the Canadian government to end discrimination against Native 
peoples, and has criticized “Canada’s failure to properly respect the land and Treaty rights of 
Indigenous peoples, noting “the rigidly adversarial positions taken by Canada” in land 
negotiations and that decisions over resource development are often made without proper 
consultation or the consent of the affected peoples” (at para. 20).  
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range of opinions and approaches among non-Native government officials towards the 
Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples in Canada.  Instead, the story that is told here is being 
told because it is the story that most needs to be told.  This story involves a very broad 
examination into how it is that Supreme Court of Canada rulings, Canadian Constitutional law, 
and international human rights laws that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold can 
be so persistently, egregiously, and discriminatorily violated for one category of people within 
borders of Canada, and how it is that the vast majority of non-Native Canadians (government 
officials and residents alike) sit back and say nothing while this happens.  Further this 
dissertation is the story of how it is that such large numbers of non-Native Canadians 
(government officials and residents alike) are not only passively complicit in these abuses, but 
are actual active supporters of them –even to the extent of lobbying their government towards the 
further progression of these violations and/or towards the inducement of additional, new 
violations.  Finally, this dissertation is the story of how it is that, in their complicity or active 
support and promotion of these ongoing constitutional and international human rights violations, 
non-Native Canadians (government officials and residents alike) persist in their unquestioning 
belief that the Native people like Haudenosaunee Six Nations are simply lying about, making up, 
or drastically exaggerating their grievances --despite massive evidence to the contrary; and why 
it is that these non-Native people persist in characterizing Native peoples who assert their land, 
treaty and human rights as liars, exaggerators, sore losers, opportunists, criminals, terrorists, 
and/or any number of other negative characterizations. 
     The answers to these questions, I argue, are related to transgenerational, historical and 
ongoing trauma and the psychopathological mechanisms that western society and the western 
cultural worldview provide for denying, repressing, and/or normalizing this trauma and the 
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intolerable feelings resulting from it of anxiety, insecurity, fear, shame, and guilt.  Though this 
dissertation argues that western society and the western cultural worldview consist of a number 
of problematic patterns of thought and behavior which have been identified as 
psychopathological in the clinical literature on trauma and post traumatic stress disorder, it 
should be clarified that it is not the people who are psychopathological, but the society in which 
they live.  Certainly it can be and is argued that this society –western society—is internalized in 
each of every one of us who live within western society, and is thus a part of who we are, so, too, 
is our common collective humanity.  In fact, this common collective humanity is much more a 
part of who we are, individually and collectively, than the psychopathological society that 
persistently encourages and requires us to ignore who we are, and to violently repress it, and to 
become something else –something that is obediently possessed and used for the benefits of a 
few, but to the detriment of ourselves, other people, other life forms, and ultimately the planet.  
The same processes that are at play in the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee people from the 
land, treaty and human rights are at play in the dispossession of each and every one of us from 
who we are as human beings. And it is imperative not only to the mental health of members of 
western society, but to their liberation as well, and to the very survival of the human species, that 
each and every one of us work to rediscover this common collective humanity that is within all 
of us, and abandon forever the psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that will 
otherwise continue to destroy ourselves, other people(s), other life forms and the planet, until 
there is nothing left to sustain the human species and most of the plant and animal species on the 
planet.  It is not only necessary and possible that we do this, but it is our responsibility --the 
responsibility that those us alive now have to ourselves, others, our future generations, all other 
life forms and their future generations, and the planet. 
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SOME NOTES ON TERMINOLOGY 
There are at least two terminological issues that should be addressed here, the first of which is 
the use of the term “Haudenosaunee” versus the term “Haudenosaunee Six Nations.”  In some 
instances, when I wish to refer specifically and solely to the Haudenosaunee people who live on 
or belonging to the Six Nations reserve, I will use the phrase “Haudenosaunee Six Nations.” The 
rest of the time I will simply use the word Haudenosaunee, which may be referring either 
primarily to the Haudenosaunee people living on the Six Nations reserve, or to the 
Haudenosaunee people more generally, who live throughout Ontario, Quebec, upstate New 
York, Wisconsin and beyond.  In these cases, the context surrounding the word will presumably 
guide the reader in terms of the intended meaning. 
     The second terminological issue that needs to be addressed is my use of the words “we,” 
“our,” or “us” when discussing the numerous problematic patterns of thought and behavior 
inherent in Western society.  As a non-Native member of Western society, I am writing about the 
society in which I live, and am writing to anyone who cares to read my dissertation, whether 
Western, non-Western, or somewhere in between.  In order to position myself within the society 
in which I live, it is only appropriate that I use these terms, rather than terms which would 
artificially separate me from this society, such as “they,” “theirs,” and “them.” Using these latter 
terms would imply that I feel it is possible for one to artificially separate oneself –through 
criticism—from the society in which one lives and/or from the responsibilities that all 
Westerners have for addressing and ending the perpetration and destruction our society has 
wrought upon the entire world (including ourselves). I have included at the beginning of Chapter 
2 a loose definition of what I mean by “Western,” both historically and in the present day. This 
definition primarily includes the people of European and European-descended nations, a well as 
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those nations that have adopted Western style political, economic and social forms of 
organization and production. However, when I am writing about the problematic patterns of 
thought and behavior in Western society, or various other problems inherent in the Western 
cultural worldview, I ask readers to consider for themselves to what extent they are a part of this 
society and its problematic patterns. In some ways, Western imperialism has reached all corners 
of the globe, slicing the planet up into territorial nation-states with governments that rule over the 
masses within their territories in a wide variety of ways (but generally in hierarchical, top-down, 
mini-empire formations).  Yet, in other ways, peoples around the world have resisted their 
consumption by Western culture and their own assimilation into Western-style nation-states to 
varying degrees of success.  Many of these non-Western peoples retain large portions, and 
sometimes virtually all, of their own, unique cultural worldviews, and have simply learned to 
live within two very different cultures.  While I expect this latter array of diverse peoples around 
the world to be familiar with many of the problematic patterns of which I write, my use of the 
words “we,” “our,” or “us” is not at all intended to forcibly include these non-Western peoples as 
Westerners, nor is it in any way intended to exclude non-Westerners from the various 
discussions in this dissertation.  It is just me, writing about problems that I have noticed in my 
society, to anyone who cares to read it. 
GUIDE TO THE CHAPTERS 
Chapter 1 provides a brief summary of the 2006 conflict between the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations protesters and the Canadian and Ontario governments, while also giving a brief 
overview of the reactions of local non-Native residents to the protest.  This summary is drawn 
from thousands of news articles and hundreds of video clips, as well as dozens of interviews and 
various background reports. This chapter also provides a brief summary of who the 
 12 
Haudenosaunee are –how the Haudenosaunee nations came to form a Confederacy and what 
some of their main cultural traditions and beliefs are.  An historical background relating to the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations land, resources and trust funds is also included, as is an examination 
of the specific area of land under protest in 2006 and the land claims with which it is associated. 
This chapter intends not only to raise the relevant issues surrounding the protest, but to establish 
the validity of many of the Haudenosaunee grievances.  Given this validity, the denial and 
dismissal of these grievances by non-Native government officials and residents is the 
phenomenon that most needs to be explained and understood in this dissertation. 
     The second chapter provides an historical overview of various problematic patterns of thought 
and behavior in the Western cultural worldview, including the denial and dismissal of the 
grievances of others.  Through identifying and examining the historical positioning of these 
patterns within Western society and the Western cultural worldview, I argue that many of these 
problematic patterns are rooted in historic traumas perpetrated by some members of Western 
society against other members of Western society.  These traumatic events were so devastating 
for such large portions of Western society over such a long period of time that they have created 
ripple effects which are still felt today.  Further, the processes that formed Western society were 
based on these traumatic destructions of local communities and cultures, and the Western 
hierarchical monoculture that came to forcibly replace these local communities and cultures has 
long failed to provide its members with many of the essential positive elements of culture, such 
as mechanisms for healing individuals from traumatic events and reintegrating them back into 
the community/society.  Lacking these mechanisms, Western society and the Western cultural 
worldview have primarily provided Westerners with psychopathological mechanisms for coping 
with present, past and transgenerational trauma.  As such, these psychopathological mechanisms 
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and the numerous traumas that preceded them, form much of the foundation of what Western 
society is and has been for many centuries.  In fact, I argue that these traumatizing processes and 
the production of psychopathological coping mechanisms are, in many ways, what is actually 
meant by the term “civilization.” Through Western society’s “civilizing process,” the historical 
traumas and psychopathologies of Western society have been reenacted on “less-civilized” 
Westerners, as well as allegedly “uncivilized” non-Western peoples.  The Western worldview 
has long held that it is necessary to inflict these civilizing processes, because forcing other 
peoples to become Westerners is “progress;” however, the real purpose of reenacting Western 
traumas and psychopathologies upon other peoples is to pacify and tame them, so that they are 
no longer able to resist as Western elites and the militarized governments that support them 
plunder their lands, resources, labor power, non-capitalist systems, and anything else that can be 
used to accumulate capital for Western elites.  In other words, the purpose of the “civilizing” 
process is and has long been accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003).  
     Chapter 3, in contrast, examines some of the characteristics of societies that were not 
traumatized by centuries of conquest and “civilizing”/colonization.  That is, it provides the 
reader with a brief glimpse into healthy societies and cultural worldviews, as represented by the 
majority of Native societies that were existing in the Americas prior to the start of the European 
invasion. Some of the characteristics of these –i.e., healthy—societies include the idea that all 
living things have a right to what they need to survive, and that human beings do not have a right 
to deprive other living things or other human beings of this.  Other common aspects of the 
cultural worldviews of these societies include the idea that healthy human beings desire peace, 
and that if “one does not feel that pain, one has become brutalized and ‘sick’” (Forbes, 2008: 12-
14, 6-7; see also: Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40). The contrast between the traumatized and 
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psychopathological nature of the Western thought and behavior in Western society, and the 
majority of Native societies existing in the Americas prior to the invasion, further demonstrates 
and reinforces the points made in both chapters 2 and 3. This exploration also provides a 
necessary framework for understanding the competing worldviews of Haudenosaunee protesters 
and non-Native Canadian government officials and residents.  
     Chapter 4 returns to the examination of the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest and the non-Native 
reactions to it by examining the responses of federal, provincial and county-level government 
officials, as well as individuals in positions of authority (the media, the local development 
corporations, for example).  The responses of these figures of authority are examined within the 
context of theories regarding the production of atrocities and the conditions of atrocity-producing 
situations.  The chapter argues that the Canadian government, and the British-Canadian 
government before that, have exhibited a longstanding pattern of treating Native peoples as “fair 
game” for projection and scapegoating by non-Natives, primarily because Native peoples have 
stood in the way of other policy objectives, such as the accumulation of Native lands, resources, 
labor power, and the cooptation of non-capitalist forms of social organization inherent in Native 
societies.  To this extent, after using these theories to examine some of the specific ways in 
which non-Native government officials and non-government authorities authorized and 
routinized attack upon, and the dehumanization of, Native peoples during the 2006 
Haudenosaunee conflict, this chapter examines several of the ongoing human rights violations 
that are being perpetrated against Native peoples across Canada in pursuit of these accumulation-
by-dispossession objectives.  The chapter will also speculate on the international and domestic 
consequences of these ongoing human rights violations in the face of mounting changes in the 
international human rights regime that have recognized indigenous peoples rights to: self-
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determination; consultation and free, prior, and informed consent; and freedom from any forced 
extinguishment of their inherent human and treaty rights.  
     Perhaps the fundamental reason why the above human rights violations are ongoing in 
Canada and other settler states is the assertion of European-descended sovereignty over Native 
lands and peoples.  While international law has not yet specifically addressed the rights of 
indigenous peoples to sovereignty, there is an increasing trend in international human rights law 
toward this end.  Some of this can be seen in the condemnations that international human rights 
monitoring bodies have made of the alleged legal justifications used by Canada and other settler 
state governments in their assertions of sovereignty.  According to these international human 
rights monitoring bodies, these legal justifications amount to legal fictions, which were built 
upon archaic political theories Western conceptions of “civilization” created to justify the 
European theft of non-Western lands and resources and the genocide and enslavement of non-
Western peoples (i.e., accumulation by dispossession).  As such, human rights monitoring bodies 
have proclaimed that these alleged justifications have no legal standing, and any court cases 
based upon them should be reconsidered in this light.  These trends in international human rights 
law are basically eroding (and even decimating) the very foundation upon which the Canadian 
government and other settler state governments claim sovereignty over Native peoples, and 
tremendous changes in relation to international, state-centric concepts of sovereignty, including 
increasing recognition of indigenous sovereignty, can be expected in the coming decades.  
Chapter 5 will examine many of these issues, demonstrating the fictitious nature of Canada’s 
claims to sovereignty over Native lands and peoples within Canada’s geographic borders, while 
also demonstrating the role of Western concepts of “civilization” in the formulation of these 
legally fictitious claims. 
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     Finally, after having provided a historical-cultural context for them, chapter 6 will consider 
the reactions of local non-Native residents to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.  Because there 
was a broad range of reactions to this protest over several months time, and because a more 
detailed examination of some of these reactions is in order, this chapter will primarily focus on 
the behavior of the 20-30% of local non-Native residents who opposed the Haudenosaunee 
protest during the first two months.  In doing so, this chapter demonstrates the existence of many 
of Western society’s problematic patterns of thought and behavior discussed throughout the 
dissertation.  Because the first two months of the protest were the least confrontational, the 
examination of non-Native opposition to the protest within this largely peaceful period is useful 
in demonstrating the ways in which Western society’s problematic patterns of thought and 
behavior were utilized by many non-Native residents to escalate non-Native anger and mobilize 
non-Native opposition to the protest (and to Native treaty rights).  While non-Native support, and 
even non-Native ambivalence, neutrality, and/or silence in response to the protest are also 
extremely worthy avenues of examination, and are touched upon in the introduction, conclusion, 
and in small ways throughout the chapter, non-Native opposition to the protest appears to have 
been the norm in the small town of 10,000 people, and its public displays dominated space in the 
town, coverage in the media, and dialogue with government officials for the duration of the 
protest and beyond.  (Indeed, six years later several non-Native residents still regularly gather 
near the 2006 protest site and voice their anger over alleged “special privileges” enjoyed by 
Native people and alleged provincial police discrimination against non-Natives). 
     The dissertation concludes with a few words on the absolute necessity of healing from past 
individual, group, and societal traumas in order to move away from the psychopathological 
patterns of thought and behavior that have long infected Western society and its members, and 
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Overview of the Conflict and Background to the Conflict 
 
Non-native governments are stealing our land all up and down the Grand 
River…and the government will not sit down and talk with us. 
~ Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chief Arnold General, quoted in Morse 2006a. 
 
With the way our neighbors are developing land around us, there will soon be 
nowhere for Six Nations to expand in the future.  This is not about us, it's about 
our children.  It's the future of our children that is being targeted (with this kind 
of encroachment).  I don't think there is a better reason to unite than to protect 
our rights and land. 
~ Protest Spokesperson Janie Jamieson, quoted in Windle, 2006d 
 
Generations have grown up talking about this problem, contemplating this 
disparity that threatens to overshadow all lesser woes, stewing about how it can 
be addressed and made right, but ultimately having to pass it on to the next 
generation because it simply never moves forward.  That's what's happening, has 
been happening all along, and it isn't the sole prerogative of so-called 'radicals' 
within the community.  It's everyone's shared past.  It's a grievance that rankles 
far more than white people can appreciate, and to simply trifle it away as 
something of no consequence, as something that happened long ago to other 
people and can be swept aside using that universal broom of last resort called the 
rule of law, well that is no solution. It's a delay.  And it won't do forever.  There 
will be a price to be paid for that type of arrogance, and the shame of it is that it's 
just so avoidable because all it demands is an honest examination. ....[W]ill 
Canada have any appetite for clearing up past mistakes or [will] they want to 
stonewall and take their chances that this can be made to disappear for another 
day?  




When construction started on the Douglas Creek Estates housing development in October 2005, 
members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations had already been waiting several decades for land 
claims procedures, court cases and even international appeals11
                                                 
11 In the 1920s the Haudenosaunee sent a Cayuga Chief, Deskaheh, to the League of Nations to 
plead for justice against Canada’s ongoing violations of Haudenosaunee rights and misuse of 
Haudenosuanee trust funds. This will be discussed in slightly more detail in chapter 4. The 
Haudenosaunee also sent representatives to the United Nations in the 1970s, and have continued 
 to recognize their title to their 
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Grand River lands.  But while official avenues for contesting non-Native encroachment on these 
lands were dragging on at a snails pace,12 non-Native encroachment and development on them 
was racing along at unprecedented rates (Hemsworth, 2006b; Harries, 2006b).13 Making the 
situation worse, in June 2005 the province of Ontario passed its Places to Grow Act: legislation 
seeking to accommodate an estimated three-to-five million new people into southern Ontario 
over the next two decades by mandating settlement and development quotas in areas throughout 
southern Ontario’s Greater Golden Horseshoe region –a region which includes the 
Haudenosaunee’s Grand River lands (Ontario Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2005; 
Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Canadian Press, 2006r; Nolan, 2006c).14
                                                                                                                                                             
to be actively involved in the shaping of legal instruments of international human rights of 
indigenous peoples, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.  
See also: Akwesasne Notes (2005).  
 Knowing full well that once 
12 There are over 800 outstanding Specific land claims registered in Canada (this number does 
not count Comprehensive land claims, which would add several hundred more to this number), 
and new claims continue to be registered every year. Through the Canadian land claims process 
it takes an average of 13 years to resolve a land claim, but claims can easily take two and even 
three decades before they are resolved. See: Canada. Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples (2006: 1), SNGR (2006a and 2006c), Oliveira, Mike and Canadian Press (2006), CBC 
News (2007b), Asch & Zlotkin (2002), U.S. Secretary of State (2009).  The Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations filed 29 claims between 1980 and 1995, and as of today only one of those claims has 
been resolved (Six Nations Lands and Resources, 2012).  
13 Both sources cited state that there had been rapid growth in the town over the past 20 years. 
14 Ontario’s 2005 Places to Grow Act is an award-winning growth plan intended to reduce urban 
sprawl in the Greater Toronto Area while simultaneously accommodating the influx to the region 
of millions of new people over the next 15-25 years. The legislation places strict limits on new 
developments within the Greater Toronto Area, limiting 40% of new development to already 
built-up areas, and mandating settlement and development quotas on lands outside the Greater 
Toronto Area, but still within the Greater Golden Horseshoe area. Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
Grand River lands fall into this category.  
   The push to settle and develop lands under Haudenosaunee claim may have, in part, been a 
result of concerns regarding a potential future labor shortage in the Greater Toronto and Greater 
Golden Horseshoe area.  See, for example: Conference Board of Canada (2007). But, also see 
chapter 4, which argues that the primary reason for this push is the drive by Canadian 
government officials and corporations to pursue financial gains from the ongoing accumulation 
by dispossession of Native peoples throughout Canada from their lands, resources and human 
rights.  
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their lands were settled and developed by non-Natives, no Canadian court would ever “return” 
the lands to Haudenosaunee hands,15 and facing only rejection in their efforts to reason with the 
local developer and government officials at the federal, provincial, and local levels,16
                                                 
15 See, for example: Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2001), 
Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000), and Kent McNeil’s discussion 
of these cases (McNeil, 2001-2002). Though there are no statutes or court rulings that would 
allow a court to extinguish a valid title of a Native nation simply because their land is already 
occupied by non-Native people (McNeil, 2001-2002; Reynolds, 2009), the Ontario Supreme 
Court and Ontario Court of Appeals in Sarnia did just this: extinguishing a valid Native title to 
land in order to “protect” the interests of non-Natives who had settled in houses and built 
businesses on the land.  (The Chippewas of Sarnia did not seek to evict non-Native residents on 
the land, but did seek to evict a few of the corporations operating on the land).  In doing so, the 
court not only ignored relevant Supreme Court rulings on protection of Native interests in 
reserve lands (such as Guerin v. The Queen [1984] at 383), and violated the Chippewa of 
Sarnia’s constitutionally protected rights, but also sent a strong “message to Aboriginal people 
that they cannot depend on the Canadian legal system to uphold their claims to lands that were 
wrongfully taken in the past” (McNeil, 2001: 344).  McNeil continues: “The Court of Appeal’s 
decision indicates that, regardless of the legal validity of their claims, judges will not necessarily 
allow those claims to prevail if they conflict with the claims of other Canadians who did not 
participate in and were not aware of the wrongs that were committed,” (emphasis in original).  
See also: Reynolds (2009).  
 the 
16 In the 12-14 months prior to the occupation, members of Six Nations had made various efforts 
to alert the developer, area politicians, non-native residents, and anyone else who would listen, 
that the site earmarked for development was on land under claim.  Starting around January 2005, 
the Elected Council of Six Nations began sending letters to officials in Haldimand, Brant and 
Norfolk Counties, the City of Brantford, the owners of Henco Industries Unlimited, Inc., (Henco) 
Don and John Henning, Ontario's Growth Secretariat, the Ontario Minister of Public 
Infrastructure, the Ontario Minister of Natural Resources and Aboriginal Affairs (David 
Ramsay), the federal Department of Justice and the federal Minister of Indian Affairs (Andy 
Scott). (Windle, 2006a; Muse, 2006f). Six Nations Community members had also staged a 
number of protests and informational pickets in Caledonia, starting in October 2005, as well as a 
letter-writing campaign directed at Haldimand County officials.   When several Haudensoaunee 
women went to the Caledonia construction site in 2005 attempting to discuss Haudenosaunee 
land rights and Canadian laws with the company developing a housing subdivision on the land, 
workers at the not only dismissed the women’s attempts to talk about Haudenosaunee rights but 
reportedly kicked dirt on the women ant told them to “bring it on,” according to Cayuga sub-
chief Leroy Hill, who added: “And our people brought it on.” (Leroy Hill, quoted in: Ahooja, 
2008b). On members of Six Nations bringing public attention to this issue for at least a year, see 
Howlett (2006b), Rook and Proudfoot (2006b); on efforts by the Six Nations Elected Council 
beginning in January 2005, see Ontario, Legislative Assembly of Ontario (2006b), Windle 
(2006a), ass also: Windle (2006h), Muse (2006d).   On the informational picket and the protest, 
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Haudenosaunee Six Nations took a different approach to dealing with Canada’s long trail of 
broken promises and ongoing injustices.  In the early morning hours of February 28, 2006, after 
months of planning, members of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations entered the construction site, 
blocked off the entrances, raised the Haudenosaunee flag, declared the site “Six Nations land,” 
and dug in for a peaceful but determined fight to prevent the development that would forever 
take the land from Six Nations’ hands (Legall, 2006g & 2006l). 
     The protest set off a cascade of events. Though many non-Native residents in the area 
expected the protest to be short-lived and quickly quashed by police, police refused to move in 
on protesters until Henco Industries, Ltd., (the development company and provincially-registered 
owners of the land) obtained a court injunction (Best, 2006c; Legall, 2006d). Over the next few 
weeks the owners of the development company, Don and John Henning, obtained a series of 
court injunctions against the protesters, but many of these were not enforceable by police 
because they were merely civil orders.17
                                                                                                                                                             
see: Walkom (2006), Muse (2005a, 2005b and 2005c), Jackson (2005); Regional News (2005), 
Legall (2005). Hamilton Spectator (2006c), Best (2006e).  
 Finally, Ontario Superior Court Justice David Marshall 
17 The March 3 order was a civil injunction pending trial of the merits of the case, with the trial 
date set for March 9th (Coyle, 2006). Though many non-Natives mistook the trial date for the 
date the injunction would be enforced by police, the OPP did not and could not enforce it 
because it was a civil injunction (Legall, 2006i). On March 9th, the court issued the development 
company a permanent, interlocutory injunction, which was also a civil order (also pending trial 
of the merits of the case) rather than a criminal order, and thus the provincial police again said 
they had no authority to enforce the order, though many non-Natives expected the new trial date, 
March 16th, to be the date that protesters were cleared off the land (Canadian Press, 2006i; 
Legall, 2006j).  The March 16th trial, held on both the 16th and 17th, resulted in a criminal order, 
which set a new deadline for March 22, and would have been enforceable by the OPP, had the 
order not also contained some technical errors that prevented police from enforcing the order 
until it was corrected (more on this below). The Hennings also claimed in their injunction 
application that the blockade was causing “contract breaches with builders and interfering with 
the company’s finances,” and sued the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional 
government for $5 million in damages. (Best, 2006c). 
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awarded the Henning brothers a criminal injunction against the protesters and held a hearing to 
set penalties for protesters who violated the injunction.   
     At the beginning of the hearing, Haudenosaunee protesters requested that Judge Marshall 
(who owned several parcels of land in areas under claim by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations) 
recuse himself from the potentially precedent-setting case on the grounds that this ownership 
constituted a conflict of interest (Gamble, 2006e & 2006f; Legall, 2006h; Jackson, 2006g; Best, 
2006e).18 Marshall, however, asserted that virtually all judges in the county owned land in areas 
under Haudenosaunee claim, and noted that “[t]he land I own was acquired through the legal 
system…it’s the only legal system we have here” (Legall, 2006h).  He further argued that the 
case was not about land ownership but was about protesters’ violation of an injunction and thus 
there was no conflict of interest (Legall, 2006h; Gamble, 2006e).  Yet, as he proceeded to issue a 
criminal injunction against Haudenosaunee protesters, Judge Marshall justified his injunction by 
citing the Canadian government’s longstanding policy and practice of extinguishing Native title 
to lands –thus admitting that the case was, after all, about land.19
                                                 
18 The case was expected to set precedents in terms of how local courts would deal with land 
claim protests, but not in terms of the rights to lands, since the Supreme Court of Canada had 
already recognized that native peoples have these rights. Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest 
spokesperson, Dawn Smith, actually had three requests for Justice Marshall: First, to remove 
himself from the case based on the conflict of interest caused by his ownership of land in areas 
under Haudenosaunee claim. Second, Smith asked Marshall to recognize the Canadian 
Constitution, which gives the federal government sole jurisdiction over matters relating to 
“Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” [See section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 
1867], and to recognize Haudenosaunee sovereignty and the Haudenosaunee’s special status as 
allies of the Crown.  Third, Smith asked that Justice Marshall hear a court-recognized authority 
on Aboriginal and Six Nations’ history talk about Haudenosaunee sovereignty, the Canadian 
Constitution and Constitutional protections for First Nations land and treaty rights. 
  From his bench in a county 
19 Justice Marshall reasoned that, because of Canada’s longstanding policy and practice of 
“extinguishment” --or of refusing to recognize title to Native lands that are or are being settled 
and developed by non-Natives, and instead offering only financial compensation for these losses-
- the Haudenosaunee title would never be recognized in non-Native courtrooms and thus the 
balance of convenience” weighed in favor of the developer, who should not be caused ‘undue 
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courtroom that was, itself, build on lands under Haudenosaunee claim, Justice Marshall then 
urged the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government to move off of the site 
before they were arrested:20
I accept that you believe in your heart you’ve been treated unfairly…. I respect 
the claims but not holding Henco and buyers for ransom.  It’s my humble view 
that’s not just. It takes courage to turn and walk away, to be strong enough to turn 
and walk away. This court is asking the clan mothers, the chiefs and the Mohawks 
to turn and walk away. (Legall, 2006k; Best, 2006e) 
 
 
     Rather than heed the injunction, Haudenosaunee people strengthened their resolve and 
gathered en masse on the site for the March 22 injunction deadline.  Hundreds of Non-Native 
supporters and Native people from other Haudenosaunee and Native territories across Canada 
also arrived to support them (Legall, 2006a; Bonnell and Canadian Press, 2006c; Canadian Press, 
2006m; Gamble & Canadian Press, 2006).21
                                                                                                                                                             
inconvenience’ by a Native protest over title and rights claims that would never be realized.  In 
this reasoning, Justice Marshall entirely ignored the Canadian Supreme Court rulings mandating 
Crown consultation and accommodation with Native peoples prior to planning or undertaking 
development projects that might adversely impact outstanding Native interests on lands.  See, for 
example: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) [2004]; Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) [2004]; Mikisew Cree First 
Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) [2005]. 
  Meanwhile, local non-Native residents who 
opposed to the protest gathered around the perimeters of the protest site, standing or sitting in 
bumper-to-bumper traffic in the middle of the street, eager to witness the anticipated police 
action that would force the end of the three-week-long protest (Legall, 2006a). As police 
helicopters circled overhead, protesters and their supporters on the site locked arms, forming a 
20 Marshall’s actions are in line with observations in the Sociology of Law, and Law and Society 
literatures which note that, because of their relative privilege, at least some judges, such as US 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall, have a substantial financial stake in the outcome of some 
of their own rulings, particularly those relating to Native title.  See, for example: D’Errico 
(2000). 
21 The Hamilton Spectator reported seeing “more than 200 people” on the site, while the 
Canadian Press –via the Toronto Star and the Montreal Gazette-- reported that there were “about 
400 Indian protesters” there (not all protesters were native). The Brantford Expositor, also using 
Canadian Press reports, simplified and merely stated “hundreds.”  
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human chain against any police movement. The 2:00 P.M. deadline came and went without the 
anticipated police appearance.  Apparently the criminal injunction contained some technical 
errors,22 and the OPP --who were still coming under fire for the 1995 killing of a Native protester 
during a similar Native protest23 -- wanted to do everything strictly according their protocol.24
                                                 
22 Crown Attorney John Pearson noted that the March 17th order, which set the March 22 
deadline, erroneously stated that protesters would be fingerprinted and photographed under the 
Identification of Criminals Act, though this act could did not apply to contempt of court cases. 
After the March 22 deadline passed with no OPP enforcement of the order, the Superior Court 
Judge was asked to clarify the order by including in it both the statement that the fingerprinting 
and photographing would be done under a probation order, and the statement that protesters 
would be guilty of criminal as well as civil contempt. The order was amended on March 28. 
(See: Legall, 2006b & 2006n; Best, 2006f; Harries, 2006c; Canadian Press, 2006l; Bonnell and 
Canadian Press, 2006d; Burman, 2006b).  However, OPP officials also stated that: “The OPP 
respects the order of the court.  We're legally bound to obey the court order so we shall undertake 
our responsibilities in the safest manner possible. This is a complex issue and the safety of all 
those involved is paramount. We’re hoping for a peaceful resolution.” (Bonnell & Canadian 
Press, 2006e; Gamble and Canadian Press, 2006).  
  
23 A public inquiry into the 1995 murder of unarmed Native protester, Dudley George, was still 
ongoing in March 2006, and by this time the public inquiry had turned up substantial evidence of 
provincial government interference in police conduct. For example, the Inquiry found that 
Ontario Premier Michael Harris and his administration had attempted to influence the operations 
of the OPP by “persistently, and forcefully pushing for a quick resolution to the occupation of 
the park,” rather than following the Ontario government’s own guidelines for dealing with 
occupation protests on contested native lands –guidelines which called for patience and 
negotiation (Windle, 2006e). The Harris administration’s attempt to interfere with police 
procedures was, perhaps, most famously highlighted through testimony about a meeting Harris 
called the day before Dudley George was shot.  According to testimony of former Ontario 
Attorney General Charles Harnick, Harris had shouted to the meeting of OPP and high level 
officials: “I want those fucking Indians out of the park!”(Ibid; Bonnell and Canadian Press, 
2006b; CBC News, 2007a).  The Inquiry also round that there was a racially-charged, anti-
Native and anti-treaty rights climate in the Harris administration, as well as in the OPP.  For 
example, though the problem of unsettled Native land claims is well recognized in Canada, 
where whole government bodies have been created and funded to try to eventually resolve these 
problems, a few years before the Ipperwash conflict, Harris was quoted in a news article (entitled 
“PC leader slams do-nothing Natives”) criticizing natives who fight for their land and treaty 
rights and characterizing them as people who  “spent all their time on land claims and do nothing 
to help themselves economically.” Harris also characterized the hundreds of native land claims 
filed in Canada as mostly “unjustified.” (Windle, 2006e.). Further the Inquiry found that several 
of the OPP officers involved on duty the day unarmed non-Native protester Dudley George was 
shot and killed had referred to the protesters as “fucking Indians,” and later celebrated the death 
of Dudley George with memorabilia such as “Team Ipperwash ‘95” T-shirts and coffee mugs, 
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To this extent, OPP officers had been meeting regularly with various parties to the protest, and 
had told members of the Haudenosaunee’s traditional government, the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy Council,25
     On the same day that the police refused to enforce the criminal injunction against the 
protesters, the owners of Henco Industries, Ltd., brothers Don and John Henning, ran a full-page 
advertisement in several local papers pleading with the public to pressure the Ministry of Indian 
and Northern Affairs to step in to resolve the dispute (Henco Indstries, Ltd., 2006; Hennings, 
2006a, 2006b & 2006c). In their advertisement, the brothers reasserted that they had “done 
nothing wrong or illegal”(Legall, 2006g; Canadian Press, 2006h), that they had had no previous 
 that no move would be made against the protesters on this day (Muse, 
2006e.  See also: Legall, 2006o; Best, 2006c; Muse, 2006d; Windle & Muse 2006).   
                                                                                                                                                             
which used symbols depicting dead native warriors. (Canadian Press, 2006j). On OPP officers 
referring to native protesters as “Fucking Indians,”see: Canadian Press (2006q). 
24 OPP protocol calls for seeking a peaceful, negotiated resolution to Native land claims protests, 
and exhausting all peaceful options first, before making a show of force to remove protesters 
(see, for example: Bonokoski, 2006; Edwards, 2006b; Bowen, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006k; 
Ontario Provincial Police, N.d.).  Though the OPP had a protocol, or “game plan,” in place to 
negotiate a peaceful resolution to the Ipperwash Provincial Park protest, several top officers 
apparently did not follow this protocol: negotiators were not prepared or sent in to talk to the 
protesters (Bonokoski, 2006), and officers leading the OPP’s special unit, the Emergency 
Response Team (ERT), were recorded on two different days prior to the shooting stating that 
they wanted to: “amass a fucking army.  A real fucking army and do this.  Do these fuckers big 
time.” (Edwards, 2006b).  Officers were also accused of creating a “made-up emergency” both in 
response to mounting pressure from non-Native cottagers (Edwards, 2006b; Bowen, 2006) and in 
order to justify violating the protocol and moving in to “do” the protesters.  [On accusations that 
the OPP made up an emergency to justify moving in against the protesters, see: Canadian Press 
(2006k).  Bowen (2006) also reported on the same “emergency” incident reported in Canadian 
Press (2006k), but does not mention the accusations that this incident was “made-up” for the 
purpose of justifying the move on protesters (nor does he mention that the officer in charge of 
ordering the move did not have evidence to back up the “made-up emergency”).] 
25 Hereinafter also referred to as the Confederacy Council or the Confederacy Chiefs.  The 
Haudenosaunee Clan Mothers, or simply Clan Mothers, also have an important leadership role in 
this traditional government. 
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knowledge of any objections to their development,26 and that they were being unfairly “held 
hostage” by a “splinter group” of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations who were jeopardizing their 
business (Henco Industries Limited, 2006; Henning, 2006b & c).27 Though the brothers’ claims 
to having no previous knowledge of Haudenosaunee objections were not entirely honest,28 the 
brothers were certainly well-justified in their frustrations with protest and the absence of federal 
involvement in seeking a resolution to it.  Others, including the Haldimand County Council 
(Best, 2006e),29 the Caledonia Chamber of Commerce,30 the Haudenosaunee protesters31
                                                 
26 From the start of the protest, the owners of Henco Industries, Ltd., Don and John Henning, had 
insisted that they had no previous knowledge of any objections to their development by the 
Haudensoaunee Six Nations. For example, Don Henning stated in an affidavit that Henco 
Industries Inc. had notified the Band Council when submitting (to Haldimand County) their 2003 
draft plan for the subdivision and “had received no objections.” (Quoting the Spectator’s 
paraphrase of the affidavit. Hamilton Spectator, 2006c).  "As a result,” Hennings affidavit 
continued, “the Douglas Creek Estates plan of subdivision was approved." (Ibid). The brothers 
also maintained that they had no knowledge or notice of Haudenosaunee problems with the 
development when they started construction in October 2005, or even when their final 
subdivision plan was approved (by the county) and circulated to the Six Nations Band Council in 
December 2005 (Best, 2006c). 
 and the 
27 The company had already put $6 million into the development at this point, and had also 
already sold six of the ten houses that were partially constructed on the site. (Best, 2006c; Legall, 
2006c & d).  
28 The Hennings’ claims of innocence/naïveté received considerable media coverage, and 
dominated press narratives of the protest.  Yet, another version of the story that got occasional 
media coverage painted a very different picture of the Henning’s knowledge of objections to 
their development.  For example, Native protest spokespeople had insisted from day one that the 
Hennings had known about the outstanding Haudenosaunee claims on the land and about 
Haudenosaunee objections to the development (Windle, 2006h), and a news article revealed 
letters written to the Hennings in 2005, which corresponded with Haudenosaunee pickets and 
protests near the site before the start of construction (Hamilton Spectator, 2006c).  At these 
protests and pickets, the Hennings or their employees were unwilling to talk with 
Haudenosaunee women about Haudenosaunee claims, had told these women that there was 
nothing they could do to stop the development, and had even reportedly kicked dirt on the 
women and told them to “bring it on.”  As Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill stated: “And so our 
people brought it on” (Ahooja, 2008b). 
29 The council also passed two resolutions, one requesting provincial help with future 
development, and one requesting federal help on resolving the long-term issues (Regional News, 
2006b). 
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Haudenosaunee Clan Mothers (Rotinoshon’non:we, 2006) shared these frustrations and made 
similar pleas to the public to pressure the federal government to resolve the land claims dispute. 
     Despite these pleas, since the start of the dispute federal officials had denied any 
responsibility in resolving the matter, and had presented several conflicting stories allegedly 
supporting this denial.32
                                                                                                                                                             
30 The plea of the Caledonia Chamber of Commerce actually asked for a “quick, permanent 
resolution to the issue in town,” (the quote is a paraphrase of the Chamber’s press release as 
described in: Jackson, 2006f) in a press release which stated: “The Chamber’s concern is on 
behalf of the business community.  The real estate market, general business trade and 
employment loss are being affected as a result of this interruption to an otherwise healthy 
economy,” (Ibid). 
  The fact that the Canadian Constitution Acts of 1867 and 1982 both 
31 For example, protester Wes Elliott told the Dunnville Chronicle that neighbors of Six Nations 
should call their federal representative, MP Diane Finley and insist that she tell the Canadian 
government to step in and start working to resolve outstanding land claims in the area: “The only 
viable solution is for them to apply pressure to their government.  Everyone who sits on our land 
are our neighbours.  Anything that they can do to help will be greatly appreciated.” (Best, 
2006b).   
32 For example, around March 8, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada communications officer 
Brock Worobel stated that the agency could not get involved in the protest because it was related 
to a land claim that was also the subject of ongoing litigation between the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations and the Canadian and Ontario governments (the Haudenosaunee Six Nations’ litigation 
against the latter governments was merely asking for an accounting of what happened to 
Haudenosaunee lands, resources and trust funds, but this litigation had been put on hold in 
2004/2005).  As such, Worobel suggested that the Ontario Provincial Police were the appropriate 
authorities to resolve the protest. (On the March 8 statements of Brock Worobel, see: Best, 
2006c; Jackson, 2006h; Muse, 2006d). Around March 15th, another spokesperson for the federal 
Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice acknowledged that Prentice knew the protest revolved 
around a land claim, but then characterized the protest as a “local dispute” between the developer 
and the protesters, and said the federal agency had no intention of getting involved. (“We don’t 
have a direct role in a protest such as this.  We don’t play a part in the protest itself, which is 
between the protesters and the developer,” that would have to be resolved by the developer and 
“the group of Six Nations activists occupying”) [Quoted in: Legall, 2006e; Muse, 2006h; 
Canadian Press, 2006i).  By April 7, the federal Minister of Indian Affairs was insisting that the 
dispute was not related to a land claim at all (“This isn’t a land-claims matter.  The actual root of 
the problem is not a land claim.  For the time being, it’s a protest”), and federal spokesperson 
Deirdre McCracken told reporters that the protest “has nothing to do with the federal 
government,” and “is really under the jurisdiction of the province.” (quoted from: Fragomeni, 
2006).  Meanwhile, the federal Member of Parliament for the area, Diane Finely, had originally 
told reporters that she could not get involved because the protest was a matter for Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada.  Eventually Finely changed her excuse, citing ongoing litigation 
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place land claims and all matters pertaining to “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” under 
the sole jurisdiction of the federal government33 did little to influence either the federal 
government or the provincial court judge who asserted his authority over the protest (this will be 
discussed further in chapter 4).  Yet, by the time the March 22nd deadline had come and gone 
with no police movement, the mounting pressure was apparently enough to force some moderate 
movement on the part of the federal government.  On March 23rd
     Though some non-Natives referred to the University of Western Ontario Assistant Professor 
of Law, Michael Coyle, as a mediator or a rescuer (Legall, 2006i & 2006n; Canadian Press, 
2006f & 2006u; Burman, 2006a; Hamilton Spectator, 2006d; Regional News, 2006a), Coyle had 
been given neither meditation nor decision-making power in his appointment,
, though still denying all 
responsibility for resolving the dispute, the federal government appointed a federal fact-finder to 
the dispute with the mandate to  “investigate the nature of grievances, identify the jurisdictional 
implications and explore the possibility of mediations” to bring about en end to the protest 
(Legal, 2006i; Coyle, 2006; Best, 2006b; S. Smith, 2006a). 
34
                                                                                                                                                             
instead, but by that time the federal agencies had already abandoned that justification, claiming 
the dispute was a local matter.  On federal MP Diane Finely referring the matter to Jim Prentice’ 
office (the INAC), see: Muse (2006d & 2006h). On federal MP Diane Finley’s office citing court 
(and potential police) involvement as the reason for her lack of involvement, see: Best (2006e). 
 as the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council knew too well.  Thus, while Confederacy Council Chiefs 
welcomed what they said was a positive first step by the federal government, they also noted that 
all facts in the conflict had already been known by Ottawa for the past 300 years and that it was 
time the federal government send someone with real decision-making power to engage in 
33 See section 91(24) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1867.  Only the federal government can 
resolve Native land claims. 
34 Coyle did have extensive mediation experience, and experience with First Nations issues.  This 
experience –often cited by Coyle and by news articles—may have added to some of the 
confusion as to what Coyle was actually sent to do. (Legall, 2006i; Best, 2006b). On Coyle’s 
mandate, see: Coyle (2006), Best (2006b), S. Smith (2006a), Harries (2006b). 
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meaningful talks with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations traditional government to resolve the issue 
(Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy Council, 2006cMarion & Canadian Press, 
2006; Smith, 2006a; Best, 2006b; Burman, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006f).35
     Reaffirming their resolve to support the protest until this happened,
   
36 Confederacy Chiefs and 
Clan Mothers standing on the steps of the Onondaga longhouse read to the media their response 
letter to fact finder Michael Coyle, laying out a short list of four items that, if agreed to by the 
federal government, would immediately end the protest by: 1) placing a moratorium on all new 
development on lands under Haudenosaunee claim until these land claims were resolved; 2) 
ending the criminalization of Haudenosaunee protesters who were merely fighting to protect 
their land, resource and treaty rights;37
                                                 
35 “Our neighbours want the Canadian government to act. We want the Canadian government to 
act.… We believe the federal government has the power to end this dispute today. We believe 
there is a solution that is in Canada's power to iron out….” (Best, 2006b; Marion & Canadian 
Press, 2006).  Haldimand County Councilmember Buck Sloat made a similar criticism regarding 
the federal government’s search for facts it had already known for centuries.  However, 
according to Sloat, the Haudenosaunee protest was illegal, the protests were criminally 
trespassing on the developers’ land and interfering with his access to property, and the police 
needed to end the protest immediately. (Best, 2006b). 
 3) ending the “self-dealing,” i.e., the negotiations between 
36 “I’ve been so troubled about what’s going on all around us,” one Clan Mother stated, referring 
to development on lands claimed by the Haudenosaunee. (Bernice Johnson, quoted in Best, 
2006b).   Another Clan Mother noted that the Haudenosaunee had no choice but to continue the 
protest “or we’re lost again,” (Unnamed Clan Mother, quoted in: S. Smith, 2006a).  On this 
point, see also: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy Council (2006c), Marion & 
Canadian Press (2006), Burman (2006a).  Marion (IBID) pointed out that the gathering of Chiefs 
and Clan Mothers was not a full expression of the Confederacy Council.  Chiefs and Clan 
Mothers present represented various clans of the Mohawk, Cayuga and Onondaga nations, and 
those present were also likely those who had been in support of the protest consistently since the 
beginning, and had been present on the protest site.   
37 “Our people down there are not criminals and the police know this.  We hope the federal 
government orders the police to disengage… Our people don’t want to see violence.  We don’t 
want this thing to escalate any further…  If Ottawa committed to a moratorium on construction, 
those people would be happy to leave.” (Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, quoted in several 
different sources (with a few slight variations in the exact wording of the statement.  One source 
said: “our people” and “police understand this,” while another source said “those people” and 
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the federal government and the Six Nations Band Council, a federally created, funded and 
colonially-imposed body of government opposed by the majority of the Haudenosaunee 
people;38 and 4) re-entering into an ongoing relationship with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
Confederacy Council and honor commitments made by the Crown centuries ago through the 
Two Row Wampum treaty agreement (Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy 
Council, 2006c).39
The Confederacy Council is not a splinter group or a special interest group.  We 
are the government of Six Nations: We hold these treaties and lands in our 
jurisdiction.  Canada has the ability to end this now --they've had the ability for 
300 years. We the Chiefs are sending this message back with Mr. Coyle, that the 
development of our land in Caledonia must stop and that talks between the federal 
government and the Confederacy Chiefs [must start] not only over this dispute, 
but over what has happened to our lands and trust fund. Canada must come to the 
table with people mandated to make decisions, not fact finding.  Our people have 
been waiting for 300 years.  Our neighbors are waiting and need their government 
to act (Smith, 2006a
  Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton clarified for the media the role of the 




     The suggestion of a moratorium on construction, coupled with the unexpected staying power 
of the protest, began to send ripples of panic and anger through Caledonia --particularly among 
those who worked in the real estate, investment and construction industries. Perhaps in response 
                                                                                                                                                             
“the police know this.”  One other source, still, said “the OPP understand this.”).  (Marion & 
Canadian Press, 2006; Best, 2006b; Burman, 2006a). 
38 “The community is against the elected council dealing with land claims.  But that is who 
Ottawa deals with.”  [Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill, quoted in:  Burman, 2006a; Best, 2006b 
(says community opposition was “overhwhelmingly opposed”); Smith, 2006a].  And, on the 
appointment of fact finder Michael Coyle, Hill also noted the “insulting overtones when the 
federal government continues to recognize only its Indian Affairs [colonially-imposed] band 
council.  While it sends Mr. Coyle back to us, Canada continues its talks on our land with the 
band council and the province” (Quoted in: Smith, 2006a.  See also: Burman, 2006a; Marion & 
Canadian Press, 2006). 
39 The Two Row Wampum is a treaty of peace, respect, friendship and non-interference.  
According to the treaty, the British ship and the Haudenosuanee canoe would travel the river of 
life together along parallel lines, side by side, never touching, never crossing, but willing to help 
each other as friends.  In the treaty, the Haudenosaunee agreed never to attempt to steer the 
British ship, and the British agreed never to attempt to steer the Haudenosaunee canoe. 
 31 
to this escalating anxiety, a few high profile non-Natives intensified their own demands 
regarding the end of the protest.  Haldimand County Councilmember Buck Sloat condemned the 
protesters’ interference in the Henning’s access to their property and demanded police act to 
immediately end the protest.  In a similar vein, the Henning’s lawyer confidently announced to 
the media that this newly-revised injunction40 would be enforced by police “immediately” 
(Legall, 2006b).41  These escalations in official demands, as well as in the power and authority 
presumed by local officials making them, again raised expectations among non-Native residents 
who opposed the protest.  Though OPP officials were still voicing their intent to follow their 
protocol by pursuing dialogue, safety, and a peaceful resolution to the conflict rather than 
confrontation and force, 42
                                                 
40 The revised injunction was issued on March 28, the day after the Haudenosaunee press 
conference. For more on this, see the above discussion and notes, or see: Best (2006f), Harries 
(2006c), Canadian Press (2006l), Bonnell and Canadian Press (2006d), Legall (2006n), Burman 
(2006b), Smith (2006a) Marion & Canadian Press (2006).   On Judge Marshall being “irate” or 
“peeved” see: Legall (2006b) Canadian Press (2006l).   
 area non-Natives again gathered en masse in a nearby parking lot to 
watch what they expected to be a forced end to the protest (Windle, 2006f; Greenberg, 2006a). 
41 However,  Harries (2006c) quotes the Hennings lawyer, Micahel Bruder, as stating that the 
order would be enforced “as soon as reasonably practical,”-a much more reasonable assertion, 
given the OPP’s emphasize on dialogue and a peaceful resolution. 
42 For example: “We are progressing, and as long as we’re talking, that’s positive.  We’re hoping 
the work we’re doing behind the scenes is going to be effective.  We’re pleased that everyone is 
allowing us the opportunity to bring this to a peaceful resolution” (Brantford Expositor, 2006d; 
Healey & Morse, 2006).  “[W]hat we need people to do and what we really try to express here is 
that we need their understanding, we need them to be patient, cooperative, and understand that 
not only are we working towards the peaceful resolution but one that is long lasting” (Jackson, 
2006j). And: “It’s safe to say the OPP continues to learn, develop and grow with the needs of our 
communities in a manner that is conducive to being respectful to everybody involved…  
Although this (standoff) is staged in Caledonia, it has wide reaching ramifications.  We want to 
make sure we’re doing everything appropriately and that every avenue is explored.” (OPP 
Sergeant Dave Recktor, from “It’s safe” to “Caledonia” was quoted in: Healey & Morse, 2006.  
From “it has wide” to “explored,” was quoted in Jackson, 2006j). See also: Bonnell, Gregory & 
Canadian Press, 2006d; Jackson, 2006f; Legall, 2006n; Brantford Expositor, 2006d; Ontario 
Provincial Police, 2006a; L. Greenberg, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006u; Morse, 2006b; Healey & 
Morse.  2006; Jackson, 2006j.   
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“It might get a little rough,” said one non-Native resident, adding that he hoped the protesters did 
not have weapons (Windle, 2006f). However, instead of the expected show of force, what they 
witnessed was a verbal standoff with the local sheriff who came to read the court injunction to 
the protesters. As the sheriff read the court injunction, some protesters read their own counter-
injunction while others drummed loudly in the background, resulting in what one reporter called 
“an unintelligible jumble of verbiage” (Ibid). 
     After the March 22
 After the readings, both sides attempted to give the 
other side copies of their order, and both sides refused to take the orders of the other side. At 
least one protester made an obscene gesture towards the sheriff, and as the latter departed the 
scene, copies of both orders lay scattered on the ground, stomped on by one protester and lit on 
fire by another (the fire quickly smoldered out) (Legall, 2006m; Windle, 2006f; Burman, 2006b; 
Greenberg, 2006a; Canadian Press, 2006u).  
nd public appeal by the Hennings, there was a change began in the media 
coverage of the protest.  Prior to this date, media coverage primarily focused on positive stories 
about the protest and its supporters, but after this date considerably more coverage focused on 
sensationalizing the potentially threatening aspects of the protest,43 such as through playing upon 
stereotypes of Native warrior societies, whose members began arriving on the site.44
                                                 
43 Prior to this date, only a minority of news outlets –in particular the local Regional News—had 
expressed decidedly anti-protest views.  Most local newspapers had continued to portray the 
protest in a sympathetic light and, when dealing with non-Native views at all, had focused on 
profiling non-Natives who expressed these sympathetic views. Though many news accounts still 
remained sympathetic to the protest immediately after this date, anti-protest views increasingly 
trickled into the media coverage.  
 This shift in 
44 Most non-Natives in Canada have only negative associations with Native warrior societies 
(which are often compared to the Hell’s Angels or gangs).  Non-Natives are not entirely without 
reason for having these associations as, in the past, some Native warriors had engaged in 
activities that were less than peaceful, and were in some cases outright destructive for Native 
communities in which they operated.  This was the case in Akwesasne in the late 1980s when 
wealthy non-Natives (including the governor of New York State at the time) had joined together 
with a few Akwesasne Mohawks to forcibly establish gambling venues on the Akwesasne 
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media coverage became even more perceptible after the verbal standoff with the sheriff on 
March 30th, which was broadcast into the homes of residents throughout the area and treated as 
evidence that the protest had become militant and confrontational.45  Some media outlets adopted 
both the language of victimization and the factual misrepresentation that had been prominent in 
the Henning’s public appeal.  As such, these media reports characterized the protesters as a 
disorganized, leader-less group of people who could not be satisfied.  These reports often argued 
that protesters should thus “pack it in while they’re ahead,” instead of unfairly continuing to 
punish the Hennings, who had (allegedly) already consulted with the Six Nations Band Council46
                                                                                                                                                             
reserve.  Gambling on the reserve went against the wishes of the traditional government and a 
large portion of the reserve population. As the latter struggled to prevent monied non-Natives 
and their Native partners from establishing casinos and other gambling venues on-reserve, 
Natives invested in the establishment of gambling venues formed warrior societies which 
resorted to patrolling streets in heavily armed motorcades, intimidating those who spoke out 
against the gambling venues, chasing large numbers of people from their homes on the reserve, 
and engaging in shootouts with those who remained until at least two people were dead as a 
result. Many of these same Mohawk warriors later arrived –armed-- at Oka, where they 
reportedly promoted their own agenda at the expense of the Native people who were already 
peacefully protesting against non-Native encroachment on Mohawk lands (non-Natives wanted 
to expand a golf course onto the Mohawk’s land, which also contained a Mohawk burial ground) 
(George-Kanentiio, 2006; Johansen, 1993).  Most non-Natives in Caledonia and throughout 
Canada only knew of Native warriors from these militant actions, as well as from the 1995 
standoff in Ipperwash Provincial Park (which was widely and knowingly misrepresentated by the 
news media as an armed conflict, though all of the Native protesters in the park were unarmed) 
(Orkin, 2003). 
 
“as part of a three-year planning process” (see for example: Brantford Expositor, 2006b).  Other 
news articles played with the wording they used to describe the peaceful protest.  For example, 
45 The shift in reporting was based on a real shift in dynamics at the protest site.  For example, 
even some of the original Haudenosaunee protesters voiced concern with the escalation of verbal 
confrontation on the March 30th verbal standoff with the local sheriff.  And while some 
protesters dismissed this as a show for the cameras, at least one took this as his cue to exit the 
protest, stating: “I’ve been here from the beginning and I can’t do this.  I’m outta here” (Wes 
Elliot, quoted in: Windle, 2006f). 
46 The Six Nations Band Council is the federally-created, funded and controlled governing body 
of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations –i.e., the colonially imposed governing body.  This will be 
discussed further later in the chapter. The assertion that the Hennings had consulted with the 
Band Council is simply untrue. 
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though all of the residents interviewed in one news article had admitted that the protest had been 
peaceful, the reporter described it as a “military encampment preparing for battle,” and quoted 
confused residents who could not understand why the police had not yet cleared the site.  The 
same reporter also emphasized that the protest was frustrating, inconveniencing, and negatively 
impacting non-Native residents living near the site, and even allegedly preventing one resident 
from selling her home (Legall, 2006f).  
     This shift in reporting captured numerous voices of non-Native opponents to the protest –
voices that had previously been virtually ignored in all but perhaps one local weekly paper.47
Contrary to some protesters' beliefs, they are subject to the laws of Canada. Just 
ask any of the natives currently serving time in Canada's prisons. (Lupton, 2006) 
  
For example, one resident countered Haudenosaunee claims to sovereignty by stating: 
 
Another resident, in keeping with the escalation in demands by local officials, argued that the 
protesters were receiving special treatment for being allowed to stay on the protest site and, like 
county councilmember Buck Sloat, demanded that police “Get them out now.  Do it peacefully if 
they will allow it, but get them out!” (Lupton, 2006).  Though residents were in many ways 
helpless to end the protest, some residents began to demonstrate their opposition to the protest in 
other ways: around this time Haudenosuanee people began reporting that derogatory statements 
and discriminatory behavior were directed towards them by some non-Native business owners in 
Caledonia, a few of whom even reportedly refused to serve Native customers.  Some non-Native 
residents of Caledonia even organized to boycott businesses that continued to serve Native 
people (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a; Interviews with Caledonia and Six Nations residents, 
2009).  All of these discriminatory actions and behaviors eventually led to a Haudenosuanee 
                                                 
47 The Regional News had consistently voiced anti-protest (and even outright anti-Native) views. 
 35 
boycott of Caledonia businesses, as well as a non-Native boycott of local business that served 
Natives (Muse, 2006i; Interviews with Caledonia and Six Nations residents, 2009).  
     Non-Native responses to the protest will be more thoroughly explored in Chapter 6.  What is 
important to note here is that, though there had, from the very start, been a constant, simmering 
of non-Native opposition to the protest (as well as some outright anti-Native sentiment), it did 
not start to emerge in the media –or in the solidified actions of non-Native residents-- until after 
the verbal showdown between the protesters and the local sheriff and, perhaps more importantly, 
after the Haudensoaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council’s request for a moratorium on 
development on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim.  After this request, the already escalating 
sense of urgency among non-Native residents escalated to new heights (see for example: 
Brantford Expositor, 2006a; Jackson, 2006j).  The request reminded residents invested in real 
estate, construction or financial investment industries, as well as residents who had banked their 
futures upon the predicted rapid growth of Caledonia,48 that there was more than just a 40-acre 
tract of land at stake.  The Haudenosaunee had filed claims on the lands up and down the Grand 
River. “The whole town is ours,” noted one protester referring to the fact that the town of 
Caledonia had been built on lands under Haudenosaunee claim (Janie Jamieson, quoted in 
Greenberg, 2006a).49
                                                 
48 As noted above, Caledonia was supposed to be the fastest growing community in southern 
Ontario, with residential development as the single largest industry in the area (Best, 2006a).  
ON resident’s expectations for, and financial investments in this rapid growth, see chapter 6. 
 Further, combined with the staying power of protesters and the inaction by 
provincial police, the request also infused the protesters’ demands with a new seriousness that 
had previously not been considered by most non-Native residents.  As one protester noted of this 
staying power:   
49 Statement by protest spokesperson Janie Jamieson, quoted in: Greenberg (2006a).  On 
increased alarm among non-Natives, see: Brantford Expositor (2006a); Jackson, 2006j.   
 36 
We plan to maintain the site until we get what we want… It’s not about the 
money.  It’s about the land.  We want the land back six miles on each side of the 
Grand River from the mouth to the source….  First and foremost, we want the 




     Intent on making sure that the Confederacy Council did not succeed in its call for a 
moratorium on all new development in the area,51 and that the protesters did not succeed in 
stopping the Henning’s subdivision,52
                                                 
50 Meanwhile, as the protest remained unarmed, peaceful and mellow --but unmoved by court 
injunctions or the threat of arrest—the demands of the protesters had become slightly more 
militant and had begun to take on a new level of seriousness. One protester explained to the 
media that he was willing to die in the protest and that police would have to kill him and take 
him out in a body bag to remove him. Reflecting on his anxiety with the situation and his 
readiness for the worst case scenario, he added: “Sometimes I hope it doesn’t end violently, 
sometimes I hope it does.  At least it would be finished and we cold show we are ready to do 
what we have to do.” On the protest being described as peaceful and mellow (by protest 
spokesperson Janie Jamieson), see: Brantford Expositor (2006c). On the protest being unarmed 
see: Greenberg (2006b). On statements by protester Michael Laughing, reported as one or more 
of the following: that he was willing to die, that police would have to kill him to remove him, or 
that he would only be taken out in a body bag, see: Legall (2006f & 2006m), Jackson (2006j), 
Healey & Morse (2006), Nolan (2006b). 
 non-Natives in the construction, real estate, and financial 
investment industries quickly raised the alarm among other residents, handing out flyers 
declaring: “If this situation is not resolved quickly we could all be looking at significant 
decreases in our property values.” The flyers urged residents to pressure their elected officials to 
pay the Hennings and other “builders, trades men and home owners a monthly stipend until the 
situation is resolved,” and also urged them to attend a counter-protest rally which sought to 
guarantee the survival of the residential development industry in town (Best, 2006a; Pearce, 
2006a).  Several hundred residents heeded the call to rally with the Hennings and other local 
51 For example, Haldimand County Councilor Craig Ashbaugh stated outright that: “a 
moratorium on development cannot be allowed.”  Ashbaugh, quoted in: Best (2006a).   
52 Something that, anti-protest residents argued, would set a bad precedent for development (on 
Haudenosaunee lands) in the area.  To this extent, real estate business owner Bruce MacDonald, 
noted that the protesters’ demands “would indicate that all lands [in the Haldimand tract] are 
subject to their interference.”  MacDonald, talking to Best on April 4 and quoted in: Best 
(2006a). 
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business owners, and showed up to the rally holding signs stating: “We want our town back,” 
“Put an end to this now,” and “Municipal, Provincial, Federal Do Something.” As they gathered, 
local real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy emphatically and confidently (though also incorrectly) 
announced to the crowd that the Haudenosuanee lands under protest had “absolutely” been 
surrendered in 1841, and claimed that both the protest and the police failure to remove the 
protesters were flagrant violations of the law: 53
The laws are being flagrantly violated…. There’s a need to bring this to an end 
and to bring it to an end promptly…. The law of the land has to be enforced….  
This land belongs to Henco Industries Ltd.  Nobody has the right to interfere with 
it. (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a) 
 
 
These statements were given an additional boost of legitimacy the following day when 
Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer uncritically --and incorrectly-- reasserted them, stating 
decisively that “there’s no doubt” that the lands under protest had been obtained legally by the 
Canadian government, and adding: “I guess the Natives are not believing anyone or anything” 
(Pearce, 2006a).54
                                                 
53 Estimating 250 residents in attendance: (Bauslaugh, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a). Estimating 300: 
(Windle, 2006b; Smith, 2006b).  On estimates of 500: (Fragomeni, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006o; 
Graham and Canadian Press, 2006t; Graham, 2006).  Nolan (2006c) says “ a few hundred,” but 
notes that rally organizer Jamie McMaster estimated that 500 people attended.   
   
     On messages on protest signs, see: Nolan (2006c) and Baughslaugh (2006a).  On demands 
that the protesters be removed by force and/or complaints of falling property values or a hurt 
town image, see: Pearce (2006a), Baughslaugh (2006a), and Nolan (2006c).  On McCarthy being 
a real estate lawyer --rather than a lawyer who deals with treaty or First Nations’ issues (a fact 
that was not reported in the first several articles that quoted him)-- see: Macleod (2006).  On 
McCarthy’s insistence that the land was surrendered in 1841, see, in addition to above citations: 
Pearce (2006a) Nolan (2006c), Baughslaugh (2006a), Windle (2006b).  
54 In this same article the mayor complained about the existence of “four different factions of 
natives that have to be consulted,” and voiced her concern about potential protester violence, see: 
Baughslaugh (2006a).  The mayor also escalated her public statements on the protest after her 
mid-May meeting with Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice.  Before the meeting, though Trainer 
had uncritically adopted every bit of rhetoric opposing the Haudenosaunee protest, she had also 
maintained that a peaceful, negotiated resolution would be the best outcome because “When it’s 
finally come to a conclusion, they (the natives) are still going to be my neighbours and my 
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     Despite widespread and growing opposition to the Confederacy Council’s demands among 
area non-Natives, a series of meetings aimed at ending the protest were finally opened to the 
Confederacy Council and Haudenosaunee protesters on April 12 (McKay, Nelson and Nolan, 
2006; Canadian Press-CTV Toronto, 2006; Livingston, 2006; Burman, Macleod and Nolan, 
2006; Harries, 2006d; Windle & Van Every, 2006). This marked the first time that the federal 
and provincial governments had sat at the same table with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
Confederacy Council since the Canadian government had outlawed the latter and imposed a 
colonial Band Council system of government upon the Haudenosaunee Six Nations people in 
1924.55  Regardless of this historical first, Canadian and Ontario officials, and even Band 
Council Chief David General, completely ignored the Confederacy Council’s suggestions for 
ending the protest (see Appendix 1 for a list of the proposals made by each government at this 
meeting)56
                                                                                                                                                             
friends and their grandchildren will go to school with my grandchildren” [Trainer, quoted in: 
Pearce, (2006a)]. She had also adamantly advocated federal involvement in resolving the protest, 
responding to assertions by federal officials that the protest was not a federal matter by stating 
that “Everything to do with natives has to do with the federal government.  The natives don’t 
want to leave until they are assured something will happen with their land claim” (Fragomeni, 
2006; Canadian Press, 2006n).  However, the mayor emerged from her meeting with Prentice 
asserting her agreement with Prentice’s position to not deal with  “the radicals (in the 
subdivision) out there” (Best, 2006g): 
 until several days later when the Six Nations Band Council voted seven to five to 
If you go out and deal with the Mohawks or the ones causing this problem from all 
across Canada, you’re just giving them more power, so there’s no way anyone is going 
to deal with them.  The minister made it quite clear and I have to agree, you can’t deal 
with the radicals that are out there. (Quoted in: Jackson, 2006k). 
55 This will be discussed further below. 
56 In fact, these three governments failed to discuss the protest at all, and ignored all of the 
Confederacy Council’s attempts to do so.  One Band Council member, Helen Miller, remarked 
upon this, voicing her frustrations as well as the likely frustrations of others attending the 
meetings: 
I came to these meetings thinking we were here to discuss how to resolve the 
occupation.  Our chief General presented a paper that council didn’t discuss, approve 
and had no knowledge of until late Monday night.  Yesterday we dealt with that paper, 
today I was waiting for us to come back with ideas on how to end the protest.  Not once, 
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transfer the lead in talks to the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council57 –the only council with the 
ability to end the protest.  Yet, even with the lead officially transferred to the Confederacy 
Council, the Canadian and Ontario governments refused to respond to any of the Confederacy 
Council’s suggestions for ending the protest58
                                                                                                                                                             
yesterday or today, were the people on the site even mentioned, or any concern shown 
about their safety. I wanted to stop the OPP from going in….  There were some good 
things in the paper that Dave developed.  But it’s not going to help get people off that 
site. The government paper is not going to get people off that site.   They have put the 
onus on the Confederacy and Six Nations Council and have taken themselves out of the 
picture when they’re the only ones that can bring and end to it.  I don’t want anyone’s 
blood on my hands (Band Councilor Helen Miller, quoted in: Windle & Van Every, 
2006). 
 and, instead, focused solely on the suggestions 
See also: Windle & Van Every, 2006; Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy. 
2006a; Harries, 2006d; Jackson, 2006e; McKay, Nelson and Nolan, 2006. The actual, April 13th 
Draft proposal has not been located to date, but a letter from Jim Prentice outlining some of the 
Drafts’ points has.  See: Canada, Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 
2006. Also giving a summary of what was contained in the federal and provincial, joint Draft 
proposal: Harries (2006d).  See also: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy. 
2006a; General, 2006.  
57 Windle & Van Every, 2006. To this extent, Band Council Chief David General drafted a letter 
to the Canadian and Ontario governments stating that the Band Council wanted the INAC to 
recognize the lead of the Confederacy Council, and that the Band Council would continue to play 
a supportive role.  In addition, the letter stated that the Band Council supported the suggestions 
voiced by the Confederacy Council both in the meetings and in the March 27th letter, and wanted 
the federal and provincial governments to respond to these suggestions. However, the letter also 
stated that David General’s Draft Terms for a New Understanding Among Six Nations, Canada 
and Ontario should be “honoured and form the basis of ongoing talks surrounding the resolution 
of the activities at Douglas Creek Estates” –something that completely contradicted the assertion 
that the Band Council was giving the Confederacy Council the lead in the negotiations (Since 
David General’s Draft Terms document completely ignored all of the suggestions raised by the 
Confederacy Council as issues that, if addressed, would end the protest.  See: Six Nations Band 
Council, 2006. Also see: Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006a. 
58 For example, Confederacy attempts to meet the three non-Native governments part-way on the 
request for a moratorium, by requesting either a temporary, 90-day moratorium on only the 
Douglas Creek lands, or a moratorium “until there are reasonable negotiations going on,” were 
simply ignored or refused, as were Confederacy attempts to broker a deal on the second request –
a promise from Canada and Ontario that the protesters would not be criminalized for asserting 
their land, treaty and self-governance rights.  On this latter request, the Confederacy had been 
willing to meet the government part way by simply asking for either a temporary (90-day) stand 
down by police, in order to give all the parties time to negotiate a peaceful end to the protest; or 
by requesting simply that the Attorney General intervene to ensure that the judge heard the 
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that Band Council Chief David General had made (which had nothing to do with ending the 
protest at all59).  Not surprisingly, these talks quickly broke down.60
                                                                                                                                                             
historical and legal arguments on the matter that had not yet been heard. Both of these offers 
were refused, with both Canada and Ontario stating that they did not want to interfere in ‘police 
business’ –a position which clearly sought to confine the protest over violations of Six Nations’ 
rights and Canadian Supreme Court rulings (which went well beyond the jurisdiction of local or 
provincial police) to a mere case of local trespassing (with a clearly one-sided and historical 
view of who was doing the trespassing). (Muse, 2006b).  On the offers of placing only a 90-day 
moratorium on development and a 90-day order for the OPP to stand down, see: Best (2006d), 
who also reports that neither government was willing to follow the Confederacy’s suggestion to 
compensate the developers.  Also see: Indian Country Today, (2006).  On the federal 
government’s refusal to accept, acknowledge or consider these options, see, in addition to 
sources cited above: Muse, 2006b; Windle & Van Every, 2006; Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
“Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006b; Windle, 2006i; Gamble, 2006a.   
  
59 See Appendix One.  Further many items in the federal and provincial proposals that came 
closest to satisfying the Haudensoaunee grievances –such as working to resolve Haudenosaunee 
land claims or returning lands taken from the Haudenosaunee-- were either not defined 
concretely or came with subtle catches. For example, these two governments promised to 
commit to having talks about these items (or the possibility of these items), without defining 
when talks would take place, what, concretely, these talks hoped to achieve, and how quickly Six 
Nations community members could expect to see results.  And given Canada’s tendency to drag 
out land claims for, on average, two or more decades, these vague commitments really couldn’t 
mean that much without being more defined in these ways. (See: Muse, 2006b).  And Further, 
the provincial government’s ‘commitment to engage in talks’ around the ‘possibility’ of making 
certain provincially-owned lands (most of which were under Six Nations claim) ‘available’ to the 
Six Nations community came with the condition that “Any lands made available pursuant to 
these discussions would be credited or set off against any lands transferred to any claims 
settlement agreements.” (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canada, and 
Minister responsible for Aboriginal Affairs, Ontario, 2006). In other words, Canada and Ontario 
were giving themselves a two-for-one offer, and trying to make it sound beneficial to Six 
Nations, by stating that Six Nations lands under claim might be made available to the Six 
Nations community in exchange for the abandonment of an equal amount of land that was under 
claim.  But since both sets of lands were under claim –and thus already thought to be owned by 
the Haudenosaunee Six Nations community—then the question remained, exactly what would 
Six Nations be gaining by agreeing to this?  Or, as protest spokesperson Janie Jamieson asked:  
“That’s already our land so what kind of a bargaining tool is that?” (Best, 2006d). 
60 Haudenosaunee Six Nations “Iroquois” Confederacy, 2006b (“These issues are urgent matters.  
They require thoughtful, meaningful solutions and the serious attention of all parties, not simply 
throwing a few dollars at a band council department or promises of what might be.  Canada 
needs to take this matter seriously and open talks with the Confederacy Council on the issues we 
have raised in our latter of March 27, 2006 and that still remain not only unresolved but not even 
considered by the Minister.  We urgently await their reply”). See also: Muse, 2006b; Windle & 
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     Protesters responded to the breakdown in talks by issuing a renewed call for support. The call 
was met by mid-afternoon by Native warriors from in and out of province and members of the 
Hamilton Steel Workers union (Windle, 2006i; Gamble, 2006a). Also responding to the 
breakdown in talks, Ontario Provincial Police forces began amassing forces in the area and the 
Hennings threatened a lawsuit against the police if they did not enforce the injunction (Gamble, 
2006a; Windle, 2006i; Legall & Nolan, 2006b; COP, 2006). A confrontation between police and 
protesters was supposedly put off when all parties to the conflict returned to talks on April 19th.  
Talks lasted late into the night and, with the Confederacy Council finally being taken seriously, 
reportedly resulted in breakthroughs that brought all parties closer to a settlement than they had 
ever previously been (CTV News  2006h & 2006f; Nelson, 2006; Schmidt, 2009; CBC News, 
2006h; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Canadian Press, 2006b; Windle, 2006g; Miner, 2006a; 
Urquhart, 2006).  With talks scheduled to resume the following morning, OPP officials assured 
Mohawk Confederacy Chief Allan MacNaughton that the police keep to their promises not to 
move in on protesters in the Caledonia subdivision as long as talks were underway (Schmidt, 
2009; Windle, 2006g; Hughes; Miner, 2006a).61
     A few hours later, at about 4:30 A.M. on Thursday, April 20, hundreds of OPP officers armed 
with assault rifles, tasers, tear gas, and pepper spray --and with guns drawn and ready to fire-- 
descended upon the protest site in a move of quick, “overwhelming force” that was intended to 
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Van Every, 2006; Windle, 2006i; Best, 2006d; COP (2006); Canadian Press, 2006b; Gamble, 
2006a.   
61 The OPP had actually made a number of promises that were broken that night.  OPP officials 
promised the Confederacy Council and the protesters the following: 1) they would not move in 
on that specific night; 2) they would not move in so long as talks were ongoing; 3) they would 
not move in during night time; 4) they would notify the Confederacy and protesters prior to 
moving in; and 5) once they had made the decision to move in, they would first warn protesters 
of the possibility of arrest, in order to give those who did not want to be arrested a chance to 
leave (Hughes, 2007; Windle, 2006g; Schmidt, 2009; Gamble, 2006d; Miner, 2006a). 
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end the protest by removing the protesters under the cloak of darkness.62 Officers reportedly 
covered the entire site within seconds, dragging sleeping protesters out of tents, using pepper 
spray and tasers against several protesters, and arresting 16 people –in some instances, without 
first giving the protesters the promised pre-arrest warning or an opportunity to leave without 
arrest.63
                                                 
62 Some of the officers were dressed in full SWAT gear.  See, for example: Windle (2006g) and 
Nelson, (2006), which also reported that there were “tactical officers and uniformed officers,” as 
well as police dogs and a helicopter flying overhead.  Both sources also report that officers 
carried assault rifles (Windle) or “high powered rifles drawn and pointed at unarmed protesters,” 
(Nelson).  On there being hundreds of officers, see: (Windle, 2006g; Hill, 2006; Indian Country 
Today, 2006).  Nelson (2006) reports that there were “more than 24 police vehicles lining the 
road” outside of one of the several entrances to the property; while the Globe and Mail (2006a) 
and Graham (2006) both included an account that police swarmed everywhere and an estimate of 
how many were there could not be made. 
  Nonetheless, even as protesters were detained on one of the streets running by the 
protest site, other Six Nations members began trickling onto the site, and eventually flooding into 
     Most sources report that officers entered the site with guns drawn; were also armed with tear 
gas, tasers and pepper spray; and descended upon the site with quick, “overwhelming force” (or 
even “abrupt violence”[Indian Country Today, 2006).  For example, in addition to the sources 
cited above, see: Resource News International, 2006b; Canadian Press, 2006o; Graham & 
Canadian Press, 2006; CTV News, 2006f; Graham, 2006; Hill, 2006; Legall, 2006p. 
     Other sources that partially report on (and support the above reports on) the police presence 
include:  Globe and Mail, 2006; Dunfiled & Howlett, 2006; Agence France Presse, 2006; 
Ontario Provincial Police, 2006b; Associated Press, 2006; CTV News, 2006h; CBC News, 
2006h; Muse, 2006a. 
63 See the last note in the above paragraph for a description of the various promises police had 
made to the protesters (and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council) pertaining to police action 
against the protesters. 
     On police covering the entire site within seconds, or on accounts stating or implying that the 
OPP failed to give some protesters the promised opportunity to leave before being arrested 
appear see: (Nelson, 2006; Resource News International, 2006a & 2006b; Canadian Press, 
2006o; Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Graham, 2006; Windle, 2006g; CBC News, 2006h; 
Pearce, 2006c). On protesters being dragged from their tents, see: (Globe and Mail, 2006a; 
Dunfield & Howlett, 2006).  Accounts suggesting that police used tasers and pepper spray 
against protesters (in some cases, prior to giving warnings) include: Hamilton Spectator (2006e) 
(which stated that: “protesters were pepper-sprayed as police approached the barricade in the 
darkness”) and Resource News International, (2006a & 2006b)  (which stated that: “a number of 
people were subdued with shocks from Tasers as police “covered the entire area within 
seconds”).  Other accounts of the use of Tasers and/or pepper-spray can be found in: CTV News 
(2006h & 2006f), Globe and Mail (2006a), CBC News (2006h), Dunfield & Howlett (2006), 
Nelson (2006), and Hill (2006). 
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the site on foot, in pick-up trucks, and in all-terrain-vehicles.64
     After the forced police retreat, some protesters celebrated the victory while others worked to 
ensure that another police raid would not occur in the near future.  To these ends protesters 
blocked a section of the main road through Caledonia with an 18-wheeler, and blocked other 
areas of the road, and other roads around the protest site, with piles of gravel or wooden planks, 
tire fires, guard rails, portions of torn up highway fencing, gravel piles, logs, tree branches, and 
 As a critical mass of Six Nations 
reinforcements gathered at various points on the site, unarmed Six Nations women at one corner 
of the site began linking arms and walking in a line straight towards the police officers, forcing 
officers to chose whether to attack the unarmed women or move back.  Officers at this corner 
eventually backed off the site, at which time the women focused their attention on another 
corner, marching peacefully and unarmed towards the police and walking them backwards off 
the site. The women eventually cleared officers from every corner of the site, and officers began 
retreating the area (Hill, 2006a; Windle, 2006g; Nelson, 2006; Graham, 2006; Graham and 
Canadian Press, 2006; Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Adams, 2006).  
                                                 
64 In their official “timeline of events,” the Hamilton Spectator held that police had cleared, 
secured and then left the site by mid-morning, before protesters reoccupied (Hamilton Spectator  
2006e).  It is not clear why the Spectator gave this official version, in contradiction of virtually 
all other reports, including some by its own reporters.  On protesters forcing police off the site, 
see, for example, Windle (2006g), who reported that as early as 5:30 am there was a steady 
stream of Six Nations cars and people moving onto the site, with over 100 people on the site 
(taunting the police) shortly after this time.  Adams (2006) reported that there were sufficient 
numbers of Six Nations people on the site to push police off the site as early as 7:30am.  And 
another article in the Hamilton Spectator (Nelson, 2006) stated that by 8am Six Nations people 
were stepping out of the woods, well behind police lines, in increasing numbers.  The article also 
stated that by 8:15 am OPP officers were leaving the site.  A first hand account from Hill (2006) 
similarly reported that protesters pushed police off of the site by 9am (and not that police left, 
and protesters re-took the site).  A number of other articles also report that Six Nations 
reinforcements pushed police off the site (Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Graham, 2006;  
Dunfiled & Howlett.  2006; Muse, 2006c; CTV News, 2006h; CTV News, Anchor Lloyd 
Robertson; Erwin, 2006;  Associated Press, 2006).   These reports are apparently confirmed by 
CHCH news video showing lines of linked-armed protesters walking police off the site (Gamble, 
2006d). 
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other make-shift barricades.  Many of these barriers were either burning or were ready to be set 
on fire if it became necessary to stop another police raid on the site.65  A number of other 
protesters, wary of the police regrouping, flooded into nearby subdivisions on foot or ATVs to 
patrol for a renewed police presence.  Some of these protesters carryied baseball bats, lacrosse 
sticks, or wooden rods, and many wore masks over their faces (to protect against a pepper spray 
attack) (Nelson, 2006; Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; CBC News, 2006h; Rook, 2006b & 2006c; 
Rook & National Post, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006a; Graham, 2006; CTV News, 2006f; 
Gamble, 2006b; Adams, 2006; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Dunfield, 2006).66
     The failed police raid, and the chaos that followed on that day and the next, was the last straw 
for many residents who were opposed to the protest and had been waiting for two months for the 
   
                                                 
65 Tire fires were reported lit in a number of spots on Argyle Street, Sixth Line Road and 
Highway 6.  On the various types of road blockades, see: (Nelson, 2006; Harries, 2006e; 
Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Muse, 2006c; CBC News, 2006h; Gamble, 2006d; Rook and 
Canadian Press, 2006; Bailey, 2006; Legall & Morse, 2006b; Rook and National Post,  2006; 
Nolan, 2006d;  
Pearce, 2006b; Rook, 2006b; BBC News, 2006; Adams, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006a; 
Associated Press, 2006; Graham, 2006; Windle, 2006g; CTV News, 2006f; Hamilton Spectator, 
2006e; Resource News International, 2006a & 2006b; Edwards & Gombu, 2006; Healey & 
Nolan, 2006; Canadian Press, 2006p; Miner, 2006a & 2006c). The latter source also notes that 
protesters were ready to light up barricades on Highway 6 by pass if police came. 
66 Though many of the young men patrolling the perimeter and barricades of the protest site were 
reportedly yielding sticks, bats, and other make-shift weapons, there were also a fair number of 
older Six Nations’ members at the scene attempting to calm protesters’ anger and keep high 
emotions from leading to violence and injury.  For example, one Native couple who said they 
were representing the Apostolic Motorcycle Ministry of Jesus Christ, went to the site to talk with 
the young men who had the job of protecting the site.  The couple asked these protectors to be 
aware of the perceptions they were giving to others who saw them with make-shift weapons like 
baseball bats, and asked them not to carry such weapons:   
You need to put that down.  That’s not called for.  Don’t brandish it.  It looks like you 
want to fight.  I know how you feel inside, but I want to see you at the end of this.  
When all of this is over, I want to know that you’re alive.  I don’t want to see anything 
bad come to the people … not for Caledonia residents and not for Six Nations.  Not at 
all. (Lesley Greene, quoted in Hemsworth, 2006a).  
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police to end it.  While many in the town remained sympathetic to the protest,67 and support for 
the protesters poured in from other areas,68 those residents who had already been angry, 
frustrated or afraid found further fuel for these emotions in what they heard about or saw in the 
days activities. They had watched police officers driven away by people who had already been 
characterized as criminals by protest opponents, watched masked protesters with bats or sticks 
speed through subdivisions near the site on ATVs,69
                                                 
67 “We’ve been here all day and (the protesters) have done nothing wrong…  I’m embarrassed to 
be Canadian right now” (Unnamed resident, quoted in Oliveira, 2006).   Others, such as Kathy 
Maher, who lived right by the protest site, noted that the OPP never sent officers by to let 
residents know what was going on, but at least six protesters had stopped by her house to make 
sure everything was alright, to assure her kids that everything would be alright, and to offer help 
in the event that Maher and her family needed anything (Miner, 2006b).  Still other residents 
found the protesters more than willing to comply with resident concerns [See Mike Watson and 
Steve Tong’s experience successfully getting the protesters to stop driving ATVs in their 
neighborhood, as told in: Proudfoot (2006) and Muse (2006g) and noted in Interviews with 
Caledonia Residents (2009)].    
 seen the black smoke in the sky from tire 
68 “In our experience, where people stand up for their rights –including the labour movement—it 
gets turned into a law and order issue and we get criminalized.  We stand with [the Six Nations].  
It [the protest] should be resolved with discussion” stated Hamilton Steelworker and member of 
United Steelworkers Local 1005, Paul Lane, who came to the site with his local president and a 
contingent of union members, (quoted in: Pearce, 2006c).  On the unions present, see also: 
(Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Marxist-Leninist, 2006a & 2006b).  Members from numerous 
groups, including the following, also showed up to support the protest and help stave off another 
police raid: Solidarity for Palestinian Human Rights, the Communist Party of Canada, Ontario 
Coalition Against Poverty, No One Is Illegal, and Justicia for Migrant Workers had a presence 
on the site, and large numbers of unaffiliated non-Natives arrived at the site to show their 
solidarity and help defend against another OPP offensive.  Others were prevented from making it 
to the protest site after the Canadian border police refused entry to Natives from reserves in the 
US, and provincial and/or local police forces reportedly stopped and harassed Native people 
leaving their reserves within Canada.  Many of those unable to make it to Caledonia simply held 
their own solidarity rallies where they lived (or posted information on how to travel to southern 
Ontario without detection). On the Canadian Border Police stopping and refusing to allow Native 
from reserves in the US to enter Canada, the stopping and harassment of some natives leaving 
reserves in Canada, and the posting of instructions on how to get to southern Ontario without 
police detection, see: Marxist-Leninist (2006a & 2006b).  On one solidarity rally which involved 
the blocking of traffic and the hanging of warrior flags on the Mercier Bridge, see: Rook 
(2006b).  
69 Protest leaders reportedly stopped protesters from driving ATVs through neighborhoods near 
the protest site after a few residents complained to protesters.  The protesters were so organized, 
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fires,70 seen or heard that a van was toppled over a bridge and set on fire to block a freeway near 
the site, experienced the high tension, near-chaos, and general uncertainty that permeated the 
morning of the failed raid, and heard the Mayor’s panicked request for the army to come in and 
finish what the OPP failed to do (Dunnville Chronicle, 2006; CTV News, 2006d).  Responding 
to the morning’s events, angry residents gathered near the barricades throughout the day, 
reportedly taunting protesters with insults and demanding that they “go home”71
                                                                                                                                                             
and the response to the complaint so immediate that when one of the Caledonia residents who 
had complained were given a ride back to his subdivision, “another protester stopped them to say 
they were no longer allowed to drive the vehicles through the neighborhood” (Proudfoot, 2006). 
 or taunting and 
challenging police for sitting in vans around the protest site rather than making another move to 
end the protest (Gamble, 2006b; Adams, 2006; Hamilton Spectator, 2006e; Interviews with 
Caledonia residents, 2009; Rook, 2006b; Graham & Canadian Press, 2006; Nelson, 2006). By 
nightfall, several hundred non-Native residents had joined the mob of angry, taunting residents 
(Healey & Nolan, 2006; Nolan, 2006d), until Ontario Provincial Police moved in around 9:00 
70 Tire fires were set in the morning response to the raid, but Clan Mothers stopped protesters 
from burning tires due to environmental concerns.  After that pallets were burned and gravel 
piles were used to block roads instead. (Pearce, 2006b).  The exchange was also reported in:  
Windle, (2006g) which did not mention Jamieson’s name, but instead stated that Clan Mothers 
ordered the stop to burning tires because of pollution to the environment (and that protesters 
complied). 
71 Only a few news articles mentioned this development, and most simply mentioned it in 
passing as a series of angry verbal exchanges between residents and protesters.  But at least one 
article, which discussed the confrontations in slightly more detail, painted a different picture, 
noting that it was mostly non-Native residents who were speaking and hurling insults, while 
Native protesters manning the barricades –some of whom had pieces of wood, shovels or bats—
merely watched, speaking up only when residents got too near to the barricade, and then only “to 
order Caledonians back.” See: Healey & Nolan (2006).  Articles that summarized the face-offs as 
angry verbal exchanges coming equally from both sides include: Edwards & Gombu (2006) and 
Gamble (2006d) (the latter source also notes that residents had been gathering around the 
barricade, and pushing (“easing”) close, throughout the day). Oliveira (2006) noted that 
“[c]urious onlookers and angry locals linger day and night near the fortified barrier.”  On 
residents stating that they felt abandoned by the police or being critical of the police for leaving, 
see: Edwards & Gombu (2006); Legall & Morse (2006a); Healey & Nolan (2006); Gamble 
(2006d). 
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P.M. and forced residents back from the barricades (Edwards and Gombu, 2006; Healey & 
Nolan, 2006). Though the police had started the day facing off with protesters in an attempt to 
remove them, they ended the day facing residents, in an attempt to create a buffer zone between 
residents and Native protesters and keep the former from moving in and sparking a physical 
confrontation. 
     Non-Native residents were furious with this development in the police procedure, and over 
the next 40 days this anger culminated in both regular angry gatherings of non-Natives taunting 
Native protesters near the barricades, and a series of ever-intensifying anti-protest rallies, some 
of which drew 2,000-3,000 people in a town of only 10,000 (Bonnel & Canadian Press, 2006c; 
Canadian Press, 2006v).  Anti-protest rally-goers frequently sang the national anthem, waved 
Canadian flags, and demanded police or military action against the Native protest.  Some of 
these rallies ended in “near riots” with hundreds of flag-carrying non-Natives rushing the police 
lines near the protest site, shouting insults at OPP officials and racial slurs at Native protesters, 
while attempting to force their way through the police lines and onto the site --presumably to “do 
what police wouldn’t do” and forcibly remove Native protesters from the land.72  At the peak of 
this “intense, intense, irrational anger,”73
                                                 
72 Harries & Rusk (2006) describe these incidents as “near riots.” At least 500 residents 
participated in one or more of these incidents, or 5% of the town’s population (Harries, 2006a; 
Harries and Rusk, 2006).  CBC News (2006a) reported that close to 1000 residents stormed the 
police line on April 24th.  On another occasion in May, non-Natives succeeded in pushing 
through the police lines and physically confronting Native protesters in a mass fist-fight that 
involved hundreds of people and culminated in a power outage that impacted thousands of 
people in several southern Ontario counties.  On residents yelling racial slurs at Native protesters 
and insults at police, see: Harries (2006a). On the April 24 raid in particular, see also: (Bonnell & 
Canadian Press, 2006a; Rook & Proudfoot, 2006a; Weber & Howlett, 2006; Rook, 2006a).  
 the county mayor made derogatory remarks about 
73 As described by former Ontario Premier David Peterson (Harries & Rusk, 2006).   
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Native protesters on national television74 and non-Native business owners refused to serve 
Native customers (Muse, 2006i; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a; Interviews with Caledonia and 
Six Nations residents, 2009).  Likewise, kids’ non-Native sports teams refused to play 
Haudenosaunee sports teams; non-Natives threw trash out car windows at Native people walking 
down the street; and some non-Native residents even reportedly stockpiled Molotov cocktails in 
their backyards or planned to ship guns into the town in the event that “shit hit the fan” and a 
“civil race war” broke out in Canada (something that people were still talking about three years 
later) (Interviews with Caledonia residents, 2009; Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007).75 Adding 
fuel to the fire of non-Native opposition, a late May decision by the province to stop all 
development on the site under protest sparked a day of mass confrontation and repeated fistfights 
that left residents throughout several counties without power.76
     The motivations behind the explosive and sometimes violent expressions of non-Native anger 
in Caledonia have been largely framed and justified in terms of financial hardships and other 
injuries that are said to have been inflicted upon non-Native residents by the Haudenosaunee 
protest.  While it is certainly true that some non-Native residents were adversely impacted by the 
  
                                                 
74 The mayor stated that Native people didn’t understand, but needed to understand, that 
Caledonia residents don’t have checks coming in every month and have to go to work –implying 
that the Native protesters didn’t work and relied on monthly welfare checks.  Haldimand County 
NEWS RELEASE # 6, 2006; Bonnell, 2006a &2006b; CTV News, 2006a & 2006c; Legall & 
Nolan, 2006a; Harries & Rusk. 2006; CBC News, 2006f.  
75 Interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009. 
76 According to some residents, the intense conflict on one long weekend in May was largely a 
result of the efforts of local realtors and others in the construction and financial investment 
businesses misinforming and inciting fear, anger and anxiety among local residents in an attempt 
to unravel the province’s proposed moratorium on development (Interviews with Caledonia 
Residents, 2009). On the May weekend in general, see: (Canadian Press, 2006d; CBC News, 
2006b, 2006c, 2006d, 2006e & 2006g; MacArthur, 2006; Pona, 2006; Globe and Mail, 2006b; 
Hamilton Spectator, 2006b; Canadian Press, 2006g; National Post/Broadcast News, 2006a & 
2006b; CTV News, 2006b, 2006i, 2006f & 2006g).  The latter two sources noted that “Non-
Native locals are upset because they believe that the natives are dictating how the dispute will be 
resolved, Laurie reported.”  
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protest, such as construction workers employed on the Douglas Creek Estates development who 
may or may not have gone weeks or even months without steady work because of the protest, the 
discussion in chapter 6 will demonstrate that the vast majority of non-Native residents who 
claimed to have been victimized by the Haudenosaunee protest greatly exaggerated their claims 
to victimhood.  In some cases they perhaps did so in pursuit of financial compensation.  Further, 
as the below background discussion will show, none of these non-Native residents were 
victimized anywhere near the extent to which the Haudenosaunee have been victimized by non-
Native government policy and private non-Native settlement and development on their lands for 
hundreds of years.  Thus, however injured some non-Native residents may have felt that they 
were, these injuries certainly cannot compare to the historical and ongoing injuries inflicted upon 
the Haudenosaunee by non-Native governments and by private non-Native individuals acting 
under the approval and direction of these governments. 
     Regardless of who was injured or how heavily anyone was injured, what is of interest here is 
the fact that non-Native government and resident grievances against the Haudenosaunee protest 
routinely sought not merely to establish the legitimacy of their own grievances, but to dismiss 
and deny Native grievances.  To this extent, the Canadian and Ontario governments routinely 
released statements (often made by anonymous officials) asserting that the Haudenosaunee 
claims regarding their lands and rights were false, fabricated, mistaken or purposefully deceptive 
(see chapters 4 and 6).  Likewise, many non-Native residents who vocalized opposition to the 
Haudenosaunee protest frequently did so by denying, dismissing and outright denigrating the 
Native protest (and sometimes Native people).  In doing so, these non-Native residents employed 
two types of (frequently overlapping) tactics.  First, they used assertions of race, class, gendered, 
legal and nation-based dominance over Native peoples, such as through demanding that the 
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Canadian, Ontario and Haldimand County governments proceed as usual with their settlement 
and development plans on lands under Haudensoaunee claim –and employ the militarized armed 
aggression of the Canadian army, if necessary, to do so.  Second, they attempted to assert 
exclusivity in the ability to make claims to victimhood (“the victims are the people living in the 
community”77), thereby exaggerating the injury caused to non-Natives (“what about my right to 
go about my life?”78 and “at least clear the road so we can get on with our lives”79
 
) and replacing 
Haudenosaunee grievances with these exaggerated non-Native claims.  These patterns of thought 
and behavior that are involved in denying Haudenosaunee claims to injury, and in instigating, 
perpetuating and intensifying the ongoing violation of Haudenosaunee land, resource and treaty 
rights, need to be understood, and will be examined in more detail in chapter 6. 
BACKGROUND 
1) The Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy80
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations
 
81 is a confederacy of Native nations82
                                                 
77 A Caledonia resident paraphrased in Nolan (2006a). 
 that are governed on the 
basis of consensus, and thus constitute one of the oldest known participatory democratic 
traditions still in existence, and the only governing tradition founded on the basis of actively 
striving for peace (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992: 33; Porter, 2006 and 2008: 24; Woo, 
78 An unidentified Caledonia resident quoted in Harries (2006e).  
79 An unnamed Caledonia man, quoted in Nolan (2006d).  
80 This is an extremely abbreviated description of the formation of the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations Confederacy. 
81 Also known as the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy, the Six Nations Confederacy, the 
Haudenosaunee, the Iroquois and/or the Iroquois Confederacy. 
82 The Haudenosaunee were originally a confederacy of five native nations –the Mohawk, 
Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca.  Around 1722 the Tuscarora joined the confederacy, 
making it the Six Nations confederacy.  Other Native nations, or parts of Native nations, have 
since joined or merged with the Confederacy, such as the Tutelo and members of the Delaware; 
however, given the manner in which these nations joined or are represented in Confederacy 
decision-making, the Confederacy is still referred to as one of Six Nations. 
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2003; Johansen, 1998; Vachon, 1993). According to the Haudenosaunee’s detailed oral history, 
the confederacy was formed long before Europeans began their invasion of the Americas,83 and 
at a time when there was much warfare and violence, when people had forgotten their common 
humanity and the rules handed down to them for treating and getting along with other human 
beings and other life forms.84
These people lived at a time of dark despair and chaos.  Their story recounts a 
period when humans had cast aside the rules of coexistence, a period when 
bloodlust and vengeance overshadowed the goodness in human beings.  It was a 
time of what we today would call civil war, when brothers hunted brothers, when 
head-hunting was common, and when men and women sought vengeance for 
wrongs, real and imagined. (P. 34) 
 As Oren Lyons (1992) has stated: 
 
During this time of great chaos and fighting, a man known as the Peacemaker,85 together with a 
woman he met named Jigonsaseh, traveled around to each of the original five member nations, 
seeking to talk to the fiercest and most feared men among them as well as the women leaders 
(Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992; Porter, 2008).86
                                                 
83 Haudenosaunee oral history, and some convincing historical evidence, suggests that the 
Confederacy was formed long before European contact, perhaps even a thousand years or more 
before this (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; George-Kanentiio, 2006; Porter, 2006; Lyons, 1992; 
Vachon, 1993).  Though many Western-style scholars have attempted to set a more recent date 
for the founding of the Confederacy (Taylor, 1993; Johnston, 1964; Wise, 1971), these accounts 
both lack evidence and contradict Haudenosaunee oral history. For a more detailed, and very 
well-researched discussion of both western and Haudenosaunee methods of determining the date 
the confederacy was formed, see Mann & Fields (1997), who date the founding of the 
confederacy at 1142 C.E..   
 One by one, sometimes with the aid of 
another man, Hiawatha (or Aionwahtha), the Peacemaker and Jigonsaseh convinced each of 
these men, along with the other members of each of these nations, that there had to be some force 
84 Tehanetorens (2000) notes that people had strayed from and began to forget their traditional 
ways of life –began to forget instructions on how to live with the natural world and with each 
other.  
85 The name of the Peacemaker is not generally spoken outside of ceremonies; therefore, though 
his name has been written in various articles, in this paper “Peacemaker” will be used to refer to 
this person.  
86 See also: Mann, Barbara Alice. 2000. Iroquoian Women: The Gontowisas. New York: Lang 
Publishing. (Thanks to Barbara Mann for pointing out this source). 
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that created all life and the world around them, and that this force would not want men to destroy 
the world the living things in it (Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992).  Instead, the Peacemaker 
argued, healthy minds desire peace,87 which could be established when members of a society 
worked together88 not only to eliminate violence and conflict, but to establish universal justice 
for all people and all living things89 –all of which have an equal right to what they need to live, 
and none of which can deprive another of this.90
                                                 
87 “The Peacemaker began his teachings based on the principle that human beings were given the 
gift of the power of reason in order that they may settle their differences without the use of force.  
He proposed that in every instance humans should use every effort to counsel about, arbitrate, 
and negotiate their differences, and that force should be resorted to only as a defense against the 
certain use of force.  All men whose minds are healthy can desire peace, he taught, and there is 
an ability within all human beings, and especially in the young human beings, to grasp and hold 
strongly to the principles of righteousness. The ability to grasp the principles of righteousness is 
a spark within the individual that society must fan and nurture so that it may grow.  Reason is 
seen as the skill that humans must be encouraged to acquire in order that the objectives of justice 
may be attained and no one’s rights abused.” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005, pp. 33-34). 
  In actively striving for universal justice and 
88 “The power to enact a true peace is the product of a unified people on the path of 
righteousness, and reason is the ability to enact the principles of peace through education, public 
opinion, and political, and when necessary, military unity.  The “power” that the Peacemaker 
spoke of was intended to enable the followers of the law to call upon warring or quarrelling 
parties to lay down their arms and to begin a peaceful settlement of their disputes” (Akwesasne 
Notes, 2005, p. 34). 
89 Peace, as the Peacemaker understood it, flourished only in a garden amply fertilized with 
absolute and pure justice.  It was the product of a spiritually conscious society using its abilities 
of reason that resulted in a healthy society.  The power to enact peace (which requires that people 
cease abusing one another) was conceived to be both spiritual and political” (Akwesasne Notes, 
2005, p. 34). 
90 Akwesasne Notes, 2005: p. 33 (“Other political philosophers and organizers have come to the 
conclusion that governments can be formed for the purpose of establishing tranquility, but the 
Peacemaker went considerably further than that.  He argued not only for the establishment of law 
and order, but for the full establishment of peace.  Peace was to be defined not as the simple 
absence of war or strife, but as the active striving of humans for the purpose of establishing 
universal justice.  Peace was defined as the product of a society that strives to establish concepts 
that correlate to the English words power, reason, and righteousness”); Lyons, 1992, pp. 38-39 
(“The Peacemaker taught that peace is not simply the absence of violence but can only exist 
through the vigorous efforts of clear-thinking people to eradicate injustice in the world…. In 
summary, The Peacemaker facilitated what can be described as a revolution.  He caused the 
power of the warrior leaders to be subordinated to the workings of the council of elders whose 
purpose was to promote peace within the framework of a true confederacy”). 
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peace, the Haudenosaunee sought to eliminate all causes of conflict, such as by removing “all 
thoughts of prejudice, privilege or superiority” and recognizing that “no person or people has a 
right to deprive others” of what they need to survive.91 In addition, the Peacemaker argued that 
the purpose of government is to prevent the abuse of anyone’s rights, not to orchestrate or 
participate in this abuse (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32; Lyons, 1992: 34).92
     One by one members of the Five Nations agreed to the Peacemaker’s ideas, known as the 
Great Law of Peace (or Kaianere’kowa)
 
93, and together they buried their weapons of war and 
formed a governing body, the Confederacy Council.  This Council was founded on ideals of 
universal justice, rather than of law and order.  It was also founded on the principles that “the 
power and authority of the people lies with the people and is merely transmitted by them through 
the ‘chiefs’” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). 
                                                 
91 Akwesasne Notes, 2005, p. 33.  Also see p. 34 (“The principles of law set forth by the 
Peacemaker sought to establish a peaceful society by eliminating the causes of conflict between 
individuals and between peoples.  It was a law that was conceived prior to the appearance of 
classes, and it sought to anticipate and eliminate anything that took the appearance of group or 
class interest, even in the form of clan or tribal interest, especially in the area of property”). 
 As such, the Chiefs of the council had no power of 
coercion, domination or self-enrichment, but they do have great responsibilities to serve the will 
of the people of their clan, who make participatory-democratic decisions on the basis of 
consensus. The Chiefs also were (and are) selected democratically by the women of their clan, 
and nominated by their Clan Mothers, who can veto their decisions or remove them from their 
position (“dehorn” them) if they fail to serve the will of the people and/or follow the Great Law 
92 According to the latter source: “The true purpose of human political organization, The 
Peacemaker argued, must be to oppose violence.  This, he said, can be accomplished when men 
of healthy minds and bodies unite to create a just world in which human abuse is abolished 
forever, and in which war is abandoned as a way of settling disputes.  Force, he asserted, is 
justified only when it is necessary to halt aggression and to create the conditions we might call a 
truce that could be used to create a road to peace.” 
93 Also translated as the “great way of being” in Alfred (2010), who describes this as a 
philosophy of life based on and reflective of the best lessons that humans have learned, and 
messages they have been given, about how to live as human beings. 
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of Peace.  In addition, the women, as those who can alone give life and allow the culture to 
continue, held their own councils through which they made (and still make) all of the decisions 
regarding when to go to war and when to have peace, the location of villages, the distribution of 
food, life in the village, and decisions pertaining to a number of other matters, including all 
matters related to the Haudenosaunee lands.94
     The men on the council of Chiefs were responsible for conducting relations both among the 
five (late six) confederated nations and internationally with other Native nations, or with 
Europeans, once their invasion of the Americas began.  While each nation within the 
confederacy governed itself in its own affairs, each also agreed to yield a portion of its 
sovereignty to the group in affairs that impacted the entire confederacy, as no nation could make 
unilateral decisions that impacted others.  For example, any “decision concerning the disposition 
of Seneca lands must first pass through the Confederacy Council, where the other nations, who 
also have rights in Seneca lands, can participate in the decision-making process” (Akwesasne 
Notes, 2005: 35; Lyons, 1992).
  
95
                                                 
94 The women have so much power in matrilineal Haudenosaunee society that some westerners 
have remarked that the council of chiefs appears to “serve only to represent and aid the women 
in matters in which decorum does not permit the latter to appear or act,”(Father Joseph Francois 
Lafitau (1974) [quoted in Bonaparte, 2008]). See also: Akwesasne Notes (2005), Lyons (1992), 
Taylor (2006) Johnston (1964), Woo (2003). 
  As a participatory democratic tradition of actively striving for 
peace, the Confederacy was (is) open to, and welcoming of, other nations or individuals outside 
of Haudenosaunee territories who wished to join and seek shelter under the Great Law of Peace, 
so long as they adhere/d to the Great Law and did/do not induce factionalism among the people.  
Further, as a governing tradition that actively strived for peace, aggression was only to be used in 
self-defense, only when all efforts at diplomacy had failed, and only to the extent that was 
95 As title holders of the land, the women and the Clan Mothers also (and perhaps primarily) 
needed (and still need) to be consulted, and to be in agreement on any decisions pertaining to 
lands.   
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needed to achieve an end to the hostilities. Even then, three warnings, ordered by the Clan 
Mothers, had to have been delivered before any hostile actions could be taken.96
Even following the unconditional conquest of an invader, the conquered were to 
enjoy rights.  There would be no collection of spoils from those who were 
conquered.  There would be no requirements that a conquered people adopt the 
religion of the conquerors.  The aggressors would be required to disarm, but 
otherwise they would be left in control of their country, and the dispute would be 
taken to the Great Council, where it would be resolved. (P. 34) 
 Lyons (1992) 
has further noted that:  
 
 And that: 
 
The ideas and principles expressed in the Silver Covenant Chain and other 
traditions of the Haudenosaunee have been central to our relations with other 
nations and states, whether Indian, European, or American.  In these traditions, 
there is a recognition that peoples are distinct from each other.  However, since 
the beginning of our memory this distinctiveness has been seen as a foundation 
for mutual respect; and we have therefore always honored the fundamental right 
of peoples and their societies to be different.  This is a profoundly important 
principle, and one which, even in the twentieth century, humans continue to 
struggle to realize. (P. 42)  
 
     As a result of building societies around the Great Law of Peace, the Haudenosaunee were able 
to achieve a relatively stable society, free from police or coercion, in which theft, rape, and the 
inequalities experienced in European societies were virtually unknown (see chapter 2 for more 
on these inequalities, and chapter 3 for more on the Haudenosaunee and other Native societies in 
the Americas).  These results amazed many European settlers who contrasted this level of 
freedom and respect experienced by the Haudenosaunee with the oppression and inequalities 
experienced in the colonies --many of which were governed by martial law (Canny, 1979; 
Mohawk, 1992 & 2000). Though there have been times when the Haudenosaunee have 
                                                 
96 This sentence was added by Barbara Mann through email correspondence and editing 
suggestions, April 19, 2012.  Mann cites the following source: Parker, Arthur C.  1916. 
Constitution of the Five Nations, or Iroquois Book of the Great Law. Albany: NY: State 
University of New York, p. 54. 
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imperfectly followed their principles and ideals, the society that they were able to maintain was 
revolutionary in many respects, and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy was later used as a model 
for both the United States Constitutional Democracy, and the League of Nations (now the United 
Nations) (Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Mohawk, 1992; Berman, 1992; Woo, 2003; Johansen, 1998; 
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38; Vachon, 1993; Porter, 2006).  
 
 
2) The Haudenosuanee Grand River Territory 
 
Figure 1. The top map shows the area of detail, the bottom map shows the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory (outlined in red), a portion of the Haudenosaunee’s 
traditional territory that was set aside for their sole use in perpetuity in the Haldimand 
Proclamation of 1784 (this land is also sometimes referred to as the Haldimand Tract). 
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In 1784, a sizeable portion of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy settled on a 950,000-
acre tract of land in their traditional beaver hunting grounds along southern Ontario’s Grand 
River (see Figure 1).  The move was the result of Crown promises to the Haudenosaunee, as well 
as Crown treaty violations and attempts to repair these violations.  Several years prior to this, 
when the Haudenosaunee were struggling to defend some four million acres at the center of their 
traditional territory from encroachment by non-Native squatters, land speculators and corrupt 
government officials,97 Crown officials at war with the thirteen revolutionary colonies made the 
repeated promise to Haudenosaunee member nations that if they fought with the English in the 
war then the Crown would –at Crown expense-- restore them to the state they were in prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities.98
                                                 
97 The center of the Haudenosuanee’s traditional territory is in what is today upstate New York.  
The Haudenosaunee’s full traditional territory spanned east to west from the Huron to the 
Mississippi Rivers, and north to south from southern Michigan, Ontario and Quebec to Kentucky 
and the northern short of Chesapeake Bay (Six Nations Council, 2010/2011). Or, alternately 
explained as: “from the upper Great Lakes through the Ohio Valley and Pennsylvania to the 
limits of Cherokee territory in the Carolinas” (Berman, 1992: 148). Berman notes that the 
Haudenosaunee held political and commercial hegemony over this area --and the Indian nations 
within it-- and controlled “trade routes, the allocation of rights in large but relatively unpopulated 
hunting territories, and the process of international relations with the Dutch, French, and 
English,” into the 1790s, which made the Haudenosaunee “a significant commercial and military 
friend or formidable foe for the Europeans,” dependent upon the fur trade.  The full extent to 
which this was so is unlikely to be reflected in European documents (Ibid, 148-9). On the 
Haudenosaunee’s ongoing, sovereign struggle against encroachments by non-Native squatters, 
land speculators and corrupt government officials who ignored binding treaties with the 
Haudenosaunee, see: Akwesasne Notes (2005), Berman (1992), Taylor (2002 and 2006), 
Nammack (1969), Harring (1998). 
  Though many among the Haudenosaunee member nations took this 
98 These promises were made on numerous occasions –both verbally and in writing-- prior to and 
during the Revolutionary War --“particularly during the critical months of 1780 and 1781, when 
so much depended on the Indians’ ability and readiness to maintain adequate pressure on 
American forces,” (Johnston, 1964: xxxiv).  See, for example, the written promise made by 
Frederick Haldimand Esquire, Captain General, Commander in Chief of the Province of Quebec, 
and General and Commander in Chief of his Majesty’s Forces in the Province and the Frontier, 
7th April 1779 (LAC Haldimand Papers, 1779-1783: Section 3, p. 7). See also the promise made 
by Haldimand in 1779 that the Mohawk villages of “Conajoharie [sic], Tiyondarago [sic], and 
Aughwago [sic] would be restored to them  ‘at the Expense of the Government, to the state they 
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promise to heart and fought with the British in the war,99 at the end of hostilities the British 
Crown signed over to the 13 colonies more than 4 million acres of Haudenosaunee lands in what 
is today upstate New York.  This move, enshrined in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, was made without 
the knowledge or consent of the Haudenosaunee, and despite the fact that the land was neither 
Britain’s nor the colonies to barter.  Additionally, the move violated a number of treaty 
agreements and promises made by the British Crown not only with the Haudenosaunee, but with 
a number of other Native nations as well (Johnston, 1964: 36; Berman, 1992; Taylor, 2006).100
                                                                                                                                                             
were in before’” the war (Letter from Frederick Haldimand to Daniel Claus, 17 December 1783, 
quoted in Good, 1994: 25).  Also see Good (1994: 35): “At the outbreak of the American 
Revolution Sir Guy Carleton, Governor of Quebec, requested the Mohawks to “assist in 
defending their country, and to take an active part in defending his Majesty’s possessions; 
stating, that when the happy day of peace should arrive, and should we not prove successful in 
the contest, that he would put us on the same footing in which we stood previous to our joining 
him. …  After the defeat of the British, Carleton’s successor, Haldimand, promised the Mohawks 
that they would be granted land in Quebec “to hold on the same footing with those w fled from.”  
And see: Canada, Legislative Assembly (1870). 
 
99 The Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Council took an official position of neutrality in 
the war, but individual nations were free to do what they wanted, and many member nations 
fought with the British in the war. To this extent, the Mohawks and members of other 
Haudenosaunee nations [if not the “great majority of Iroquois,” as argued by Taylor (2002)] took 
up arms and fought with the British in response to this promise (see Porter, 2006; Vachon, 1993; 
Taylor, 2002; George-Kanentiio, 2006; Taylor, 2002; Lyons, 1992; Vachon, 1993; George-
Kanentiio, 2006).  Some Oneidas and Tuscaroras chose, instead, to fight with the 13 colonies 
during the war (Taylor, 2002; Lyons, 1992; Vachon, 1993).  George-Kanentiio (2006) argues 
that the Mohawks were actually split in the war, with many fighting for the British under 
Mohawk Johseph Brant, and some fighting for the 13 colonies. 
100 In addition to the Haldimand Promise (the signed promise that the Crown would restore, not 
steal and sign away, Haudenosaunee lands), the 1783 Treaty of Paris violated the 1768 Fort 
Stanwix Treaty which, signed by the British Crown and at least 35 Native nations, was still in 
effect and could not be unilaterally changed (Johnston, 1964: 36; Berman, 1992; Taylor: 2006).  
In fact, a main component of the treaty was an agreement to a line, going north to south, which 
divided white and Indian lands.  According to the treaty, no Native nation could sell or dispose 
of lands west of the treaty line without consent from all 35 nations (Taylor, 2006: 116).  The 
Treaty of Paris also violated the Crown’s own Royal Proclamation of 1763 –a proclamation 
which, Borrows has convincingly argued, was as much an agreement with Native nations as a 
declaration and directive by British Crown to British subjects (Borrows, 2002).  
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     Despite the Crown’s rather unprecedented generosity to the thirteen colonies in the 1783 
Treaty of Paris,101 Crown officials knew full well that they did not have the authority to 
unilaterally change their previous treaties and promises with Native nations.  For example, an 
embarrassed and ashamed102
                                                 
101 According to both historians today and Crown officials in 1783, the British Crown’s decisions 
to sign away this land was an act of unprecedented –and unnecessary—generosity towards the 
colonies, which had been worn to the brink of near dissolution during the war, were nearly 
bankrupt, faced growing internal anger and unrest, and were being strained ever further by Indian 
raids along the insufficiently defended frontier (Taylor, 2006: 111-2, Johnston, 1964: 35). Since 
the colonies would not have dreamed of all that they were given in the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and 
the British were certainly aware of the colonies weakened state (Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964), 
there may have been other reasons for the betrayal by Britain, such as the desire for Crown 
officials to have a buffer zone of friendly Indians between the British subjects and the colonies 
and/or less friendly Indians.  On the Crown’s desire for a buffer zone see: Taylor (2006: 114-
115) and Taylor (2002). Though Taylor (2006) suggests that the decision to create a buffer zone 
came slightly after the signing of the 1783 Treaty of Paris, and in response to Haudenosaunee 
complaints about it, he also notes British fears about further aggression from the colonies and/or 
from unfriendly Native nations –noting, for example, that in 1783 there were only 200,000 
British subjects north of the 49th parallel, but there were 2,500,000 Americans in the colonies 
(Taylor, 2006: 118-119).  In addition, there were 35 Native nations set to defend the 1768 Fort 
Stanwix treaty line against non-Native encroachment (Taylor, 2006:116). Others speculate that 
the Crown wanted to out-maneouver/eliminate the Americans from the fur trade by positioning 
the Haudenosuanee in their traditional hunting grounds in Canada –and thus rendering 
unnecessary the hunting grounds around the American side of the Great Lakes (Lord North to 
Governor General Haldimand, August 8, 1783, reproduced in Johnston, 1964: 42; see also p. 53 
and Taylor, 2006: 113-114). 
 Governor-in-Chief Frederick Haldimand wrote to his superiors in 
Britain, remarking:  
102 Crown officials were reportedly not only embarrassed and ashamed at the illegal betrayal of 
their Haudenosaunee allies, but also aggrieved and humiliated at the unprecedented –and 
unnecessary-- extent to which this betrayal humbled the Crown before the war-worn and 
considerably weakened independent colonies.  The overly-generous conditions of the 1783 treaty 
were remarked upon by General Alan Maclean, while at Fort Niagara, as “certainly beyond their 
[the colonies] most Sanguine Hopes or Expectations…” (Johnston, 1964: 35); and Governor-
General Frederick Haldimand expressed more outright shame in a letter to a friend:  
My soul is completely bowed down with grief at seeing that we (with no absolute 
necessity) have humbled ourselves so much as to accept such humiliating boundaries.  I 
am heartily ashamed and wish I was in the interior of Tartary. (Taylor, 2006: 112). 
Further, the Home Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons, Lord Sydney later stated of 
Upper Canada’s attempts to placate the Haudenosaunee with offers of compensatory lands: 
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These people, my Lord, have as enlightened Ideas of the nature and Obligations 
of treaties as the most civilized nations have, and know that no infringement of the 
Treaty of 1768… can be binding upon them without their express concurrence & 
consent. (Taylor, 2006: 115, emphasis added) 
 
Because the Haudenosaunee had been excluded from the 1783 Treaty of Paris negotiations [an 
act that some Haudenosaunee chiefs interpreted as an affirmation of their continuing status as 
independent and sovereign nations (Taylor, 2006)], they were not immediately aware of the 
unauthorized and illegitimate betrayal. Crown officials, terrified of a potential Native uprising, 
did everything within their power to prevent the Haudenosaunee from learning about it –from 
lying outright to “gifting” the cold, hungry, poorly clothed and war-traumatized Haudenosaunee 
in refuge in Niagara with 1,800 gallons of rum in the hopes of keeping them inebriated for a few 
more days or weeks (Taylor, 2006: 112-14; Johnston, 1964).103  Despite these best efforts, 
rumors of the terms of the treaty began trickling in to the Haudenosaunee encampment at 
Niagara.104 Crown officials moved quickly to attempt to repair some of the damage done by the 
treaty by promising that pre-war treaty agreements and promises would be kept105
                                                                                                                                                             
If the [Mohawk] Indians should not accede to any Proposals that may be made to them 
by the American Deputies, or cannot be prevailed upon peaceably to accept the asylum 
already directed to be offered them, within the Province of Quebec, Our Situation will 
in some degree become embarrassing. (Quoted in Good, 1994, p. 26). 
 and that the 
103 Further, British officials who had been making steady efforts to decrease the amount of 
presents given annually to native nations, also reversed themselves and instead increased presents 
to the Haudenosaunee.  They also attempted to placate the Haudensaunee by completely 
misrepresenting the terms of the peace treaty:    
Citing a secret (non-existent, in fact) clause to the peace treaty, Sir John Johnson & 
John Butler assured the Iroquois that the forts would never be relinquished until the 
Americans had done Justice to the Indians (Taylor, 2006: 114). 
104 “The Indians from the Surmises they have heard of the Boundaries, look upon our Conduct to 
them as treacherous and Cruel; they told me they never could believe that our King could pretend 
to Cede to America What was not his own to give, or that the Americans would accept from Him 
What he had not right to grant” (General Alan Maclean, at Fort Niagara, remarking on the Native 
perception of illegality of their betrayal, quoted in: Taylor, 2006: 112 Johnston, 1964: 36;). 
105 To this extent, Crown officials agreed –in violation of the newly-signed treaty with the 
colonies-- to honor the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty borders and retaining numerous border forts 
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Haudenosaunee and other Native nations would be compensated for their losses in the war 
through deeds granted to them in Upper Canada (today lower Ontario).106  To this end, Governor 
General Frederick Haldimand was authorized and requested by the King of England107
                                                                                                                                                             
signed away in the 1783 treaty (Taylor, 2006:113-121; Johnston, 1964: xlii, 42, 53). In fact, 
Crown officials were so afraid of an impending uprising by the Haudenosaunee that the 
Haudenosaunee not only “compelled a dramatic shift in British policy” in these above-mentioned 
areas (Taylor, 2006:114), but also induced the Crown into “endorsing, advising and supplying 
presents (especially ammunition)” to a newly-formed confederation of 35 Native nations intent 
on defending the borders of the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty that clearly went against British 
interests by uniting “Indians independently of white people,” and thus rendering worthless the 
longstanding British policy of dividing Natives by promoting jealousies among them (Taylor, 
2006: 116).   
 to find 
106  In granting land, the Crown not only sought to make up for violations of pre-war treaties and 
agreements, but also conceded to another Haudenosauene demand: that an Indian buffer zone be 
created in the area of overlap between the 1768 Fort Stanwix Treaty and the 1783 Treaty of 
Paris.  This buffer zone was actually quite strategic for the British as well, who wanted nothing 
more than a buffer between their remaining colonies and potential attacks by the newly 
independent colonies to the south, or by less friend Indian nations to the west (Taylor, 2006: 113-
121). In addition, this buffer zone also had economic appeal to the British, since an Indian buffer 
zone would virtually eliminate the newly-independent colonies from competing with British 
merchants and settlers in the fur trade (Taylor, 2006:114; Johnston, 1964: 42, etc.). 
107 “…The King… much approves of your having sent Major Holland to … survey the North 
Side of the Lake Ontario, as well as of your intention of carrying into execution your endeavor to 
prevail upon the Mohawks to settle to the Northward of the Lake, provided the country should be 
found well suited for their convenience.  These People are justly entitled to Our peculiar 
Attention, and it would be far from either generous or just in Us, after our Cession of their 
Territories and Hunting Grounds, to forsake them.  I am, therefore, authorized to acquaint you, 
that the King allows you to make those Offers to them, or to any other Nations of friendly 
Indians, who may be desirous of withdrawing themselves from the United States, and occupying 
any Lands which you may allot to them…” (Lord North to Governor General Haldimand, 
August 8, 1783, p. 42 in: Johnston, Charles M. 1964.  The valley of the Six Nations.  Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press).   
     There were also a number of strategic reasons for wanting to satisfy the Haudenosaunee. For 
example, see Johnston (1964, p. 42, in the same letter from Lord North) and Taylor (2006) both 
of whom point to Britain and Upper Canadian official’s desire to corner the fur trade by keeping 
the Haudenosuanee in their traditional beaver hunting grounds. Good, 1994, p. 26, who notes 
that Lord North had wanted the Haudenosaunee to serve as a “barrier against the colonies’ 
incursions” as well as a barrier to the western Indians.  Taylor (2006) also notes this. In addition, 
Good (p. 27, note 21, quoting: NAC, Haldimand transcripts, vol. B-115, p. 113, Frederick 
Haldimand to Sir John Johnson, 26 May 1783) notes the competition between the Upper Canada 
and the 13 newly-independent colonies for the alliance of the Haudenosaunee: 
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lands agreeable to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations as compensation for their losses in the war, as 
thanks for their alliance with the British in the war, and as partial fulfillment of the Haldimand 
Promise. One of these grants,108 made on October 25, 1784 through the Haldimand 
Proclamation, was intended to partially compensate the Haudenosaunee for their losses by 
granting them a tract of their traditional territory located along the Grand River:109
allotting to them… six miles deep on each side of the river beginning at Lake Erie 
and extending in that proportion to the head of the said river, which them and 





     Despite the permanence implied in the wording of the document (“for ever”), and the intent 
behind it,111
                                                                                                                                                             
It is frequently asserted that Joseph Brant’s pro-British warriors were barred from 
returning to their former villages after end [sic] of the American Revolution, but that 
situation did not last long.  By 1784 American agents were inviting them back with 
sweet offers to treat for the purpose of a part of their lands.  Haldimand’s offer was 
intended to head off the effect of these “proposals from the United States” 
 today the Canadian government only recognizes 45,000 acres --less than 5% of the 
108 The other grant was on the Bay of Quinte, and will not be discussed here.   
109 As Phil Monture, Six Nations lands researcher and President of Native Lands, Inc., stated: 
“They granted us portions of our own land.  Big deal.” (Haudenosuanee Confederacy.  2007). 
110 Grant from Governor Haldimand to The Six Nations Indians, October 25, 1784 at the Castle 
of St. Lewis at Quebec. Indian Treaties and Surrenders, from 1680-1890, Vol I. No. 106, page 
251. Frederick Haldimand was the highest ranking Crown official in British North America at 
the time, serving as Commander in chief of Crown forces in North America and Governor 
General (Good, 1964, p. 28). 
111 According to legal scholar Sidney Harring (1998a & 1998b) the wording of this document 
implies the conveyance of fee simple property, or property that was being given outright --along 
with all of its associated rights-- to the Six Nations. Other loyalists in the war were being granted 
deeds in fee simple, so there was little reason for the Haudenosaunee to expect to be given 
anything less (see also: Good, 1994, pp. 20-21). In fact, Brant clearly expected –and was 
convinced he was receiving-- more: the Haudensoaunee were recognized as sovereign and 
independent before the war (when the “government well knew we were the lawful sovereigns of 
the soil, and they had no rights to interfere with us as independent nations”) so there was no 
reason the grant should not also recognize this sovereignty after the war [Speech of Joseph Brant 
at Six Nations Council meeting, Fort George, 15-17 August 1803, quoted in: Good (1994: 34)]. 
Good further notes that recognizing the sovereign independence of Native nations was part of 
British Common law, and continued to be US common law that Native nations could grant their 
land to whomever they wanted, and those who purchased from them would hold their land 
“under them by a title dependent on their laws….”  In fact, Frederick Haldimand made it quite 
 63 
original 950,000-acre land grant-- as belonging to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, and claims 
the other 95% of the land as Canadian or Ontario property (see Figure 2).112
                                                                                                                                                             
clear to Brant that the land would be granted through a deed [see, for example, “Substance of 
Brant’s Wishes Respecting Forming a Settlement on the Grand River” and Haldimand’s Answer, 
March 1783, reproduced in pp. 44-45 in Johnston (1964: 44-45), which specifically states that 
the land will be granted to the Six Nations “by a Deed”and would be held by them “on the same 
footing as those we fled from.” See also: Speech of Joseph Brant at Six Nations Council meeting, 
Fort George, 15-17 August, 1803, quoted in: Good (1994: 35, 31). Jennings (also quoted in 
Good, 1994: 37) further found that the Haudenosaunee were told that “the Crown was saving 
their land instead of Crown land, and saving it for them instead of for the Crown,” meaning that 
Crown officials clearly intended to portray to the Haudenosaunee that they would be considered 
sovereign title holders of their Upper Canadian lands]. Good (1994: 31, note 27) further notes 
that the Haldimand Grant was viewed as a binding treaty agreement by British-Canadian 
officials into at least the early 1820s.  For example, Good states: 
  
In R. v. Phelps (1823), 1 Taylor 47 at 52-53 Robert Baldwin argued for the defence that 
“[t]he foundation of the title from General Haldimand is evidently a treaty, and as such 
must be recognized by the court, for all courts of justice will recognise treaties, as is 
constantly seen in cases of seizures, etc.  The [Six Nations] Indians must be considered 
as a distinct, though feudatory people; they are not subject to mere positive laws, to 
statute labour, or militia duty, though perhaps to punishment for crimes against the 
natural law, or law of nations.  It may be considered as a ridiculous anomaly, but it 
appears from Vattel that these sort of societies, resident within and circumscribed by 
another territory, though in some measure independent of it, frequently exist, and that 
the degree of independence may be infinitely varied; and however barbarous there 
Indians may be considered, the treaty under which they migrated to and reside in this 
country is binding. (P. 31 note 27) 
However, Good (1994: 20, note 6) further notes that the Upper Canadian land registry system 
was not fully formed at the time of the Haldimand Proclamation, nor for at least a decade and a 
half later.  Instead, at the time of this Proclamation, Canadian property law was governed by 
French feudal custom.  After changes in 1791 and again in 1796 colonial officials seized upon 
irregularities in the Haldimand Proclamation (versus the new registry system customs for land 
grants) as a reason to treat this land grant as something less than fee simple deed.  And though 
there are suggestions that the views toward the document of Haldimand, Simcoe and other 
colonial officials was changed over time, Harring (1998: 219, note 33) concludes: “There can be 
no question that both Simcoe and Haldimand intended to satisfy the Indians that they were being 
granted lands, that is, given their lands to own. If they did not actually intend to convey such 
title, then they appear to have intended to perpetrate a fraud upon the Six Nations.”  See also 
page 67 of this same source, where  it is noted that in 1816 Under-Secretary of State for the 
colonies, Henry Goulburn, admitted that “the grant on the Grand River which was, after the 
peace of 1783, made to the Five Nations and their posterity forever, is a grant as full and as 
binding upon the government as any other made to individual settlers.” 
112 In addition, while both parties agree that about 45,000 acres, or 4.8% of the original 
Haldimand Proclamation land grant, is contained in the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Grand River 
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Figure 2.  The map shows the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory 
(the Haldimand Tract, outlined in red) and the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Reserve (in purple 
and white). 
 
The Haudenosaunee Six Nations have been persistent in pursuing their claims to this land 
through petitions, protests, international appeals,113 and various legal actions114
                                                                                                                                                             
reserve, Canada claims that it owns the underlying title to this land, as well.  See, for example, 
Borrows (1999) on the Canadian Supreme Court rulings on Aboriginal title. 
 (when 
113 In the early 1920s the HSN sent one of their Chiefs –Cayuga Chief Deskaheh-- to Britain in 
order to request that King George III speak to Canada about its obligations to the HSN –
obligations Canada inherited from the British Crown through the British North America 
Act/Constitution Act of 1867 (Constitution Act, 1867; Woo, 2003; Awkwesasne Notes, 2005).  
Though Deskaheh was unable to meet with the King and returned without having accomplished 
his objective, the Canadian government retaliated against the HSN by outlawing the HSN’s 
traditional government –the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council—and sending the RCMP to 
raid the homes of Confederacy Council Chiefs.  THE RCMP jailed many Chiefs, took over their 
council house, broke into the safe, stole several Wampum belts (treaties), built a Canadian army 
barracks on HSN lands and announced that a “free election” would be held to replace the 
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available115). The Haudenosaunee have also filed 29 different land claims through the Canadian 
land claims process (see Figure 3), only one of which has been resolved.  More claims would 
have been filed on additional lands (see Figure 4) but the Canadian government has prevented 
the Haudenosaunee from filing additional claims since the latter filed a 1995 lawsuit against the 
Canadian and Ontario governments.  The lawsuit has merely asked for an accounting of how the 
Canadian and Ontario governments claim to have acquired Haudenosaunee lands, and what the 
Canadian and Ontario governments have done with Haudenosaunee lands, resources and trust 
funds116
                                                                                                                                                             
traditional government (Woo, 2003; Akwesasne Notes, 2005). According to Leroy Hill, Cayuga 
sub-Chief, only 13 or 14 people voted (with several voting twice, apparently, to cast a total of 27 
votes) Ahooja’s (2008a), and with that, Canada brought “democracy” to the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations reserve.  As for Deskaheh, after his various trips to Europe and appeals to European 
countries he was denied re-entry into Canada and he eventually died in upstate New York 
without ever having seen his family again (his family members in Canada were told that they 
would not be able to return to Canada if they left to visit him). 
 (see Figure 5).  Once this suit was filed, the Canadian government ended the 
Haudenosaunee’s ability to file new claims, closed the claims already filed, and cut off funding 
for further land claims research (SNGR, 2006a: 8, 34). 
114 Some of those taken in recent decades include filing 29 claims to parcels of Haldimand tract 
lands with Canada’s Specific Claims Commission from 1980-1995 (the Specific Claims 
Commission was created by Canada in the late 1970s in response to international pressure), and 
filing a lawsuit against Canada in 1995, which demanded an accounting of what Canada did with 
all HSN lands, rents, resources, and trust funds.  In response to this lawsuit the government of 
Canada prevented the HSN from filing additional land claims, closed the HSN claims that had 
been filed, and cut off funding for HSN land claims research (SNGR, 2006a: 8, 34). 
115 Under the Indian Act, from 1927 to 1951 it was illegal in Canada for Native nations to hire 
lawyers to bring claims against Canada, and illegal for any lawyer to accept monies from a 
Native nation for such purposes. (Mathias and Yabsley, 1991; Harring, 1998a; SNGR, 2006a: 5) 
116 According to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, though their trust accounts (managed by the 
Canadian government) should contain upwards of $400 billion in revenues from leased lands, 
resource extraction, and any legitimate (or even illegitimate) land sales, the trust fund only 
contained $2.3 million in May 2004 (SNGR, 2006a: 1; SNGR 2006b).  On the $400 billion that 
should be in the Six Nations trust funds, see: Toronto Star (2006a), Marion & Canadian Press 
(2006), Burman (2006a), Best (2006b). In fact, this $400 billion estimate is incredibly low, 
compared to the well-documented instances of Crown theft of Six Nations trust funds, and 




Figure 3. The orange areas represent lands the Haudenosaunee have registered under claim 
through the Canadian land claims process.  The area that is orange and transparent represents 
an estimate of what the Canadian government claims to have obtained from the Haudenosaunee 
in 1841 (more on this claim in the text, below). Two of the Haudenosaunee claims lie outside the 
Haldimand Tract and are not shown in this map.  A tiny area in bright green represents the 
single area of land within the Haldimand Tract that is not contested by the Haudenosaunee. 
 
 
Amidst all of these efforts by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations to have their land title and treaty 
rights recognized and honored, or at least to get some sort of accounting from the Canadian and 
Ontario government, both governments have remained steadfast in their refusal to provide any 
additional legal documentation or historical evidence to justify their claims to ownership of the 
Grand River Territory. Instead, the Canadian and Ontario governments have consistently 
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engaged in a broad range of behaviors and activities aimed at preventing the HSN from asserting 
their land, treaty, resource and self-government rights.117
 
  Further, the Ontario government has  
 
Figure 4. The areas in transparent pink represent land claims that have yet to be filed.  The 
Haudenosaunee were prevented from filing additional land claims when they started a lawsuit 
against the Canadian and Ontario governments in 1995, merely asking for an accounting of how 
Canada claims to have obtained, and what Canada and Ontario have done with, Haudenosaunee 
Six Nations lands, resources and trust funds. The Canadian government also cut all funding for 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations land claims research and halted all progress on Haudenosaunee 
registered claims (the areas shown in orange in Figure 3) in response to this 1995 litigation. 
 
pushed ahead with approval for numerous settlement, development and extraction projects on 
lands under Haudenosaunee claim –including the sites under development in 2006 and the 
                                                 
117 For example, on the Canadian government’s efforts to deny these rights to Native nations 
more generally, see: Joffe (2010).  
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mandated quotas for settlement and development in 2005 (see Figure 6), both of which helped 
spark the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest. 
 
 
Figure 5. The table shows a small sample of the various ways in which Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations trust funds were used –without Haudenosaunee permission—quite literally to build 
Canada.  The Haudenosaunee Six Nations estimate that some $400 billion dollars are missing 







Figure 6. The area in dark purple represents the areas projected to have heavy settlement and 
development under Ontario’s 2005 Places to Grow Act, which mandates settlement and 
development quotas in areas outside of Ontario’s Greenbelt (represented by areas in three 
different shades of green, surrounding the Greater Toronto Area).  The town of Caledonia, the 
site of the 2006 conflict, can be seen within the Haldimand Tract, near the top right corner of the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations Reserve.  As can be seen from the map, Caledonia is one of the 
areas within the Haldimand Tract slated for heavy settlement and development. 
 
 
3) The Land Under Protest in 2006 and Its Related Land Claims 
This section is concerned with summarizing the completing claims to ownership on the land 
under protest in 2006.118
                                                 
118 Unfortunately there is not room here for an extended discussion of each of the parcels of 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations lands, the history behind these lands, the claims made upon them by 
both the Haudenosaunee and the Canadian and/or Ontario governments, and the full legal 
arguments made by each party in relation to these claims, though such an analysis has already, 
for the most part, been written. 
 The small, 40-acre plot of land that was reclaimed by Haudenosaunee 
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protesters in 2006 is a portion of two larger, overlapping land claims filed by the Haudenosaunee 
Six Nations in 1987 and 1989.  The first registered claim on this land was filed with the claim on 
the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road, an area of land consisting of approximately 10,407 acres 
(see Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 7. The Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road land claim, shown in orange, was registered 
with the Canadian land claims process in 1987. The red dot within the orange claim represents 
the approximate location of the 40-acre plot of land under protest in 2006. 
 
According to Haudenosaunee oral history and historical documentation, Crown officials 
repeatedly approached the Haudenosaunee along the Grand River in the 1830s, requesting that 
the Haudenosaunee sell this stretch of land to the Crown so the latter could build a road running 
from Hamilton to Port Dover.119
                                                 
119 Crown officials reportedly began construction on the road in 1834, before the Haudenosaunee 
had even been approached, much less agreed to a road through their lands.  The construction 
sparked complaints by the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, who complained that timber 
was being cut without Haudenosaunee permission and without compensation being paid to the 
Haudenosaunee.  See, for example, Tully (2009); Canada, Legislative Assembly (1843: 5, 27).  
According to this latter source, Indian Agent Sir John Colborne was motivated to get a surrender 
in a deal with the Grand River Navigation Company, telling the company that if it got it’s stock 
up, Colborne would get a surrender for the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road lands (pp. 5, 6, 10, 
16, 25). 
  The Haudenosaunee Six Nations repeatedly refused to sell the 
land, but consistently offered to lease the land half a mile on each side of the road to the Crown 
for this purpose, and stipulated that the lease revenues should be paid into the Haudenosaunee 
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trust funds annually (SNGR, 2006a, 2006b, and 2008).120 Crown officials eventually agreed to 
lease the land form the Haudenosaunee, but within a few years the former began treating this 
lease as if it had been a sale.  To this extent, the Crown began selling lands and issuing patents 
for lands within the half mile on either side of the road (SNGR, 2006a & 2006b; Six Nations 
Lands and Resources, 2008).121  Yet, to this day, Canadian officials have failed to produce 
documents demonstrating that this tract of land was ever knowingly or willingly surrendered to 
the British Crown or the Canadian government.122
     This second registered claim on the land (relating to the purported “General Surrender” of 
1841) is a slightly more complicated claim, in large part because the extent of the land 
supposedly being surrendered to Canada was never defined in the written document and no map 
was ever included.  Thus, the estimated area of land covered in this purported document of 
surrender varies, but for the purposes of this discussion we will stick with the Canadian 
government’s estimates as shown in Figure 8. 
  Instead, the government had relied upon non-
Natives’ historical assertions of ownership over the land, as well as the purported “General 
Surrender” of 1841, which relates to the second registered claim filed on the land. 
 
                                                 
120 For example, Crown official, Marcus Blair, stated in January of 1835, the land would be 
“utterly impossible to buy” because “the Indians will not surrender to us in perpetuity.” A lease 
for “a moderate number of years” was the alternative suggested by Blair (SNGR, 2006b). 
121 The actual process of attempting to dispossess the Haudenosaunee of these lands was actually 
much more complex than can be described here.   
122 Further, a July 2, 1862 map by the Department of Crown lands shows the Haldimand tract 
and some of the alleged surrenders of Haudenosaunee Land, but does not show the Hamilton-
Port Dover Plank Road lands as having been surrendered (Canada, LAC, Item 382, Map 
400/290).  The same lack of a surrender is shown on a map that was purportedly leaked to a Six 
Nations newspaper from Indian Northern Affairs Canada in September 2006 (see Canada, Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada, N.d.). 
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Figure 8. The area outlined in pink highlighter on this map –minus the area colored in light 
purple—represents one estimate of the area covered by the purported “General Surrender” of 
1841, as shown on page 6 of the Archives of Ontario file: Native Bands, Reserves and Land 
Claims Files: Six Nation Band – Unsold Surrendered Indian Reserve Lands April 10/89, RG 1-
568, box 233946, D 4-2-4.123
                                                 
123 The above map does not show the top third of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Grand River 
lands because less than 10 years after the Haldimand Proclamation set aside the entire 950,000 




In the 1840s, the Haudenosaunee Six Nations Confederacy Grand River Territory was overrun 
by non-Native squatters, many of whom were actively encouraged to settle on Haudenosaunee 
territory either directly by Crown officials or indirectly through clear but unofficial Crown 
policy.124  Official Crown policy had long outlawed encroachment on Native lands,125
                                                                                                                                                             
the tract through whatever means possible.  To this extent, Crown officials claimed that the top 
third of the territory was granted only in error, and thus never legitimately granted.  There are a 
number of reasons why this argument is inaccurate, but these issues go beyond the scope of the 
present work. 
 and 
124 On direct encouragement of Crown officials, see: (SNGR. 2006a; Woo, 2003; Harring, 1998; 
Podur, 2006). Johnston (1964: xlii) notes that white people were already living in the 
Haudenosaunee Grand River territory when those lands were set aside for the sole use of the 
Haudenosaunee in 1784.  Further, there may be some evidence that the Crown continued to grant 
fee simple tracts of land within Haudenosaunee Territory to loyalists for several years after 1788.  
For example, on July 23, 1788 one such grant was given to James Holmes, who was allowed to 
choose whether he wanted to live in Johnstown on the Grand River (In Haudenosaunee lands) or 
at the head of the Bay of Quinte (also Haudenosaunee lands).  See: Ontario, Archives of Ontario, 
Grant of 700 acres to Loyalist James Holmes.  July 23, 1788).  More research is needed to 
determine the full extent to which this practice occurred.  On indirect encouragement through 
unofficial Crown policies of refusing to prosecute squatters on Native lands, see Podur (2006) 
and Harring (1998: 44-45), the latter of whom notes that despite widespread knowledge of 
official Crown policy on squatting, non-Natives routinely squatted on Haudenosaunee lands 
because the Crown’s “unwillingness to remove” squatters was well known. When squatters were 
threatened with removal from these lands, they responded in outrage, and quickly filed petitions, 
attended Legislative Assembly hearings, and even brought cases to court.  Many of these efforts 
regularly resulted in the awarding of land patents to non-Natives who had squatted illegally on 
Native lands.  For more on these efforts, and to see just how far squatters were willing to go to 
gain legal title to the lands they coveted, see, for example: Canada, Legislative Assembly (1853, 
1843, and 1837: 4), Canada, House of Assembly (1837: 392-402), and Harring (1998a: 40-46, 
61). 
125 For example, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 set very strict conditions under which non-
Natives could obtain and/or settle upon lands held by Native nations and promised Crown 
enforcement of these conditions.  And in 1794 the Upper Canadian government, finding that 
squatters were endemic throughout the country and on both Indian and non-Indian lands, 
“formed an unambiguous legal policy regarding squatters,” through which land surveyors were 
expected to report cases of suspected squatting and squatters, if found guilty, were to be removed 
immediately (Harring, 1998a: 42). Further, in 1812 Upper Canada issued its Proclamation on the 
Indian Lands, which set penalties of 10 pounds for the first offense of squatting on 
Haudenosaunee lands, and penalties 20 pounds for the second offense and every offense after 
that.  The proclamation also required that every non-Native person living on Haudenosaunee 
lands report to William Claus, Superintendent General of Indian Affairs (Harringa, 1998: 43).  
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repeated Crown promises (as well as Crown fiduciary duty) to the Haudenosaunee required that 
the Crown remove non-Native squatters on Haudenosaunee territory.  But in practice, though the 
Crown prosecuted non-Natives when they squatted on non-Native lands, it put little time and 
resources into prosecuting non-Natives who squat on Native lands (Podur, 2006; Harring, 1998a: 
54, 41). Instead, the Crown officials used the presence of squatters on Native lands to try to force 
surrenders from Native nations (Harring, 1998a: 54).126  The motivations for doing so 
historically are not so dissimilar from the motivations for doing so today, i.e., to profit politically 
and economically from the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations.  Historically, 
Crown officials sought to profit politically by accommodating close to a million non-Native 
settlers moving into Upper Canada between 1790-1851 amidst a land shortage (Harring, 1998a: 
41, 44 note 53);127 to populate Upper Canada with white settlers (Ibid: 49);128
                                                                                                                                                             
And in 1837 the Upper Canadian Legislative Assembly passed a series of laws intended to 
punish squatters, including the 1839 Act of Provincial Parliament, 2nd Victoria, 15 (passed 
protecting unsurrendered Indian Lands) (Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853: 1; Harring, 
1998a: 97) --though, according to Harring, these same laws supposedly protecting Native 
peoples and their lands also treated Native peoples as dependents, and prohibited them from all 
sorts of things, including making agreements regarding the leasing or sale of their lands or the 
sale or lease of “timber, stone, hay, and soil” on those lands.  
 and to placate a 
voting population of non-Natives hungry for “free” land and willing to fight bitterly against any 
126 “By the 1820s Canadian authorities were permitting squatter occupation of the Grand River 
lands as one element of a strategy to force the Six Nations to cede their lands to the crown.  … in 
the legal chaos that followed …mere occupation of the land [was] sufficient to accord a 
substantial legal claim” on the land by non-Native squatters, under colonial law (Harring, 1998a: 
61). 
127 According to this source, the population of Upper Canada increased from 10,000 in 1790 to 
951,000 in 1851.   Meanwhile, today Canadian and Ontario officials are seeking to accommodate 
three to five million new settlers amidst a potential labor shortage in the Greater Toronto Area 
(see above discussion of the conflict, this chapter). 
128 The source notes that the Upper Canadian government was “intent on occupying Upper 
Canada with settler/farmers” and thus was “unwilling to even pretend to enforce” laws against 
non-Native squatting on Native lands.  Meanwhile, today the Canadian and Ontario governments 
seek to settle and develop Haudenosaunee lands with non-Native residents and businesses. 
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politicians who sought to enforce anti-squatting laws (Ibid: 42, 44).129  Crown officials also 
sought to profit economically, and reasoned that the value of these lands, and surrounding lands, 
would be greatly increased once squatters did the heavy labor of cutting the timber, clearing the 
lands and making them ready for cultivation (Harring, 1998: 49).  These same activities --which 
destroyed the subsistence value of the land for the Haudenosaunee by driving game away, 
destroying wild foods and plants and removing all timber without compensation to the 
Haudenosaunee-- immiserated the Haudenosaunee and (theoretically, at least) made them more 
easily coercible when land surrenders were demanded.130
     Despite the horrendous losses to Native peoples of lands, subsistence and culture, all of these 
dispossessive activities were self-servingly and paternalistically justified as “benevolence” on the 
grounds that they were necessary for “civilizing” the “Indian Race” through forcibly assimilating 
 
                                                 
129 Only whites could vote, and only property-owning whites could run for office; thus, only 
white concerns needed to be placated by politicians.  When Mohawk John Brant won an election 
to the House Assembly in 1832 this was challenged on the basis that those who voted for him 
were mainly squatters or Indians, the former of which did not own property and the latter of 
which only owned property communally, and this did not count as owning property for the 
purpose of voting or holding office (Harring, 1998a: 57).  See also: Canada, Legislative 
Assembly (1858: 121-123), which states: “it must be remembered in dealing with these lands 
that the sympathies of the Country at large are with the squatters.” While Native people can vote 
today, Canadian and Ontario officials have sought to satisfy the much more numerous non-
Native population, particularly those sectors of the population (such as the financial and business 
elite) whose livelihoods are based on the settlement and development of Native lands (see the 
first section of this chapter). 
130 Government reports that were concerned with this destruction (i.e., that squatters “clear cut 
thousands of acres of valuable oak forests and moved on”) were generally concerned not because 
it cheated Native peoples of their resources, revenues, subsistence, and so forth, but because it 
“cheated lumber companies” of revenues, or it cheated settlers of better means and social 
standing “who cannot be expected to join in the squatting or settle on the interior lots 
afterwards.” According to these reports, squatting was bad primarily because it meant that 
wealthy settlers and land speculators lost quality lands to “a poorer and inferior class of settlers” 
before the lands ever reached the market (Harring, 1998a: 43-44, 55).  Similarly, the non-Native 
settlement and development (or resource extraction) on lands under Native claim today are seen 
to increase the value of the land and force Native nations into extinguishing their land, treaty and 
aboriginal rights to the lands with little or no compensation (see chapter 4). 
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them into white ways (Reid, 2004; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991; RCAP, 1996; Harring; 1998a: 41, 
61).131
The younger portion of the Indian Race may be led to form new and civilized 
habits, but in our opinion all that can be done for those now advanced in life, is, 
so far as may be possible, to give them the means of support in exchange for the 
land they occupy so unprofitably. (P. 121-23) 
  For example, one Report in the Journal of the Legislative Assembly of Upper Canada 
(1858) argued that: 
 
 Another urged: 
 
That complete protection of such [Indian] property can only be looked for as the 
result of that change which shall assimilate the Indians with people accustomed 
from infancy to the idea of separate and individually appropriated property, where 
each is, under Law, the protector of his own possessions… (Canada, Legislative 
Assembly, 1847; Harring, 1998a: 41) 
 
Other common stereotypes and alleged justifications at the time held that Native peoples were 
“improvident” and lazy people who “had a natural aversion to labour,” were dependent upon 
government payment of annuities,132 and were merely wasting the lands they held by refusing to 
put them to good use through clearing and cultivation (Harring, 1998: 54-55).133
                                                 
131 This same rhetoric is also widespread among non-Native residents and Canadian/ provincial 
officials today, though equally widespread is the outright denial that such lands belong to Native 
nations at all.  Both forms of justification are clearly visible in the Caledonia conflict, as will be 
further demonstrated in chapters 4 and 6. 
  These same 
132 Annuities are annual revenues owed according to treaty agreements relating to the sharing (or 
alleged surrender) of lands. “This reliance [on annuity payments] has doubtless had the effect of 
encouraging their natural indolence and improvidence; of keeping them a distinct people; of 
fostering their natural pride and consequent aversion to labour; and of creating an undue feeling 
of dependence upon the protection and bounty of the Crown.” (Canada, Legislative Assembly, 
1847; Harring, 1998a: 54).  Of course, the forcible transformation of Native peoples from 
independent sovereign peoples into a state of dependency had considerable strategic value for the 
British Crown, since by creating Native dependence upon the British Crown the latter was able 
to claim that Native sovereignty was subordinate to (and even subsumed by) British/Canadian 
sovereignty.  See, for example, Lenzerini’s (2006: 157-59) discussion of sovereignty as it was 
formulated in early international law. 
133 This was an entirely false characterization of Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples who 
were highly efficient at agricultural (remember, it was Native people and their generosity and 
abundance of agricultural produce that helped the first several European settlements survive). 
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stereotypes and civilized/uncivilized dichotomies were also used to portray settlers who illegally 
squatted on Native lands –and destroyed Native subsistence-- as “honest and hard working-
farmers,” and to portray Native peoples who complained about illegal squatting as scheming 
victimizers.134
     It was against this background and amidst these “justifications” that Crown officials 
encouraged and/or refused to prosecute squatting on the Haudenosaunee’s Grand River lands in 
the 1830s and 1840s.  When repeatedly pressured by the Haudenosaunee to fulfill treaty 
promises and remove the squatters, the Crown engaged in a half-hearted campaign against the 
squatters on Haudenosaunee lands: paying the illegal squatters financial “compensation” for their 
alleged losses out of the Haudenosaunee trust funds (Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853).  
Many of the squatters who received compensation to leave the Haudenosaunee lands later 
refused to leave and/or sought additional compensation on the basis that they had been “injured” 
by living in a “semi-wilderness state” that had deprived them of roads and markets (Ibid).  Those 
who persisted were eventually awarded the right of preemption in November of 1840, meaning 
that they had first claim towards purchasing the lands upon which they had illegally squat (Ibid).  
Meanwhile, the Haudenosaunee were never compensated for the unpaid rents, for the loss of 
valuable resources, or for the wanton destruction of their lands and subsistence by the non-
Native squatters (Ibid).  Instead, they were forced to pay those who had squat illegally on their 
  
                                                 
134 For example, illegal squatters were frequently portrayed as “innocent victims” who had fallen 
prey to scheming Natives who mislead the squatters into believing they could lease the land. 
Harring (1998a: 42-45, 49-50) notes that such accusations were “dishonest” and entirely 
unfounded, particularly given the fact that most squatters had no leases and knew they were 
squatting illegally.  
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lands for the destruction they had caused, and were in many ways forced to fund their own 
further immiseration,135
     In 1840, after being ordered to obtain a surrender of Haudenosaunee lands, Chief 
Superintendent of Indian Affairs Samuel Jarvis wrote a letter to the Haudenosaunee Confederacy 
Council blaming them for the presence of non-Native squatters on their lands, insisting that the 
Crown could do nothing to remedy the situation, and accusing them of barring progress and 
posing a nuisance to the province and the public by keeping their land in a natural state.
 something which was quickly used against them.     
136
                                                 
135 Haudenosuanee trust funds were further used –without Haudenosaunee approval or often 
knowledge-- to fund the surveying of lands, the laying out of village sites, for roads and other 
“improvements” that were desired by non-Natives, and for various other activities of the Indian 
department, including the salaries of Indian Department officials. Further, Though Crown 
officials insisted on holding and managing Native trust fund accounts, Native peoples such as the 
Haudenosaunee were charged for this “service” –and were often charged at more than twice the 
rate of these services elsewhere [Canada, House of Assembly (1837: 392-402); Canada, 
Legislative Assembly (1858: 107)]. In other words, the Haudenosaunee were forced to fund their 
own colonial dispossession and near-destruction as a distinct people.   
 Jarvis 
136 Jarvis (1841a) wrote, in part:  
The Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion that very great difficulties will be found in 
any medium course between the expulsion of all intruders or non-interference, as 
experience has shewn that with all the anxiety to do justice, and with all the care 
exercised to prevent injury to Indian interests, the interference of the Indians 
themselves, continually, has created new difficulties, to which there seems to be no end, 
and yet the Government is expected to compromise its own character by adjudging what 
is right and wisely recommended by the Indians, or what, on the other hand, may be 
capriciously or corruptly counseled by them. 
   The Lieutenant Governor is of the opinion that there can be no remedy found for the 
continuance of this unsatisfactory and embarrassing state of affairs while the lands 
remain general property under the circumstances which it is no reproach to the Indians 
to say that they cannot manage the estate for the general interests of the tribes. 
   The Lieutenant Governor therefore considers that it would be very much for the 
benefit of the interests of the Indians if they surrendered into the hands of the 
Government the whole tract [except for a small, unidentified portion for their use] … 
which at present is not only unproductive to the Indians, but absolutely useless to them 
in every point of view, and which is considered by the public a bar to the improvement 
and prosperity of the districts in which it is situated, and in fact a nuisance which the 
public have a right to call upon Government to abate.  
   Harring (1998: 52 and 41) suggests that both the claim that Upper Canada could do nothing to 
remedy the situation, and the claim that the Haudenosaunee were, themselves, to blame for the 
 79 
insisted that the only plausible course of action in response to repeated Haudenosaunee 
complaints about illegal squatters on their lands (Harring, 1998: 50-52, 41-42) would be for the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations to surrender all of their land except a small plot, which would be 
reserved for their own use.  Ten days later, after having received word that the Haudenosaunee 
were upset by the tone of his letter and by the Crown’s repeated breach of its treaty agreements 
and fiduciary duty to the Haudenosaunee,137 he wrote a second letter, insisting that his first letter 
had been “altogether misinterpreted” (Jarvis, 1841b).  Arguing that he only wanted to “protect 
the true interest of the Indians,” Jarvis repeated and elaborated upon the accusations in his first 
letter138
                                                                                                                                                             
mass presence of squatters were completely false.  For example (41): “The government’s 
professed inability to protect Indian lands belies both logic and reality, a fact the Six Nations 
pointed out at the time.  No crime is more easy to detect than squatting, which, by definition, is 
open and prolonged.”  Further, (52) the Haudenosaunee had provided the government with a list 
of names and locations of squatters on their lands when they demanded their removal. 
 and insisted that the Haudenosaunee must surrender to the Crown all but a tiny plot of 
their land.  Jarvis gave the Chiefs three days time to document their agreement to this surrender -
-knowing full well both that the Chiefs were unlikely to agree to Jarvis’ demands and that even if 
they had wanted to do so, it would have been impossible for the 50 or more Confederacy Chiefs 
137 Including treaty promises and fiduciary duty to remove illegal non-native squatters from 
Haudenosaunee lands. 
138 For example, while repeating the accusations that it was the Indians own fault that white 
people had illegally crowded onto their lands and claiming that nothing could be done to remove 
them, Jarvis also claimed that the Indians had taken large payments from non-Natives in 
pretended sales to them (large payments which the Natives were now “wholly incapable of ever 
refunding”). [Of course, these accusations were patently false (Harring, 1998a: 52)].  Jarvis 
further suggested that the Six Nations would benefit from the sale of their lands because the 
monies would be deposited into a fund for them that would earn interest and increase 
continually.  He stated that he was not suggesting that any Native person should be forcibly 
removed from his/her lands, but that all lands not in use should be surrendered so as not to cause 
further injury to their non-Native neighbors.  Finally, he made yet one more promise that, if the 
Haudenosaunee just agreed to this surrender of virtually their entire tract of land, the Crown 
would ensure “that any further trespass or intrusion, of any nature whatsoever, upon the reserved 
tract, whether committed without or with the approbation of the Indians, either singly or 
collectively, will meet with the strongest disapprobation of the Government, and that the party 
offending shall be immediately removed and punished according to the law.” (Jarvis, 1841b). 
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(many of whom lived a great distance from the Haudensoaunee Grand River Territory) and all of 
the people whom the represented,139
I am informed, and believe from my own observations, that the above plan 
proposed meets with the approbation of the most intelligent, industrious and 
worthy of the Indians, and I am fully satisfied that their true interest requires its 
adoption. 
 to come to a consensus on the matter within three days time.  
Stating that he would be at the Onondaga Council House in three days, Jarvis further threatened 
that if the Chiefs could not come to an unanimous agreement in favor of Jarvis’ proposition, the 
Crown would take over the Haudenosaunee Six Nations affairs and do what it wanted with 
Haudenosaunee lands: 
   Those who are opposed to it must therefore reflect that any private division in 
the Council, from whatever cause proceeding, cannot prevent the Government 
from interfering in seconding the wishes of the industrious and from promoting 
the wealth and prosperity of the Nation as a body. 
     In case any further divisions should take place in Council, and by declining 
amicably to meet the views of the Government, the Indians should continue to 
thwart the measures devised as most conducive to their interest, I am 
apprehensive that the Government will be compelled, however reluctantly, to take 
into their own hands the exclusive management of their affairs, and as Chief 
Superintendent it will be my duty, immediately upon my return, to recommend 
such a course, to prevent the public property of the Six Nations from being 
sacrificed to the avarice and rapacity of individuals. (Jarvis, 1841b) 
 
                                                 
139 At the time, there were at least 50, and possibly as many as 88 chiefs living throughout the 
Haudenosaunee territories, of which the Grand River Territory/Haldimand Tract is but one, with 
the rest being located throughout Ontario, Quebec, New York State and even Wisconsin.  For 
example, Holmes (2009b: 9), notes that there were 88 chiefs in January, 1845.  As noted above 
in the brief background on the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, the Chiefs were literally 
representatives of the people and had no power whatsoever to make decisions regarding the 
alienation of lands.  Williams (1982) further remarks upon the European colonists continual 
inability to comprehend this sort of non-hierarchical, democratic governance structure, and 
constantly wanted to portray and treat Haudenosaunee Chiefs (and Native chiefs in general) as 
princes with unlimited power over their people.  This preference is likely both in part because of 
the European’s inability to comprehend democracy at the time (Di Nunzio, 1987), but also the 
fact that pushing their agendas upon Native people would be much easier if they only had to 
convince one supreme power, rather than the entire populace –or, at least, if they only had to cut 
off the head of the sovereign in order to control the body, as was done with the Mexica (Aztec) 
and other Empires in South America. 
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     Three days later Jarvis arrived as promised (threatened), but found only six people at the 
Onondaga Council House (not all of whom have since been confirmed to be Chiefs).  Because 
most if not all of these men had been born and raised speaking their own Haudenosaunee 
languages140 in a culture based on oral, rather than written history and in which Chiefs are 
servants of the people enmeshed in this traditional culture, it seems highly likely that none of 
these men could read the English document presented to them.  Further, all of these men would 
have had understood that in Haudenosaunee culture the women are the titleholders to the land, 
decisions could be made without consulting all of the people, and the alienation of land was 
contrary to the Haudenosaunee Great Law.141 Thus, though three-to-five of the men who were 
present at the longhouse on that day signed the document, they immediately protested that the 
document had been misrepresented to them, that they had not known what they had been signing, 
and that they were all opposed to the surrender.142  Further, even if these men had all be Chiefs, 
the signatures of three-to-five men, at a time when there were fifty or more Haudenosaunee 
Chiefs,143
                                                 
140 Each Haudenosaunee nation (Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Tuscarora and Seneca) 
have their own language, though there is some overlap in the languages and some fluent speakers 
of one language can understand other languages). 
 does not constitute an agreement --particularly when all of these men, as well as the 
141 The alienation of lands is prohibited in the laws of most Native nations throughout North 
America, as is also true of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace.  On this point relating 
generally to Native nations, see McNeil (2001-2002); on this point relating specifically to 
Haudenosaunee law, see the above background on the Haudenosaunee, as well as Akwesasne 
Notes (2005).   
142 The Chiefs said the document was presented to them as some mandate from the Queen of 
England, not the officials of Canada, and that they had no choice in the matter (certainly this 
latter impression was Jarvis’ intention, as per the threats to this extent in his January 15, 1841 
letter). 
143 Holmes (2009b) notes that there were some 88 Haudenosaunee chiefs around 1844. 
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full Haudenosaunee Six Nations Council, immediately protested to Jarvis and petitioned the 
Queen to have the document invalidated (Jarvis, 1841c).144
     The Haudenosaunee have continued to protest this fraudulent surrender since this date, and in 
1843 the Governor General of Upper Canada acknowledged the invalidity of the document 
(McDowell, 2008: 113-14), as did Jarvis, himself, that same year (Jarvis, 1843) and again the 
following year (Holmes, 2009a),
 
145 and as did later Superintendent Generals of Indian Affairs 
(Canada, Legislative Assembly, 1853).146  Despite these acknowledgements, Jarvis appears to 
have continued to impress upon the Haudenosaunee the belief that the surrender had been valid 
and mandatory (Jarvis, 1844),147
                                                 
144 Though full Council of Chiefs requested that Jarvis present their petition to the Queen, it does 
not appear that Jarvis ever did so. 
 and that the only matter up for discussion was which 
previously-undefined area of land would be reserved for the Haudenosaunee.   
145 Holmes is citing: Jarvis, Samuel P.  Chief Superintendent of Indian Affairs to Six Nations 
Chiefs, February 7, 1844. LAC RG 10 Vol. 717 pp. 243 Reel C-13, 411. 
146 In this source, superintendent General of Indian Affairs R. Bruce acknowledged in July 1851 
that the 1841 “General Surrender” did not obtain a surrender from the Haudenosaunee, though he 
also tried to imply that the document did authorize the Government to take over parts of the 
Haudenosaunee’s affairs (which is inaccurate, since a fraudulent document cannot authorize 
anything). “This agreement having created great dissatisfaction, and been repudiated by a large 
majority of the Chiefs and Indians, never received the formal sanction of the Government.” In 
addition, Bruce noted that, though he disagreed with the Six Nations’ refusal to surrender their 
lands, the government had to pay the highest respects to the rights of the Indians, and thus "even 
when different from them in opinion, with reference to the precise extent of their proposed 
reserve, it felt constrained to yield to their ascertained wishes.” 
147 In his draft letter, Jarvis notes that the Governor General had reviewed the Haudnosaunee’s 
petition, and then proceeds to blame the Haudenosaunee for the over-abundance of non-Native 
squatters on their territories (“It is a fact which the Six Nations Indians cannot deny that three 
fourths of the people occupying their lands have been invited to purchase and settle on them by 
the Indians themselves and in many instances by the very Indians who now complain of the 
inconvenience which has been thus occasioned”). He further notes that the “surrender to the 
Crown of a large tract of their waste lands in 1841 was a wise measure and should have been 
strictly attended to by the Indians.  The sale of these lands will in the course of a few years place 
the Indians in a sate of comparative affluence.”  Though it is unclear what final draft of the letter 
was ever sent (if any), this seems to be evidence that, still in 1844, Jarvis was giving no 
acknowledgement to the Haudenosaunee that the government had already acknowledged the 
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4) The Canadian and Ontario Governments’ Arguments, and the Historical Fact Pertaining to 
the Hamilton-Port Dover Plank Road Land Claim and the “General Surrender” of 1841. 
There are four general parts to the Canadian government’s claims that the Haudenosaunee gave 
up (or the Canadian government obtained) all title and rights to the lands under protest in 2006.  
In this section I will first summarize the most detailed part of this claim.  I will then briefly 
describe some of the laws and precedents relating to the surrender or extinguishment of Native 
rights and title to lands in order to further demonstrate that fallacious quality of this first part of 
Canada’s claim.  Finally, I will briefly explain the other three parts of Canada’s claim on this 
land –and the insurmountable evidence that contradicts these arguments.  
     The Canadian and Ontario governments have persistently cited the purported “General 
Surrender” of 1841 as a legitimate document of surrender through which the British-Canadian 
government gained title to a huge portion of Haudenosaunee Grand River Territory.  For 
example, in the Crown’s 1996 Statement of Defense against the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
lawsuit, the Canadian government stated: 
On January 18, 1841 the Six Nations in Council agreed to the surrender of all of 
their lands, with certain exceptions, with a view to those lands being disposed of 
for the benefit of the Six Nations. 
     Following the surrender, a faction of the Six Nations sent the government 
petitions objecting to the surrender….(Canada, Attorney General, 1996, paras. 67 
and 68)148
                                                                                                                                                             
1841 surrender as invalid.  After all, one would think that if the Haudenosaunee had been 
notified of this fact prior to this letter draft, Jarvis would not still be writing of the 1841 
surrender as a wise move (since there would have been no surrender to speak of).  
 
148 On the protests of the Chiefs who signed once they learned what it was they had signed, see 
Jarvis (1841c). In fact, virtually all of the existing Haudenosaunee Chiefs protested and 
petitioned against this surrender.  Not only did these chiefs number far more than the number of 
men who had signed the document, but they also were acting on discussions about the surrender 
that they had had in Council and in consultation with the Haudenosaunee people they 
represented. The representation by Canada of those protesting the surrender as a faction --and the 
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This assertion has been repeated again and again by the Canadian and Ontario governments.  For 
example, it was a key point of contention between Natives and non-Natives during the 2006 
protest, and more recently the Archives of Ontario --in consultation with the Ontario Ministry of 
Aboriginal Affairs and the Government of Canada-- made the assertion that: 
On January 18, 1841, the “Chiefs and Warriors of the Six Nations Indians” met in 
“full Council assembled at the Onondaga Council House” and agreed to surrender 
all of the remaining Haldimand Tract land for sale or lease, except for those parts 




In their 1996 response to the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 1995 lawsuit, the Canadian 
government also argued that: “no Six Nations lands were sold without the consent of the Six 
                                                                                                                                                             
implicit suggestion that everyone else was in favor of the protest—is of interest here, both 
because it is reflected in the Canadian government’s rhetoric around the 2006 protest (labeling 
the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council and the protesters as a faction), and because it is an 
outright lie. Those who protested the surrender were not a faction, they were the Haudenosaunee 
Council and people.  And those who signed the document were not the Council, they were a 
faction (a tiny faction of people who days later stated that the document had been misrepresented 
to them, that they did not know what they had signed and that they were strongly opposed to any 
such surrender). 
   Just as historically Canada treated those few –however small in number—who went along with 
Canada’s will as the legitimate leaders of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations, so in 2006 did Canada 
treat the colonially-imposed but virtually unsupported Six Nations Band Council as the 
legitimate leadership of the people.  And just as historically Canada referred to the 
Haudenosaunee people and their traditional government as a mere “faction,” so, in 2006, did 
Canada treat the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government as a radical faction –
though the hundreds of protesters who descended upon the site to halt the police raid on April 
19th belies this suggestion. In fact, this has consistently been Canada’s approach toward 
traditional Native governments within Canadian borders who refuse to go along with Canada’s 
plans for taking Native lands, rights and resources and for forcibly assimilating Native peoples.  
This will be discussed in some more detail below, and in chapter 4. 
149 Though the Archives is clearly quoting something, it does not cite the source –which, 
regardless, is entirely incorrect in its assertion.  The Chiefs did not meet on the matter in the 
mere three days given for them to do so, and they most certainly did not meet in “full council” 
nor agree to the document in “full council” on January 18, 1841.  Instead, a mere handful of 
people –not all of whom have been confirmed to be chiefs—were present at the Onondaga 
Council House, some of whom signed the document, stating that it was misrepresented to them 
and they had not known what they were signing. 
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Nations Council” (Canada, Attorney General, 1996 at 103), and that the invalid 1841 surrender 
had been affirmed in an 1843 petition and an 1844 document containing the minutes of a council 
meeting: 
     This Defendant says that the Six Nations consented to the sale of these lands.  
The consent was given after the Six Nations had thoroughly discussed the matter 
at various Council meeting between 1840 and 1844…. [T]he Six Nations 
consented to the sale of these lands at a Council meeting held on December 18, 
1844. (Canada, Attorney General, 1996, para. 115) 
 
     The circumstances surrounding 1841 “General Surrender” document have already been 
discussed above and considerable evidence has already been provided to show that the 
proceedings of this attempted surrender were coercive; that the surrender document was 
misrepresented to those who signed it; that only a tiny handful of people (not all of whom have 
been confirmed to be Chiefs) signed the document --out of 50 or more Chiefs whose signatures 
would have been required; that the Haudenosaunee did not even have time to meet and discuss 
the issue;150
     The 1843 petition upon which the Canadian government relies for “affirmation” of the 1841 
“General Surrender” is actually a petition protesting that very surrender.  At the time the 
Haudenosaunee wrote the 1843 petition, they had heard nothing back from their 1841 petition to 
the Queen of England (who likely never received it from Jarvis). They do not appear to have 
been informed that the government had denounced and agreed not to recognize the “General 
Surrender” of 1841 (as evidenced in Jarvis’ draft letter of 1844).  They were thus under the 
 and that the Upper Canadian government, itself, later admitted numerous times that 
the document did not actually obtain a surrender, was invalid, and as such, never received the 
formal sanction of the Upper Canadian government.  All of these facts were available long 
before the Canadian government’s 1996 Statement of Defense. 
                                                 
150 This is particularly true given the great distance away that many of their chiefs –and people—
live from each other and the Onondaga council house on the Six Nations reserve. 
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impression –just as clearly Stated in Jarvis’ January 15, 1841 letter-- that the government was 
taking their lands regardless of their opposition and protests, and that all they could do was plead 
to keep certain portions of their lands.  As such, the Haudenosaunee wrote their 1843 petition in 
a tone of bargaining and pleading: they pleaded to retain certain of their lands (lands south of the 
Grand River, plus the various tracts near Brantford)151 and attempted to leverage their pleading 
with the argument that the government had already taken --and/or the Haudenosaunee had 
already “given”-- the remainder of their lands, so they should at least be able to keep these 
(Holmes, 2009).152
     The 1844 document that the Canadian government also cites as an “affirmation” of the 1841 
“General Surrender” is a very abbreviated summary of a meeting between the Haudenosaunee 
and Canadian officials which spanned a couple days (December 13
  In other words, the document reveals the reality that had become all too clear 
to the Haudenosaunee –they were losing their lands to a government that took what it wanted, 
did not keep its treaty promises, had no consideration for Haudenosaunee traditional governing 
processes, and did not care that the Haudenosaunee protested or objected vehemently against 
these actions.  
th and 18th, 1844).  This 
meeting summary, referred to as “meeting minutes,” was written by an Upper Canadian colonial 
official who was part of an Indian Department contingent ordered to secure lands from the 
Haudenosaunee.153
                                                 
151 The Haudenosaunee had always made clear that they wanted to retain Oxbow bend, 
Johnson’s settlement, Eagle’s nest, the Mohawk Flats, Martin’s settlement, and other tracts of 
land near Brantford, and to lease these lands to non-Natives for short, 21-year periods, so that 
they would have some annual revenues coming in from the land and, when the Haudenosaunee 
population grew, would be able to use it for their future generations. 
  The “meeting minutes” do not detail the discussions during the meeting, and 
152 Holmes is citing: Petition of the Chiefs and Sachems of the Six Nation of Indians residing on 
the Grand River, undated ca. June 1843. Library and Archives Canada. Vol. 624, pp 241-245. 
153 Canada. Library Archives Canada. RG 10 Vol. 144, pp 83271-83279.  Meeting minutes, 
Onondaga Council House, December 13 and December 18, 1844. 
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do not give voice to any points, arguments or statements made by the Haudenosaunee Chiefs at 
the meeting.  Instead, it contains only the Crown’s proposal as to which lands the 
Haudenosaunee will reserve for themselves, and an agreement that the Haudenosaunee can lease 
or sell the Brantford area lands that they had already expressed an interest in leasing in their 
1843 petition.  To this extent, the 1844 proposal by the Crown reflects a response to the pleas in 
the 1843 petition from the Haudensoaunee (in which the Haudenosaunee believe that their land is 
being taken from them without their consent and all they can do is plead and attempt to bargain 
to keep certain lands within the boundaries of their reserve). For example, the Crown is clearly 
responding to the 1843 petition pleas of the Haudenosaunee when it argues that the lands pleaded 
for in that petition are too much, and that the Haudenosaunee should satisfy themselves with 
keeping less than that.154
                                                 
154 In their 1843 petition, the Haudenosaunee pleaded to keep all of the lands on the south side of 
the Grand River, as well as the various Brantford tracts of land.  In this 1844 proposal, the 
Crown argues that –though the Haudenosaunee should have a free choice in this matter—it is not 
in their interest to keep such a large portion of land. The Crown instead argues that, instead of 
keeping all of the lands on the south side of the river, the Haudenosaunee can/should really only 
keep half (or less) of these lands –i.e., those within Tuscarora Township.  For example:  
 (The Crown also slips the term “sale” into the agreement when it 
The Commissioner is instructed by Command of his Excellency the Governor General 
to bring under the reconsideration of the Chiefs of the Six Nations of Indians in Council 
the lands to be set apart as a territory for the future residence of them selves and their 
people and the leasing or selling of such parts of their lands on the Grand River known 
as Oxbow, Eagles Nest, Martin and Johnson settlements. 
   While his Excellency is desirous that their choice should be free on the reserve as he 
does that it should be in all other matters connected with their own property yet he does 
not consider that their interest would be promoted in extending the tract to become their 
future [illegible] residence from the west side of the Plank Road to Burtch’s Landing or 
that of leasing of the places aforementioned. 
   But his Excellency believes that it would promote the welfare of the tribes by having 
the reserve confined to the Township of Tuscarora (according to the boundary about to 
be established.  A sketch of which is herewith submitted). [No sketch is contained in 
this document].  (LAC RG 10 Vol. 144, pp 83271-83279. Meeting minutes, Onondaga 
Council House, December 13 and December 18, 1844). 
By the time this Crown proposal had been made, the Haudenosaunee had been dealing with 
British-Canadian government officials for centuries, and knew full well that the language of 
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suggests that the Brantford tracts of land could be set aside for “leasing or selling” –though it is 
clear the Haudenosaunee only wanted to lease these lands. 155
                                                                                                                                                             
“free choice” and “in their interest” was not meant literally, but was language of manipulation 
and coercion (note the extensive use of references to the Indian interest in the 1841 letters written 
by Samuel Jarvis to the Haudenosaunee, for example).  A whole dissertation chapter (or 
dissertation) could be written on the manipulative use of language by non-native government 
officials historically and today, but that will have to be a work for another time. 
).  As a document responding to the 
1843 Haudenosaunee petition, the 1844 proposal does not acknowledge the invalidity of the 
1841 General Surrender, but proceeds as if that surrender was a done deal and as if the only issue 
155 By slipping the word sale into the discussion, the Crown appears to be setting the stage for 
future fraudulent dispossession of even these lands.  While the Haudenosaunee knew full well 
the difference between leasing and selling plots of land, and had always maintained that they 
wished to lease their land, not sell it, Crown officials –unbeknownst to the Haudenosaunee-- 
often treated leases as sales, and would grant title to land based on leases.  Non-Native settlers, 
similarly, picked upon this and also treated leases –even short, 21-year leases—as sales, thus 
causing infinite problems for the Haudenosaunee when individual non-Native leaseholders 
subdivided and/or sold lands that had been clearly leased to them.  See, for example, Journal of 
the House of Assembly of Upper Canada, 1836, November 8, p. 396, in which a number of non-
Natives sought to have the government recognize their title to/ownership of land based on the 
fact that they had each obtained a lease from an Native person for 21-years or less.  Others did 
not even had leases, only their word that they had gotten permission from individual Natives to 
live on and farm a particular area of land.  Some of the leases had been confirmed at Indian 
Councils, while others had not, and some of them were purportedly confirmed by (deceased) 
Joseph Brant.  The Assembly notes that they don’t know whether Brant acted in good faith in 
confirming leases, but that they have not seen evidence that he did not.  Further, they reason that 
and that the Six Nations would have to be bound by the acts of their agent, and so they hold that 
all leases purportedly confirmed by Brant would be sufficient for granting title.  A number of 
people without this confirmation were also granted title (a matter discussed more thoroughly in 
future hearings of the Assembly) –despite the fact that all of these agreements were leases, not 
sales.   
     The after-the-fact treatment of Native leases as sales was so prevalent among non-Natives that 
even contemporary writers confuse the difference.  For example, Sidney Harring, in his seminal 
book White Man’s Law (1998 Toronto: University of Toronto Press) consistently treats the two 
different types of agreements as synonymous (and as sales), reflecting the historical attitudes 
towards Native land rights. 
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for debate was which previously undetermined lands will be reserved by the Haudenosaunee out 
of all of the lands being taken.156
     Thus, clearly both the 1843 petition and the 1844 meeting minutes encouraged the 
Haudenosaunee to believe that their lands had been virtually all taken from them by a unilateral 
action of the Canadian government in 1841, and that the only thing the Haudenosaunee could do 
was attempt to save as much of this land as possible through pleas and bargaining attempts.  
Despite the obvious fraud and coercion, the Canadian government routinely uses these 1843 and 
1844 documents as “evidence” that the 1841 “General Surrender” was valid.  Yet, neither the 
1843 petition nor the 1844 meeting minutes are documents of surrender.  Neither document 
requests consent or affirmation of surrender, and in neither document do the Haudenosaunee 
explicitly agree to a surrender.
   
157
     What’s more, despite the Canadian government’s ongoing omission of historical evidence 
that the “General Surrender” of 1841 was illegitimate and invalid, it remains true that, even if the 
1841 “General Surrender” document had not been declared invalid by the Upper Canadian 
government, it certainly would be declared as such by any honest judge in any of Canada’s high 
courts today. To lend support to this assertion, it seems worthwhile to briefly review some of the 
laws and precedents relating to surrenders of Native lands and the extinguishment of Native 
.  The 1844 document does not even mention the word 
“surrender,” nor does it use comparative terminology. Thus, rather than aiding in the legitimacy 
of an otherwise admittedly illegitimate document of surrender, both documents appear to 
represent an ongoing fraud perpetrated upon the Haudenosaunee.  
                                                 
156 There are a number of other problems with this document in relation to the Brantford tracts of 
land that the Haudenosaunee had repeatedly set aside for leasing, but here I will stay focused on 
the tracts of land under protest in 2006.  
157 Much less do they agree to it in a public meeting of the full Haudenosaunee Council that was 
advertised in advance and called for the explicit purpose of granting a surrender of land (a 
requirement under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, discussed further below). 
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rights on and/or title to these lands.  After that I will even more briefly mention the other, much 
more easily refutable, aspects of Canada’s claims to have obtained this land. 
     Under Canadian constitutional law,158 the extinguishment of Native title, rights and/or 
interests on lands within Canadian borders can only be achieved in only two ways: 1) prior to 
1982, through constitutionally-applicable (i.e., federal) legislation that expresses clear and plain 
intent to extinguish Native title and rights,159
Legal Scholar Kent McNeil (2001-2002) has examined the various limits involved in the first 
method of extinguishment and has concluded that extinguishment under this method never 
occurred, because there are no known federal statutes that could have achieved it.  Thus, a 
voluntary agreement with the relevant Native nation(s) is the only means through which Canada 
can legitimately claim to have obtained ownership to lands within Canada’s borders under 
Canadian law. 
 and 2) through a voluntary agreement with Native 
nations.  
                                                 
158 Which involves some highly problematic, and unfounded, assumptions of Canadian 
sovereignty over First Nations lands and peoples. These assumptions and their fictitious nature 
will be discussed more in chapter 5. 
159 In R. v. Sparrow [1990], the Supreme Court of Canada held that the “existing rights” 
protected by section 35(1) of Canada’s Constitution Act, 1982, includes those rights that had not 
been extinguished prior to 1982, either through agreement or through federal legislation 
expression a clear and plain intent to extinguish Native title and rights.  For more on clear and 
plain intent, see: R. v. Sparrow [1990] at 1099 and Calder et al. v. Attorney-General of British 
Columbia, [1973] at 404. Only the federal Parliament (from 1931-1982) or the Imperial 
Parliament (possibly up to 1860) have constitutional authority to interfere with property rights, 
the federal executive branch does not (McNeil, 2001-2002: 310-11, 315, 320, 322, 324).  Thus, 
provincial legislation could not (cannot) achieve the extinguishment of Native title or rights 
(McNeil, 2001-2002; Lambert, 2009). McNeil (2001-2), however, points to a disturbing 
possibility that title can also be extinguished in courts, as was the case in Chippewas of Sarnia 
Band v. Canada (Attorney General) (2000 and 2001). 
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     However, not all purportedly voluntary surrenders are equal, and legal scholars,160 
government reports,161 and even the Supreme Court of Canada162 have increasingly recognized 
that the English/written versions of treaties purporting to obtain surrenders from Native nations 
frequently did not reflect the oral agreements made between Native nations and Crown officials, 
nor did they reflect the understandings or intentions of Native nations who had entered into them.  
In fact, it has become clear that in a large number of treaties of purported surrender, the 
intentions of many Native nations was not to surrender or alienate land at all, since the alienation 
of land is prohibited by the traditional laws of most (if not all) Native nations throughout present 
day Canada (McNeil, 2001-2002: 304-08 and corresponding notes; Venne, 2002; Hutchins, 
2009; Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996: 459; Pape, 2009).163
                                                 
160 McNeil (2001:305-7 and accompanying footnotes); Macklem (2002); Hutchins (2009); Pape 
(2009); Venne (2002). 
  Instead, history has 
161 Reference here is to the Hon. Sidney Linden in Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (Queen’s 
Printer for Ontario, 2007), Vol. 2, pp. 109-110. Also see: Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples (RCAP) op cit. (1996 at 459).  
162 For example, see: R. v. Badger, [1996]; R. v. Marshall, [1999]; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band, [1990]; R. v. Paulette [1977] (all of which are also discussed in McNeil, 2001-2002, who 
also provides an overview of relevant lower court rulings on this topic). 
163 Under these traditional laws of Native nations, land is seen not as a commodity that can be 
bought, sold, traded or given away, but as a sacred gift given by the Creator not only to the 
present generation of people, but to the past and future generations, as well as to all plant and 
animal life –all of which has an equal right to the land that nurtures it. Hutchins has noted that 
this has also been recognized by the Inter-American Court (Hutchins, 2009: 455-6). See also: 
Akwesasne Notes, 2005 on these aspects of the Haudenosuanee Great Law of Peace. Thus, as 
legal scholar Kent McNeil has noted, since “Aboriginal parties to treaties would presumably 
have acted in accordance with their own laws, they cannot have intended to surrender their entire 
interest to the Crown if that would have violated these laws.” (McNeil, 2001: at 307.  But see: 
304-8).  See also: Hutchins (2009), who further notes:  
So to suggest that First Nations negotiating with Crown representatives for recognition, 
protection and security are not only ceding, releasing and surrendering their territory as 
a “fungible commodity” (the term used by Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw) in 
European eyes, but in so doing we also severing themselves from their systems of 
Aboriginal law and the elements of the practices, customs and traditions encompassed 
in that body of law is, I would submit, a most improbably assertion and one that has 
never been satisfactorily explained through Canadian jurisprudence. (P. 447) 
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shown overwhelmingly that Native nations intended to share their lands with newcomers, and 
that this is the understanding many Native peoples had when making treaties with Crown 
officials. As Justice Sidney B. Linden noted in the Report of the Ipperwash Inquiry (2007): 
Every treaty in Ontario supported the expectation that treaty lands outside of 
reserve[s] would be shared.  Promises made by Crown representatives encouraged 
these expectations, but despite these promises, colonial and Canadian authorities 
referred to these lands as “surrendered lands.” …     Although, in making treaties 
with the Crown [Native nations] agreed to give up their exclusive title to these 
lands, they never intended to abandon them.  They continue to regard these lands 
as a major source of their sustenance, and as fundamental to their identity.  The 
promise of continued access to these lands was a crucial condition of their consent 
to the treaties. (P. 109-110)164
 
 
                                                 
164 In fact, the words “cede, release, surrender” and so forth are also not translatable into many 
Native nations. See, for example: Venn (1997); Cardinal & Hildebrandt (2000:58), both of whom 
found that the Elders had difficulty understanding the meaning of the words “cede, release, 
surrender” and, according to the latter source, were incredulous and in disbelief once these terms 
were explained to them.   
   Additional evidence that Native nations did not intend to alienate land, but instead to share it 
with the new immigrants, is also found in the practice many Native nations had of retaining 
hunting, fishing and other rights on the lands supposedly alienated from them.  Agreements over 
the retention of such rights frequently –but not always-- made it in to the written/English 
versions of treaties, further demonstrating that the Native understanding and intention behind 
these treaties was that all parties agreed to share the lands.  Implicit in these agreements to share 
was the presumption that all people would refrain from behaviors that destroyed the lands or 
made them uninhabitable for present or future generations, as well as for plant and animal life –
and this understanding also sometimes found its ways into the written/English forms of treaties 
through promises that Native nations would be able to continue their way of life. 
   Canadian courts have increasingly recognized the intentions of Native nations to share –not 
surrender—their lands, and to retain rights to continue their way of living upon them.  For 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada found in the Mikisew Cree [2005, op. cit.] case that 
despite a written treaty of surrender for the Mikisew Cree lands (Treaty 8) which had provisions 
specifically allowing the Crown to take up lands within the treaty area for various purposes, the 
Mikisew Cree had clearly intended to retain their rights to hunt, trap and fish throughout these 
traditional territories, and thus the Crown was required to consult with and accommodate the 
Mikisew Cree before engaging in activities that would adversely impact their rights. The treaty, 
the Court held, was merely a beginning, and not an ending to the Crown’s fiduciary duty to the 
Mikisew Cree.  Mikisew (2005 para 54); see also: Hogg (2009: 14-15); Hutchins (2009: 453). 
See also: Halfway River First Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) [1999] 4 
C.N.L.R. 1 at para 134 (cited in McNeil, 2001: p. 308 note 29). 
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     Crown officials apparently routinely took advantage of these perceptions of Native peoples 
and regularly (and even egregiously) misrepresented the written versions of treaties to Native 
peoples in treaty negotiations.165  Because of this, in more recent years, Canadian Courts have 
recognized the discrepancies between the written/English versions of treaty agreements and the 
oral agreements that were made by holding: that treaties must be “interpreted as the parties, 
especially the Aboriginal parties, would have understood them at the time;”166 that treaty 
promises have to be placed “in their historical, political, cultural contexts to clarify common 
intentions of the parties and the interests they intended to reconcile at the time;”167
                                                 
165 For example, an examination of the oral agreements and negotiations around Canada’s 
numbered treaties --purported treaties of surrender-- reveals “not one reference” to the alienation 
of land in treaties 1-7, despite the fact that the written/English version of treaties claim Native 
nations ceded, released and surrendered their lands [Hutchins, 2009 (citing Morris, 1880).  See 
also: and McNeil (2001:305-7 and accompanying footnotes); Venne (2002).  For the similar 
misrepresentations in Treaties 8-11, see: R. v. Paulette [1973] 6 W.W.R. 97 (N.W.T.S.C.), in 
which Morrow J. remarked: “…it is almost unbelievable that the Government party could have 
ever returned from their efforts with any impression but that they had given an assurance in 
perpetuity to the Indians in their territories that their traditional use of lands was not affected” 
(quoted in Macklem, 2002)].  Instead, the oral negotiations and agreements were full of 
assurances by the Queen (made by officials on her behalf) that she would protect the Native 
peoples from anything that would adversely impact their way of life, that she would not take 
anything from them that would do so, and that the land was large enough for all to share 
[Hutchins (2009: 436). See also: Venne (2002), McNeil (2001).  Further, some of these 
negotiations made no mention of land at all. For example, according to speeches given around 
Treaty Seven, and according to Elders who were alive when the treaty was negotiated, the entire 
purpose of the agreement was to establish peace and to address problems internal to the five 
Native nations that were a party to it. As Hickey et. al. (1987: 105) note: “Not one elder 
mentions that the treaty had anything to do with giving up land or sharing it with white people.  
Rather, Treaty Seven is an agreement that was made to establish peace, to stop Indians from 
killing each other, and to put an end to the disruptions caused by liquor.” See also, Harring 
(1998: 27), who notes that British colonists drafted treaties in English so they could evade giving 
real interpretations of them and could cheat indigenous peoples. 
 that any 
“ambiguities or doubtful expressions in wording of a treaty must be resolved in favour of the 
Indians;” that “any limitations which restrict the rights of Indians under treaties must be narrowly 
166 McNeil (2001: 307); R. v. Badger [1996]; R. v. Sioui, [1990]; R. v. Marshall [1999]; Mitchell 
v. Peguis Indian Band [1990]. 
167 See also, Feder and Isaacs, (2007) in their discussion of R. v. Morris. 
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construed;”168 that  “treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally construed and 
uncertainties resolved in favour of the Indians;” and that “Indian treaties ‘must therefore be 
construed, not according to the technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the 
sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.’”169  Further, courts have 
allowed the use of Native oral histories as evidence –on equal footing with written documents-- 
in court, thus recognizing that written treaty documents were often prepared in advance (to 
achieve specific Crown aims that may or may not have been discussed verbally) and were, from 
the perspective of Native nations, of little relevance in negotiations with the Crown.170
     In the context of these court rulings, it is clear that the “General Surrender” of 1841, as well 
as the 1843 and 1844 documents would have to be considered in the historical, political and 
cultural contexts of the time, which would show a long history of fraudulent, misrepresentative, 
   
                                                 
168 R. v. Badger [1996] at para 41.  See also: O’Reily (2009: 387) and Hutchins (2009: 444-45).   
169 See also Hall (N.d.), on the Supreme Court of Canada ruling in R. v. Sioui [1990]. 
170 R. v. Badger [1996] at paras. 52-56; Hutchins (2009: 447-8).  Hall (N.d.), further notes that 
the force of treaties “lies in what was actually said, often in aboriginal languages, at the time of 
negotiation.”  At least one former government official has cited this precedent (of admitting 
evidence from native oral histories into court proceedings) as a potential reason for the Canada’s 
government’s constant stalling when it comes to resolution of outstanding Native land claims.  
As the former Commissioner of Canada’s Indian Specific Claims Commission and Carlton 
University Professor, Jane Dixon-Gilmore, noted: 
One of the most important forms of evidence that communities can bring to vindicate 
their claims is the testimony of elders.  And I sometimes fear that the government is 
only too well aware that, if they just wait a little longer, the corporate memory of 
communities dies.  
Dixon-Gilmore, quoted in: Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (APTN). 2011. Ottawa 
stalling on claims tribunal so elders die out: ex-commissioner.  APTN National News.  May 18.  
[video and blurb, available: http://aptn.ca/pages/news/2011/05/18/ottawa-stalling-on-claims-
tribunal-so-elders-die-out-ex-commissioner/.  In this sense, the Canadian land claims process, 
itself, could be seen as coercive, as Epstein (2002: 51-52) has noted: 
We should note that land claims negotiations themselves are usually the result of 
unwanted incursions or development activities on indigenous lands, which force 
indigenous peoples to reach a land claims settlement or face the consequences of 
development activities which proceed with or without consent or the indigenous 
peoples.  Insisting on surrender under these circumstances is a clear instance of duress.  
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and coercive dealings on the part of the Upper Canadian government and/or Upper Canadian 
Indian Department officials.171  These documents would also have to be interpreted according to 
Haudenosaunee understandings and intentions,172
We know the government, uh, doesn't have a document where Six Nations agreed 
to sell that [Kahnonstaton].  They don't have that document where Six Nations 
agreed to sell that parcel of land in Caledonia.  They don't have the agreement.  
What they're doing is, they're analyzing discussions and minutes in meetings and 
saying, "Look at, he said this..." That's not how our government works.  You can 
say anything in a meeting.  That's --minutes in a meeting is altogether different 
from agreeing to sell you something.  Where's the agreement?  What are the terms 
and conditions?  Where did the money go?  They cannot produce that.  And we 
know it. 
 the former of which demonstrates that the 
Haudenosaunee were clearly coerced and mislead, and the latter of which was always for the 
Haudenosaunee to retain their lands. Any doubt to this intent, further, would have to be resolved 
in favor of the Haudenosaunee, and Haudenosaunee oral histories can demonstrate beyond a 
shadow of a doubt that it was always the Haudenosaunee intent to retain –and merely lease out-- 
the Grand River lands that were under protest in 2006.  As Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill has 
noted on the matter: 
     …  [W]hat Six Nations knows is that we agreed to lease that land along, along 
that highway. … We agreed to lease it, short term.  And the thinking of our chiefs 
back then was that, "We'll get these non-Natives to come in here and clear up 
some parcels of land for farming then kick them out once we need to expand."  
That was the thinking.  "And we'll collect rent.  They can, they can clear the land 
for farming, and we'll, we'll collect rent.  When we need to expand, we'll expand." 
(Ahooja, 2008b) 
 
     Despite the numerous court rulings that would force an interpretation of these historical 
documents in the Haudenosaunee’s favor, were the case to be resolved in court, the Canadian 
                                                 
171 The above discussion, and in particular some of the above notes, provide ample evidence for 
this assertion.  Much more evidence on the Upper Canadian government’s fraudulent dealings 
with Native peoples can be found in the history surrounding virtually all other tracts of 
Haudenosaunee Grand River lands, as well, but such an examination is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation and will have to be reserved for future work instead. 
172 Haudenosaunee understandings, and Native understandings more generally, will be discussed 
more thoroughly in Chapter 3. 
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and Ontario governments have persisted in pushing for extremely narrow interpretations of these 
documents that rest on overly-legal technicalities so that they can continue claiming that the 
Haudenosaunee legitimately surrendered their lands in 1841 (and “affirmed” this decision in 
1843 and 1844).  This problematic gap between Canadian Supreme Court rulings and Canadian 
and provincial government practice –which will be further examined in Chapter 4-- has been 
remarked upon by scholars such as Anthony Hall (N.d.), who has noted: 
In spite of the high constitutional character of treaties in Canada, these deals were 
often viewed cynically by those non-Indians responsible for both making and 
implementing these agreements as relatively cheap and expedient ways to ease 
natives off most of the lands of Canada so that these resources could be opened 
for exploitation by other groups and interests. The tendency on the part of federal 
and provincial governments so far has been to continue this cynicism by 
interpreting Treaties as narrowly and legalistically as possible, while holding to 
the position that natives "ceded, surrendered and yielded" all their Aboriginal 
rights and titles to their ancestral lands through these instruments. 
     This narrow and one-sided view of treaties essentially as real estate deals by 
which native groups sold all their interest in vast parcels of land for small original 
payments and small continuing payments - usually $5 per treaty Indian per year - 
has produced a huge schism of perception. On the one hand is the view of treaties 
as legal instruments that extinguished Aboriginal rights. On the other hand is the 
view of treaties as instruments of relationship between peoples who agree to share 
the lands and resources of Canada as co-existing but relatively autonomous 
communities. Seen from this latter perspective, treaties didn't extinguish rights but 
rather confirmed rights through Crown recognition that Aboriginal peoples have 
the capacity to make and enforce their own laws and thus to act as self-governing 
participants on the international stage. Bridging the gap between these 2 views of 
treaties, either as a solvent or as a confirmation of Aboriginal rights, poses a huge 
challenge to the people and law makers of Canada. 
 
     The three other arguments made by the Canadian (and Ontario) governments regarding the 
land under protest in 2006 are considerably more transparent, and require only an abbreviated 
consideration here.  The first of these three arguments is that there are no outstanding debts and 
obligations owed to the Haudenosaunee by the Canadian government,173
                                                 
173 In Canada’s legal argument against the Haudenosaunee Six Nations in 1996, and in response 
to the Haudenosuanee protest in 2006, Canada argued that, since it was not in existence prior to 
 and that, if there are 
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outstanding debts and obligations, the Ontario government is responsible for them, not the 
Canadian government.  Not surprisingly, the Ontario government says that it is the Canadian, 
and not the Ontario, government that is responsible.  The latter actually makes the more accurate 
case.  Under the Constitution Act of 1867, s. 111, the Canadian government inherited all of the 
outstanding debts and liabilities of the British Crown –including debts and liabilities to Native 
nations.174
                                                                                                                                                             
1867, it could not have been in a fiduciary relationship with the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
before that time; and thus, it could not be held accountable for any obligations, debts or liabilities 
owed to the Haudenosuanee Six Nations that arose before 1867. [Attorney General of Canada 
(1996), Coyle (2006)].  However, elsewhere it has been acknowledged that Canada did, indeed, 
have a fiduciary responsibility to the Haudenosaunee (Archives of Ontario, 2011). 
  And under section 91(24) of that same Act, the Canadian government is designated 
as the sole Canadian governing body with jurisdiction over matters relating to Indians and Lands 
reserved for Indians (Canada, Constitution Act, 1867; Wilkins, 2002). This matter will be 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
174 Section 111 of the Act states that “Canada shall be liable for the Debts and Liabilities of each 
Province existing at the Union.” In other words, Canada inherited the liabilities of the British 
Crown (and/ through) the provinces, though there were a few limits to this inheritance.  One of 
these limits was that, when it came to the debts of Ontario and Quebec, who were large debtor 
provinces at the time of Confederation, section 112 of the Act limited the amount of these large 
debts inherited by Canada to $62,500,000.  Any debt above and beyond this $62 million that was 
held by either Ontario or Quebec at the time of Confederation remained the liability of Ontario or 
Quebec.  However, under section 91(24) of the Act, Canada is the sole Canadian governing body 
with jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands Reserved for the Indians.” This means that only the 
federal government –and not the provinces—can hear the merits of, determine the validity of, 
and negotiate, litigate, or in some other way resolve the outstanding obligations, debts and 
liabilities to Native nations, whether these debts accrued before or after Confederation. Thus, 
Canada cannot pass on to the provinces any outstanding obligations, debts or liabilities owed to 
First Nations, because these clearly fall under sole federal jurisdiction.  In fact, the Canadian 
government had to be well aware of this fact both in 1996 (when they filed their statement of 
defense) and 2006 during the Haudenosaunee protest, because in 1991 the Canadian government 
acknowledged as much when it reversed itself and began to allow Native nations to file pre-
confederation claims through Canada’s specific claims process --thus acknowledging that it was 
responsible for these claims. Prior to 1991, pre-confederation claims could not be heard.  On this 
reversal, see, for example, Six Nations of the Grand River 2006, page 5; and Six Nations of the 
Grand River 2008, page 2 
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     The second of these three additional arguments is the Canadian government’s assertion that 
the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which mandated that certain procedures be adhered to in 
obtaining surrenders of Native lands was 1) a unilateral act that Crown officials did not have to 
adhere to, 2)  repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774 (Canada, Attorney General, 1996 at 7-10). The 
momentum behind the creation of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the desire and necessity 
to quell disputes between Native nations and the Crown, whose subjects had been encroaching 
upon Native territories without Crown sanction through squatting, shady and fraudulent dealing, 
and other activities aimed at gaining Native lands for the purpose of speculation/ profit.  These 
activities led to an almost infinite number of grievances voiced by Native peoples against the 
Crown, as well as to a constant threat of the outbreak of hostilities on the part of disgruntled 
Native peoples.  Through extensive consultation with numerous Native nations,175
                                                 
175 For example, see: Borrows (2002), who argues that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 can only 
be understood when examined together with the Treaty of Niagara of 1764.  Borrows also argues 
that “the full legal consequence of the Royal Proclamation is to bind the Crown to ensure that 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the First Nations, including their right to govern themselves, are 
not undermined,” (quoted in: Asch (2002: xiii).  See also, Nammack, 1969, p. 93 and Good, p. 6, 
note 12, who both note that the Royal Proclamation was a response to grievances voiced by the 
Haudenosaunee 
 the parties 
were able to come to an agreement upon a boundary line separating Native from non-Native 
territories.  In its attempts to mitigate the grievances of Native nations and prevent the creation of 
future grievances, the Proclamation prohibited non-Natives from settling on or purchasing 
territories on the Native side of the boundary, and further laid out a number of rules and 
regulations for the legally acquiring Native lands.  Thereafter, lands could only be legitimately 
acquired under British law by the Crown or Crown agents, in public meetings with the Native 
nation(s) in question that had been called specifically for the purpose of discussing a surrender of 
lands, and had been publicly advertised well in advance as being meetings that would take place 
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for that specific purpose.176
     The Canadian government’s claims that the Proclamation was not binding nor not in effect 
when Haudenosaunee lands were taken were made to allow that argument that, if the 
Proclamation was no longer in effect and/or Crown officials were not bound by its terms, then 
purported surrenders might be considered valid even if they were obtained through questionable 
means.  In fact, one lower court had previously made this argument (claiming that the Royal 
  Though the document was intended to regulate only the behaviors of 
subjects of the Crown (which, it recognized, Native peoples were not), and was intended to 
prevent disputes between Native peoples and the colonists, the Crown both wanted and needed 
the agreement of Native nations in the determination of the Proclamation’s boundaries, and in 
determining and agreeing to many of the other provisions in the document.  Further, as a 
document created out of negotiations and agreements between the Crown and dozens of Native 
nations, the Proclamation established a fiduciary responsibility on the part of the Crown to police 
its own subjects and prevent unauthorized encroachments into the lands of Native peoples (Hall, 
N.d.; Guerin v. The Queen, [1984]).  Thus, the Proclamation is a document that depended upon 
negotiations with, and the agreement of, a large number of Native nations –all of whom expected 
the Crown to fulfill its duty to them as was established in the Proclamation.   
                                                 
176 These regulations were beneficial to Native peoples in preventing government officials or 
random non-Native people from finding any Native person and getting him (through 
intoxication, bribes or trickery) to sign a document purporting to surrender lands over which he 
had no authority –a practice that was quite common prior to the enactment of the Proclamation.  
Though numerous secondary sources report that the British Crown’s rules and regulations for 
land transfers were rarely (if ever) followed (Woo, 2003; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; SNGR 2006a; 
SNGR 2006b; Nammack, 1969; Good, 1994: 7 note 14; Harring, 1998a: 28; Harring. 1998b), the 
Proclamation at least theoretically offered some legal recourse to Native nations who were 
wronged in this way.  Thus the Proclamation has been referred to, even by bodies of the 
Canadian government, as the “Indian Bill of Rights” with the force of a statute analogous to the 
Magna Carta (Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1993, pp. 15-16).  See also, Paul 
(N.d.), which notes that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 “was regarded by the Indians as their 
charter.”   
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Proclamation of 1763 had been repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774)177 and a judge in the same 
court later relied on parts of the argument when he justified dispossessing Native peoples of their 
lands, that they unquestionably held legal title to, on the basis that their rights had been 
extinguished by the adverse possession of non-Native peoples settled on their lands.178  
However, the Canadian government’s arguments are not supported by the existing evidence.  For 
example, claims that the Proclamation was a unilateral document are historically inaccurate, as 
are claims that the Proclamation was not binding on colonial authorities.  As McNeil (2001-
2002: 320) has pointed out, the Proclamation was part of Imperial legislation, which was binding 
on all colonial officials and could not be altered or repealed by local legislative bodies.  And 
even if parts of the Proclamation were repealed by the Quebec Act of 1774, the parts of the 
Proclamation relating to Indian affairs could not have been repealed or altered by colonial 
officials, since Imperial authorities retained control over Indian affairs in Canada until at least 
1860,179 and perhaps until as recently as 1931.180
                                                 
177 McNeil, 2001-2002, p. 320, citing: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Bear Island Foundation, 
[1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 85-88,68 O.R (2d) 394 at 410-13. 
  Further, there is a virtually insurmountable 
178 McNeil, 2001-2002, pp. 320-21, (citing: Chippewas of Sarnia v. Canada (Attorney General) 
(2001),51 O.R. (3d) 641, [2001] I C.N.L.R. 56 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2001] 4 
C.N.L.R. iv., at paras 185-219). Though McNeil notes that in this case, the court did not 
specifically rule on the correctness of this assertion.  Further, there was considerable 
disagreement on this point among the different judges who heard different stages of this case, 
and both a motions judge and the Ontario Court of Appeal noted that the Chippewas land rights 
had not been extinguished by the Upper Canadian government because either they did not have 
the authority to do so (motions judge), or they did not demonstrate the requisite intent to do so 
(motions judge and Court of Appeal).  [[However, the court failed to cite the provision of the 
Quebec Act that allegedly repealed the Proclamation (Reynolds, 2009, pp. 100-101), and in this 
same case the Supreme Court of Ontario argued that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 was in 
effect in the 1840s (McNeil, 2001-2002: 329).]] 
179 McNeil (2001-2002: 320) notes that “the Imperial government retained control over Indian 
affairs in the province of Canada until 1860 [which] probably would have prevented the 
legislative assembly in the province from enacting statutes prior to that time that extinguished or 
authorized the extinguishment of Aboriginal title.”  This was also corroborated in the Chippewas 
of Sarnia case (Ontario, 1999) where Campbell J noted that the “1834 and 1859 statutes could 
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body of evidence that the Royal Proclamation of 1763 continued to be in effect: for example, the 
Proclamation has been affirmed and/or cited in British and Canadian law consistently long after 
the 1774 Quebec Act, including in 1793,181 1796,182 1797,183 1803,184 1805,185 1812,186 1835,187 
1839,188 1847,189 1858,190 1888,191 1993,192 and the 2000s.193
                                                                                                                                                             
not apply to Indian lands because Indian rights were “within the exclusive imperial authority and 
beyond colonial legislative power” (also quoted from McNeil, 2001-2002, p. 321). 
  In fact, the Royal Proclamation 
continues to play an important role in both understanding Native land titles and in the 
formulation of new treaty agreements.  Evidence of this can be found in Canada’s own Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (1982) section 25, which states that the guarantees in the Charter:  
180 McNeil (2001-2002: 324) notes that, though s. 91(24) of the British North America Act of 
1867 (also known as the Constitution Act of that same year) gave Canadian federal authorities 
jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians,” “this jurisdiction could have been 
subject to provisions of Royal Proc of 1763 prior to Satute of Westminster of 1931.” 
181 The Simcoe Patent of January 14, 1793 (applying specifically to Six Nations land granted 
under the Haldimand Proclamation). 
182 Public Notice May 5, 1796 (leases had to be sanctioned by the crown first) (SNGR, 2006a: 3). 
183 March 10, 1797 directions to President Russell (Ibid). 
184 April 17, 1803 speech by William Claus (that Proclamation of 1763 was still in effect) (Ibid). 
185 Public Notice April 10, 1805 (Ibid). 
186 Proclamation February 1, 1812 (Ibid).  In fact, in its statement of defence the Canadian 
government did recognize that the similar, and less often cited, Governor’s Instructions from 
1812 were binding on the Crown, but it attempted to make the argument that: “a court is not 
bound to enforce strict compliance with [this] policy,” (Attorney General of Canada, 1996: at 
106). 
187 Public Notice of November 20, 1835 (SNGR, 2006a: 4). 
188 Act May 11, 1839 (Ibid). 
189 A report in Appendix I. to Journals, House of Assembly, Canada, 1847, headed "Title to 
Lands and Tenure of Land," cited in Paul, Daniel, op. cit. 
190 Journal of the Legislative Assembly, 1858, App A21, REPORT, page 121-123- 
191 St. Catherine’s Milling v. Queen (1888). 
192 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (1993: 24), which notes that the Quebec Act did 
not replace the Royal Proclamation of 1763, because the latter contained “a saving provision 
ensuring that the restoration of French law would not have harmful effects on ‘any Right, Title, 
or Possession derived under any grant, Conveyance, or otherwise howsoever, of or to any Lands 
within the said Province’.” 
193 In the Chippewas of Sarnia (2001) case, the Supreme Court of Ontario argued that the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 was in effect in the 1840s (see also: McNeil, 2001-2002: 329). 
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of certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate 
from any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that pertain to the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada including 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the Royal 
Proclamation of October 7, 1763; … 
     Thus, clearly the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has continued to play an important role in 
Canadian law.  But even if the Royal Proclamation had been repealed (which is unlikely), the 
Canadian government is still bound by the recent high court rulings already mentioned --rulings 
requiring that treaties be placed in their historical, political and cultural contexts and interpreted 
in the terms Native peoples would have understood at the time, as may be evidenced through 
Native oral history, and according to the intentions of both parties; and that ambiguities or 
uncertainties be resolved in favor of the Native peoples, that any limitations on Native rights be 
narrowly construed, and that treaties be liberally construed in favor of the affected Native 
peoples.   
     The third additional argument that the Canadian government made in an attempt to get around 
accountability to the Haudenosaunee for violations of lands, resources and treaty rights is the 
argument that the Haldimand Proclamation was not a treaty but a unilateral document to which 
the Canadian government could adhere, or not adhere, at will.  Though the historical facts 
surrounding the Haldimand Proclamation clearly demonstrate that it was recognized by Upper 
Canadian courts as a binding treaty until the early 1800s,194
                                                 
194 See the above discussion on the Haldimand Proclamation, and the accompanying notes. 
 after this time, shifts in international 
law, accompanied by historical revisionism, led some Canadian courts to accept this argument as 
factual.  These shifts in domestic and international legal attitudes towards the rights of 
Indigenous peoples will be discussed in Chapter 5, where it will be shown that the faulty and 
ahistorical nature of these arguments, as well as the arguments made by the settler state 
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governments forming the old British Empire (including the United States, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand), are fatally flawed.   
 
5) Motivations Behind the 2006 Haudenosaunee Protest 
Clearly the loss of lands that had been set aside for future Haudensoaunee generations was a 
major motivation behind the protest.  In 2005 and 2006, construction projects were underway in 
three cities bordering the reserve, of which the Caledonia site was only one.  There were also 
several other reasons behind the 2006 protest; and even if the Canadian and Ontario governments 
wanted to hold fast to their position on the 1841 “General Surrender,” they should not have been 
willing or able to ignore these other issues.  The first of these other issues was Native nations’ 
international human rights and domestic rights to consultation and accommodation.  These rights 
were being thoroughly ignored in the approval of construction projects and the mandating of 
settlement and development quotas on lands under registered claim by the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations.  
     A states’ duty to consult Indigenous peoples prior to making decisions that might affect them 
is “firmly rooted in international human rights law,” and “derives from the overarching right of 
indigenous peoples to self-determination” (UN Human Rights Council, 2009).  But states have 
more than just the duty to consult Indigenous peoples prior to making decisions that might affect 
their rights: international human rights law has increasingly integrated and come to depend upon 
a higher standard of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC).195
                                                 
195 A few of the international human rights bodies and reports that have recognized FPIC as an 
international human right include: UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2009); International Labor Organization (1989: art. 4); UN Commission on Human Rights 
(2006, at 4, para. 11); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008: 
 In fact, FPIC is a human rights 
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standard that Human Rights Council members are required to uphold (Joffe, 2010: 190; Gunn, 
2007:82), and Canada was either lobbying to be on, or actually sitting on this Council in 2006 
when Haudenosaunee people were demanding that Canada fulfill its duties to consult with them 
under Canadian law.196  And while the Canadian government has come under increasing 
criticism in recent years for its ongoing violations of the international human rights of indigenous 
peoples,197 the duty to consult and accommodate Native nations prior to planning projects that 
might affect their outstanding land, treaty and aboriginal rights is also enshrined under Canadian 
law through various Supreme Court of Canada rulings –some of which had just been handed 
down in the year before the 2006 protest.198  Further, in recognition of the excessively slow land 
claims and court processes in Canada, the Supreme Court ruled that the Crown (the Canadian 
and provincial governments) have the duty to consult regardless of whether First Nations claims 
to land title or outstanding rights have been proven in court (Haida Nation, 2004: para 53).
                                                                                                                                                             
articles: 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 29(2), 32(2)); United Nations Development Group (2008); UN 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1997: Annex V at para 5).  
  
     A number of states have also implemented FPIC, or recognized indigenous collective rights to 
their lands.  Recently Columbia’s Constitutional Court unconditionally affirmed Indigenous 
Peoples rights to FPIC (Intercontinental Cry, 2011), and the Constitutional Court of Guatemala 
recognized an indigenous community’s  collective property rights to their lands, and ordered the 
Guatemalan government to “take the necessary measures for issuing and land title to the 
community.” (Indian Law, 2011).  In addition, early reports back from two court rulings in 
Argentina (Scandizzo, 2011) suggest that courts in that country have also upheld the right of 
Indigenous peoples to consultation as defined and outlined in the International Labor 
Organizaiton’s Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal People (op cit., articles 6, 
7, 15), as well as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (op cit., articles 10, 19, 29, 
32).  
196 Canada was on the Human Rights Council from June 2006-June 2009 (see: UN Human 
Rights Council.  Membership of the Human Rights Council (2006-2012)).  
197 Two of the most recent of these criticisms can be found in: Joffe (2010) and UNCERD 
(2012).  A more thorough discussion of this topic can be found in Chapter 4. 
198 Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British 
Columbia, [2004]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, [2005].   
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     Prior to initiating their protest, the Haudenosaunee knew full well that the Canadian and 
Ontario governments were violating their rights to consultation under Supreme Court of Canada 
rulings and international human rights laws. To this extent, they had involved themselves in 
numerous activities aimed at getting the Canadian and Ontario governments to fulfill this duty to 
consultation and accommodation prior to approving or mandating settlement and development 
projects on lands under Haudenosaunee claim.  The fact that they were not successful, and that 
both Canadian and Ontario governments demonstrated a determination to disregard, ignore and 
egregiously violate Haudenosaunee international human rights and domestic rights, was a major 
motivation behind the 2006 protest.  The Haudenosaunee knew they were in the right, both in 
this regard and in regard to the 1841 “General Surrender.” 
     Another issue motivating the 2006 protest was that of self-government.  In 1924, in response 
to the Haudenosaunee’s attempts to draw international attention to Canada’s ongoing violations 
of their rights, the Canadian government outlawed the traditional Haudenosaunee Confederacy 
Council and forcibly imposed upon the Haudenosaunee a federally funded, created and 
controlled system of government.  The Canadian government justified the move in the name of 
“democracy,” but it was more apparently an anti-democratic maneuver for the purpose of 
silencing the Haudenosaunee and limiting their abilities to hold Canada accountable for 
violations relating to their land, resource, treaty and trust fund rights.199
                                                 
199 After raiding homes, arresting several chiefs, and breaking into the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy Council’s council house where the RCMP broke opened a safe and stole several 
Wampum belts (treaties), the RCMP built a barracks on the reserve and announced that a “free 
election” would be held to determine the new government.  According to Cayuga sub-Chief 
Leroy Hill, this action by Canada was seen as being so illegitimate among the Haudenosaunee 
people that only 13 or 14 people voted in the election (with several voting twice to cast a total of 
27 votes) (Ahooja, 2008a).   The irony, of course, is that the Haudenosaunee Confederacty 
Council is one of the oldest, longest-standing, continually existing participatory democracies on 
earth.  And, like other Native nations, it served its people far more democratically than the 
 Though the forcible 
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imposition of colonial systems of government upon Native peoples is technically legal under 
Canada’s Indian Act, (Canada, Indian Act, 1985; Mathias & Yabsley, 1991), it is an egregious 
violation of the international human right of all peoples to self-determination.200
                                                                                                                                                             
colonial that was forcibly government imposed upon it.  Despite this, Native Lands, Inc. 
researcher Phil Monture has pointed out that the Haudenosaunee were experiencing a number of 
problems with self-governance at the time the RCMP raided the Six Nations reserve.  These 
problems include various allegations of corruption among some of the traditional chiefs, and 
Monture points out that there was already pressure for change among some of the 
Haudenosaunee themselves.  Yet, a forcibly-imposed system of government of Canada’s own 
design was clearly not what was desired, as demonstrated from the numbers of people who 
participated in the first (and in all subsequent) Band Council election(s) (Conversation with Phil 
Monture, May, 2012). 
  This 
international human right is one of the founding purposes of the United Nations, as recognized in 
     More generally on the point about participatory democracy in Native nations’ traditional 
systems of governance, Bradford Morse (quoted in Canada Senate (2010) has noted: 
My experience and understanding is that, prior to the Indian Act, or where the Indian 
Act regime is not applied, First Nations were global leaders in democracy. Democracy 
in my mind does not mean elections with ballots; it means the voice of the people in the 
selection of their leaders and in the decision-making of governments. First Nations were 
extraordinarily democratic… (32) 
Conversely, Indian Act governments in general have been recognized to be virtually the opposite 
in terms of democracy and/or accountability to their communities, as Menno Boldt noted in the 
same hearing (Canada Senate, 2010: 69): 
Any analysis of power in Indian communities must take into account the important fact 
that virtually all authority and funds of band/tribal councils come through [Canada’s 
Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND)]. Thus, although 
band/tribal chiefs and councillors must seek the vote of their people, their mandate to 
govern comes from DIAND. This puts elected Indian officials (chiefs and councillors) 
and the appointed bureaucrats in an inevitable position of political subordination to 
DIAND officials, rather than to the people who elect and appoint them. As a 
consequence of this historical status, Indian leaders’ responsiveness and accountability 
to their people has not been institutionalized. 
Or as Senator Gerry St. Germain has also noted (quoted in: Gooder & Powless, 2010: 1): 
Under the Indian Act, electoral accountability primarily lies between the elected 
officials and the minister of Indian Affairs, not between the elected officials and the 
citizens.  
200 Article 1 of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR, supra note 1, state that “[a]ll peoples have the 
right of self-determination.  By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.” See also: Anaya, supra note 22 
(“The Human Rights committee has confirmed that the self-determination provision in article 1 
has bearing upon the obligations of states toward indigenous peoples under the covenant[s]”); 
Vienna Convention, articles 26 & 27, supra note 8 
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the United Nations Charter (1945, article 1; see also: Harvard Law School, 2010) and is also 
widely considered to be customary law (law that is binding on all states regardless of whether a 
state has become party to a particular agreement).201 It has even been considered as such a 
foundational human right as to be a prerequisite to the exercise of all other human rights, and 
thus to be a peremptory norm (a norm from which no derogation is permitted), or a part of jus 
cogens (the “compelling law” that all countries must follow).202
     Canada’s problematic record of violating the international human rights of indigenous peoples 
has been well recognized. Perhaps less recognized is Canada’s violation of its own laws 
pertaining to the rights of indigenous peoples.  For example, the right of self-determination for 
indigenous peoples has also been at least partially recognized by the Canadian government as a 
right that is protected under section 35 of Canada’s Constitution (Canada, Minister of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development, 1995; Joffe, 2010: 180, note 328).
  
203
                                                 
201 Reference Re Session of Quebec [1998 at 114] (self-determination is a part of customary 
international law), Joffe (2010: 133), Anaya (2004: 97-98), D’Amato (1997: 136-138) (on the 
1975 Helsinki Accords having become customary international law). 
  Despite this 
recognition, the Canadian government has sought to drastically limit the right of Native nations 
to self-determination (Canada Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development, 1995), 
ignoring the fact that human rights are “inherent and inalienable” rights (Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 1948, preamble) that cannot be limited or restricted by states or other 
202 Human Rights Council (2009 at 41) (self-determination is a prerequisite to all other human 
rights); Joffe (2010: 132-33); Anaya (2004: 75); Lâm (2006 at 155) (self-determination is a 
peremptory norm, or part of jus cogens). 
203 Some have been more cautious in asserting that the right to self-government is recognized and 
protected by section 35(1) of the Constitution, noting that this issue has not been specifically 
addressed by Canadian courts (Macklem, 1982/2001: 117; RCAP, 2010: 38).  
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parties.204  Thus, the Canadian and Ontario governments’ persistent refusal to recognize the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, or to engage in nation-to-nation negotiations with this 
governing body, is a persistent, ongoing violation of the Haudenosaunee right to self-
determination.  This, too, was a major motivating factor behind the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest 
in Caledonia.205
     A final motivating factor in the 2006 protest that must be mentioned is the combined issue of 
sovereignty and jurisdiction. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy, like many other Native nations 
in North America, was recognized as a sovereign, independent confederacy of nations by 
Europeans who came to the Americas in search of lands and riches (Berman, 1992: 128-29, 133; 
Cote, 2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 377-78, 387; Gunn, 2007: 66; Harring, 1998: 10; Kades, 
2008, note 75; Johnston, 1986: 14; Williams, 1982: 3, 5, 58, 62; McNeil, 2001-2002: 10; 
Borrows, 1999). This sovereign, independent status was immortalized in nation-to-nation treaties 
between these European nations and the Haudenosaunee,
 
206 and the Haudenosaunee insist that 
they have never surrendered this sovereign nation status –whether willingly or otherwise—and 
can, therefore, be nothing less than a sovereign nation today.207
                                                 
204 “In international human rights instruments, human rights are recognized as inherent and 
inalienable.  They are not defined as contingent on State-co-operation or as requiring joint 
exercise with the State,” Joffe (2010: 181).  
  Thus, according to the 
205 It is also a violation of numerous other human rights of the Haudenosaunee, and these issues 
will be considered in more detail in Chapter 4. 
206 Such as the Two-Row Wampum and the Covenant Chain treaties of friendship and non-
interference (Berman, 1992; Lyons, 1992; Akwesasne Notes, 2005). 
207  “[W]e never surrendered to anybody.  Never have.  1924 comes along and an elective system 
was imposed on us.  One of those reasons why they imposed that elected system on us is because 
they did not want to give us an accounting of money --our money-- up and down the tract that 
was embezzled from us.  That money was taken and never benefited Six Nations the way our 
ancestors intended it to be.  We entered into an agreement of leases and sales to be held in trust 
by the Crown for the benefit, for the perpetual benefit of our people, for our health and our 
welfare.  Instead it was used to build institutions from McGill University to the railway that cut 
across Canada, all sort of things, built Canada's infrastructure on Six Nations' money.  And today 
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Haudenosaunee, all matters of disagreement between the Haudenosaunee and non-Native 
governments in Canada –whether these governments are local, provincial or federal—need to be 
resolved through nation-to-nation negotiations with the federal government. 
     Though Canadian law does not recognize Native sovereignty, under s. 91(24) of the Canadian 
Constitution Act of 1867, the federal government is the sole Canadian governing body that has 
jurisdiction over matters relating to “Indians or Lands reserved for Indians.”  Thus, under 
Canadian law, the federal government should have been involved in negotiations with the 
Haudenosaunee in order to resolve the various problems experienced by the Haudenosaunee in 
relation to their treaty, land, consultation, self-government and other human rights.  What’s 
more, under international law, the justifications used by Canada (as well as the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand) for allegedly asserting sovereignty over Native lands and peoples 
have become increasingly problematized, with several international human rights bodies calling 
for the nullification of all laws that rest upon these justifications.  For example, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council (1989) has condemned the legal justifications relied upon 
by Canada and these other settler states as having “no legal standing,” and proclaimed that any 
laws or precedents based upon these concepts must be called into question and adjusted 
accordingly: 
The concepts of ‘terra nullius’, ‘conquest’ and ‘discovery’ as modes of territorial 
acquisition are repugnant, have no legal standing, and are entirely without merit 
or justification to substantiate any claim to jurisdiction or ownership of 
indigenous lands and ancestral domains, and the legacies of these concepts should 
be eradicated from modern legal systems. (Para. 40b at 10) 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
we have to go out there and we're told, "you're no good Indians, you're living on the tax 
payers....” (Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton, quoted in: Hughes, 2007) .There is considerable 
evidence, and compelling legal argumentation, that supports this assertion of sovereignty.  See 
for example the discussion in Chapter 5. 
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     Aside from its longstanding history of relying upon “legal fictions” to justify its claims to 
sovereignty over Native peoples, for more than a year prior to the 2006 protest, the federal 
government consistently refused to engage in discussions with the Haudenosaunee (discussions 
that might well have prevented the protest).  It also refused to get involved with discussions 
surrounding –or acknowledge its responsibility and sole jurisdiction to resolve— the 2006 
protest until two months into the protest (when a failed police raid and mobs of angry non-
Natives finally forced the federal government’s hand on the issue –at least temporarily208
     In the face of these numerous, ongoing violations of land, resource, treaty and human rights 
(which will be examined more thoroughly in Chapters 4 and 5) motivating the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest, the remainder of this dissertation will be focused on understanding how 
it is that 1) Supreme Court of Canada rulings, Canadian Constitutional law, and international 
human rights laws that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold can be so 
persistently, egregiously, and discriminatorily violated for one category of people within borders 
of Canada; 2)  
).  This 
issue of sovereignty will be examined more thoroughly in Chapter 5. 
the vast majority of non-Native Canadians sit back and say nothing while this happens; 3) such 
large numbers of non-Native Canadians are either passively complicit in these abuses, or are 
active supporters and/or promoters of them; 4) in their complicity or active support and 
promotion of these ongoing constitutional and international human rights violations, large 
numbers of non-Native Canadians persist in ignoring outright Haudenosaunee grievances, and –
                                                 
208 Though these events forced federal involvement in discussions/negotiations with the 
Haudenosaunee traditional government aimed at resolving the protest, federal efforts to this 
extent were short lived, and ended almost as soon as large-scale public attention aimed at the 
2006 protest and conflict dissipated.  Three years after the initial start of these talks, it seems 
fairly safe to say that there have been no real talks between the federal government and the 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council for more than a year, and likely closer to two years. 
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despite mounting evidence supporting the Haudenosaunee grievances-- justify their purposeful 
ignorance through negative (and sometimes outright racist) characterizations of Native peoples 
as exaggerators, sore losers, opportunists, criminals, liars, terrorists, and so forth.  In order to best 
answer these questions, the next two chapters will take a brief detour from the specific story of 
Haudenosaunee land claims, and will venture into an examination of problematic patterns of 
thought and behavior that are inherent in the western worldview and that, I argue, can account 
for a large potion of this willful ignorance and denial of the ongoing abuses and violations that 






The Long History of Trauma and the Psychopathology of Western Society 
 
It may perhaps seem at first sight an unnecessary complication to investigate the 
genesis of each historical formation. But since every historical phenomenon, 
human attitudes as much as social institutions, did actually once ‘develop’, how 
can modes of thought prove either simple or adequate in explaining these 
phenomena if, by a kind of artificial abstraction, they isolate the phenomena from 
their natural, historical flow, deprive them of their character as movement and 
process, and try to understand them as static formations without regard to the 
way in which they have come into being and change?   … The psychogenesis of 
the adult makeup in civilized society cannot, therefore, be understood if 
considered independently of the sociogenesis of our ‘civilization’. By a kind of 
basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes once more 
through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long history. 
~ Elias 1998, 43, 42 
 
We are not less the offspring of our ancestors because their bodies have been 
buried.  Our society, like all others, is the product of its entire antecedent history, 
with all the human generators thereof.  ….   Despite the real pitfalls of historical 
moralizing, the logic seems plain that what we approve in past conduct will be 
repeated in the future. 
~ Jennings 1976, vii 
 
If you know your history,  
Then you would know where you’re coming from. 
Then you wouldn’t have to ask me, 
Just who the hell do I think I am. 
~ Marley 2002 
 
In his work on the “civilizing process,” Norbert Elias argued that this process, as it occurred in 
the history of any society, is passed down to each individual in that society through the 
socializing process.  In this latter process, the whole history of one’s society and culture is 
reproduced, in abbreviated form, and internalized in the individual (Elias, 1998: 41-42, 53-54).  
Thus, what each person does in any given situation is not simply a product of the choices that a 
person makes in the moment, i.e., it is not merely a produce of responses personal, innate 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure (Elias, 1998: 53).  Rather, these choices reflect the imprint of 
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society on the inner self, and must be contextualized within the historical sociogenesis of one’s 
society, as well as the manner through which these processes were reproduced by others, and 
internalized by the individual, in his or her lifelong socialization process (Elias, 1998: 41-42, 53-
54).  According to Elias, these sociohistorical processes are so fundamental to the development 
and operations of society and the individuals within it that they should be considered as “a 
fundamental law of sociogenesis and psychogenesis” (Elias, 1998: 54). 
     Though these sociohistorical patterns are of such fundamental importance in determining all 
that a society and its members are and do, Elias (1998: 49-50) also notes that once these patterns 
are established in a given society, they no longer remain in the consciousness of that society or 
its members. For example, though they generally believe Western society to be superior to other 
societies and cultures, few Westerners would link this belief to their own sociohistorical 
“civilizing” process; nor would they link to these processes their “ritualized or institutionalized 
feelings” of disgust, shame, displeasure, fear, or distaste that are often provoked by the behaviors 
of Westerner or non-Westerner “others” who were differently socialized (Elias, 1998: 53-54).  
Both of these unconscious processes can be observed in recent comments made by Oprah 
Winfrey on her recent tour of India.  When Winfrey managed to offend a whole country with her 
remarks on international television that “I heard some people in India eat with their hands still?” 
(Sergio, 2012; Sen, 2012), she was, unfortunately, unconscious of the sociohistorical processes 
linking Western assumptions of superiority to the “rise of the fork” in Western society (Elias, 
1998: 51-54).  As a result, she generalized to the whole world her own society’s preferences, and 
her own society’s views of “progress” and “civilization.” In her obliviousness to these 
sociohistorical processes, she failed to predict the offended response that she would provoke 
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among an entire nation, enraged that it needed to defend its own equally valid traditions against 
Western ignorance (Sergio, 2012; Sen, 2012). 
     Like Oprah, many non-Native residents responding to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest were 
unconsciously reproducing patterns of thought and behavior that had long ago been established 
in Western society and into which they had been socialized.  The impact of these processes of 
sociogenesis and psychogenesis is profound, and since these processes are constantly, 
unconsciously reproduced, “so long as the structure of human relations is not fundamentally 
altered” (Elias, 1998: 53), it should be clear, as Elias argued, that we need to understand these 
past processes –and bring them to consciousness—if we are to understand our own societies and 
the behaviors of individuals within them (and especially if we wish to change them).  To this 
extent, this chapter will provide an overview of some of the problematic patterns of thought and 
behavior that have long been prevalent in Western society for the purpose of gaining a better 
understanding of the range of non-Native (government and resident) responses to the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest (which will be examined in chapters 4 and 6).  Once identified, many of 
these problematic patterns of thought and behavior will be traced back to various points in the 
history of Western society.    
     Aside from identifying these patterns, I argue that many of the sociohistorical processes 
associated with these problematic patterns of thought and behavior –as with the Western 
“civilizing process” as a whole-- were highly traumatizing to individuals and to Western society 
in its entirety.  As such, many of the problematic patterns of thought and behavior that arose out 
of these processes reflect various attempts to cope with these repeated, severely traumatizing 
events, often through repression and denial rather than through acknowledgement and healing.  
Western society’s failures to recognize these events as traumatizing and/or to “work through,” 
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resolve, and heal from these past traumatic events, has resulted in massive, societal and 
individual, transgenerational trauma, and has led to the institutionalization and ritualization of 
unhealthy, and even psychopathological, coping mechanisms.  These coping mechanisms have 
been so widespread in Western society for so long as to constitute not only integral parts of 
Western society and the Western cultural worldview, but to form the very essence of this society 
and cultural worldview, and the very foundation upon which these have been built.  Their 
understanding is, therefore, of utmost importance in understanding how and why many (but not 
all) non-Native residents responded to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in the unhealthy ways 
that they did, as will be discussed further in chapter 6.  However, it is important to note, here, 
that the argument that follows here and in chapter 6 is not that the people are psychopathological, 
it is that their society is.   
PROBLEMATIC PATTERNS OF THOUGHT AND BEHAVIOR IN THE WESTERN 
CULTURAL WORLDVIEW 
[T]he understanding of the racial question does not ultimately involve 
understanding by either blacks or Indians.  It involves the white man himself.  He 
must examine his past.  He must face the problems he has created within himself 
and within others.  The white man must no longer project his fears and 
insecurities onto other groups, races and countries.  Before the white man can 
relate to others he must forego the pleasure of defining them.  The white man must 
learn to stop viewing history as a plot against himself. 
~Deloria 1969, 175 
 
In Hitler’s Willing Executioners Daniel Goldhagen asks, How could average, 
everyday ordinary churchgoing Germans, who we all know were fully 
acculturated twentieth-century Western civilization people, get u in the morning, 
walk outside, shoot women and children in cold blood, and then come back in the 
evening and have supper as though they were doing nothing more than making 
widgets?  How could people act in such a cold-blooded manner?  Well, all we 
have to do is follow the real story of Western civilization and we’ll see that there 
has been episode after episode of people getting up in the morning, going out and 
murdering people.”  
~ Mohawk 1997 
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In his new book, Civilization: the West and the Rest, Niall Ferguson (2011) argues that Western 
civilization came to dominate the world because it developed of six “complexes of institutions 
and associated ideas and behaviors” that other societies and cultures lacked: competition, 
science, medicine, property law, consumption and the Western work ethic (Ferguson, 2011: 12). 
Though Ferguson presents his book as being “not a history of the West but a history of world, in 
which Western dominance is the phenomenon to be explained”(p. xxv), he quickly dismisses the 
bulk of non-Western human societies and their histories as irrelevant,209 and approaches his topic 
in the same Western-centric fashion as generations of Western scholars before him.210  As such, 
Ferguson fails to interrogate one of the basic assumptions made by Western-centric thinkers –
i.e., the assumption that, because Western society launched imperialistic, colonial, and genocidal 
ventures that decimated entire populations and cultures in the pursuit of wealth and world 
domination, it must be true that all societies would have wanted to do this, but were simply 
incapable of doing so due to inferiority or weakness.211
                                                 
209 Ferguson notes that the earth’s population today makes up less than 7% --or 1 out of 14-- of 
all human beings who have ever lived, and wisely warns his readers that “we ignore the 
accumulated experience of such a huge majority of mankind at our own peril”(p. xix. See also 
pp. xviii-xx).  However, he quickly dismisses the bulk of this accumulated experience (and the 
rich oral histories of surviving indigenous societies) when he argues that history is only 
concerned with civilizations “because without written records the historian is thrown back on 
spearheads and pot fragments, from which much less can be inferred” (p. xxvii). 
  This assumption is illustrated early on, 
as Ferguson asserts in his preface that his book  “offers a meta-narrative of why one civilization 
transcended the constraints that had bound all previous ones,” which had been “incapable of 
providing their inhabitants with any sustained improvement in the material quality of their lives” 
(pp. xxv-xxvii [emphasis added]). But in failing to interrogate this assumption (or even recognize 
210 Including the Sociology greats: Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx. 
211 See, for example, Ferguson: “[I]t was not just Western superiority that led to the conquest and 
colonization of so much of the rest of the world; it was also the fortuitous weakness of the 
West’s rivals”(p. 13). 
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it as an assumption) Ferguson fails to recognize that he is projecting the dominant cultural values 
of the present onto past (as well as present-day) non-Western societies. In other words, he is 
engaging in the cultural-centric historical revision, common among dominant groups, that was 
recognized and problematized by Stanley Diamond (1974) decades before, when he noted that: 
“as civilization accelerates, its proponents project their historical present as the progressive 
destiny of the entire human race” (p. 1). 
     While certainly it is true that the Western world spent centuries developing the mentality, the 
behavior patterns, and the most efficient and effective technology and techniques for conquering, 
dominating, destroying, massacring, and exploiting lands and peoples all around the world, it is 
not at all the case that the bulk of humanity or the vast majority of human societies had ever 
desired or attempted to achieve such goals. In fact, evidence to the contrary abounds.212 For 
example, despite the general assumption that other societies were simply too weak or too inferior 
to the West to achieve world dominance, the technologically more advanced Chinese sailed 
around the world at least as early as 1424 --more than half a century before Columbus. They did 
so not for the purpose of dominating, colonizing, enslaving, massacring and/or forcibly 
exploiting other lands and peoples, but for the purpose of establishing networks of mutually 
beneficial trade with the peoples of Africa, the Americas, and Australia. The type of atrocities 
and destruction characteristic of Western ventures was nowhere a part of the Chinese mentality 
or behavior in their own ventures (Menzies, 2004).213
                                                 
212 As Diamond (1974: 18) notes, “Whatever else we may say about men as political beings, it is 
clear that the great majority of them have viewed the exercise of political power as either 
irrelevant to, or destructive of their daily concerns.” 
 And contrary to Ferguson’s assertions that 
non-Western cultures were simply “incapable of providing their inhabitants with any sustained 
213 Ironically, in their travels around the world the Chinese avoided Europe entirely, viewing 
Europeans as backward people who had nothing of value to offer in trade.  
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improvement in the material quality of their lives,” throughout the Americas the majority of 
human societies were self-sufficient and self-sustaining societies whose members enjoyed a 
higher quality of life than many Europeans at the time (Mann, 2005; Diamond, 1974; Drinnon, 
1990; Canny, 1979; Williams, 1982; Jennings, 1976; Mohawk, 1992: 143-45). In fact, the 
disparity between the quality of life among Native peoples in the Americas and the European 
colonists who settled there was so great that colonists constantly fled to live among Native 
societies, and even colonial efforts to impose martial law and/or to hunt down and execute 
deserters (as a warning to the rest of the colonists) failed to deter further desertion (Drinnon, 
1990: xxv, 30; Canny, 1979: 30-34). This sort of widespread desertion from European colonial 
ventures to Native societies was not limited to European ventures in the Americas, but was also a 
factor in Ireland and, more generally, everywhere Europeans had an opportunity to closely 
interact with members of indigenous societies (Diamond, 1974; Canny, 1979). Meanwhile, 
Native peoples persistently refused not only to live in European settlements, but to adopt 
virtually any aspects of European culture; and they did so not because they were unable to 
comprehend the vastly superior world of the European, but because their own cultural 
worldviews existed in complete opposition to many, if not most, European patterns of thinking 
and behaving in the world.214 (This included the shocking and appalling European practice of 
attacking and indiscriminately massacring entire villages215
                                                 
214 Rousseau was among those who observed this phenomenon, noting that: 
). As Black Elk (1983) notes:  
It is an extremely remarkable thing for all the years that Europeans have been 
tormenting themselves to bring the savages of the various countries in the world to their 
way of life that they have not yet been able to win over a single one, not even with the 
aid of Christianity; our missionaries sometimes make Christians of them, but never 
civilized men.  Nothing can overcome the invincible repugnance they have of adopting 
our morals and living in our way.  If these savages are as unhappy as it is claimed, they 
are, by what inconceivable depravity of judgment do they constantly refuse to civilize 
themselves by imitating us or to learn to live happily among us—whereas one finds in a 
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Now, none of these “enlightened” Europeans ever got around to asking the 
savages whether there might, in fact be a reason why Natives fancied using stone 
tools and such. … And so it has become a tradition in Europe to view virtually 
everyone else as underdeveloped, backward….  The standard of measure seems to 
me to be that the more compulsive a culture can become in terms of gathering up 
and rearranging material, the more “advanced” it is considered to be.  The more 
relaxed, at peace, and willing to leave material things (beyond real needs) alone a 
culture can be shown to be, the more “backward” it is considered. … I mean, 
consider the implications of a tradition which compels its people to march across 
half a continent, engage in a major war to steal the land from my people, engage 
in genocide in order to preserve their conquest, and all primarily so they can dig 
gold out of a small portion of that land, transport it back across the continent, and 
bury it again at Ft. Knox!  The virulence of the disease Sitting bull spoke of is 
truly staggering (P. 143-45) 
 
     Ferguson is not unique among Western scholars in his one-sided, self-congratulatory 
glorification of Western society, his downplaying of its more problematic aspects,216
                                                                                                                                                             
thousand places that … Europeans have voluntarily taken refuge among these natives, 
spent their entire lives there, no longer able to leave such a strange way of life…. 
(quoted in Diamond, 1974: 24-25). 
 his 
warnings against “romanticizing” (i.e., finding anything good about) non-Western cultures, 
and/or in his complete disregard for non-Western, non-Empire forms of human societies –i.e., 
See also: Drinnon (1990), Means (1983), Deloria (1972), Mohawk (1992), Mann (2005). 
215 Mann (2005: 60) notes Native peoples’ “unwillingness to match the European tactic of 
massacring whole villages,” and more generally writes about the incompatibility of European 
ways with Native cultures. Jennings (1976: 147-170) compares Native forms of warfare to 
European forms of warfare; and Black Elk (1983: 141-42) mentions that Native societies treated 
warfare more as a sport, in that they did not wantonly slaughter other peoples. 
216 For example, Ferguson appears to present the massive-scale genocide perpetrated upon the 
indigenous peoples of Africa, the Americas and Australasia as having been a conquering and 
conversion to the Western way of life that was “achieved ultimately more by the word than by 
the sword” (p. 5). At the same time, he criticizes the West’s ongoing conquests via the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq not on the basis that both are immoral wars causing incalculable 
destruction of innocent lives, homes and infrastructure, but on the basis that there is not more 
manpower, enthusiasm, and funding for the wars (pp. xvi-xvii).  He also argues that the “days of 
Western predominance are numbered” --not because Western society is an unsustainable society 
that has destroyed its own economies and is destroying the planet and all life on it, but because 
“the Rest” have now adopted Western ways (once monopolized by the West), and the latter “has 
literally lost faith in itself.”(Quoted from the dust jacket description of the book).  
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the bulk of all human societies that have ever existed.217 By persisting in this blindly self-
aggrandizing, and solipsistic form of analysis, Ferguson (like Western scholars more generally) 
also –and perhaps more importantly-- fails to question the mentality, morality and wisdom of a 
culture that both desired and proceeded to engage in what was perhaps the most massive 
campaigns of genocide and atrocities the world has ever known–killing as efficiently and 
effectively as the technology would allow at the time, all in order to further its greed for wealth 
and power.218
     The rest of this section will be concerned with examining some of the problematic patterns of 
thought and behavior endemic to the Western cultural worldview. In the spirit of departing from 
the widespread, longstanding self-aggrandizement of Western culture, much of the following 
discussion will be somewhat critical of these patterns of thinking and behaving in Western 
society and the Western cultural worldview, and will focus on creating a framework for Western 
 Yet this, above all else, is what needs to be interrogated, particularly since the 
morality, mentality and wisdom of Western culture has changed very little since that time, while 
its capacity for destroying all life on the planet has increased exponentially.   
                                                 
217 In almost the same breath that Ferguson dismisses the bulk of humanity’s historical 
experience, he warns his readers against “the temptation to romanticize history’s losers” (p. 
xxvi), which, given his dismissal, appears to be an effort to discourage any examinations of these 
other societies: finding anything good about them at all is immediately equated with 
“romanticizing” them. 
218 “Nothing was more destructive of man than the early settlements on this continent.” (Deloria, 
1969: 177-78). “The destruction of the Indians of the Americas was, far and away, the most 
massive act of genocide in the history of the world” (Stannard, 1992: 3). Stannard holds that 8 
million Native peoples were killed within the first 21 years of Columbus’ appearance in the 
Caribbean, and that 90-95% --or about 19 out of every 20-- of the tens of millions (if not more 
than a hundred million –see Mann [2005: 102]) of people living in the Americas at that time 
were killed over the proceeding centuries.  Mann (2005: 101) further cites a mortality rate of 
95% in the first 130 years of European “contact”/invasion.  Both Mann (2005: 102) and 
Stanndard (1992: 33) state that central Mexico, alone, had a population of more than 25 million. 
While many accounts of Native population decline downplay the role of human violence in this 
mass genocide, other accounts do not.  In addition to the above sources, see also: Hanke (1959), 
Todorov (1982), Drinnon (1990), Mohawk (2000 & 1997), Trudell (2003 & 2001, track 18). 
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society’s critical self-reflection –a long-avoided pattern that is desperately needed in this time of 
unprecedented extinction and destruction. As will be demonstrated, many of these patterns, on 
their own or in interaction with other patterns, involve self-reinforcing rationalizations that have 
long kept westerners from critically and realistically evaluating the true impact of their society 
on themselves and the rest of the world. 
     Before beginning, it seems worthwhile to make two quick notations.  First, because all of 
these patterns overlap, interrelate and reinforce each other, the full impact of any one of them 
cannot be fully understood without also understanding all of the other patterns and their 
interactions and interrelations.  As such, it is difficult to separate and isolate these problematic 
patterns from each other and/or from the context of their cultural worldview.  However, since the 
separation of individual phenomena from the contexts in which they occur and from other 
phenomena to which they are inextricably bound, and the examination of these extracted and 
decontextualized phenomena in isolation, is a fairly long-standing requirement of academic, 
scientific and other work within the Western cultural worldview, I will do my best to draw out 
certain of these patterns that are of predominant interest in this story and to examine them 
separately. 
     Second, it seems worthwhile to note that, because the Christian church was such an influential 
force in the history of the West and in the formation of the Western cultural worldview, many 
parts of this examination will be concerned with various actions and/or trends within or by the 
Christian church which contributed to these less than positive patterns of thinking and behaving 
in the Western worldview.  The focus on, and criticism of, the many immoral undertakings by 
the Christian church is not intended as an attack on or a blanket dismissal of Christianity, 
Christians, or any derivative religion and its members.  Certainly, many constructive and positive 
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initiatives have been undertaken by Christians (though it is somewhat less clearly the case for the 
institutionalized Christian Church as a whole).  Therefore, in all of the following discussion, it is 
only my intent to begin the above-mentioned process of critical self-reflection, something which, 
though fairly uncommon within Western society, is urgently needed and should not be seen as 
contrary to the interests of the majority of people, groups, and religions within any society.  As a 
prominent Christian leader once noted, in a statement that applies equally well to Western 
society as it does to Christianity: 
If you want to make religion a constructive force in society, religions must begin 
with an honest admission of those moments when they haven’t been a 
constructive force, when they’ve been a destructive force.  And the thing that 
frustrates me to no end is when religious leaders get up and give the impression 
that religion has always been on the side of good and virtue.  It hasn’t.  Let’s be 
honest (Father John Pawlikowski, President, International Council of Christians 
and Jews, quoted in: Carroll, 2007).  
 
Indeed, let’s be honest. 
 
 
Social Relations of Domination 
 
[D]omination is increasingly a matter of colonizing the internal world of the 
dominated classes, a feat that cannot be accomplished by force but only through 
messages, codes and the dissemination of images and information. … Put simply, 
domination requires the establishment of an entire way of life as standard and 
expected, the identification of the dominated with the dominators, and the subtle 
establishment of the prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable, indeed 
commonsensical.  When domination reaches the internal world of the actors, 
resistance is almost unthinkable. …[T]he power holding people to the existing 
system is deep and multileveled, and… we often obey as a matter of reflect for the 
simple reason that our very identities are formed by the dominant framework to 
the extent that we are powerless to do anything else. 
~ Litowitz 2000, 524, 528, 529 
 
The methods of establishing control over another person are based upon the 
systematic, repetitive infliction of psychological trauma.  They are the organized 
techniques of disempowerment and disconnection. Methods of psychological 
control are designed to instill terror and helplessness and to destroy the victim’s 
sense of self in relation to others. 
~ Herman 1992, 77 
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You cannot enslave a mind that knows itself, that values itself, that understands 
itself. 
~Wangari Maathai, quoted in Hytrek 2012, 87 
 
Social relations of domination are not unique to Western culture.  Expressed through hierarchical 
social relations in which a relatively small portion of the population exercises military, political, 
economic, social, religious and/or other forms of control over the remainder of people within a 
given area, social relations of domination have been present in many cultures and societies 
throughout history, and have been present in every large-scale society that has existed.  Such 
relations are foundational elements in the Western cultural worldview, in large part because 
Western culture is a result of, and has been built upon, the conquest, destruction and 
homogenization of other cultures. This was true throughout the Mediterranean by the rise of the 
Greek city-states, where successive waves of conquest for trade, wealth, and/or power had 
completely destroyed local cultures and made any continuity of culture impossible (Mohawk, 
1997). This was also true throughout Western Europe by the late Middle Ages, when centuries of 
Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts successfully, and quite purposefully, destroyed virtually 
all of that remained of these cultures;219
                                                 
219 There are still some remaining pockets of indigenous peoples in Western Europe who have 
managed to continue their traditional cultures, such as the Sami people in northern Europe, who 
live in areas inhospitable enough as to not have been appealing to would-be conquerors. 
 tortured and killed (as heretics, heathens, witches, etc.) 
all who resisted; and consolidated all people under the centralized, hierarchical domination of 
monarchs and the Church. This was true during the European invasion and colonization of much 
of the world from the fifteenth to nineteenth centuries, when (often privately-funded) explorers 
plundered indigenous peoples for land, resources, slaves, and anything else that could be turned 
into fame and fortune; and when missionaries moved in an attempt to convert (not infrequently 
by force) whoever remained after the plunder. And this remains true today, as Western societies 
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continue to rely on the forcible exploitation of land, resources and labor abroad, and Western 
settler states, intent on existing or expanding through the forcible expropriation of indigenous 
lands and resources, continue policies and practices at home that perpetuate the disruption and 
destruction of the remaining indigenous cultures.    
 
Universalism: Acceptance, Domination, and Rejection 
 
Every culture, every class, every century, constructs its distinctive alibis for 
aggression.  …[T]raditional reasons why certain pugnacious activities are 
appropriate, ethical, even commanded by nature, amounts to a recognizable 
cultural style. 
~ Gay 1993, 35 
 
[In hierarchical social relations of domination] each new class which puts itself 
in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through 
its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of 
society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the forms of 
universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.  
~ Marx 1972, 138  
 
With some exceptions,220 the homogenization or transformation of culture throughout the ancient 
period and the early Middle Ages was not the purpose of the successive waves of conquest that 
destroyed local cultures of Western Europe (Diamond, 1974; White, 1961).221
                                                 
220 Such as the Moorish attempt to conquer the Franks in the early Middle Ages, and likely there 
are earlier examples as well. 
  Even though 
some of these early campaigns of organized, armed aggression were undertaken for the purpose 
of the expansion of societies that had outgrown their own territories, or the expansion of the 
power of an aspiring king or emperor, they were also just as frequently undertaken for the sole 
221 “[C]ivilizations other than that of the contemporary West have been ethnocentric, imagining 
themselves to represent the height of human achievement. The Egyptians, Chinese, Greeks, 
medieval Islam, the Romans, the Feudal European church, all defined themselves as peerless, a 
notion that was concentrated in but by no means confined to the upper strata of their respective 
societies.  But the purpose of imperialism, as engaged in by pre-industrial societies, was political 
and economic control.  Other cultures may have been judged strange or inferior, but it was not 
explicitly assumed that the imperial mission was to transform society in the image of the 
dominant power, even when that occurred to some degree” (Diamond, 1974: 36).   
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purpose of plundering wealth and resources, and possibly capturing humans as slaves. Peoples 
conquered by expanding societies were often able to continue practicing their own cultures and 
religions (or what remained of them), so long as they paid taxes or whatever else was required to 
the conqueror(s).  This was true under the Roman Empire, where conquered peoples, particularly 
those in the rural and outlying regions, often continued to practice their own cultures, follow 
their own laws, and worship their own gods through their own forms of religion --so long as, or 
to the extent that, these were not seen as a threat to Rome, and so long as they also made 
sacrifices to the Roman Gods and fulfilled the other requirements of Empire (Keal, 2003: 69; 
Tigar & Levy, 2000: 27-28, 34-37; Osborne, 2006: 114-17; Mohawk, 2000: 48, 52-61). Though 
Roman society did have some provisions allowing for former enemies to become citizens of 
Rome, or for non-Romans to make claims generally reserved for citizens under Roman law, the 
universalism present in the Western cultural worldview can be best attributed to Christianity.  
     One of the earliest interpretations of the teachings of Jesus Christ envisioned two distinct 
forms of universalism that the Western cultural worldview has long since conflated and been 
unable to separate. The first was a universalism that accepted anyone and everyone who wished 
to be included in the Christian Church. Many Christians at the time were opposed to this sort of 
universalism, since it opened the religion to non-Jews. The second was a universalism that was 
applied to everyone who joined Christianity and, later, even to people who did not.  Under this 
second type of universalism, first envisioned by Paul, all Christians were required to follow a 
single doctrine which dictated how people were to worship and what rules people were to follow.  
This was a universalism of domination and, for Paul, failure to follow this code of behavior and 
thought would result in ejection from the Church, as well as eternal damnation. In other words, 
this was a universalism of judgment and rejection for the slightest deviation from domination. 
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Though, as Osborne (2006) wrote, “[t]here was no obvious reason why Christian communities 
should not practice their religion in their own way… Paul was determined that this should not 
happen”(p. 117. See also pp. 118-19). 
     It is unclear whether Paul noticed the contradictions in positing, on the one hand, an accepting 
and inclusive religion that allowed people of any social class or circumstance to join and, on the 
other hand, a judgmental and rejecting religion that ejected people outright for deviations in 
thought or deed from the expected protocol.  If he did, that didn’t stop him from creating rules in 
his doctrine of a universally-accepting religion that were not universally accepting at all. For 
example, at a time when women were working in virtually all professions and holding positions 
of status in both Roman society and the early Christian church, Paul created rules of sexual 
behavior which deemed women as temptresses who should thus be submissive and quiet in 
church (Osborne, 2006: 118).  
     Regardless of what Paul thought (or didn’t think) about these contradictions, they likely 
didn’t matter much during the early years of Christianity.  During its first few centuries, when 
followers of Christianity were periodically persecuted, there were so many different sects --each 
with its own ideas and practices regarding worship under the Christian faith—as to make 
unlikely Paul’s vision of uniting (or, perhaps, conquering) all followers under a single doctrine 
(Osborne, 2006: 113-33). This changed, however, with the religion’s legalization and then 
institutionalization as the official (and only legal) religion of the Empire (Mohawk, 2000: 64).  
With this, the religion was transformed from the egalitarian reform movement that had originally 
“exhibited an ability to respect women, nature and people of varying cultures”(Mohawk, 2000: 
64), to a hierarchical and authoritarian tool of empire-building (or preservation) that quickly 
became oppressive towards various categories of people and life (Mohawk, 2000: 64, 66-70; 
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Osborne, 2006: 122). Women were deemed unclean, their sexuality a threat to male spirituality, 
and they were expelled from church ritual duties (Mohawk, 2000: 64, Federici, 2004: 37). 
Peoples of other faiths were “demonized as agents of Satan whose objectives were … the 
conquest of the minds of all people,” and the Church set out on its own such conquest, punishing 
the practice of other religions under penalty of death (Mohawk, 2000: 64). And even the natural 
world was reconceptualized, under Aristotelian ideas incorporated into Christianity around the 
fourth century B.C.E., as a hierarchy of living creatures created for the use and abuse of humans 
(Serpell, 1999: 44).222
 
  As these views became institutionalized in the religion, the universalism 
of acceptance and inclusion became deeply intertwined with the universalism of domination, 
judgment and rejection.  The Western cultural worldview has not been able to separate these two 
concepts since. 
 
Dualism, Separation, and Alienation 
 
Newton “revolutionized” physics and the so-called natural sciences by reducing 
the physical universe to a linear mathematical equation.  Descartes did the same 
thing with culture.  John Locke did it with politics and Adam Smith did it with 
economics.  Each one of these “thinkers” took a piece of the spirituality of human 
existence and converted it into a code, an abstraction. … Hegel finished the 
process of secularizing theology –and that is put in his own terms; he secularized 
the religious thinking through which Europe understood the universe. Then Marx 
put Hegel’s philosophy into terms of “materialism.” That is to say, Marx 
despiritualized Hegel’s work altogether.  Again, this is in Marx’s own terms.  And 
this is now seen as the future revolutionary potential of Europe.  … Christians, 
capitalists, Marxists, all of them have been revolutionary in their own minds.  But 
none of them really mean revolution.  What they really mean is a continuation.  
They do what they do in order that European culture can continue to exist and 
develop according to its needs. … [E]very revolution in European history has 
served to reinforce Europe’s tendencies and abilities to export destruction to 
                                                 
222 The idea of the separation of man from all other living things and the natural world was also a 
part of Paul’s doctrine, which, along with the separation of man from woman, he had adopted 
frmo the Old Testament, reportedly in an attempt to make the religion more appealing to Jews 
(Osborne, 2006: 118-119).   
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other peoples, other cultures and the environment itself.  I defy anyone to point to 
an example where this isn’t true. 
~ Means 1983, 21, 26, 24  
 
Nothing can be truly understood except in relation to everything else.  Thus, the 
universe can be understood as a total of all its parts, but the understanding of any 
of the parts does not produce an understanding of the universe.  In fact, unless the 
interaction of the universe is understood, a true understanding of any single part 
within it can never really be arrived at. 
~ Black Elk 1983, 147 
 
Social relations of domination always necessarily involve some degree of dualism and 
separation.  One can only be dominant in relation to others who are subordinate, and one can 
only be superior in relation to others who are inferior.  But dualism and separation in Western 
culture developed historically into a much more extreme form than that which was practiced, or 
even contemplated, in many other cultures, including large-scale, hierarchical societies. For 
example, Mies (1986) (relying heavily on Merchant [1989]) argues that, while patriarchal 
societies in China, India, and Arabia exhibited some separation between man and woman, human 
and nature, and conquerors and conquered peoples, this separation was nowhere near complete: 
In the old patriarchies (China, Indian, Arabia), men could not conceive of 
themselves as totally independent from Mother Earth.  Even the conquered and 
subjected peoples, slaves, pariahs, etc., were still visibly present and were not 
thought of as outside the oikos or the ‘economy’ (the hierarchically structured 
social universe which was seen as a living organism).  And women, though they 
were exploited and subordinated, were crucially important as mothers or sons for 
all patriarchs (P. 74-75) 
     Some supporting evidence for these assertions can be found in Menzies (2004), who notes 
that the Chinese sailed around the world at least as early as 1421 for the purpose of establishing 
mutually beneficial and respectful trade relations with the coastal peoples of Africa, North and 
South America, and Australia.  In establishing these mutually respectful relations, the possibility 
of dominating and subjugating other peoples was nowhere a part of the mentality or actions of 
the Chinese.  Similarly, White (1961) has argued that while colonization in ancient Greece 
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changed local cultures, often making them dependent upon the city-states that colonized them, 
the main point of this colonization was to establish trade relations.  As such, colonies were often 
not undertaken in areas where there was considerable opposition among local cultures. The idea 
that colonized or conquered peoples were not conceptualized as being completely separate from 
the conquering peoples is also present to some extent in the works of Diamond (1974: 5), 
Mohawk (2000: 48), and Keal (2003: 69).223
     Merchant (1989), Mies (1986: 74-75), and Mohawk (1997) all suggest that the change --this 
separation-- in Western society took place in the modern era, with the rise of science and 
technology, and with the beginning of European expansion around the world. But this separation 
actually developed in a much earlier period --the end of the fourth and beginning of the fifth 
centuries—when St. Augustine integrated the ideas of Paul and Aristotle into his writings and the 
teachings of the Church.
 And according to Serpell (1999) the idea that 
humans were connected to the natural world and needed to treat animals with an ethic of respect 
and avoid their unnecessary suffering had been a consistent fixture in human societies for over 
500,000 years, and “[i]n all of the ancient agrarian civilizations –Greece, Egypt, Mesopotamia, 
Assyria, and Indian—the killing of animals in a nonsacrificial manner was considered a crime 
morally equivalent to manslaughter” (pp. 44-45).  
224
                                                 
223 The former of whom notes: “In the beginning, conquest and domestic oppression were 
indistinguishable.  As the earliest societies that bean to consolidate as states expanded 
territorially, local peoples were conquered and incorporated as lower-class subjects or slaves into 
the evolving polity.  We find this pattern everywhere….”(p. 5). 
 It continued throughout the early Middle Ages and into the 
224 Osborne (2006: 122) notes that previous scholars –both in Greece and Rome-- had integrated 
the ideas of Aristotle and other Greek philosophers (as well as ideas from other cultures) into 
Christianity. Likewise, Serpell (1999: 45) does not specifically attribute this shift to Augustine, 
but states that these changes took place around the 4th century with the integration of Aristotle’s 
writings into the religion.  However, Osborne (2006) also notes that “apart from the Bible, 
Augustine’s City of God was the most widely read book in medieval Europe”(p. 114), and 
Mohawk (2000: 68-70), Serpell (1999: 45), and Osborne (2006: 113-133) have attributed the 
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present.225
     However, Augustine moved beyond the separations in Aristotle’s philosophy, and set the 
stage for much of the brutality, inhumanity and dehumanization that was to come in later 
centuries when he promoted two additional ideas.  The first was the idea of the existence of a 
separate class of humans.  Augustine argued not only that some humans were natural slaves, but 
that some people, like dwarfs, giants and wild men, if they existed, were not human at all, or at 
least were not descendants of Adam (Drinnon, 1990: 51). With this argument, Augustine 
demonstrated a willingness to dehumanize categories of people he had never before encountered, 
investigated, or spoken to, simply on the basis of a hypothetical difference in appearance and/or 
in life style.  The second was a combination of the ideas that “an abstract entity called ‘evil’” 
existed in opposition to that entity called ‘good’ (Osborne, 2006: 127, 129); that all of humanity 
was inherently evil, as evidenced by the sins of Adam and Eve; and that an omnipotent and 
 As already noted above, the ideas adopted and promoted by Augustine included the 
idea that women were inferior to men and, as tempters of men, were unclean and even unholy; 
that some people (perhaps the majority of people) were natural slaves; that people of other faiths 
were suspect, if not evil; and that the natural world existed for the use and abuse of human 
beings.  
                                                                                                                                                             
promotion of various of the above-discussed ideas to Augustine.  So I have here attributed to him 
the integration of these ideas into Chirstianity. He was not the first writer to introduce many of 
these ideas into Christianity, but he was likely the most influential in his time and throughout the 
early Middle Ages.  Though there is some evidence that many of the ideas integrated into the 
Bible were borrowed from other cultures, at this point in time these ideas, adopted into Western 
thinking, also became Western ideas. 
225 On the regulation of women and sexuality being propagated in the teachings of the Church 
throughout this period, see Federicci (2004: 37-38).  Similarly, Serpell (1999) presents the shift 
away from humane treatment of animals, which began in the fourth century, as a shift that 
continued throughout this period and into modernity. In addition, as mentioned in the note above, 
Augustine’s book City of God was the second most popular book read throughout the early 
Middle Ages, next to the Bible –which suggests that these ideas continued to have considerable 
relevance, though circumstances of the period prevented their implementation on the scale that 
science and technology has made possible today.  
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vengeful God had divided humanity into ‘the good’ (those select few who were sent to earth to 
do special works, lived in the City of God/ Jerusalem and were predestined to survive judgment 
day226) and ‘the evil’ (those who lived in the city of Evil/ Babylon, and were predestined to be 
destroyed on judgment day) (Mohawk, 2000: 69; Osborne, 2006: 130-32). Because good and evil 
was in every human, a person, according to Augustine, needed “to live through the good in his 
soul and mind,” and separate himself from the evil of his “thoughts, deeds and desires of flesh,” 
which could then be made inert (Osborne, 2006: 132, 127; see also, 113-33).  And because man’s 
fate was already predestined, “the role of the true Christian was to fear God, to suffer, and to 
await his judgment” (Osborne, 2006: 132), while living in unquestioning submission to the 
Church authorities –the only humans on earth who could influence the outcome (Mohawk, 2000: 
68-69).227
     Thus, through this logic, Christian man was to actively strive to separate himself from, and 
repress, significant parts of himself  –i.e., those parts deemed evil, and those parts constituting 
his free will.  The latter was to be replaced by the absolute submission to other human beings. 
Because Augustine saw these human beings (Church officials) as having a special ability to 
communicate with and interpret the word of God, Christian man was also separated from, and 




 Hence, in addition to 
Christian man’s separation from woman, non-Christian peoples, and the natural world; by the 
early fifth century Christian man was also separated from himself, the Church was separated 
from Christian man, and the word of God was separated from God. 
                                                 
226 Presumably, of the two categories that Augustine created, he saw himself falling into this one.  
227 With these arguments, St. Augustine successfully had the proponent of free will, Pelaguis, 
excommunicated from the Church. 
228 In some cases only Church authorities were allowed to read the Bible. 
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Universal Intolerance, Dehumanization and Rewriting “the Word of God” 
 
‘[T]here may not be so much difference between the anti-Semite and the 
democrat.  The former wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing in him 
but the Jew, the pariah, the untouchable; the latter wishes to destroy him as a Jew 
and leave nothing in him but the man, the abstract and universal subject of the 
rights of man and the rights of the citizen.’ In both cases the oppressor is 
unwilling to recognize and accept a human difference.  What the self-righteous 
person cannot tolerate is inaction toward evil.  “To live and let live” is, for him, 
not a prescription for decent human relations but a pact with the devil. 
~ Szasz 1970, 272 (quoting Sartre, 1977: 57)  
 
They see only one truth: their truth.  Human beings must become like them, think 
like them and adopt their values, which they insist are universal, or be banished 
from civilized society.  All other values, which they never investigate or examine, 
are dismissed. 
~ Hedges 2009, 7 
 
Bombs over Baghdad 
New World Order is an Old World lie. 
Fighting for “peace,” watch them all die. 
Dragging in God, as they turn violent 
God says nothing. He just remains silent. 
~ Trudell 1992, track 6  
 
If the institutionalization of Christianity made the Church a tool of Empire-building, the fall of 
Rome made it an inheritor of Empire –both in the Church’s ideological (re)interpretation of 
Scripture, and in its continued accumulation of authority and material wealth throughout the 
early Middle Ages (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 40-41, 43, 104; Osborne, 2006: 122).229
                                                 
229 In the same pages, Tigar & Levy also note that in its appointment of Charlemagne as Emperor 
of the Holy Roman Empire, the Church established the mythical belief that “the Roman Empire 
had been prophesied in Scripture… [and that] the Church temporal was logically, historically, 
and as veritably as the Scripture, the successor to the Roman Empire, a view maintained by men 
as diverse in time and temperament as Pope Leo III and Dante.”  Similarly, on Osborne notes 
that “there was a serious strand of Christian thinking that saw the building of the empire as the 
necessary precursor to Christ’s arrival on earth –Christiainty began to absorb the history of 
empire into its own story.” 
 Aspects of the 
mentality of Empire survived the decentralization of Western European society (and the 
decentralization of the Church) as the Church became a feudal lord that collected homage from 
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tillers, nights, petty nobles and lesser lords, and amassed extensive land and wealth from donors 
or later through Church-sponsored conquests, making it one of the largest landowners in Europe, 
as well as the dominant ideological force of the period (Federici, 2004: 33-34; Mohawk, 2000: 
67; Osborne, 2006: 113; Tigar & Levy, 2006: 35-36, 40, 42, 49). In its pursuit of further 
consolidating Church power, those with exclusive access to the “word of God” began making a 
number of adjustments to this word, which were adopted into Church doctrine and practice.  
     Aspects of the mentality of Empire, and the aspirations of empire-building combined in ways 
that created a new form of universalism: a universal intolerance. Whereas, under the writings of 
Augustine and Paul the universalism of acceptance and inclusion opened the religion to all who 
willingly converted, within a few centuries of the fall of Rome the Church was engaged in 
attempts to make conversion mandatory –sponsoring conquests by Charlemagne and the 
Normans, as well as later Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts (Mohawk, 2000: 70, 79, 81, 23; 
Tigar & Levy, 2000: 40).230
                                                 
230 On the appointment of Charlemagne as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, Tigar & Levy 
(2000:40) note that: “The Empire, built by extraction of homage from lesser lords, had little 
claim to be holy, and no claim at all to be Roman.  Within a few years after Charlemagne’s death 
in 814, it also had ceased to be an empire.” 
 And whereas, under these same writings, the universalism of 
domination and rejection contained in Church doctrine was applied to all Christian converts, 
within this same period the Church began actively applying Church doctrine to non-converts. To 
both of these ends, the sixth century plague was blamed on the failure of non-Christians to 
follow Church doctrine, the Church claimed jurisdiction in secular courts over all matters related 
to the welfare of the soul, heresies were attacked, skeptical questioning was suppressed, libraries 
were burnt, and laymen were forbidden to read the Bible (though most were illiterate anyway). 
The Church began sponsoring missions to bring Church doctrine to various parts of Western 
Europe, as well as sponsoring conquests, Crusades, Inquisitions and witch-hunts to forcibly 
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convert, punish, terrorize or murder those who refused (Mohawk, 2000: 71, 79, 81, 83; Tigar & 
Levy, 2000: 40-41; Berman, 1983: 27, 52-68).231
     The mentality of Empire and aspirations of empire-building also brought about several other 
changes.  For example, though Paul had originally preached equality, charity, inner 
contemplation, and faith as the bases for salvation, and had argued that material poverty, rather 
than wealth, power, or status led to spiritual richness, the Church had become one of the major 
institutions now engaged in the daily exploitation of the poorest majority of society, as well as 
the suppression of peasant revolts against its military-dictatorship style of exploitation (Osborne, 
2006: 117-18; Federici, 2004: 33-34; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49-50; Mohawk, 2000: 79). Both Paul 
and Augustine had also preached that charity and arbitration, not litigation, should be practiced 
in disputes, but the Church sponsored a continuous legal learning throughout the early Middle 
Ages and by the end of the period it had produced a number of legal manuals that combined 
Canon and Roman law into a “divine” law, attempting to assert its jurisdiction over commerce 
 The extension of Church doctrine –and 
judgment—to even those who had not chosen to follow the religion, combined with the 
separations created by the Church between Christian man and himself, his God, and everything 
else, created a new sort of universalism that reinforced these separations: i.e., a universal 
intolerance towards non-Christians, and towards all who were not behaving or thinking 
according to the expectations of Church doctrine.   
                                                 
231 The latter source (Berman, 1983: 27, 52-68) notes that many of the peoples of western Europe 
welcomed at least some aspects of the teachings of the Church as they were presented to them, 
arguing that: “when Christianity first came to the Germanic peoples of western Europe, it was 
presented as an otherworldly faith, concerned with the sacred and the saintly and having 
relatively little to say to the existing military, political and economic power structure, except to 
devalue it.” However the The History Channel (2007) notes that many tribal leaders were 
beheaded or otherwise murdered in Charlemagne’s conquest of forcible conversion.  See also 
Mohawk (2000: 79). 
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and other secular concerns as a means of consolidating its power and its empire (Tigar & Levy, 
2000: 42-44, 49-50, 102-104).232
     Church doctrine had also long forbidden usury and had looked upon the lifestyle of merchants 
as immoral (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42-46, 102, 104), but Roman law promoted and protected the 
interests of merchants. Throughout much of the period, when trade was virtually non-existent 
and the wealth and power of the Church was deeply invested in maintaining the feudal hierarchy, 
the Church continued to oppose merchant trade –not, according to Tigar and Levy (2000), 
because it went against Church doctrine, but because it threatened social stability and thus 
Church power: “If ancient doctrine taught that trade was sin, the new political reality taught that 
traders threatened the feudal system” (p. 49). However, the Church, itself, participated in usury 
as thousands of Church officials, including the papacy, acted as creditors and debtors to the 
rising merchant class. As the latter rose and its accumulated wealth increased, Church officials 
recognized the value of merchant wealth in building “cathedrals and universities and liv[ing] in 
the style to which they had become accustomed,” and employed considerable legal talent in 
sifting through the Church’s legal doctrine to find a way around even the most onerous of these 
prohibitions (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49, 45, 46).
  
233
     While all of these revisions in “the word of God” had adverse impacts on life in the early 
Middle Ages (impacts which have reverberated throughout the centuries), perhaps the most 
destructive of the revisions during this time period came in the Pope Urban’s 1095 decision to 
  
                                                 
232 Here I am using Berman’s (1983: 14) timeline, which places the end of the early Middle 
Ages/ Dark Ages, around 1050-1100. 
233 “More legal talent was spent in devising a way around these prohibitions than in drafting their 
terms, particularly as the Church’s position as creditor grew. … The merchant had no need to 
defy the Church’s proscriptions and thereby risk his soul: there was enough written doctrine on 
in the Church’s own storehouse to find a way around the most onerous proscriptions.  The 
Church was especially likely to tolerate evasion on the part of the wealth, since it stood to benefit 
when they succeeded in business.” (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 46) 
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mobilize a Crusade of pillage and plunder against non-Christians (primarily Muslims). Claiming 
to speak the will of God, but mostly speaking on behalf of the Church’s greed for wealth and 
power,234 Urban called upon any who would volunteer to unite and attack the “accursed race,” 
“wicked people,” “unclean nations” and “infidels,” who “worship[ped] demons,” and had 
“invaded the lands of these Christians” (the “race chosen and beloved by God).” Urban further 
alleged that these non-Christians had destroyed or appropriated the Churches and defiled the 
alters, committed unmentionable acts of rape against women, as well as acts of murder, torture, 
enslavement and various atrocities against the eastern Christians (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66; 
Mohawk, 2000:83; The History Channel, 2000; Munro, 1895: 5-8; Halsall, 1997; Gerish, 
N.d.).235  After reminding his audience of the over-population and lack of fertile land in western 
Europe,236 promising a utopia in the holy land, and encouraging would-be Crusaders to enrich 
themselves by conquering and dividing up the Turk’s land and wealth amongst themselves, the 
Pope further promised eternal salvation to all who died in battle (Mohawk, 2000:81-85; The 
History Channel, 2005; Tigar & Levy, 65-67).237
                                                 
234 Urban primarily wanted to open markets in Jerusalem to Christian merchants, end the private 
wars and looting by knights and nobles which targeted merchants and hurt trade, preoccupy this 
group with another endeavor outside of western Europe, and unite western Europe under a new, 
common Christian European identity headed by church leadership; though, as Tigar and Levy 
(2000: 65-66) point out,  “[t]here were religious reasons for undertaking the Crusades as well.” 
(See also: Mohawk, 2000: 83-85; The History Channel. 2005). 
 
235 The exact wording of Urban’s 1095 speech did not survive, but numerous versions of the 
speech exist, recreated through first person accounts (all written sometime later) and/or from 
correspondence after the Crusaders captured Jerusalem and reflected on the purposes of the 
Crusade.  For several different versions of this speech see Halsall (1997). 
236 “Let none of your possessions detain you, no solicitude for your family affairs, since this land 
which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded by the mountain peaks, is too 
narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food 
enough for its cultivators.” (Quoted in: Munro, 1895; see also: Mohawk, 2000: 83) 
237 Tigar & Levy (2000: 66-67) suggest that promises of salvation, along with the call to arms, 
were primarily directed at knights and petty nobles –the class of people who had been robbing 
merchants and/or charging them large fees to traverse their lands. 
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     By commanding a holy war, allegedly in the name of God, Urban and successive Popes 
engaged in what one might today call Orwellian double-speak, transforming some of the most 
fundamental aspects of Church doctrine that were to be followed at all times --i.e., the ten 
commandments-- into a list of items that were really only to be followed some of the time.  The 
God who forbid murder, stealing, and coveting anything that belongs to another, and the God 
who commanded that all should love their neighbors, was transformed into the God who 
commanded murder, coveting, and stealing; who promoted a hatred of non-Christian others; and 
who now promised salvation for all who committed these very offenses (The History Channel, 
2005; Mohawk, 2000: 82-83).238
If there had been no Islam, just east and west Christianity, exactly the same thing 
would have happened, but they would have had to find a different ideology.  They 
probably would have said ‘These are not proper Christians, we’re the true 
Christians’ like religious fundamentalists of all hues say. (Quoted in: The History 
Channel, 2005) 
 Similarly, the God who punished “us”(Westerners, Christians) 
for transgressions against Church doctrine became a God who punished “them”(non-Westerners, 
non-Christians) for everything, and for simply being something other than Christian. Further, 
though not apparent to the general population at the time, the God who frowned upon usury and 
trade became the God who commands wars in the interest of merchants and usurers; and the 
religion that had promoted faith, charity, and personal reflection became the religion that 
promoted trade, commerce and material wealth.  As Tariq Ali stated:  
 
     The Pope’s speech furthered the separation between Christian men and everything else. 
Playing upon the separation between man and woman, adults and children, and humanity and 
beastliness (which included both animals and nature) (Gerish, N.d.), 
                                                 
238 Depending upon one’s point of view, the Pope also broke the commandment forbidding the 
bearing of false witness against others through his propagandic speech against the Turks/ 
Muslims, which greatly exaggerated the mayhem and atrocities committed by the Turks. 
the Pope created a degraded 
 138 
image of the Turks/Muslims as peoples so inferior as to constitute an exception to God’s 
commandments against killing, stealing, coveting, and so forth. Not only did they now constitute 
an exception to these commandments, but God (according to Urban) had mandated that 
Christians commit these forbidden acts against the Turks/Muslims and had promised immediate 
forgiveness of all sins of, and eternal salvation for all who died in, the fight (Halsall, 1997: 
version 1).239
     Not surprisingly, the permissions and command to commit atrocities against Muslims was 
immediately translated into permission to commit murder, plunder and other atrocious acts 
against any and all “other” people –including Jews and even other Christians (Gerish, N.d.),
 
240
                                                 
239 “All who die by the way, whether by land or by sea, or in battle against the pagans, shall have 
immediate remission of sins. This I grant them through the power of God with which I am 
invested. O what a disgrace if such a despised and base race, which worships demons, should 
conquer a people which has the faith of omnipotent God and is made glorious with the name of 
Christ!” (Quoted from: Halsall, 1997 version 1) 
 as 
Crusaders with permission to dehumanize others did so to everyone who was not them.  Before 
they even left Western Europe, Crusaders massacred at least (and likely well over) a thousand 
Jews living along the Rhine River, and took their belongings to fund their participation in the 
first crusade (Carroll, 2007).  Every “subsequent crusade would be prefaced with a pogrom, or 
massacre, of Jews” (Mohawk, 2000: 84-86).  Jews, Christians and Muslims, women, children 
and elderly were all indiscriminately killed in cities along the path of the Crusaders: everyone 
was killed in Antioc and Maarat an-Numan, and after slaughtering 20,000 people in the latter 
240 Who notes that eastern Christians, as victims of Muslim enemies who were so 
hypermasculine (and beastly) as to tarnish everything they touched.  They were also, alternately, 
presented as effeminate –closer to humanity because of their Christianity, and in need of saving 
by Christian men, but not truly human because they were feminine. The same source also points 
out that though Western Christian men were considered human, the private wars they had 
previously been waging within because Western Christendom caused them to be presented as 
“more like animals than they should be” were they not warring against fellow Western Christians 
(Gerish, N.D.: 4-5). 
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location Crusaders reportedly boiled or roasted and ate the bodies of adults and children who had 
been killed.  The Crusaders also attacked villages that were entirely Christian, and reportedly 
chopped babies into pieces, roasted and ate them in Nicea.  In Jerusalem, the Crusaders 
slaughtered some 30,000 Muslims, burned Jews in their synagogues, and interpreted their 
success in taking the city as God’s will, and a sign that God was on their side. The various claims 
among Crusaders to have had visions and/or to have found ‘holy relics’ were also interpreted as 
signs that God was on their side, and that the indiscriminate slaughter, atrocities and cannibalism 
were all acts done with the approval of, and under the guidance of God (Mohawk, 2000:85-86; 
The History Channel, 2005). 
     Thus, the pattern set forth by the Church of rewriting the word of God, coupled with the 
various conflated forms of universalism and the numerous separations between Christian man 
and the rest of the world gave way to the creation of a new form of separation that has also, long 
since, characterized the Western cultural worldview: our separation from reality.  
 
 
Cultural Amnesia, Speaking for God, and Magical Thinking  
 
I believe that philosophy was used by Western civilization to obscure the act of 
plunder by cloaking it in fancier terms.  Aristotle could have said, ‘We’re evil 
exploiters, and we’re going to conquer these people; we have the arms to do it, 
and we’re going to do it without any bad conscience whatsoever because we have 
the power and we can get away with it.’  
     He could have said that, but he didn’t.  Instead, he developed a rationale for 
one culture ruling another.  What he said was, ‘We’re a community of very bright 
people, and we need someone to do all the drudgery.  We’ll make these other folks 
do it because if they don’t, we real bright people won’t have any time to sit under 
a tree and think about how smart we are.  We’d have to be hoeing the garden, 
washing the dishes, and all the rest.  But we need time to think, and if we think 
long and hard enough, we’ll come up with all the answers.’ 
~ Mohawk 1997 
 
The decline of magical thinking is hard to reconcile with the obsessive-
compulsive neuroses that Freud identified as a central process in the personality 
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of modern Western man.  Correlatively, magical thinking is replacing religion in 
the Western consciousness, rather than the other way around.  
~ Diamond 1974, 45 
 
“[T]ruth” changes so fast in European minds; [their] answers … are only stop-
gaps, only temporary, and must be continuously discarded in favor of new stop-
gaps which support the mathematical models; which keep the models alive.  
~ Means 1983, 21  
 
The revisions to Church doctrine during the early Middle Ages would probably not mark the first 
time in the history of human society that the pursuit of wealth and political power motivated the 
manipulation of laws, religious doctrine, and/or history. It would, however, mark the 
development of an important pattern in Western society, one that would drastically impact the 
direction in which the Western cultural worldview developed in the future. This pattern of 
rewriting of history, law and religious doctrine to justify the pursuit of wealth, power and 
empire-building reappears again and again throughout the history of Western society, and it has 
had far-reaching and devastating consequences for all of humanity, the effects of which we 
continue to experience today.   
     Throughout the history of Western society, this pattern has gone hand in hand with another 
pattern: widespread willful amnesia.  Though there were a number of factors that prevented 
challenges to these doctrinal changes in the early Middle Ages (some of which are described 
above), such factors are no longer present --or required-- today. Yet, despite the fact that 
Westerners have long had the freedoms to remember the past and challenge the revised and 
illegitimate versions of history, religion, law and/or reality that are presented to us,241
                                                 
241 How long we, in the US, will continue to have these freedoms is another matter, given the 
2011 National Defense Authorization Act which will allow all present and future leaders of the 
country to indefinitely detain anyone who challenges their actions or their versions of reality. 
 we 
continue to follow in the pathways of our ancestors by willfully adopting erroneous beliefs 
regarding the world around us and the consequences of our actions (or those of our leaders) in 
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this world.  When Western leaders rewrite history, the law, or religious doctrine in their pursuit 
of empire-building and of political or financial gain for themselves or the classes they represent, 
large numbers of people willfully discard from memory all versions of history –and even the 
present-- that conflict with these new, official versions. They blindly support –or are at least 
indifferent to-- the new “truth,” and often engage in rabid verbal rhetoric or even physical attacks 
against all who challenge this alleged “truth.”242  In North America, the majority of the people go 
along with whatever version of history, law, religion or “facts” that Western leaders are endlessly 
promoting at the time. Thus, history, the law (including the US and Canadian Constitutions) and 
religious doctrine are rhetorically rewritten again and again to favor whatever the new political 
fad is being promoted at the time and/or to turn the masses against whatever new target has been 
selected for war.243
     The willful cultural amnesia of Western society, combined with Western leaders’ persistent 
revision of history, law, and religious doctrine, has contributed to other problematic patterns in 
 
                                                 
242 Many such attacks were repeated over and over again in response to the opposition to the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The new version of “truth” created by Western leaders 
(particularly in the U.S.) blamed Afghanistan, and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, for the 
September 11th attacks that were perpetrated by a handful of extremists.  Such irresponsibly 
inaccurate rhetoric, and the immoral actions it sought to justify, served to condemn hundreds of 
thousands of Afghans and Iraqis to loss, suffering, torture and death. US leaders further 
presented a new, official version of history which claimed that “Muslims” (not just extreme, 
fundamentalist Muslims) hate us for our “freedoms” (rather than for the past several decades of 
CIA intervention, economic sanctions, militarily-imposed no-fly zones, and U.S. support and 
control of CIA-backed dictators, etc., etc.).  Meanwhile, new versions of these “freedoms” were 
created which did not include freedom of speech, freedom to protest, or even freedom to travel, 
drive or ride the subway unmolested by police.  Within the U.S., assertions of these sorts of 
freedoms now stand in as signs of being “against us” and for “them,” of being unpatriotic, of 
sympathizing with terrorists and of perhaps even being a terrorist oneself.   
243 Since the end of World War II, in particular, the United States government has never ceased 
to be at war –whether officially and overtly, or unofficially and covertly.  The targets have 
changed, but the persistent drive to dominate and exploit other peoples for the political and 
financial ends of the US government and its corporate leaders has not, except in its increase in 
intensity and overtness. 
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Western culture: magical thinking and purporting to speak for God.  Though these two patterns 
frequently overlap and in many ways resemble each other, they are not always one and the same 
thing.  Magical thinking occurs in all kinds of ways throughout Western society without making 
any reference to God.   
     It is important, in this brief discussion of magical thinking trends in the Western culture, to 
differentiate the Western pattern of magical thinking, and its origins, from the accusations of 
“magical thinking” that Western academics (particularly Anthropologists) have generally been 
leveled against so-called “primitive” societies.  The type of so-called “magical thinking” that 
arises from one’s connection with all things, in which one finds answers to questions, gains 
valuable wisdom, or even receives messages or visions through meditation or self-reflection, is a 
process that has been honored in virtually every religious system and culture around the world 
throughout history.  The Christian religion is no exception.  The original teachings of 
Christianity promoted this type of inner contemplation as the means to salvation, and the Church 
still sometimes designates acts as miracles or people as saints.  Regardless of anyone’s views on 
these designations and on the existence of miracles or saints, the acts and people that are 
generally so-designated are those that have been beneficial to other people in some ways.  Thus, 
this type of thinking, even for those who disagree with it, is far more constructive than 
destructive.  And the type of meditative reflection and self-reflection that corresponds to this way 
of thinking --whether interpreted as meditative self-discovery or messages received from an 
other-worldly power—similarly result in constructive revelations and actions.  For example, this 
type of meditative reflection and self-reflection can provide individuals and groups with new 
ways of thinking about and/or being in the world around them, and/or can provide them with 
new ways to survive adversity and trauma (including the adversity and trauma of totalitarian 
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domination, disconnection, and repression). Thus, these forms of thinking are not destructive and 
they do not deviate from the basic, shared, moral proscriptions held by the vast majority of 
humanity throughout human history. Instead, they generally result in (or are aimed at) healing 
and making whole that which has been fragmented, degraded, or traumatized, or are aimed at 
protecting against threats of trauma and destruction. 
     In contrast, the type of magical thinking of concern here is that which often arises as the result 
of the destructive processes of Western society, and which preys upon people’s insecurities and 
psychological despair by promoting a continuation or escalation of destruction. This type of 
magical thinking frequently constitutes a maladaptive way of coping psychologically with the 
adversity and trauma that is inherent in various destructive processes of Western society.  Siding 
with the perpetrator of crimes or oppressions is an example of one such maladaptive coping 
mechanism that will be discussed in a later section. Chris Hedges (2002) discusses another 
example of this type of magical thinking, and of one of its many root causes in western society:  
Economic dislocations bring with [them] destruction of communities, destruction 
of families, substance abuse, domestic abuse, all of the attendant problems that 
come when communities break down, and people retreat from this reality based 
world –which frankly almost destroys them, almost has destroyed them—into a 
non-reality based belief system.  And all totalitarian systems are non-reality-based 
systems: a world of magic, of historical inevitability, a world where god 
intervenes on your behalf. (P. 104) 
 
David Harvey (2003) further discusses economic dislocation, and other forms of dislocation, as 
being an inherent part of capitalism, and thus Western society, in his discussions of accumulation 
by dispossession.   
     One of the most destructive forms of magical thinking involves the claim to have a message 
from God which is used to justify the infliction of pain and suffering upon other people or life 
forms, and which clearly transgress the most basic moral principles that are shared by most 
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religions and by virtually all cultures in the world –i.e., proscriptions against killing, stealing, 
lying, abusing, exploiting, and so forth. This type of magical thinking abounded during the 
Crusades and was influenced to some extent by the economic dislocation of people living in 
Western Europe in the early Middle Ages. During this time, Western Europe was plagued by 
famine, sickness, and continual warfare and conquest. All of these were referenced and utilized 
by Pope Urban II in his statements regarding the misery and suffering of the peoples of Europe.  
These references were used first to remind people of their own misery, and then to unite and 
mobilize them around an immoral and Utopian (Mohawk, 2000) series of wars by appealing to 
their self-interest: 
Let none of your possessions detain you, no solicitude for your family affairs, 
since this land which you inhabit, shut in on all sides by the seas and surrounded 
by the mountain peaks, is too narrow for your large population; nor does it 
abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence 
it is that you murder one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you 
perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your 
quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. 
Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race, 
and subject it to yourselves. That land which as the Scripture says "floweth with 
milk and honey," was given by God into the possession of the children of Israel. 
Jerusalem is the navel of the world; the land is fruitful above others, like another 





The possessions of the enemy, too, will be yours, since you will make spoil of 
their treasures and return victorious to your own; or empurpled with your own 
blood, you will have gained everlasting glory. For such a Commander you ought 
to fight, for One who lacks neither might nor wealth with which to reward you. 
(Balderic of Dol., quoted in Halsall, 1997)  
 
This call to arms, presented as a call commanded by God for all to engage in ruthless slaughter 
and plunder of other people, launched Christian Crusaders into a mentality of magical thinking, 
in which they believed that they could do no wrong because all that they did or thought was 
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approved of and supported by God.244
     Almost a millennia later, Western leaders still invoke God when calling for crusades against 
“Godless communists,” “narco-terrorists,” and other alleged incarnations of “evil” –such as 
George W. Bush’s call for a crusade against Muslim extremists, in which he claimed that he was 
acting on instructions from God, who was on “our” side (MacAskill, 2005).
 Spurred by the Pope’s call, the Crusaders took the 
initiative to go beyond even what the Pope requested, massacring Jews up and down the Rhine 
River and making spoil of their treasures in order to fund their march to fight the Muslims 
(Carroll, 2007). They indiscriminately slaughtered people in their path of all religions and ages 
because they believed they were fighting a holy war.  During difficult times when their beliefs to 
this extent wavered (such as when it appeared that their own lives were in danger at Antioc), 
some among them would claim to have ‘uncovered’ various relics that were claimed to be holy 
relics --and thus signs that their massacres and atrocities were supported and called for by God, 
and that God was fighting with them against their enemies. 
245
                                                 
244 Of course, many scholars today have noted the wide variety of secular motivations for the 
Pope’s call for a crusade, none of which were holy, and virtually all of which egregiously 
contradict the most fundamental religious and moral teachings regarding how Christians are to 
treat other people.  Some of these motivations have already been discussed above. See also: 
(Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66, 68; Mohawk, 2000: 83-85; The History Channel, 2005) 
 Not surprisingly, 
these calls to war –spurred on by the alleged discovery of weapons of mass destruction, rather 
than alleged holy relics-- have led to the justification of indiscriminate murder and atrocities 
against the populations of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Sudan, Libya, and so forth, as well as 
against Arab, or “Arab-looking” people throughout Western society.  Whereas trauma of 
245 "President Bush said to all of us: 'I am driven with a mission from God'. God would tell me, 
'George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan'. And I did. And then God would tell me 
'George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq'. And I did. And now, again, I feel God's words coming 
to me, 'Go get the Palestinians their state and get the Israelis their security, and get peace in the 
Middle East'. And, by God, I'm gonna do it." (Former Palestinian foreign minister, Nabil Shaath, 
quoted in: MacAskill, 2005).  
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repeated conquests and economic dislocation were factors in the original Crusades, trauma from 
the 9/11 attacks and politically-induced fear and paranoia induced widespread fanaticism 
favoring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In both cases the underlying motivation for the 
crusade has less to do with God than it has to do with plundering wealth from other people, 
politically dominating a strategically-positioned territory and its resources, and uniting and 
consolidating Empire. The most fundamental aspect of this form of magical thinking –in 
purporting to speak for God when calling for the commission of atrocities against other people—
is that it knows no moral boundaries.  It is completely divorced from the moral prescriptions of 
virtually all religions and cultures, which prohibit killing, theft, torture, abuse, exploitation, and 
so forth.  
     Other forms of magical thinking abound in Western society, most of which are far less 
destructive than those claiming God has endorsed and commanded mass atrocities, but which are 
still, nonetheless, destructive. Virtually all of the various expressions of Western magical 
thinking have arisen out of the separation from, and universal intolerance of, other people, the 
natural world, and oneself,246
                                                 
246 Having lost all of these connections, it is little surprise that Western society has, in many 
ways, also lost some connections with morality; and it is little surprise that individuals in western 
society routinely experience despair, isolation, alienation, and other psychological difficulties 
which make them susceptible to various types of destructive magical thinking. 
 as well as from the resulting experiences of alienation, despair and 
various other psychological difficulties. Often these very psychological difficulties arise, 
themselves, from our separation, alienation and intolerance. In these separations, we have lost 
touch with the cycles of life. Our consumer culture worships youth (which sells products), while 
the elderly are discarded, ignored and forgotten. In denying parts of ourselves, and basic aspects 
of life, we flock to anti-aging cures which are supposed to make us look younger, live longer, 
and appear more desirable in consumer culture’s image. The same can be said for a variety of 
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other self-help programs and products which promise amazing results through unrealistic means.  
Since consumer culture only recognizes our worth as human beings in our surface appearances, 
or in what we own, rather than reject this culture, our alienation and disconnect from ourselves 
and the world around us drives us to consumer various material items that we don’t need and 
only use temporarily (until these are out of fashion, which will be almost immediately) in a 
desperate attempt to demonstrate that we have worth as human beings. And when we become 
exhausted from our perpetual and losing mobilization to prove our worth as human beings 
through material consumption and various “cures,” we fall into even greater despair, and 
experience even greater psychological difficulties, as all that we have attempted to separate, 
repress, and reject bubbles up from our subconscious, reminding us of the symbolic violence that 
has been done to our lives and our relationships with the world around us, with others, and with 
ourselves. Meanwhile, another ready-made, magical cure awaits us in the various medications 
for depression, ADHD, ADD, panic and anxiety disorders, and the scores of other ‘disorders’ 
that have been created in, and are largely unique to western society.  In the despairing chaos that 




Projection, Inability to Respect Difference, Lack of Empathy and Incapacity for Critical Self-
Reflection 
 
Islam is accused of violence as if Christianity is innocent. 
~ Caroll 1997 
 
[Freud] argued that so far as they are not justified by real exploitation or real 
persecution, people making an enemy will adopt the psychological maneuver of 
projection.  They defend themselves against their unacceptable thoughts or wishes 
by expelling them from their own mind to the outside world, onto the convenient 
Other.  This mechanism provides a highly supportive way of living with one’s 
failings; it permits the denial that one is subject to these failings in the first place 
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and then opportunely rediscovers them in strangers or adversaries, real or 
imagined …  Once the transposition from self to others has been made, the search 
for villains is bound to prove an agreeable diversion from self-reproach.  And the 
aggressive acts that follow are likely to be all the more furious because a certain 
measure of uneasiness may be surging up from the depths.  Can it be that one is 
no better than one’s victims? It is a terrible thought, to be kept at bay. 
~ Gay 1993, 69-70 
 
Admission of fundamental incorrectness in anything has never been demonstrated 
to be a European cultural characteristic.  A way must be found out of such an 
impasse. 
~ Black Elk 1983, 157 
 
The ideological separation between good and “evil” parts of ourselves, combined with the 
universal intolerance of the Church, both contributed to and utilized our individual and 
institutionalized separation from reality.  In order to escape the negative parts of themselves, our 
Western Christian ancestors had to constantly repress and/or attack aspects of who they were.  
Unable to fully eliminate these aspects in themselves that exist in every human being, they 
engaged in the next closest thing: psychologically projecting these undesirable aspects of 
themselves onto other people.  By psychologically projecting onto external others what they 
hated and despised within themselves, they alleviated some of their (consciousness of their) own 
anxieties relating to their inability to eliminate the “evil” within.  The evil within became the evil 
in “them,” and their anxiety, which remained, could be partially alleviated by avoiding, 
attacking, dominating or killing the targets of their projections –and thus symbolically 
conquering the undesirable aspects of themselves and achieving a form of pseudo-salvation.  But 
because they could never really be freed from these undesirable aspects of themselves, their 
attacks upon the targets of their projections –even when these attacks resulted in death and near 
extermination of those targets-- could only ever result in temporary alleviation of their anxiety, 
fear, hatred, despair, and/or in temporary pseudo-salvation.  This is because, even if the old 
targets were completely exterminated, the undesirable parts that they were trying to repress, 
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attack, and exterminate within themselves remained, as did their need to engage in psychological 
defense mechanisms for denying these aspects of themselves and dealing with their anxiety 
related to the existence of these suppressed aspects.  Thus, new targets would be needed for these 
psychological mechanisms of separating, repressing and rejecting entire aspects of who they 
were, and who all human beings are. In this way, Tariq Ali’s remarks on the Crusades ring true 
on many levels, and are worth repeating: 
If there had been no Islam, just east and west Christianity, exactly the same thing 
would have happened.  But they would have had to find a different ideology.  
They probably would have said: ‘These are not proper Christians, we’re the true 




     Thus, the violence perpetrated upon other peoples –heretics and non-Christians during the 
early Middle Ages and then the Crusades—was primarily a result of the violence that Western 
Christians were first required to commit against themselves when they were indoctrinated 
(voluntarily or by force) into the Church’s universalisms of domination, rejection, and 
intolerance, as well as the attempted separations between themselves and other people, the 
natural world, their God and even various aspects of themselves. In attempting to maintain these 
separations and forms of intolerance, Western Christians constructed an extremely fragile 
cultural worldview that was threatened by all non-Christians, as well as by other Christian 
peoples who were not actively engaged in the same symbolic self-flagellation against various 
parts of themselves.  Seeing these other people accept within themselves those human aspects 
that Western Christians were so vehemently attacking and denying in their own persons was 
threatening to Christians.  It was also threatening to their cultural worldview, which held that 
                                                 
247 Likewise, David Loy (2002) has remarked on the recent war on terror: “If there were no 
Afghanistan, it would have needed to be invented. (Perhaps it was? Evidently most of the 
September attackers, like bin Laden himself, were from Saudi Arabia, which has been a major 
source of support for al Queda.  But there was no talk of attacking Saudi Arabia).” (p. 260) 
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such parts of oneself (if not rejected, suppressed and projected onto others) would lead to eternal 
damnation. Because of their attacks on themselves, and their attacks on others (in a futile attempt 
to save themselves from attack), these Christians had already become engaged in perpetration 
even before they set out on their various Crusades.  It is thus no wonder that they displayed a 
complete lack of empathy for those against whom they committed murder, plunder, abuse, 
torture and other atrocities –and thus a complete lack of morals (except for those pseudo-morals 
present in their episodes of magical thinking).  They had been conditioned and compelled to both 
ignore and attack the pain and suffering of others because they were first, and perhaps primarily, 
ignoring, repressing and attacking the pain and suffering of themselves. As McFarlane & van der 
Kolk (2006) have noted in their clinical work around trauma and post traumatic stress disorder, 
in order for people to be able to confront and face the pain and suffering of others, they must first 
be able to do so for themselves.  The failure to be able to do the first is a result of a failure to do 
the second: 
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at least 
in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.  
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and 
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes 
even compassion for others.  Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of 
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so 
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with 
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the 
wounded parts of themselves.  Identification with the aggressor makes it possible 
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others. (P. 36). 
 
     This behavior pattern has been a part of Western society for so long that most of us project 
“undesirable” parts of ourselves onto others on a daily basis without having a clue that this is 
what we are doing, and often without being able to recognize or believe it if someone pointed it 
out to us.  When we look at someone we don’t know and decide that we don’t like his/her for 
various reasons, we are engaging in projection.  When we stereotype groups of people and 
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negatively judge individuals from these groups for the characteristics that we imagine they have, 
we are engaging in projection.  Often when we feel slighted or envied by strangers, co-workers, 
or acquaintances, we are engaging in projection.  We engage in projection on a routine basis with 
our acquaintances, family members, close friends and intimate partners. And while projections 
can sometimes result in sympathy for or empathy with others, such as when we care for others 
during their difficult times and imagine their suffering, the predominant occurrence of projection 
in Western society is negative –i.e., the type of projection that allows us to hate, dislike, dismiss 
and perhaps even verbally or physically attack other people for the motives, thoughts, ideas, 
characteristics we imagine them to have, or even the things that we imagine they are doing. 
     When, as individuals, we act upon these projections without realizing that they are 
projections, our actions can have embarrassing, insulting and destructive consequences for our 
interpersonal relationships or careers. When, as groups or societies, we act upon these 
projections without realizing that they are projections, our actions can have much more 
destructive, deadly, and even genocidal consequences for those targeted in these projections. 
They also have dire consequences for those doing the targeting, since the action of victimizing 
others furthers their detachment from themselves, others, and the world around them, and 
potentially deprives both victims and victimizers of personal identity and a sense of community 
(Kelman, 1973: 51-52). 
     There are two other patterns in the Western cultural worldview that are closely related to 
these patterns of separation, intolerance, and projection: our inability to tolerate difference, and 
our incapacity for critical self-reflection.  By projecting the rejected parts of ourselves onto 
others, we become intolerant of difference.  In our intolerance, we are unwilling to treat peoples 
or cultures that are different with respect.  And since these separations and all other patterns in 
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Western society stem from social relations of domination, we can’t comprehend different people 
or cultures as being equal: they must be either inferior or superior to us (See for example, Keal, 
2003: 56-61 and 185-216). Further, since, in our universal intolerance, we see everything that is 
not like the idealized parts of ourselves as inferior, this is also how we see those people or 
cultures that do not represent these ideals. (Though, in many ways, these peoples or cultures 
cannot represent our ideals, not only because they have different ideals, but also because we 
project all the negative parts of ourselves onto them.)  Moreover, since this imagined 
“inferiority” (i.e., difference) triggers our own anxieties about the existence of repressed and 
rejected parts of ourselves, we are almost psychologically incapable of just letting the difference 
be.  Instead, we have to change it, dominate it, repress it, punish it, kill it or in other ways 
“improve upon” it (all in order to avoid acknowledging that “it” is really us).  We frequently do 
so by attempting to force other people to conform to our religion, our cultural worldview and our 
way of life, and thus to share our psychological impairments. Frank Black Elk (1983) has made a 
similar observation regarding Christians, Capitalists and Marxists: 
are all proselytizers; that is, seeking to gain recruits, more recruits.  All of them 
want me to change; none of them care to support who I am. … I, and my people, 
are just so much more material to be accumulated and rearranged into something 
we weren’t and never wanted to be. (P. 146) 
 
     With all of these cultural patterns and psychological defense mechanisms built up around us 
to prevent us from fully realizing who we are as human beings and in relation to others and the 
world around us, it is little wonder that we have a difficult time seeing these patterns. Thus, 
another characteristic of the Western cultural worldview is a virtual incapacity for critical self-
reflection. It is not that we are biologically unable to engage in these self-reflective processes; it 
is that we are culturally conditioned –by layers and layers of psychological defense mechanisms 
passed down through the generations-- not to do so.  Many of us don’t even realize that there is 
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anything to critique, since we don’t see the patterns that we engage in on a daily basis at the 
individual, group and societal levels (and since we are so busy projecting undesirable parts of 
ourselves onto others, and then trying to “improve” these others).  If we do not see these cultural 
patterns and/or parts of ourselves that we have rejected, individually and/or as a cultural 
collective, then it is impossible to address, correct, or otherwise improve upon who we are as 
individuals or as a cultural collective. Instead of actual personal or cultural growth, we reinforce 
our individual and cultural pathologies of projection, separation, intolerance, domination, 
rewriting history, collective amnesia and magical thinking--- cultural patterns which are always 
reinforced only to the detriment of ourselves, other peoples and all life on the planet.  
 
Scapegoating and Human Sacrifice 
 
To be sure, men have always had their methods of producing deviants, enemies, 
subhuman humans.  But only in the modern world has betrayal of the Other 
become exalted as the supreme proof of loyalty to the group. … Only through 
participating in the ritual destruction of the Other, only through committing 
existential cannibalism, is man admitted to membership in the modern State. …. It 
follows that man’s refusal to sacrifice scapegoats –and his willingness to 
recognize and bear his own and his group’s situation and responsibility in the 
world—would be a major step in his moral development. ….  [O]ur ancestors 
were, and we remain, existential or spiritual cannibals.  As a rule, we live off the 
meaning others give their lives, validating our humanity by invalidating theirs.  
….  Can we create meaning in our lives without demeaning the lives of others? 
~ Szasz 1970, 283-286 
 
If only it were all so simple! If only there were evil people somewhere, insidiously 
committing evil deeds, and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest 
of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart 
of every human being.  And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart? 
~Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quoted in Loy 2002 
 
 
Scapegoating and human sacrifice have existed in a number of different cultures throughout 
history and, despite the widespread refusal of Westerners to acknowledge the presence of the 
latter, both have remained prominent practices in Western society. Both of these practices are so 
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important and fundamental to who we are within our Western cultural worldview that one could 
even argue, as I am here, that they are indispensable, and that, without them, we would have no 
collective identity and nothing to unify us as anything more than “a violent conglomerate of 
individuals, not a people” (Deloria, 1969: 185).248
     Though some Westerners have preferred to attribute scapegoating and various forms of 
sacrifice to “savage” or “primitive” peoples (for illustration, see Frazer, quoted in Szasz, 1970: 
260),
 
249 scapegoating is so prevalent in Western society that that examples of its recognition 
abound.  For example, from the beginning of its study as a discipline, Sociologists have 
implicitly recognized the existence of scapegoating in their recognition that deviance performs 
essential functions in (Western, industrialized, hierarchical250
                                                 
248 “All the white man has succeeded in creating in his time on this continent had been a violent 
conglomerate of individuals, not a people.” Admittedly, this may be less the case for Westerners 
in Europe than it is for Westerners living in settler-states throughout the European Diaspora. The 
difference might only be in degrees, however, and this topic will taken up indirectly in the next 
sub-section on individualism. 
) society. Durkheim found that 
249 From Frazer’s 1922 study of magic and religion (The Golen Bough: A Study in Magic and 
Religion):  
The notion that we can transfer our guilt and sufferings to some other being who will 
bear them for us is familiar to the savage mind.  It arises from a very obvious confusion 
between the physical and the mental, between the material and the immaterial.  Because 
it is possible to shift a load of wood, stones, or what not, from out own back to the back 
of another, the savage fancies that it is equally possible to shift the burden of his pains 
and sorrows to another, who will suffer them in his stead. (quoted in: Szasz, 1970: 260) 
Similarly, Keal (2003), Todorov (1982) and others have remarked upon the attitudes of 
Europeans towards Native nations that engaged in ritual human sacrifice 
250 It is important to keep in mind that many Western Sociologists have long made 
generalizations about their culture and then applied these generalizations to all other cultures. 
The necessity of deviance in society is one such instance of ethnocentrically projecting the 
dynamics of western society onto other cultures, particularly when we consider that most Native 
cultures in the Americas, prior to the European invasion, had no police forces, and were without 
repressive forms of government.  As Forbes (2008) remarks on the contrast between Native non-
Native “civilizations”: 
[A] civilization is (it would appear) a society in which there are so many evil or violent 
or dishonorable people that the police, soldiers, and other armed forces of control must 
almost equal the total population in numbers.  
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deviance clarifies moral boundaries, affirms that the cultural norms and values of the group 
defining deviance are seen as “good,” and affirms that those violating these norms and values are 
seen as the opposite of good. In this way, deviance unites people within a given group around 
these shared common norms and values and (more importantly) against those who have been 
labeled as violators of the moral boundaries of the group, i.e., as “deviant”(Durkheim, 1982; 
Garland, 1990: 23-46) In support of Durkheim’s assertions, Kai Erikson (2005) found that, 
though certain deviant behaviors were virtually eliminated over time, the Puritans of 
Massachusetts Bay colony defined a steady portion of their population as deviant by defining 
new acts as deviant, and thus making examples of how not to behave for the rest of the colony.  
Likewise, both Thomas Szasz (1970)251 and Howard Becker (1963)252
                                                                                                                                                             
     On the other hand, I believe that a true civilization is a society where people are 
“civil”; that is, where they behave so well toward each other that they do not need 
police or other armed systems of control. (P. 46, emphasis in original). 
 have found that deviance 
is not the related to the act that a person commits, but is a consequence of the label that is placed 
upon a person by the society in which he lives (or, one might add, is placed upon another society 
or culture by a society or culture that wishes to oppose it, for whatever reason).  In other words, 
Western society’s requirement that its members create (and then destroy via sacrifice) scapegoats 
in order to form a collective identity (in which we define ourselves as “good” by rejecting others 
that we have defined as “bad” and “evil”), has been well observed by Western scholars.  So has 
251 “[D]eviance is not, as is often erroneously believed, a defect exhibited by, or contained in the 
personality of, an individual actor…; it is, instead, an inevitable consequence, and indeed an 
integral part, of the construction of social compacts or groups” (Szasz, 1970: 279). 
252 “[S]ocial groups create deviance by making rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and 
by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders.  From this point of 
view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the 
application by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender.’”(Becker, 1963: 9, emphasis in 
original). 
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the tendency to ensure conformity to desired patterns of behavior by creating a fear of the 
punishments associated with non-conformity.  
     Sociological studies of deviance are not the only place where implicit examples of 
scapegoating are found.  These examples also abound in our every day experiences, and are 
prevalent in instances and expressions of nationalism, racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, 
campaigns against Native treaty rights, and all forms of anti-s and -isms.  Scapegoating is present 
in small towns or rural communities, as well as large cities.  We encounter it in our workplaces, 
in our circles of friends, and even in our families.253   In particular, we find forms of 
scapegoating in political campaigns at local, state and national levels, where demonizing various 
groups of people, and even declaring domestic “wars” upon them has long been a tool for 
unifying large sections of the population in order to consolidate one’s support and power as a 
candidate (or incumbent).254  Scapegoating is always present, often on numerous levels, in any 
war, and it often seems that the more hateful the propaganda produced against the “enemy” or 
various “enemies,” the more solidly the support for the war congeals, the more the pressure to 
conform with this support, and the more vehement the rejection of those who speak out against 
this scapegoating.255
     Thus, though many Westerners might be reluctant to admit it when they, themselves, are 
engaged in scapegoating (and, in fact, might not even recognize it in these instances, given the 
 
                                                 
253 See, for example: Laing, R.D.  1972.  The Politics of the Family and Other Essays. New 
York: Vintage Books. 
254 A number of scholars have written on this process in relation to the drug war, the war on 
terror, the red scare, McCarthyism, and so forth.  One excellent study on the topic is John 
Helmer (1975) Drugs and Minority Oppression, which details the various wars on drugs in the 
United States, situating them within economic turmoil, political opportunism, and scapegoating 
of various minority groups.   
255 A recent example of this in the US can be found in George W. Bush’s attempts to silence 
opposition to the “war on terror” by asserting that people and countries “are either with us or 
against us”(and implicitly, for the terrorists), (CNN, 2001).  
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general lack of critical self-reflection in Western society), most today would accept and admit 
that scapegoating is widely practiced in Western society today. And though some might still 
cling for comfort to the unrealistic idea that “savage” or “primitive” societies have engaged in 
more --or worse-- forms of scapegoating, others will readily admit that, not only is scapegoating 
practiced all around us, all the time, in Western society, but participation in scapegoating, in 
many instances, has become mandatory.  As Thomas Szasz (1970) has noted, “[t]o refuse to 
persecute the socially accredited scapegoat is interpreted as an attack on society itself” (p. 288). 
     Like scapegoating, human sacrifice is also widespread in Western society.  However, it is 
rarely recognized for what it is, and most Westerners would deny that such a thing exists within 
their culture because they prefer to imagine that it is more advanced and sophisticated than other 
cultures.  This failure to recognize the presence of human sacrifice is a reflection of many of the 
problematic cultural patterns already identified above, including separation and projection, the 
inability to tolerate difference, and the inability to engage in critical self-reflection. For example, 
Keal (2003) notes complete lack of critical self-reflection among Spaniards, who viewed as 
inferior Native South American cultures that practiced human sacrifice (killing hundreds of 
people a year), but thought nothing of torturing and massacring hundreds of thousands of Native 
South Americans for gold or for fun:  
Ultimately the Spaniards were apparently incapable of comparing themselves in a 
negative way with the Indians.  They were, for instance, repulsed by the highly 
ritualized killing involved in sacrifice, but were totally uncritical of the random 
massacres perpetrated by themselves. (Pp. 60-61. See also: Todorov, 1982)  
 
Forbes (2008) has made similar observations: 
 
Various terms, such as “wild,” “savage” and “barbarian” have been used 
frequently to refer to violent, crude, brutal, cruel, destructive and aggressive 
behavior.  Ironically, such terms have often been used by European writers to 
refer to non-European peoples whose customs were different and therefore 
(because of that element of difference) called “wild” or “savage.”  The irony 
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stems from the fact that few, if any, societies on the face of the earth have ever 
been as avaricious, cruel, violent and aggressive as have certain European 
populations. (P. 23) 
 
Further examples of this lack of critical self-reflection abound throughout Western society, 
including in the present alleged wars “on terror,” in which the number of innocent civilians 
slaughtered, maimed, and tortured at the hands of U.S. troops is hundreds of times greater than 
any death or suffering caused by alleged terrorists.  The victims of the former are frequently 
referred to by administration officials as “collateral damage,” which is clearly a modern 
euphemism for human sacrifice, though the existence of human sacrifice continues to be 
vehemently denied (at least in mainstream society).256
     Despite these general impairments in Western culture, critical self-reflection does 
occasionally surface.  To this extent, some scholars have acknowledged the existence of human 
sacrifice in ritualized and non-ritualized forms in Western society, such as in the death penalty 
(Harding, 2000; Smith, 2000)
  not in Christian fundamentalist circles). 
257 and in war (Gaston, 1961),258
                                                 
256 This denial is less clear in Christian fundamenalist circles.  See, for example, the 2009 film 
Waiting for Armageddon, which documents the push among Christian fundamentalists for 
escalating war against Muslims in the Middle East.  According to their fundamentalist doctrine, 
these Christians believe that the death and destruction of Muslims is a sign of –and will cause—
the Rapture, in which they will be called by God to everlasting salvation in heaven while the rest 
of humanity suffers and burns on earth. (And, in some cases, is slaughtered by these saved 
Christians, who return to earth with Jesus, armed with swords, and proceed to massacre everyone 
who is not saved for some reason or another). 
 while others have argued that 
257 The former source notes:  
The ritual slaughter of humans for sacrificial purposes has an ancient provenance. Few 
members of modern society would be inclined to believe that killing humans for 
sacrificial purposes continues. Of those, most probably envision it only being practiced 
by individuals who belong to "uncivilized," or non-"First-World" cultures. Upon closer 
scrutiny, however, it becomes apparent that this is a misconception because the past and 
present practice of capital punishment includes a thinly disguised manifestation of the 
ritualized killing of people, otherwise known as human sacrifice. (Harding, 2000: 175-
176) 
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cannibalism (at least symbolic cannibalism) is still widespread in Western society (and 
cannibalism, of course, presupposes human sacrifice) (Szasz, 1970: 284-88; Forbes, 2008).  A 
few scholars, arguing that human sacrifice is basically the rationalized, ritualized killing of 
human beings by social institutions, insist that there is “hardly any form of violence cannot be 
described in terms of sacrifice” (Harding,  
     Given this view of institutional ritual controlled by the authorities in a hierarchical society, it 
is easier to see how all forms of state or state-sanctioned killing could fall into the category of 
human sacrifice.  This becomes even more clearly the case when we consider the religious 
characteristics of Western secularism, such as the worship of consumption and material goods, a 
blind faith in the ability of science and technology to solve all of the world’s problems, and an 
unfounded belief that all that Western society is and does constitutes human “progress” towards 
a future utopia with Western society leading the way to progress and utopia (Mohawk, 2000 & 
1997; Means, 1983: 21-22; Black Elk, 1983; Diamond, 1974: 39, 41; Szasz, 1970: 275; Mies, 
1986: 74-76). We now kill our sacrificial victims at the altar of Western progress, science, 
technology, and material accumulation. We do so not to bring them closer to us or to bring 
ourselves closer to a spiritual God, as have other societies before us (Szasz, 1970: 260-89).
2000: 182, 177; Girard, 1977: 1, 306). 
259
                                                                                                                                                             
258 “On an ethnological plane, war may be considered a destruction rite involving (1) wanton 
economic destruction, and (2) human sacrifice” (quoted from the abstract). Possibly also see: 
Horowitz (1991).  
 
Rather, we do so to expel negative aspects of ourselves that are projected onto others, so that we 
259 See Szasz, p. 260-289 reports that in some historical societies the humans sacrificed in rituals 
were treated extremely well by the whole society before and during the sacrifice ritual, which 
was conducted to bring the society closer to God and/or the sacrificed; though in other historical 
societies the sacrificed was despised or tormented prior to or during the sacrifice ritual).  See 
also: Forbes (1992). Others have argued that human sacrifices were not done for the purpose of 
getting closer to the victim, and involved ritualized torture of the victim prior to sacrifice 
(Harding, 2000; Smith, 2000). 
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can be unified in our imagined goodness as we pursue unending consumption and material 
accumulation at the expense of other peoples and other life on the planet. 
     In this way, war and capital punishment are not the only forms of ritualized human sacrifice. 
All forms of imperialism and colonialism, whether undertaken through traditional military means 
or modern, economic ones, constitute forms of human sacrifice.  Further, human sacrifice can be 
constituted in any instances in which state authorities or corporate elites purposefully engage in 
behavior that results in the death of other people. But it could also be constituted in some forms 
of non-lethal punishment. Police brutality and military training can also constitute forms of 
human sacrifice, the former of which involves a ritual through which men and women are trained 
to sacrifice themselves for the goals of politicians and wealthy elites. Penal sanctions against 
innocent young black men for the assault, rape and/or murder of privileged white women (such 
as the Central Park jogger) can also be characterized as human sacrifice, as whole sections of the 
lives of the wrongfully punished are lost in prison.  Likewise, the evictions of millions of people 
from their homes, jobs and access to subsistence has taken on new heights during the recent 
financial crisis, could constitute a form of human sacrifice, as can all forms of economic 
dislocation that leaves victims with nothing so that the wealthy few in society might accumulate 
even more.  In this latter form, the “society” benefiting from these repeated, ongoing sacrifices 
consists of only the smallest handful of elites, leaving the rest of us as potential sacrificees.  Jack 
Forbes (2008) has linked all of these forms of sacrifice together, and has gone so far as to refer to 
these not simply as human sacrifice, but as cannibalism without ceremony: 
Cannibalism, as I define it, is the consuming of another’s life for one’s own 
private purpose or profit. … The deaths of tens of millions of Jews, Slavs, etc., at 
the hands of the Nazis, the deaths of tens of millions of blacks in slavery days, the 
deaths of up to 30 million or more Indians in the 1500s, the terribly short life 
spans of Mexican Indian farm workers in the US, and of Native Americans 
generally today, the high death rates in early industrial centers among factory 
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workers, and so on, all clearly attest to the fact that the wealthy and exploitative 
literally consume the lives of those that they exploit.  …  It is simply raw 
consumption for profit, carried out often in an ugly and brutal manner.  There is 
no respect for a peon whose life is being eaten.  No ceremony.  No mystical 
communication.  Only self-serving consumption. (P. 25). 
 
     Hence, perhaps the only differences between what is generally considered to be human 
sacrifice by Westerners and the various forms of human sacrifice that routinely occur in Western 
industrial society involves 1) who is doing the sacrificing and 2) the sheer number of victims 
killed and/or dispossessed of their livelihoods.  In terms of the latter, Western society is the 
undisputed leader of the practice, historically and today.  The Inquisition provides an excellent 
illustration of this, and will carry us into the discussion on primitive accumulation, or taking 
more than is needed. 
 
Accumulation by Dispossession, or Taking More Than Is Needed 
 
European states are like stomachs, requiring a [constant] diet of infidels. 
~ Gay 1993, 68 
 
Anger and violence are not the only smokescreens for fear.  Different fears call 
for different smokescreens.  Probably the most common one is the security to be 
gained from obtaining and using power.  Money and property might be called 
congealed power.  Of course a certain amount of such congealed power is 
necessary to live, especially in today’s hyper-commodified world, but when their 
pursuit has become the main goal of life, that life is dominated by disguised fear.  
The fact that this psychopathology is now so widespread and acceptable does not 
make it any the less problematic, of course; it just indicates a psychopathological 
society. 
~ Loy 2002 
 
Previously in the chapter Tariq Ali was quoted in his observation that, had there been no Islam, 
the Crusades would still have occurred, just under slightly modified justifying ideology (quoted 
in The History Channel, 2005). As history has shown, Ali couldn’t have been more correct in his 
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observations. Aside from aiding in the slaughter of Jews260 and ignoring the indiscriminate 
slaughter of non-Western Christians (and Muslim women and children) during the first Crusade, 
the Church became involved in an official Crusade against Western Christians in 1209, when 
Pope Innocent III launched the Albigensian Crusade against Cathars from the town of Albi in 
what is now the south of France (Federici, 2004: 33 note 16). The Church had battled against 
heresy from the early to late Middle Ages, but this seems to have marked the first official war on 
Western Christians who did not conform to official Church doctrine.  However, it was definitely 
not the last.261
     Anyone examining the above-discussed patterns in the Western cultural worldview, including 
the widespread entrenchment of the patterns of projection, scapegoating and human sacrifice, 
would be hard pressed to come to a different conclusion from Ali.  But in addition to these 
above-discussed patterns, there was another reason why the Crusades and the domestic wars that 
followed were inevitable: the drive for accumulation by dispossession by Church (and, 
increasingly, secular) authorities driven by the mentality of Empire-building. As previously 
noted, the underlying purposes of the Crusades were to consolidate the wealth and power of the 
 Just over two decades later, with the Crusades still ongoing, Pope Gregory IX 
launched the Inquisition, an institutionalized war on heretics –i.e., everyone who did not strictly 
conform to official Church doctrine—which was created for the purpose of exterminating the 
Christian Cathars and Waldenses who preached against the corruption of the Church Federici, 
2004: 33 and note 16). 
                                                 
260 According to Jacoby, not only did Bishops refuse to protect Jews who had not converted to 
Christianity from the Crusaders, but priests actually led the Crusaders into the Jewish 
neighborhoods so they could kill the Jews (Carroll, 2007).  
261 For example, in 1234 the Bishop of Breman called for a crusade against his tenants who 
refused to pay tithes (Federici, 2004: 34), and other examples can readily be found. 
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Church262 by taking for the Church land, wealth, and souls possessed by other people but 
imagined --through magical thinking and a disconnection from reality-- to belong to the 
conquering Crusaders and Christendom. This pattern of taking what belongs to others –here 
referred to as the processes of accumulation by dispossession, 263
     As mentioned above, by the time of the Crusades, the Church was already well-entrenched in 
these patterns of taking more than is needed, and doing so at the expense of other people. The 
Church had been silent on slavery once it became a state religion under the Roman Empire, and 
this silence continued long after the fall of the Empire, as did slavery (Federici, 2004: 23; Tigar 
& Levy, 2000:36).
 or of taking more than is 
needed—is a part of the mentality of Empire which had already been a long-established pattern 
in the Western cultural worldview by this time.  It was during the Inquisition that this pattern 
really rose to prominence, allowing for the accumulation of land and wealth on an unprecedented 
scale, and paving the way for exponentially more accumulation by dispossession during the later 
period of imperialism and colonialism.  Because this pattern is perhaps one of the pentultimate 
problematic patterns in Western society, a quick overview of the events surrounding the 
Inquisition is worthwhile.   
264
                                                 
262 The main motivations for the Crusades have been said to be securing and expanding trade 
networks, ending attacks on merchants, and uniting western Europe under a common Christian 
identity headed by the Church –all of which were objectives that were in the interest of the 
Church and its solidification and expansion of empire (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 65-66, 68; Mohawk, 
2000: 83-85; The History Channel, 2005). 
  The Church was also a major participant, and a major institutional power 
in the daily exploitation of serfs under the manorial system which treated serfs and their 
possessions as little more than property of the manorial lord (Federici, 2004: 33-34, 23-25; 
263 Following Harvey’s (2003: 137-82) definition of the term. 
264 Slavery continued through at least the seventh century, and was never fully abolished 
according to Federici (2004). 
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Mohawk, 2000: 67, 78; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 49-50, 38-39; Osborne, 2006: 117-18).265
By the 11
 But the 
Church was also responsible for numerous additional constraints on and exploitations of the 
serfs, as Federici (2004) notes: 
th
 
 century the Church had become a despotic power that used its alleged 
divine investiture to govern with an iron fist and fills its coffers by endless means 
of extortion.  Selling absolutions, indulgences and religious offices, calling the 
faithful to the church only to preach to them the sanctity of the tithes, and making 
of all sacraments a market, were common practices from the pope to the village 
priest, so much so that the corruption of the clergy became proverbial throughout 
Christianity.  Things degenerated to the point that the clergy would not bury the 
dead, baptize or grant absolution from sin unless it received some compensation. 
Even the communion became an occasion for a bargain, and “[I]f an unjust 
demand was resisted the recalcitrant was excommunicated, and then had to pay 
for reconciliation in addition to the original sum.”(P. 34; see also pp. 25-28; The 
History Channel, 2005b) 
Sometimes the tithes charged by the Church equaled as much as one-tenth of a serf’s income, 
and Church lawyers and administrators reportedly lived like princes as the masses of serfs and 
peasants struggled to survive (Federici, 2004: 27). Though the Church continued to preach about 
the virtues of an impoverished lifestyle, many Church officials had practiced anything but this.  
Instead, these teachings were intended to maintain the Church’s privileged position in two ways: 
first, by extracting further wealth from rich lords and nobles who were attracted by guarantees of 
salvation through impoverishment, and second, by keeping serfs docile amidst the exploitation 
they suffered at the hands of their feudal lords and the Church, itself (Federici, 2004: 34 note 
                                                 
265 Serfs were required them to get permission from (and pay a fee to) their lord for marriage, 
trade, travel, transmitting land to future generations, and many other basic aspects of life, and 
feudal lords exercised numerous “rights” over serfs’ property and persons, including the “right to 
the first night,” or the right to sleep with the wife of a newly-wed serf on their wedding night. 
Despite these various constraints upon their lives, Federici (2004) argues that serf women had 




     In response to the often unbearable exploitation of the manorial system, and the pervasive 
corruption and inflammatory, hateful preaching of Church officials, various popular movements 
arose in the 11
 Thus, the Church’s sole authority to commune with God, and its ability to revise history, 
law and Church doctrine, had left it in an immensely powerful position by this time, materially 
and hegemonically. 
th, 12th and 13th centuries –generally categorized under the Millenarian movement 
or the Heretical movement-- which condemned the corruption of the Church and sought to create 
an entirely new set of social relations. While the Church preached (hypocritically) about 
apostolic poverty, many of these sects practiced it. They also opposed hierarchical and 
exploitative social relations and many actively worked towards the creation of communal forms 
of life that rejected all forms of authority, resisted commerce and trade, and challenged Church 
and secular authorities.  The Cathers, a heretical sect, tolerated other religions, provided safe 
havens for Jews, treated women as equals, and created networks of schools, safehouses and self-
defense (Federici, 2004: 31-35, 38).267
                                                 
266 “[T]he Church exalted poverty as a holy state and engaged in distributions of alms, trying to 
convince the rustics to accept their situation and not envy the rich. … The exaltation of sancta 
pauperas (“holy poverty”) also served to impress on the rich the need for charity as a means for 
salvation. This tactic procured the Church substantial donations of land, buildings, and money, 
presumably to be used for distribution among the needy, and it enabled it to become of the 
richest institutions in Europe.  But when the poor grew in numbers and the heretics started to 
challenge the Church’s greed and corruption, the clergy dismissed its homilies about poverty…” 
(Federici, p. 34, note 19). 
 Like most of these movements and sects, the Cathars 
challenged secular and Church authorities, arguing that God did not speak through corrupted 
clergy, that sacraments were not valid when administered by such clergy, that Purgatory was 
267 “[I]n the Church women were nothing, but here they were considered equal; they had the 
same rights as men, and could enjoy a social life and mobility (wandering, preaching) that 
nowhere else was available to them in the Middle Ages.  In the heretical sects, aove all among 
the Cathars and Waldenses, women had the right to administer sacraments, preach, baptize and 
even acquire sacerdotal orders.” (Federici, 2004: 38). 
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merely an invention of the clergy seeking to extort more wealth by selling indulgences, and that 
people should not pay the tithes charged by the Church, because material aspects of worship did 
not matter, only inner belief did. The Cathars further argued that they were the “true” church 
because they were not corrupted like the Catholic clergy (Federici, 2004: 31-35).   
     Despite some of the various oddities of the different Millenarian and Heretical movements,268 
they had widespread appeal among groups from all sectors of feudal society.  But they were 
particularly popular among the impoverished urban and rural masses.  The heretical movement 
was one of the most popular because it addressed (and opposed) both the ideological and 
material conditions forced upon the masses at the time. In this regard, the heretical movement, in 
particular, has been credited as providing the organizational structure for much of the social 
unrest that had been fomenting, and that would continue to intensify over the next few centuries 
(Federici, 2004: 33).269
     By the end of the early Middle Ages, and likely long before that, many serfs throughout 
Western Europe were involved in what James C. Scott (1990) has termed the arts of resistance. 
Peasants asserted that they were free men, not serfs; serfs avoided taxes and fees by refusing to 
bake bread, grind grain, or engage in other subsistence activities in the lord’s facilities (which 
they were required to use, then taxed for using); and workers fled feudal manors and took up 
residence in the towns.  Other peasants and workers who remained in the feudal manor often 
refused to show up to work the lord’s fields, or showed up late and took numerous breaks so that 
 
                                                 
268 See Federici, pp. 21-59, who mentions the various self-flagellative, apocapyptic, and/or 
prophetic characteristics of some of the Millenarian sects, and of the broad range of sexual 
beliefs among the heretical Cathars --from complete abstinence and refusal to consume any 
(animal) food that was the result of procreation, to beliefs that sexual intercourse was necessary 
as the best way to achieve innocence.  Characteristic of their tolerance for other religions, the 
Cathars tolerated this broad range of beliefs and practices among their own. 
269 Federici (2004) has referred to the heretical movement as “the most important oppositional 
movements of the Middle Ages”(p. 33). 
 167 
the crops were not harvested.  While Church and secular authorities likely viewed these 
behaviors as a low-level rebellion, many peasants and serfs likely viewed them as mere 
assertions of their rights, though many among the latter also participated more outright 
rebellions, such as the 1251 uprising in which peasants and town workers burnt and pillaged rich 
neighborhoods and demanded better working conditions (Federici, 2004: 26-29, 32). These latter 
actions were more the exception than the rule among peasants and workers, and though they may 
seem extreme, in the context of the indiscriminate slaughters promoted in the ongoing Church-
ordered Crusades, and the new assaults that arose in the Inquisition, these actions could be 
argued to have fit neatly into the range of acceptable social behavior at the time.  The main 
difference, of course, being that they were not ordered by the wealthy or powerful, but were 
levied against them. 
     Under the Crusades the Church had called for and led a series of, often indiscriminate, attacks 
against everyone who was not Western Christian.  Sensing the increasing threat to its hegemonic 
and material powers posed by the Millenarian and Heretical movements, the Church now began 
to focus its attacks on everyone who was not obedient to Church doctrine. To this extent, it 
began charging virtually every form of social or political resistance with heresy.  It rewrote 
Church doctrine, which once viewed poverty as apostolic and virtuous. Now only voluntary 
poverty was virtuous and “deserving” of salvation and help from the Church, while all other 
forms of poverty were suspicious or even indications of laziness (Federici, 2004: 34 note 19).  
Public preaching was also outlawed by anyone who did not first obtain a license from a local 
bishop, and measures were taken to confiscate the property of anyone accused and convicted of 
heresy.  To simplify this dispossession process, Pope Innocent III revamped the legal system that 
had required accusers to prove their claims against the accused, or face punishment themselves.  
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Wanting to encourage, rather than hinder would-be accusers, he created a system that allowed 
secret accusations and that accepted “sufficient belief” in place of proof (The History Channel, 
2005b). The Church also modified its stance on the death penalty, granting secular authorities the 
moral authority to judge, draw blood, and execute people, so long as they did so “justly.” 
Eventually, by the mid-13th
     With these tools in hand, early in the 13
 century, the Church had endorsed the use of torture (which it 
rationalized as benevolence) on accused heretics, leading to the production of numerous torture 
manuals, as well as torture fanatics who enriched themselves through repeated claims to have 
found fictional devil-worshiping sects and tortured 90% of their accused into making confessions 
(Federici, 2004: 35, 33; The History Channel, 2005b). 
th century, a Crusade was called against the Cathars in 
Albi, and soon an Inquisition was called targeting the Waldenses, the Cathars and all suspected 
heretics. In the early stages of these attacks, the meetings of both groups were raided by Church 
and secular authorities, some of whom executed meeting attendants on the spot.  After these 
repeated attacks forced the groups to go underground and made them more difficult to find, the 
Pope decided that on-the-spot executions were less helpful to the Church than capture, torture, 
and forced confessions, which would save at least some souls of the accused. In this way, over 
the next 150 or so years, the Church and its secular allies succeeded in annihilating the Cathars 
and Waldenses, and eradicating nearly every trace of their doctrines throughout Europe (The 
History Channel, 2005; Federici, 2004: 33 and note 17).  But they did not succeed in eliminating 
heresy altogether; nor did they succeed in eliminating the growing dissent and rebellion among 
rural and urban workers of all types, which came to resemble “true wars” by the 15th century 
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(Federici, 2004: 44, 25).270
     The crackdown of authoritarian intolerance against worker and peasant dissent was 
accompanied by increased religious persecution against Jews, Muslims, and dissenting factions 
within the Church,
 This dissent and rebellion was seen as a further threat to Church and 
secular wealth and hegemony, and it increasingly attracted the eye of the Inquisition, turning the 
Church-secular alliances in the war against heresy into an all out class war to protect the wealth 
and power of the few through the slaughter of the accused masses (Federici, 2004: 33-34). 
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270 Throughout the 14th century various forms of resistance and rebellion abound.  The famine of 
1315-22 and the first round of plague from 1347-52, which eliminated over a third of the 
population of Europe, created a tremendous labor shortage that served as an additional 
impediment to secular and Church accumulation, and an additional lift for workers’ power.  
Secular authorities responded to these challenges with new oppressive measures, such as 
freezing wages and creating a maximum wage, mandating work by all able-bodied people and 
enforcing this mandate through a capitation tax, forbidding workers to leave their present 
employment without permission from their employer/master, mandating that anyone who 
worked steadily in agriculture until the age of twelve would be forever forced to work only in 
that occupation, and passing other measures attempting to reduce workers nearly to the status of 
slaves (or to actually replace them with slaves). Merchants exercised complete control over 
urban workers, and forbid them from holding any kind of meeting, forming associations, 
carrying tools of trade (or other arms), or striking, and routinely spied on, tortured and executed 
workers through merchant-controlled town government tribunals (Federici, 2004: 37, 40, 43-45; 
Tigar, 2000: 165-66). 
 as well as against women, animals and the earth (Carroll, 2007; The 
     These various constraints on peasant and worker freedoms were met with collective resistance 
and outright rebellion by peasants and workers, who refused to pay taxes, ignored orders, and 
increasingly took up arms against the upper classes in their struggles, such as the armed urban 
rebellion in Flanders in 1377, a “whirlwind revolution” in France in 1379-1382, the English 
Peasant Uprising of 1381, various uprisings in Paris, and Taborite communism in Bohemia 
(which was armed for self-defense) (Federici, pp. 34-35, 44-45; Tigar P. 166). Throughout this 
period, Church and secular authorities responded to growing unrest by expanding the reach of 
the Inquisition and increasingly persecuting all forms of rebellion or dissent as heresy, punishing 
the workers in the Flanders as rebels and heretics, leading another crusade against the Taborites 
in Bohemia, and asserting Church control over marriage, sexuality of rich and poor alike 
(Federici, pp. 34, 36, 40). 
271 Many Jews in southern France were attacked and slaughtered in 1320 by a mob of fanatical, 
would-be crusaders, aided by local consulates.  Their counterparts in Spain were forced to 
choose between conversion to Christianity or expulsion from Spain. Many who converted were 
eventually massacred in riots or in the Inquisition after having risen to positions of prominence 
in their communities and then been accused by resentful Christians of secretly practicing 
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History Channel, 2005b; Federici, 2004: 30, 34, 40, 44, 32 note 15; Mies, 1986: 80-81; St. Clair, 
2010).272
By the mid-14
  The old teachings about women, animals, nature and non-Christian peoples, based in 
the writings of Aristotle and St. Augustine, were revived in writings of Thomas Aquinas 
(Serpell, 1999: 45-47; Mohawk, 2000: 89).  Further, the labor shortage resulting from the famine 
of 1315-22 and the plague of 1347-52 (which eliminated over a third of the population of 
Europe) was seen as a threat to social, political and economic stability for the Church and its 
secular allies, causing the Church to exert its control over marriage and sexuality by declaring 
any form of contraception as heretical and prosecutable by secular authorities (Federici, 2004: 
36, 37, 40, 44; Mies, 1986: 83-84; Tigar, 165; Ferguson, 2011: 4). In this vein, non-procreative 
sex, herbal medicine, and the general independence of women all came under attack (Mohawk, 
2000: 90-91) and the propaganda of the Inquisition, which had already annihilated many of the 
heretical sects, was ratcheted up to produce new levels of social hysteria around a whole new 
host of fictitious and fantastical evils, now associated with alleged sorcery or witchcraft. As 
Federici (2004) notes:  
th
 
 century, the Inquisitor’s reports were not longer content with 
accusing the heretics of sodomy and sexual license.  Now heretics were accused 
of animal worship, including the infamous bacium sub cauda (the kiss under the 
tail), and of indulging in orgiastic rituals, night flights and child sacrifices. (P. 40) 
                                                                                                                                                             
Judaism and attempting to seduce Christians to do the same. Many additional Jews fled the 
persecution in Spain towards the end of the 15th century only to face a new round of religious 
bigotry in Portugal, which was reportedly worse than Spain, causing many Jews to return to the 
latter.  Muslims in Spain were also forced to convert, and, like the Jews, were eventually 
attacked as false converts who were “beyond conversion” because they ‘carried the sin in their 
blood, not their belief’. Dissenting groups within the Christian Church, itself, were likewise 
attacked. Some Franciscans who attempted to return to the original teachings of Christianity 
were hung and the rest were forced back into the folds of the Church (Carroll, 2007; The History 
Channel, 2005b; Federici, 2004: 34, 32 note 15). 
272 St. Clair (2010) notes the rise of animal trials around the 13th century, but does not 
specifically attribute this to the Inquisition. 
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     Women constituted the immediate focus of the attacks against witchcraft, since they were, 
according to one manual on identifying and extracting confessions from witches, more 
susceptible to superstition and quicker to waiver in their faith than men. They were also: addicted 
to “evil” superstitions, “more impressionable and ready to receive the influence of a disembodied 
spirit,” in possession of a slippery tongue, unable to hide the evil they know from other women, 
intellectually like children, and otherwise imperfect animals that always deceive and that sought 
to vindicate their weakness through witchcraft, and so forth Kramer & Sprenger, 2005: 103-09).   
     But the real reason for this extensive, centuries-long attack on women, according to some 
writers, was that the church and secular authorities created and used “the witch-hysteria to find a 
scapegoat for all problems and disturbances and the unrest of the poor people, and to divert the 
wrath of the people from them against some poor women”(Mies, 1986: 82).273 Indeed, may of 
the acts punishable as witchcraft had not previously been recognized as crimes, but were forms 
of accepted collective behavior that now seemed to pose a threat to the interests of the rising 
social, political and economic elite (Federici, 2000: 170). Still, divert wrath they did as the 
merchant class in 14th
                                                 
273 See also the graph in Federic, (2004: 175), which demonstrates that during the decades from 
1550-1630, when the price of food had escalated (relative to stagnant, capped wages), witch 
trials were at their highest point.  
 century French and Italian municipalities essentially legalized rape of 
working or lower class women, even in the case of gang rapes. According to Federici (2004), the 
move was intended to displace tension between classes with tension between the sexes. 
Rebellious working-class males, resentful that economic circumstances had forced them to delay 
marriage for many years, became preoccupied with the legalized assaults on women (Mies, 
1986: 79; Federici, 2004: 36) rather than actions aimed at changing the system that had 
impoverished them.  Groups of up to 15 men routinely broke into homes and dragged women 
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through the streets without making any attempt to hide their crimes or their identities. According 
to some, over half of the men in urban areas engaged in this type of behavior, forever disgracing 
scores of women who, once raped, were forced either to leave town or to join the ranks of 
increasingly despised prostitutes (Federici, 2004: 47-48).  The human suffering created by these 
actions was preferred to the alternative, according to Federici (2004): 
Not surprisingly, the authorities viewed the disturbances caused by such policy 
(the brawls, the presence of youth gangs roaming the streets at night in search of 
adventure and disturbing the public quiet) as a small price to pay in exchange for 
a lessening of social tension, obsessed as they were with the fear of urban 
insurrections…. (P. 48; see also) 
 
     The sadistic, torturous, anti-woman mentality required for such depravity, inhumanity, and 
disconnect from the world, is further demonstrated through a brief glimpse into the world of 
those who made their livingoff of finding, interrogating, torturing, and trying witches.274
In 1598, the suspected sorceress François Secretain was brought before the 
inquisitional court at St. Claude in Jura Mountains of Burgundy to face charges of 
witchcraft and bestiality.  Secretain was accused of communing with the devil and 
having sex with a dog, a cat and a rooster.  The blood-curdling case is described 
in detail by her prosecutor, the Grand Justice Henri Boguet, in his strange 
memoir, Discours des Sorciers.  Secretain was stripped naked in her cell, as the 
fanatical Boguet inspected her for the mark of Satan.  The animals were shaved 
and plucked for similar examinations.  Secretain and her pets were put to various 
tortures, including having a hot poker plunged down their throats to see if they 
shed tears, for, as Boguet noted in his memoir: 
  Such a 
glimpse is found in St. Clair (2010): 
All the sorcerers whom I have examined in quality of Judge have never 
shed tears in my presence: or, indeed, if they have shed them it has been 
so parsimoniously that no notice was taken of them.  I say this with regard 
to those who seemed to weep, but I doubt if their tears were not feigned.  I 
am at least well assured that those tears were wrung from them with the 
greatest efforts.  This was shown by the efforts which the accused made to 
weep, and but the small number of tears which they shed. 
                                                 
274 Mies (1986: 84) notes that lawyers, jurists, urban and rural authorities, the Church and the 
executioners all profited, but there also “grew up a whole army o smaller fry who made a living 
out of the burning of witches.” 
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Alas, the poor woman and her animals did not weep.  They perished together in 
flames at the stake. (P. 6) 
 
     In this way, over the next several centuries, possibly millions of women were accused, 
arrested, tortured and executed for the alleged crime of witchcraft in what was not only an 
assertion of male-dominated authority over women, but an assertion of male, bourgeois, 
Christian-dominated authority over the masses of Christian and non-Christian people, animals 
and the earth (Mies, 1986: 81, 74-111; Federici, 2004: 170, 174; Merchant, 1989).275
     In many ways, the witch-hunt sprang out of the Inquisition, and the Inquisition sprung out of 
the Crusades (and the Crusades sprung out of the mentality of Empire and conquest).  The latter 
indiscriminately dispossessed Jews and eastern Christians of their lives, property, and wealth in 
the quest to also dispossess first Muslims and then heretic sects. While the plunder of the 
Crusades was not systematic or centralized, the amount of wealth that was accumulated for 
Church and secular authorities was considerable.  Of course, the Crusades were driven by more 
than just the wealth that could be immediately accumulated through plunder and pillage; they 
were also driven by a push to create the conditions that would allow for an ongoing accumulation 
of wealth well into the future.  To these ends, they were aimed at controlling trade routes and 
 All of this 
was for the purpose of allowing Church and secular elites to accumulate wealth at the expense 
of, and through the dispossession of, everyone and everything else.   
                                                 
275 The poor and working class rebellion was led by women (see Mies, 1986: 81; Federici, 2004: 
170, 174).  Estimates on the numbers of women killed during the witch hunts vary, having been 
drastically revised downward in recent years. Mies (1986: 83) argues that millions were killed.  
Mohawk, (1997) says that possibly millions were killed. Federici (2004: 169), says that in just 
two centuries in several European countries, hundreds of thousands of women were killed.  
Meanwhile, Monaghan (1999) states that “[a]t the very least, 100,000” were killed; Lemieux 
(2007: 20) argues for an extremely conservative 50,000; and Ferguson (2010: 63) provides yet a 
lower estimate of a mere “12,000-45,000 people, mostly women” who were killed throughout all 
of Europe, as well as in North America, over the seven centuries in which the witch-hunt existed 
(and in which the production of numerous volumes on finding, identifying and torturing witches 
were published –including 29 different editions of just one of these: the Malleus maleficarum).   
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expanding eastern trade; uniting feudal lords under a system of centralized trade and contract law 
headed by the Church; and consolidating Church power by eliminating alternative forms of 
accumulation by dispossession that were not controlled by the Church (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42, 
62, 65-68; 50-51).  
     In contrast, the Inquisition, like the witch-hunt, was centrally-run by Church and secular 
authorities.  These authorities more directly benefited from the dispossession of Jews, Muslims, 
non-obedient Christians, and women from their wealth and property (Federici, 2004: 12; 
Mohoawk, 2000: 91; Mies, 1986: 86-87; The History Channel, 2005b; Carroll, 1997).  Several 
writers have further argued that the witch-hunt provided the early capital accumulation necessary 
for European colonial adventures abroad and the formation of nation states at home (Mohawk, 
1997; Mies, 1986: 85-88; Federici, 2004: 12).276
                                                 
276 For example, Mies (1986: 86) notes that  “in some cases the cities and their princes used 
witch-pogroms and confiscations as a kind of development aid for their ruined economies” or to 
fund wars,  and “[t]he hope of financial gains can be seen as one of the main reasons why the 
witch hysteria spread and why hardly any people were acquitted” (pp. 86-87). Similarly, Federici 
(2004:12 and 169 note 13) notes that, though the vast majority of those targeted in the witch hunt 
were poor, single, divorced or widowed women, the witch-hunt in the 16th and 17th centuries 
served as a form of primitive accumulation of capital, adding: “the persecution of the witches, in 
Europe as in the New World, was as important a colonization and the expropriation of the 
European peasantry from its land were for the development of capitalism.”  See also The History 
Channel (2005b) on the coveting of others’ wealth as a driving force behind both the witch-hunt 
and the Inquisition.  
 Thus, like the Crusades, the Inquisition and the 
witch-hunt served the purpose of immediate accumulation by dispossession (which may well 
have been its primary purpose).  The witch-hunt (like the Crusades and even more so than the 
Inquisition) also served the purpose of establishing the long-term conditions necessary to allow 
an ongoing accumulation of wealth into the future. By scapegoating and ritually sacrificing 
women, Church and secular authorities attacked the main instigators and leaders of the rural 
rebellions against the enclosures, as well as the largest percentage of workers in urban areas 
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(Federici, 2004: 174, 30-31; Mies, 1986: 81). 277 They also destroyed much of the collective 
organizing capacity of the dispossessed masses that flooded the cities in search of work and food. 
As mentioned above, the scapegoating of women created a ready target for urban male angst. 
The privileging of men in the occupations further quelled male participation in rebellions against 
social relations of domination. And the fear of witches --or of being accused of witchcraft— kept 
people from challenging accusations against their neighbors, and destroyed alternative social 
arrangements, alternative forms of authority, alternative methods of healing, and alternative ways 
of living, thinking, and alternative earning a living (Federici, 2004: 30-31, 34, 36, 44, 46-47, 
174; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 167; Mies, 1986: 80-81).278
                                                 
277 The latter source is noting the “meticulously thought-out legal procedure” characterizing the 
witch trials, i.e., the ritual. 
 Thus, through scapegoating women, the 
rising bourgeois elite was also able to transform the impoverishment of women from a symbol of 
278 Up to the 15th century, single women had made up the bulk of urban working population, and 
had been free to work in numerous occupations, trades and professions. As dispossessed men, 
women and families flooded the cities, desperate for work or food, the attack on women justified 
the further dispossession of urban women from the professions, trades and most occupations. 
Women were also demonized and harassed in many of those occupations that remained open to 
them. For example, some female weavers were threatened with excommunication if they did not 
produce work fast enough or if they produced work deemed substandard).  And, until about 
1450, prostitution had been legal, socially accepted, and actively supported by many 
municipalities, which managed and funded brothels (using tax dollars) as a legitimate means of 
employment for single women and of relief to the numerous young men who were forced to 
refrain from marriage for economic reasons.  Prostitutes even marched in Church processions 
carrying their own banners.  This all changed with the Church’s assertion of its authority over 
marriage and sexuality, its outlawing of any and all forms of contraception, and the 
Church/secular attack on women and witchcraft. See sources cited in the text for more on this.  
     On the destruction of alternative social arrangements, Diamond (1974) argues that in the 
quest to dominate, all alternatives are seen as a threat: 
Civilized peoples and civilized disciples have, therefore, been particularly sensitive to 
political action on the part of “backward” peoples which created the possibility of 
autonomous societies and alternative cultures.  In the mind of the imperialist, the world 
is small, and loss of control in one area threatens the whole. (P. 2) 
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the destructive, anti-social and even demonic279
     By destroying or removing all possibilities for survival independent of the new social 
relations of domination, the rising bourgeois elite was able to create the conditions for 
establishing hegemony over the masses.  The masses were subjugated and tamed into obedience 
(or killed) by Church and secular authorities over a millennium,
 nature of the new social, economic and political 
relations of domination that were being imposed upon the masses, into something that was 
supposedly natural, normal, and/or justified based on the behavior of these women, themselves 
(Taussig, 1980; Federici, 2004: 170). In this way, “women’s bodies, their labor, and their sexual 
and reproductive powers were placed under the control of the state and transformed into 
economic resources,”(Federici, 2004: 170) as were, less spectacularly, the bodies and labor of 
men. 
280
to the law faculties … ‘attracted … out of greed for money and ambition.’ They 
were able, through complicated and learned interpretations of the authoritative 
 and more than ever before 
law became a tool for maintaining this obedience.  To this end, the codification and 
centralization of law that had begun at least as far back as the Crusades (Tigar, 2000: 42, 62; 
Mohawk, 2000) exploded during the witch-hunt as the sons of the rising bourgeois elite flocked:  
                                                 
279 Taussig, Michael. 1980. The Devil and Commodity Fetishism in South America. 4th Ed, 
University of North Carolina Press (cited in Federici, p. 170) observed that, when faced with the 
imposition of these same conditions, indigenous peoples in Colombia and Brazil saw these new 
monetary relations as deadly and possibly the result of devil worship by the European colonizers. 
280 Whereas the feudal lords and Church authorities once took a portion of the product of the 
serfs’ labor (that which was surplus to his/her subsistence), the bourgeois class now took the 
entire product of the workers’ labor and returned to them only a portion, which might or might 
not be enough for their subsistence. The masses were thus dispossessed not only of their property 
and means of subsistence, but also of their labor power and their life force, which no longer 
belonged to them, but to the bourgeoisie who purchased it (if any did) (See Marx, 1867/1987 and 
1932/1972a; Harvey, 2003: 137-82).  That this was a prime function of the witch-hunt is partially 
evidenced in Federici, who finds, for example, that the witch-hunt simply did not take place in 
areas where the enclosures did not take place, or in areas where people lived predominantly 
under collective land tenure and kinship systems (Federici, 2004: 171).   
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texts, to prolong the trials so that the costs of the trial would go up. (Mies, 1986: 
84). 
 
Others sought their fortunes in bureaucratic or freelance positions as executioners, witch hunters 
or Inquisitors who often got paid per witch and could prolong their employment and enhance 
their status by finding “lots of witches to prove their jobs were necessary” (Mies, 1986: 86-87).  
Thus, whereas the Crusades produced massive leaps and gains towards centralizing law and 
developing contract law (Tigar & Levy, 2000: 42, 62), and the Inquisition produced leaps and 
gains in imposing the Church as the sole authority on medicine and healing, the witch-hunt far 
surpassed the hegemonic powers of both of these through the creation of a rationalized, 
bureaucratic infrastructure geared towards identifying, trying, prosecuting and punishing witches 
–what one might refer to as the “witch-hunt industrial complex.”281
     Like all bureaucratic-industrial-complexes, the witch-hunt industrial complex developed an 
inherent tendency towards self-preservation: reproducing itself and constantly expanding its 
domain in order to continue existing merely for the sake of existing. Thus, it is likely out of this 
dramatic expansion of the legal system that we find animals increasingly hauled into secular and 
ecclesiastic courts (starting around the 13
  
th
were subjected to the same ghastly forms of torture and execution as were 
condemned humans.  Convicted animals were lashed, put to the rack, hanged, 
beheaded, burned at the stake, buried alive, stoned to death and drawn and 
quartered. … The heads of the condemned, especially in cases of bestiality, were 
 century).  The trying of animals (and even insects) for 
alleged crimes expended considerable effort, time, and money –much of which was likely 
collected through taxes, fees, and the dispossessions of the ongoing Inquisitions and witch-hunts.  
Much like the accused or convicted witches, during their interrogation or after their conviction, 
according to St. Clair (2010), animals: 
                                                 
281 Like the Military-Industrial Complex (See: Eisenhower, 1961) and the Prison-Industrial 
Complex (Davis, 1998). 
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often displayed on pikes in the town square adjacent to the heads of their human 
co-conspirators. (Pp. 2-3) 
 
     The expansion and bureaucratization of the legal system also allowed for the increasing 
criminalization of additional portions of the urban working or poor masses. By the end of the 15th 
century, a large portion of those who could not be accommodated by the limited employment 
opportunities in the towns (and who had been expropriated from their means of subsistence in 
the country) were scapegoated and dehumanized by the new bourgeois power elite.  The latter 
referred to the former as “’savages,’ ‘beasts,’ and ‘incorrigibles,’ in need of harsh discipline” 
(Lanier & Henry, 2004: 71-72), and new Poor Laws were passed that separated the unemployed, 
desperate masses into categories of “deserving” and “undeserving” poor  (drawing upon the 
Church’s earlier distinction) (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 71-72; Wikipedia, 2011).282
     In many ways, these legal persecutions of men, women, children and animals reinforced the 
old separations and disconnections. Through scapegoating and the ritual sacrifice of others, a 
climate of fear and division was created and maintained, in which the masses were subservient to 
the new bourgeois class and/or subject to potential punishment, torture, and death.  These 
persecutions also reflected a tendency among some members of the rising bourgeoisie towards 
  Those seen as 
most threatening to the new social relations –unemployed, able-bodied men, women and even 
children-- were categorized as “undeserving” and subject to penalties for countless new offenses 
under the Poor Laws, hundreds of which were punishable by execution.  As was the case with 
the witch-hunt and the Inquisition before it, investigators of these alleged offenses often relied 
upon torture to extract confessions or bought witnesses to levy accusations.  Those who escaped 
execution were sent to workhouses, or prisons (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-72).  
                                                 
282 The latter source notes the legal persecution of the poor as early as the mid-14th century, and 
the codification of periodic laws for this purpose starting towards the end of the 15th century 
onward). 
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paranoia and sadism in their enactment of violent punishments upon others.  As can be noted 
from the above discussion, punishments appear to have been enacted not only as a means of 
domination, but as a means of absolving themselves for their own guilt and immorality in these 
enactments by projecting it onto punished, “Othered” people.  In their treatment of other humans 
as animals, and their inhumane treatment of animals, the bourgeoisie’s disconnection from 
others, nature, their God, their Church and themselves are clearly visible.  These disconnections 
were further both enhanced and institutionalized as they were forcibly and hegemonically 
imposed upon everyone and everything that was within reach of their new social relations of 
domination. 
     It wasn’t just the legal profession that was dramatically expanded under the witch-hunt-
industrial complex.  A dramatic expansion and bureaucratization of science, technology and the 
medicine also took place, and the poking, prodding, and torture of women’s bodies laid the 
groundwork for considerable advancements in science and medicine, including the development 
of a new scientific method (Mies, 1986: 83, 87). As Mies (1986) notes:  
The persecution and burning of midwives as witches was directly connected with 
the emergence of modern society: the prefessionalization of medicine, the rise of 
medicine as a ‘natural science’, the rise of science and of modern economy.  The 
torture chambers of the witch-hunters were the laboratories where the texture, the 
anatomy, the resistance of the human body—mainly the female body—was 
studied.   One may say that modern medicine and the male hegemony over this 
vital field were established on the base of millions of crushed, maimed, torn, 
disfigured and finally burnt, female bodies. (P. 83) 
 
     The advancements in science, technology and medicine that took place under the witch-hunt-
industrial complex were not long restricted to witches. Like the bodies of women accused of 
being witches, the bodies of the poor, of animals, and the earth itself, were also prodded, poked, 
tortured and dissected. The old separations found in the teachings of Aristotle and St. Augustine 
were further intensified through the teachings of Thomas Aquinas,  which paved the way for the 
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new moral climate in which animals were routinely abused and dissected in public –without 
anesthesia—as “scientists” displayed their knowledge throughout Europe (Serpell, 1999: 45-46).  
The intensification and institutionalization of these old separations allowed the new bourgeois 
class to forcibly break the old taboos against mining, and “the same violent means” used in the 
prodding and torturing of bodies (i.e., “science”283) was turned on the earth in order to learn her 
secrets and take her treasures (Mies, 1986: 75; Tigar & Levy, 2000: 62; Mohawk, 1997; Szasz, 
1970: 281; Diamond, 1974: 3, 39; Sheldrake, 1994: 9-60, 179).284
must be ‘bound into service’, made a ‘slave’, put ‘in constraint’, had to be 
‘dissected’; much as a ‘woman’s womb had symbolically yielded to the forceps, 
so nature’s womb harboured secrets that through technology could be wrested 
from her grasp for use in the improvement of the human condition’. (Mies, 1986: 
88; Merchant, 1989: 169). 
 To this extent, the new men of 
science in this era argued that the earth and nature: 
 
Mies (1986) further elaborates: 
 
The rise of modern science, a mechanistic and physical world-view, was based on 
the killing of nature as a living organism and its transformation into a huge 
reservoir of ‘natural resources’ or ‘matter’, which could be analysed and 
                                                 
283 Which, in western society, is often mere superstition masquerading as science.  As Diamond 
(1974: 48), noted, “pure science itself has become a superstition, and… the superstitions of the 
primitive past are being understood as systems of belief that reflect a multidimensional reality.”  
Black Elk (1983: 155) is similarly critical of what is passed off as “science” in western society. 
Contrasting this with the perhaps superior indigenous ways of understanding the world, he notes 
that at least the Lakota “call their spirituality spirituality, not science.”  See also, Deloria (1969: 
188-189). 
284 These connections are most explicit in Mies (1986: 75), Merchant (1989) & Sheldrake (1994). 
Tigar & Levy (2000: 62) note that the systematic exploitation of mines and forests allowed for 
the accumulation of surplus capital, that was reinvested into fueling the growth of trade and the 
rise of bourgeois social relations of domination –i.e., capitalism.  Mohawk (1997) notes that “the 
war on magic was a psychological war on nature.” Meanwhile, Szasz (1970: 281) is more 
methaphorical, drawing parallels between the mining of the earth in the late Middle Ages and the 
mining of society today for “mad men.” Diamond (1974: 3, 39) is similarly metaphorical, 
discussing the ways in which colonialism transforms other cultures into raw materials, and 
discards as worthless anything that can not be “endlessly mined” for the benefit of some 
bourgeois aspect of Western society. 
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synthesized by Man into his new machines by which he could make himself 
independent of Mother Nature. 
     Only now, the dualism, or rather the polarization, between the patriarchs and 
nature, and between men and women could develop its full and permanent 
destructive potential.  From now on science and technology became the main 
‘productive forces’ through which men could ‘emancipate’ themselves from 
nature, as well as from women.  … [W]e cannot understand the modern 
developments, including our present problems, unless we include all those who 
were ‘defined into nature’ by the modern capitalist patriarchs: Mother Earth, 
Women and Colonies. (P. 75) 
 
     In this way, the old separations, and all of the above-discussed patterns, were institutionalized 
in the new bourgeois social relations of domination, and everything other than orthodox-
Christian, bourgeois man was attacked, dispossessed, and transformed –both in the bourgeois 
mind and in this new, predatory system-- into raw materials to be used and abused in bourgeois’ 
interests of capital accumulation (by dispossession).  The witch-hunt --even more so than the 
Inquisition and the Crusades before it, and like the ongoing warfare, conquest and various social 
persecutions since-- was a tool for mining society, for extracting from it every little bit of 
potential capital, for exploiting this capital to its fullest, for discarding everything else, and for 
attacking everything that got in the way of this capital accumulation.  Like warfare, conquest, 
scapegoating, persecutions, and other forms of social dislocation which are still ongoing today, 
the “witch-hunt was business”(Mies 1986: 87).285
                                                 
285 Mies, page 87, who continues:  
 And business in Western society has 
maintained a long history of separating and exempting itself from moral concerns, since these are 
incompatible with the successful exploitation, extraction, and accumulation of capital (except so 
The blood-money of the witch-hunt was used for the private enrichment of bankrupt 
princes, of lawyers, doctors, judges and professors, but also for such public affairs as 
financing wars, building up a bureaucracy, infrastructural measures, and finally the new 
absolute state.  This blood-money fed the original process of capital accumulation, 
perhaps not to the same extent as the plunder and robbery of the colonies, but certainly 
to a much greater extent than is known today. 
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far as these moral concerns can be used as capital, i.e., used to manipulate large portions of the 
masses into compliance with the goals of capital accumulation by dispossession). 
     Just as indigenous peoples throughout the Americas would later fight against the theft of their 
lands, their enslavement, and the violence and genocide that was perpetrated against them by 
European colonists –and just as they would come to view the European’s monetary relations as 
destructive and evil (Federici, 2004: 170; Taussig, 1980) -- so, too, did European women and 
men fight, first against the oppressions of the feudal lords and the Church, and then against the 
oppressions of the rising commerce economy and its enclosures, persecutions, social dislocations 
and other devastating effects. But when manipulated by the creation of false moral concerns 
(regarding women and witches, the poor or non-Christian people), or ready-made scapegoats, 
and pseudo privileges for some, the European masses then, as now, were unable to resist the urge 
to turn on each other, and to project their anger, pain, fear, desolation, and paranoia onto others 
who had too little social power to fight back.  As Mies (1986) and Federici (2004) have 
remarked: “The persecution of the witches was a manifestation of the rising modern society and 
not, as is usually believed, a remnant of the irrational ‘dark’ Middle Ages”(Mies, 1986: 83), and: 
capitalism was the counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities that had 
emerged from the anti-feudal struggle –possibilities which, if realized, might have 
spared us the immense destruction of lives and the natural environment that has 
marked the advance of capitalist relations worldwide. (Federici, 2004: 21-22) 
 
 
Individualism, the Destruction of Culture, Anxiety, Narcissism and Self-Aggrandizement 
 
Today Europe is still feeling the effects of the submersion of its original tribes 
following the demise of the Roman Empire.  Western man smashes that which he 
does not understand because he never had the opportunity to evolve his own 
culture.  Instead ancient cultures were thrust upon him while he was yet 
unprepared for them. …. Because tribes and groups had been unable to survive, 
the common denominator, the individual, became the focal point of the revolt. 
Instead of socially oriented individuals, the Reformation produced self-centered 
individuals.  Social end economic Darwinism, the survival of the fittest at any 
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cost, replaced the insipid brotherhood of Christianity not because Christianity’s 
basic thrust was invalid, but because it had been corrupted for so long that it was 
no longer recognizable. …. Because there was no way the individual could relate 
to his past, he was told to relate to the other world, leaving this world free for 
nationalistic exploitation –the real forger of identity.   
~ Deloria 1969, 177, 176 
 
An individual has not started living until he can rise above the narrow confines of 
his individualistic concerns to the broader concerns of all humanity. 
~ Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
 
Italian scholar Italo Mereu argues that the Roman Inquisition “left deep scars in the history of 
European culture, creating a climate of intolerance and institutional suspicion that continues to 
corrupt the legal system to this day” (Federici, 2004: 33 note 17).286
                                                 
286 The quotation is part of Federici’s (2004) summary of Mereu’s (2003) Historia de la 
Intolerancia en Europa (Spanish Edition). Spain: Ediciones Paidos Iberica.  Federici’s summary 
continues: “The legacy of the Inquisition is a culture of suspicion that relies on anonymous 
charges and preventative detention, and treats suspects as if already proven guilty.” To this 
extent, one can clearly see this same legacy in North America today, such as through 
Guantanamo Bay and various other US military prisons around the world, in the 2011 National 
Defense Authorization Act, and even in Canada’s response to the 2010 G20 meeting of heads of 
state in Toronto. 
  Certainly, considerable 
evidence exists supporting Mereu’s case.  But the Roman Inquisition was just one of a series of 
phases of the Inquisition that, together, spanned more than seven centuries and inflicted 
considerable violence and atrocities on various peoples (as well as animals, nature and the earth).  
Further, the activities of the Inquisition overlap with --but do not include-- the massacres, torture, 
and atrocities committed against non-Christian and eastern Christian peoples during the Crusades 
and/or the various conquests before them.  Nor do these activities include the full extent of the 
atrocities committed through the witch-hunt, the criminalization of the poor, or the Enclosures 
and the dispossession of the masses in Europe and the Americas. Thus, it would not be much of a 
stretch to argue that all of these activities, like the Roman Inquisition, left deep scars in the lives 
and cultural worldviews of all who survived them (as well as all who perpetrated them), and that 
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these trauma-induced scars were defining in many ways for Western culture and the directions in 
which it developed.  More than this, in looking back over the various massacres, conquests, 
enslavements, exploitations and dispossessions that span for over a millennium of European 
history, one might come to the conclusion that, rather than merely being “deep scars in the 
history of European culture,” these activities, in large part, lie at the core of what defines 
Western culture –i.e., of what Western culture is.  Unlike scars that can be differentiated from the 
rest of a cultural worldview, these activities are at the very center of the Western cultural 
worldview, which has been built, for millennia, around promoting and justifying these very 
activities, as well as other, increasingly more devastating and destructive, patterns of behaving 
and thinking in relation to the rest of the world (including other peoples, animals, nature, the 
earth and even parts of one’s self).287
                                                 
287 While many adherents of western culture may balk at this suggestion, its truth has long been 
apparent to non-western peoples, as can be confirmed through an examination of numerous 
accounts of history and colonization written from their perspective.  For example, Vine Deloria 
Jr. (1969: 179) noted of the culture that Europeans brought with them to the New World: 
  
As far as we could determine, white culture, if it existed, depended primarily upon the 
exploitation of land, people and life itself.  It relied upon novelties and fads to provide 
an appearance of change but it was basically an economic Darwinism that destroyed 
rather than created. 
And Russell Means (1983: 24) has likewise noted of western culture: 
You can’t judge the real nature of the European revolutionary doctrine on the basis of 
the changes it proposes to make within the European power structure and society.  You 
can only judge it by the effects it will have on non-European peoples.  This is because 
every revolution in European history has served to reinforce Europe’s tendencies and 
abilities to export destruction to other peoples, other cultures, and the environment 
itself.  I defy anyone to point to an example where this isn’t true. 
See also, James Serpel’s (1999: 40) account of the western cultural worldview’s approach to 
animals and non-human life, which he argues is an extremely atypical exception to the attitudes 
and practices towards animals in 500,000 years of human history: 
Our culture has a 700-year history of condoning and even promoting widespread and 
systematic animal abuse—a tradition that still thrives in a number of socially accepted 
practices such as factory farming, sport hunting, rodeos, rattlesnake roundups, and so 
on. … [O]ur culture’s peculiarly anthropocentric worldview appears to be highly 
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     This argument should not be shocking or surprising.  These activities – the conquests, 
enslavement, and bondage; the Crusades; the Inquisition; the witch-hunt; the Enclosures; and the 
various other dispossessions of people from the land, from their access to subsistence, and from 
their status as human beings to a status of less than human “’savages,’ ‘beasts,’ and 
‘incorrigibles,’ in need of harsh discipline”— destroyed the original indigenous cultures 
throughout Europe, and repeatedly destroyed all of the local, self-sufficient cultures that rose up 
to replace them (Mohawk, 1997; Deloria, 1969: 175-77; Diamond, 1974: 2; Lanier & Henry, 
2004: 71-72). 288
     The destruction of culture and the collective mentality, both resulted from, and resulted in, 
trauma.  Though this holds true for all of the above-discussed problematic patterns of thought 
  This destruction was, in fact, one of the main purposes of these various 
activities, as Empire-building required control over the masses, and the masses, as members of 
local, self-sufficient cultures, frequently united to fight against their subjugation to Empires 
controlled by others.  Thus, the destruction of any form of collective mentality was also an aim 
of these activities, and scapegoating various (and numerous) categories of people served to 
divide the masses through fear, as well as through the meting out of punishments and privileges 
that shifted blame away from those who had created the misery of the masses in the first place. 
                                                                                                                                                             
atypical, and is probably therefore vulnerable to being overturned by more humane, 
zoophilic, and ecocentric moral philosophies. (P. 48) 
288 Many of Europe’s original cultures had been destroyed repeatedly by the fall of the Roman 
Empire, according to Mohawk (1997) (Mohawk, how the conquest).  As Deloria (1969) further 
notes:   
More than a thousand years before Columbus … Christianity swept across the 
conquerors like the white man later swept across North America, destroying native 
religions and leaving paralyzed groups of disoriented individuals in its wake. Then the 
combination of Christian theology, superstition, and forms of the old Roman civil 
government began to control the tamed barbaric tribes.  Gone were the religious rites of 
white tribesmen. Only the Gothic arches in the great cathedrals, symbolizing the oaks 
under which their ancestors worshiped, remained to remind them of the glories that had 
been. (Pp. 175-76) 
 186 
and behavior in the Western cultural worldview, it is even more so with the destruction of culture 
and the creation of individualism.  The destruction –or even destabilization—of culture is always 
traumatic. Cultures exist to bind human beings to one another in positive ways, providing social 
support, knowledge and information, identity, self-esteem, a means for acquiring and distributing 
goods and resources, and a worldview for contextualizing group and individual experiences 
within the present, past and future, and within an enduring, meaningful universe (Devries, 2006; 
Solomon et al., 2000).289 As such, a primary purpose of culture is to integrate members into the 
collective, to help them progress orderly through the life cycle, and to protect members and the 
group as a whole from traumatic events by providing them with the required social support to 
buffer trauma’s impact.  Culture thus also functions to provide its members with collective 
grieving and healing processes that help them to regain control over emotions, behaviors, and 
lives; to readjust to new circumstances; to link more intimately to the community; and to 
reintegrate into the society.290
                                                 
289 Some of these necessary functions of culture are no longer observable in Western “culture.” 
Perhaps to this end, rather than using the term “culture,” some have used the term “human 
societies,” and have included (a critique of) Western society in their analysis. (McFarlane & van 
der Kolk, 2006).   
  In other words, culture provides its members with resilience, 
validation, restitution and rehabilitation, and it helps its members to manage the horror of trauma 
(DeVries, 2006: 410).  When culture is destroyed, in whole or in part, it frequently becomes 
290 Ibid. For example see Devries 400-411, such as page 404: 
In traditional societies, … customs can help by providing a structure, a poultice for 
these sores.  They provide a grieving process for people who, if left to their own 
devices, would not do so, and who thereby might be at risk for developing PTSD. 
Culture, with its customs and rituals, is thus a key participant in returning a person to 
normal functioning by moving the person from shock to grief, and ultimately to non-
bereavement. In the absence of culturally regulated processes, this reestablishment of 
normality is less likely to occur. 
See also: Diamond p. 254 (“Primitive cultures realize the major function of culture which is to 
make men human, and at the same time keep them sane.  That is what civilization, as we know it, 
is failing to do”); McFarlane and van der Kolk, p. 25, and also p. 30 (on the need for type of 
social support that empowers victims to regain control over their lives). 
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incapable of performing its restorative, integrative, rehabilitative, healing functions, and this can 
leave individuals entirely on their own and without the tools they need to survive and heal from 
trauma.  As DeVries (2006) notes: 
[W]hen cultural patterns, identities, and relationships are lost, life becomes 
unpredictable.  Under normal stressful conditions, a grieving process with the aim 
of leaving the old and adjusting to the new takes place. With trauma, however, 
other patterns are activated—conservative impulses … at the group level, and 
psychopathological reactions (depression, paranoia, and aggression) at the 
individual level. Culture helps protect against these processes.  In its absence, 
loss, regression, and harm occur. (P. 411)291
 
 
McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), analyzing German society, similarly remark on the adverse 
affects produced when a culture fails to acknowledge and provide healing mechanisms for 
victims of trauma:  
 
[I]n the aftermath of World War I, the inability to face [trauma’s] effects on the 
capacity of the veterans to function effectively in society, and the social 
intolerance of their “weakness,” may have substantially contributed to the 
subsequent rise of fascism and militarism. The impossible war reparations of the 
Treaty of Versailles, motivated by a lust for revenge by the Allies, humiliated 
Germany.  The German nation, in turn, dealt mercilessly with its own war 
veterans, who were accused of being moral invalids. This cascade of humiliations 
of the powerless set the stage for the ultimate debasement of human rights under 
the Nazi regime, the extermination of the weak and the different, and the moral 
justification for the subjugation of “inferior” people –the rationale for the ensuing 
war. (Pp. 33-34) 
 
     Thus, when culture is lost or damaged, individuals are less able to deal with the traumas they 
encounter because they no longer benefit from the positive, socially integrative, healing aspects 
of culture.  As such, they are more vulnerable to negative, and even psychopathological coping 
strategies, such as alienation, paranoia, projection, denial, narcissistic survival strategies, and 
dissociative delusions concretized as the new “reality” (DeVries, 2006: 410-11). They are also 
vulnerable to the manipulations of politically-opportunistic others, who can easily magnify 
                                                 
291 On these psychopathological reactions, see also, McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 26): 
“Some traumatized people deal with their encounter with unpredictability and meaninglessness 
by converting to fundamentalist political or religious sects that have rigid codes of behavior, 
exclusionary criteria for belonging, and a designated group of outsiders who embody evil.” 
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traumatized individual’s feelings of fear, anger, hatred, distrust, and other psychopathological 
mechanisms for dissociating from and denying pain and injury (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008). 
Dealing with trauma in this defensive, denying, and dissociative manner prevents a full 
acknowledgement of all of the emotions associated with the trauma and creates long-term 
individual and collective behavioral patterns that are built around fear, anxiety, resentment and 
other “violent ways of configuring community” (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008: 391, 387). Such 
an approach to dealing with trauma not only prevents healing from the trauma, but perpetuates 
the trauma, encourages the production of new traumas, and/or causes a continual reproduction of 
the old traumas, expressed in new ways (Pelcovitz et al., 1995; Breslau et al., 1995; McFarlane 
& vander Kolk, 2006: 31-33).292
     Interestingly, all of the psychopathological coping processes discussed in the above paragraph 
were already integral parts of the Western cultural worldview by the fall of the Roman Empire, 
and they have only become much more central to this worldview since that time.  This suggests 
that these patterns of thought and behavior were both the result of societal trauma and the cause 
of new traumatic symptoms through the reproduction of the old traumas and/or the creation of 
new traumas. Indeed, several scholars have speculated that the social relations of domination and 
exploitation that are characteristic of Western society are not merely the result of greed for 
wealth and power but are mechanisms through which the perpetrators of exploitation and 
 In addition to the barriers to healing that arise when cultures are 
destroyed or destabilized, this destruction and/or destablization is itself traumatic.  In its wake, 
individuals are often doubly traumatized and vulnerable (DeVries, 1996; Solomon et al., 2000). 
                                                 
292 For example, Pelcovitz et. al. (1995) found that adolescents who had been abused reproduced 
the perpetration of their abuse in their relations with peers, without an awareness of doing so. 
Breslau et. al. (1995) found that traumatized people tend to unconsciously place themselves in 
situations that may retraumatize them).  While McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006) discuss a more 
complicated form of traumatic reenactment in society. 
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domination seek to cope with their own paranoia, fear and anxiety (Loy, 2002; Diamond, 1974; 
Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Martinot, 2003a).  For example, we have already examined, in an 
above section, some of the ways in which projection and scapegoating are practiced –on an 
individual and societal level-- as defense mechanisms that allow us to denying parts of ourselves 
that we do not want to acknowledge. We have also discussed the process of human sacrifice as a 
way of attempting to control feelings of fear, anxiety, and guilt by attacking and purging from 
society of something that has come to symbolize these feelings.  Diamond (1974: 9) develops 
these ideas further, arguing that the separation of the dominating (perpetrating) group from the 
earth, others, and all connection to their subsistence creates significant anxiety among members 
of this group, as well as fear of what will happen to them were those that they exploit and 
oppress to rebel:  
Conspicuous extortion from worker and peasant was a confirmation of power; but 
power, so reified, not only confirmed social status, it also displaced anxiety about 
the actual powerlessness of the privileged, which was a result of the loss of their 
direct command of the environment. The sheer accumulation of wealth, the 
antithesis of primitive customary usage, was thus compensatory, a sign of the fear 
of impotence. It is a response of the alienated in pursuit of security; the 
manipulation of people is substituted for the command of things.  As civilization 
spreads and deepens, it is ultimately man’s self, his species being, which is 
imperialized. …  [i]mperialism is, among other things, a complicated exercise in 
cultural narcissism. (Pp. 9-10, 26) 
 
     In this fear, paranoia and anxiety, resulting from their simultaneous separation from and 
dependence upon those they exploit, members of the dominating (perpetrating) group seek to 
extract even more surplus from those they exploit by increasing the oppression and exploitation 
that is inflicted upon them.  This, in turn, fuels further discontent among the exploited and 
further guilt among the exploiters, which in turn fuels further paranoia, fear, anxiety and 
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insecurity that the exploiters then seek to deny, avoid or control through further exploitation.293
     It is not, however, only the perpetrators who adopt negative coping strategies and who seek to 
reinforce the system of exploitation and destruction.  Once local cultures are destroyed, in whole 
or in part, their members are left traumatized and in search of ways to deal with the unbearable 
emotions related to their trauma(s). Without the positive, socially integrative and reconstitutive 
healing mechanisms that are integral parts of most traditional cultures, these vulnerable people 
may have neither the ability, nor the social support, nor the motivation to reconstruct their 
worldviews and identities in positive ways. They may instead resort to dependence upon the 
same psychopathological coping mechanisms as the perpetrating group.  When the perpetrating 
group seeks to impose by force their own cultural worldview upon those they have victimized –
as was the case throughout the periods of European history discussed above—many vulnerable 
members of the exploited group may willingly embrace this new worldview in an attempt to deal 
with their own trauma.  This is particularly the case when privileges are meted out to some of 
them (such the privileges allowing European men to rape lower-class women without 
punishment, and the exclusion of working class women from the majority of occupations during 
the late Middle Ages, as just two examples), and punishments are meted out to others. In such 
circumstances, those who do not willingly accept the forcibly-imposed cultural worldview can be 
  
Some of the results of this sort of trauma, as they relate to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, are 
examined in chapter 6. 
                                                 
293 “Even if we acknowledge the necessity –due to population pressure, scarcity of land, water 
and other resources—for political constraints in the earliest stages of state formation, there is no 
inherent reason for it to have taken the oppressive form that it did except for the burgeoning 
anxiety of those removed form direct production about their economic and political security. … 
Their anxiety about not being self-supporting, along with the anticipation of such resistance, 
seems to constitute the motive for the upper classes’ elaborate extortion of wealth form the direct 
producers” (Diamond, 1974: 8-9). 
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persecuted, punished, tortured and even killed without the creation of much resistance among the 
masses. John Trudell (2001b) explains this dynamic from his perspective: 
So the Church, by 1100 AD or 1000 AD, it decided that it was now going to mine 
this resource –I mean, ‘save the souls of the heathens’.  So Church created 
Inquisition.  And basically the Inquisition was, number one, it was to change the 
perceptual reality of the descendants of the tribes of Europe.  Alright? And so 
they were terrorized and brutalized for 500 years in order to do this.  But the way 
the Church rationalized this was, they were going to save –they wanted to 
possess-- the souls of the heathens and the pagans.  See, they wanted to possess 
their souls in the name of their Lord.  Alright.  So this war was about possessing 
the souls of the descendants of the tribes of Europe.  And in order to possess their 
souls, they had to alter their perceptional reality.  So if you thought differently 
than the Church wanted you to think, bingo, you were killed.  And you were 
tortured and your property was taken.  And if somebody accused you, basically 
you were guilty if you were accused.  And you know, incidentally, during the 
torturing process, you’d probably say someone else’s name now, so someone else 
is going [to be tortured].  So they killed as efficiently as they possibly could with 
the technology they had at hand at the time.  And they did it for 500 years.  By the 
time Columbus got here it had probably been going on for 400 years.  …. 
     When the Church was doing all of this … the descendants of the tribes of 
Europe … finally figured out: “Well, hold it.  If I want to stay alive and be a 
descendant of anything, I’m going to have to accept these people.” So they 
embraced the Church, because they had to embrace what they feared; they had to 
love what they feared in order to survive.  And what they had to love –the thing 
that they had to love that they feared was possessing them.  So it’s like love and 
fear and possession as a perceptional reality kind of became intertwined at that 
time and the human beings have not been able to sort it out yet.  So that affected 
everyone in some kind of a way that’s not been healthy for us as human beings.  
 
Thus, despite their resistance, the local cultures of European men and women were attacked and 
destroyed, and the surviving, traumatized members of these cultures were persecuted, tortured 
and killed over a seven hundred year period.  It is unfathomable that the survivors were not 
traumatized, having lost family members, friends, and neighbors, and having been terrorized into 
submission by the constant, ongoing threat of persecution (as heretics, witches, or, later, the 
“undeseriving” poor). All resistance was repeatedly squashed, and the only way to survive these 
various persecutions was to adopt the mentality of the persecutor (or, what we would today call 
the colonizer).   
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     Today, the Western worldview’s historical revisions present this violent colonization of 
Europe as the “freeing” of the masses from the supposedly oppressive bonds of traditional 
societies --similar to the “freeing” of the serfs from the land (and their only possible means of 
self-sufficient subsistence) under the Enclosures and the rise of capitalism (Marx, 1867/1987: 
668-69).294
     What replaced the cultures that were destroyed was a form of monoculture, first controlled by 
the Church, then by alternating alliances of Church authorities and feudal lords who eventually 
included the rising merchant class in their alliances until the latter group emerged victorious in 
its ability to shape this new monoculture and its hegemony (Tigar & Levy, 2000; Berman, 1983 
 The latter has been recognized as a counter-revolution that destroyed the possibilities 
for collective, non-oppressive social organization which arose in the anti-feudal struggle –
“possibilities which, if realized, might have spared us the immense destruction of lives and the 
natural environment that has marked the advance of capitalist relations worldwide” (Federici, 
2004: 21-22). The former should be similarly recognized as counter-revolutionary, not only for 
its role in destroying the anti-feudal struggle, but also for its role in destroying the collective 
knowledge and practices necessary to heal from the anti-social and psychopathological 
consequences of trauma, and for its role in capitalizing on the resulting devastation and 
vulnerability that was left in the aftermath of these destructions.   
                                                 
294 “Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the 
means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production 
belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, 
unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. ….  Hence, the historical movement 
which changes the producers into wage-workers, appears, on the one hand, as their emancipation 
from serfdom and from the fetters of the guilds, and this side alone exists for our bourgeois 
historians. But, on the other hand, these new freedmen became sellers of themselves only after 
they had been robbed of all their own means of production, and of all guarantees of existence 
afforded by the old feudal arrangements.  And the history of this, their expropriation, is written 
in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire.”  
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& 2003; Shiva, 1997; Korn, 2002).295   Shaping this new hegemony, the rising bourgeois elite 
borrowed concepts from the anti-feudal struggles in order to present itself not as the counter-
revolutionary force that it was, but as the champion of the masses.  The anti-feudal rhetoric of 
freedom and equality was universalized to generate support for the bourgeois cause, while the 
bourgeoisie manipulated these concepts to its own, intolerant ends of winning their struggle 
against the feudal aristocracy and attacking everyone who opposed or threatened bourgeois 
interests. 296  Bourgeois efforts towards creating more elaborate bodies of contract and property 
law served to institutionalize these attacks and give them the appearance of legitimacy, 
particularly as bourgeois ideologies about individual rights and responsibilities (i.e., and an 
individual’s responsibility to control his/her own destiny)297
                                                 
295 The imposition of monocultures upon culturally diverse peoples is traumatic, in part because 
of the destruction of local cultures, and in part because of the external control that is exerted over 
local affairs. See, for example, Korn (2002) and Shiva (1997), the latter of whom notes: 
 replaced collective and egalitarian 
moral ideologies that had been prominent in the anti-feudal struggle (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986; 
Shiva, 1997: 104; Serpell, 1999: 42; Marx, 1972; Berman, 1983: 29-30; McFarlane & van der 
When homogenization is imposed on diverse social systems through global integration, 
region after region starts to disintegrate.  The violence inherent to centralized global 
integration, in turn, breeds violence among its victims.  As conditions of everyday life 
become increasingly controlled by outside forces and systems of local governance 
decay, people cling to their diverse identities as a source of security in a period of 
insecurity … [and] diverse peoples who have lived peacefully together start to look at 
each other with fear. (P. 102-03) 
296 “During the time that the aristocracy was dominant, the concepts of honour, loyalty, etc. were 
dominant; during the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts of freedom, equality, etc.  ….  
[E]ach new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in 
order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members 
of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the forms of universality, and 
represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones.”  (Marx, 1972a: 137, 138)  
297 Such ideas are relatively new in worldviews, and came about with the rise of science and 
technology as the new “religion” of the west, and the separation of law from the Church and –to 
an even greater extent—from morals. See, for example: Berman, pp. 29-30; McFarlane & van 
der Kolk, pp. 26; Loy, p. 266; DeVries, p. 399. 
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Kolk, 2006: 26; Loy, 2002: 266; DeVries, 2006: 399).298
     Because of the widespread affects that this new hegemony has had on Western society and the 
Western cultural worldview both then and now, a few of the ideas central to this hegemony are 
worth considering in a bit more detail here.  Of particular concern are bourgeois ideas about 
freedom, equality, and individual rights and responsibilities.  All three concepts involve dualistic 
and/or Orwellian meanings, which arose within the Western mentality of separation, domination, 
universalism, and intolerance.  As such, the bourgeois ideologies of freedom, equality and 
individualism are neither free, nor equal, nor individualistic in any true sense of any of these 
words.  After all, the bourgeois concepts of equality and freedom arose out of the counter-
revolution that violently destroyed the ideology of collective, egalitarian living, and the 
universally intolerant relations of domination that were imposed upon the masses replaced 
alternative social arrangements with forced conformity in the new monoculture.  The only real 
forms of individualism that arose during this period consisted of two contradictory parts.  First, 
  The new individualistic ideologies 
were further advanced through the heavy bourgeois investment in science and technology, which 
was geared towards the maximization profits, as well as the replacement of religion with science 
as the new authority on virtually all matters (Merchant, 1989; Miews, 1986; Federici, 2004; 
Shiva, 1997; Ferguson, 2011; Tigar, 2000; Sheldrake, 1994: 5). 
                                                 
298 The latter four sources note that the concept of an individual responsibility to control his or 
her own fate is a relatively new concept, which does not exist in most non-Western cultural 
worldviews.  Shiva (1997) notes Western society’s need to transform nature and human societies 
from “self-organizing, living system[s] to a mere raw material for human exploitation, needing 
management and control” –processes which necessarily destroy self-governance and collectivity. 
Serpel (1999: 42) points out that egalitarian moral ideologies were incompatible with the 
exploitation of animals in medieval Europe.  These same egalitarian moral ideologies, which are 
common to most communal or collective organizing efforts, are also incompatible with capitalist 
exploitation. Though the capitalist class has long used the concepts of freedom and equality as its 
rallying cry, it has never meant for these concepts to be extended in more than a symbolic way to 
any outside of its class (see, Marx, 1972a). 
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the collective rights to the commons were replaced with an individual bourgeois’s rights to 
purchase, enclose, and use property however he/she saw fit, regardless of the wishes of the 
masses and regardless of the adverse impacts of this use on others (or nature/ the earth299).  
He/she further had the right to keep all profits from this property for himself (with the exception 
of taxes/ protection monies paid to the Church or consolidating sovereigns). Second, and in 
contrast, the masses that owned no property lost all collective and individual rights to the 
commons and became individually responsible for finding another way to earn a living.  The 
many who failed to do so, largely because they could no longer support themselves on the land 
and there was only limited work in the towns, were blamed and prosecuted for this “failure” 
under the Poor Laws, or through the witch-hunt and Inquisition that sought to destroy collective 
forms of living outside of the new monoculture.300
                                                 
299 Merchant (1989) and Mies (1986) both argue that protection and sharing of the earth was 
recognized as a responsibility prior to the rise of the bourgeois class and its expansion of the 
fields of law, medicine, and science and technology. 
  Thus, members of the bourgeoisie had 
virtually unlimited rights in relation to their property and virtually no responsibilities to anyone 
else. Meanwhile, the masses, who owned nothing but their labor power, had virtually unlimited 
responsibilities to find a purchaser of this labor power, and virtually no rights whatsoever to fail 
at this task (even when there were no jobs) or to earn a living outside of the new monocultural 
relations of domination.  In this way, the new “individualism” was really (only) about giving 
merchants individual rights to earn and keep all profits from various forms of exploitation, to 
control and use the government as a tool in this exploitation (Marx, 1972a: 147-48, 150-52; 
300 In terms of the Poor Laws, Marx (1972a: 145) notes that King Henry VIII (King of England 
from 1509-1547) had 72,000 “vagabonds” (landless unemployed) hanged.   In terms of the 
witch-hunt and Inquisition, Federici (2004) provides extensive evidence that these were basically 
attacks on people who sought to form self-sufficient, collective communities, or on individual 
women who practiced herbal medicine, or engaged in other non-approvied ways of earning a 
living. 
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Harvey, 2003: 145; Gramsci, 1972; Litowitz, 2000), and to persecute individual non-conformists 
among the masses while also imposing upon these latter a responsibility to cover the costs 
associated with the bourgeoisie’s pursuit of profits (accumulation by dispossession).301
     Despite the obvious lack of equality or freedom, from the perspective of the masses, 
individualism in Western society has long been associated with freedom and equality in the 
Western worldview.  In part, this is a reflection of the self-centered and solipsistic mentality of 
the wealthy classes in Western society: the new social relations of domination represented (and 
still represent) a freedom and equality of rights for them.  And, to some extent, by drawing upon 
rhetoric of universal acceptance and the societal patterns of delusion and rewriting history, they 
were able to convince the traumatized, alienated and rootless masses that this freedom and 
equality could also apply to anyone among them who worked hard and played by the rules (their 
rules) of the system.  We see repeated evidence that this ideology is ingrained in the Western 
cultural worldview. For example, Orwell (1936: 44, quoted in Litowitz, 2000: 529)
  The vast 
discrepancies in the rights and responsibilities of bourgeois individualism then were much the 
same as they are today. 
302
                                                 
301 Individually, workers and the unemployed covered the costs through their suffering from the 
trauma of the loss of their culture, their dispossession from the land and their subsistence, the 
employment and living conditions into which they were forced in urban areas, the low wages 
they earned, and/or the punishments they incurred when they failed to find work –even if this 
failure was due to a lack of available work, rather than some fault of their own.  Collectively, the 
masses covered costs in their suffering from their trauma and their dispossession from the land 
and their subsistence; in their suffering from the effects of the bourgeois exploitation and 
pollution of nature, the water and the earth; and in their tax payments to a government that has, 
since, consistently passed legislation and enforced laws in favor of the bourgeois class and 
against the interests of the masses.   
 observed it 
in the 1930s: 
302 The quote is from Orwell’s Keep the Aspidistra Flying. 
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[H]aving no money, they still lived mentally in the money-world---the world in 
which money is a virtue and poverty is a crime … [t]hey had accepted the money-
code, and by that code they were failures.  
 
And Chris Hedges wrote about it in 2005: 
 
We watch impassively as the wealthy and the elite, the huge corporations, rob us, 
ruin the environment, defraud consumers and taxpayers and create exclusive 
American oligarchy that fuses wealth and political power.  We watch passively 
because we believe we can enter the club… it is greed that keeps us silent. (P. 
168) 
 
     These beliefs –and the act of desperately clinging to them despite all evidence to the 
contrary— reflect the fear, doubt and insecurity of the masses whose cultural safety net for 
dealing with such feelings, and for collective thinking, organizing and acting, has been 
decimated by centuries of the dominating class’ universal intolerance, violent repression, and 
forcible colonization (See for example: Marx, 1972a: 163-64; Marx, 1972b: 185, 190; Mies, 
1986: 76-77; Trudell, 2001a & 2003).303
                                                 
303 Though the dominating class has long held that all can be a part of their class, this is an 
entirely unrealistic proposition, as Marx observed two centuries ago. It is not possible for all to 
be bourgeoisie because the bourgeoisie depend upon the exploitation of the masses, and because 
the bourgeoisie routinely cast out their own members into the ranks of the proletariat.  Mies 
(1986: 76-77) likewise notes that “in a contradictory and exploitative relationship, the privileges 
of the exploiters can never become the privileges of all” and that as long as the exploitation of 
some is occurring, no one can speak of liberation.  Similarly, Trudell (2001a) argues that the 
masses of society are being mined, just as the earth is being mined. In both cases, toxins are left 
over from the mining process. And in the colonizing mining of human beings, these toxins are 
our fears, doubts and insecurities: 
  Desperately wishing to escape their position among the 
The poison, the toxic that is left over from the mining of the being part of human … 
through the intelligence of the human, are in all the fears and doubts and insecurities 
that we have in our lives –without our own personal reality-- about who we are…   
That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human. 
That’s the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see 
ourselves clearly.  We do not see and recognize clearly who we are.  And we’re never 
encouraged to.  We’re encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or 
“good” that religion, or good… workers, good [whatever].  But we’re never encouraged 
to be real about human beings.  IN a way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to 
ourselves.  See, we’re mentally and psychologically oppressed and manipulated so that 
 198 
exploited, oppressed, colonized masses, and left with only psychopathological coping 
mechanisms for the traumas inflicted upon them, huge proportions of “individuals” among the 
masses desire to become the oppressor, as a means for escaping their own oppression.  As such, 
they chose to identify with the oppressor, as a vicarious means of  escaping their fears, doubts 
and insecurities –i.e., the intolerable emotions left unresolved from numerous past, present, and 
trans-generational traumas.  But escaping their oppression/ colonization either symbolically, or 
in actuality (which, as noted, is virtually impossible) both require the sacrifice of others. Thus, in 
our traumatized state of intolerable fears and anxieties, and our state of mental separation and 
alienation from others (and ourselves), we grasp desperately to the individualistic mentality that 
has convinced us our own freedom from –and our ability to achieve a state of equality with-- our 
oppressors is possible. We thus ignore the lager picture of mass exploitation, government 
corruption, and widespread pain and suffering inflicted domestically and internationally by the 
current social relations of domination.  We sacrifice everyone else –or, at least, everyone 
different from us—to the system in hopes of saving ourselves.   
     Both of the above authors who observed the desire of the masses to identify with, and 
become, part of the oppressor/dominating class also observed this phenomenon of attempting to 
sacrifice others in an attempt to escape one’s own desperation and despair.  When two characters 
in his novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four, were charged with the crime of loving another more than 
                                                                                                                                                             
we seek things to gratify ourselves, but that doesn’t mean we’re being good to 
ourselves.  
     And the mining process to me, you know, it’s the civilizing process itself. Because 
somewhere in there, it’s like someone’s eating the spirit. Our spirit is being converted 
into an energy to run something.  Alright?  And it’s like it’s eating our spirit.  See and, 
you know, everyone has their religions and their stuff, but see it makes me wonder, how 
do we participate in this spiritual reality, if we live in a mechanism now where the 
human has been conditioned and trained to eat its own spirit, and turn it into fuel for this 
system. (Trudell, 2001a) 
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they loved their oppressor, Big Brother, and were faced with the punishment of rats eating their 
face, both betrayed and symbolically sacrificed the other in a desperate attempt to save 
themselves.  As one character remarked: 
Sometimes… they threaten you with something—something you can’t stand up 
to, can’t even think about.  And then you say, ‘Don’t do it to me, do it to 
somebody else, do it to so-and-so.’ …You think there’s no other way of saving 
yourself, and you’re quite ready to save yourself that way.  You want it to happen 
to the other person.  You don’t give a damn what they suffer. All you care about 
is yourself. … And after that, you don’t feel the same toward the other person any 
longer. (Orwell, 1949: 284)304
 
 
Similarly, Hedges remarked upon the utility of identifying and attacking external enemies as a 
means for creating temporary (psychopathological) bonds with our neighbors, and a temporary 
escape from our own pain and suffering.  He also remarks upon the delusional character of these 
thought and behavior patterns, contextualizes these patterns in the present rise of the Christian 
right, and examines how these patterns have been intensified in the recent, ongoing economic 
turmoil.  For example, in terms of externalized scapegoats and social bonds, Hedges (2002) 
writes: 
The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can 
give us what we long for in life.  It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for 
living. … The communal march against an enemy generates a warm unfamiliar 
bond with our neighbors, our community, our nation, wiping out unsettled 
                                                 
304 Many writing about Orwell’s novel, and perhaps even Orwell himself, equated a forced love 
for Big Brother/ the oppressor with a forced love of the collective over love for the individual.  
But authoritarian governments and dominating classes are hardly the collective, in fact they rely 
upon the destruction of the collective, and the atomizing of individuals who, in their isolation 
and alienation from everything including themselves, desperately reach out for and embrace the 
oppressive forces that abuse them in hopes of gaining some tiny shred of security and protection 
from their own, internal and intolerable traumatic symptoms.  All the dominating classes need to 
do is provide the masses with some hope –or at leas some delusion of hope—of escaping their 
oppression.  And the dominating classes do this, gladly, because it expands their control over the 
masses, and thus alleviates their own anxiety, fears, and paranoias relating to their own 
unresolved trauma of perpetration against the masses.  
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undercurrents of alienation and dislocation.  War, in times of malaise and 
desperation, is a potent distraction. (Pp. 3, 9; BookTV, 2012)305
 
 
     All of these forms of escapism (and psychopathological coping) require the existence or 
creation of others, which the Western cultural worldview has long provided via its universal 
intolerance; its delusions of separation; its scapegoating and human sacrifice; and its narcissistic 
projections onto created “others.”  Thus, on the one hand, Western society has gone to great 
effort to create external others, and convince itself that it is a unique society because we have 
more freedoms compared to other, non-Western peoples. These latter, we are told, are enslaved 
by the rigid, limiting bonds of traditional society which obliterate all distinction among 
individuals (Durkheim, 1933).  Yet, particularly in the context of indigenous societies, nothing 
could be further from the truth (as will be seen in the next chapter). Our unfounded belief to the 
contrary is only a result of Western society’s narcissistic projections onto other peoples 
(Diamond, 1974: 26; Keal, 2003: 82; Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Langer, 1987: 35-50), which, as 
mentioned in the discussion above, are a form of psychopathological (and delusional) coping 
mechanisms that arise out of trauma in the absence of positive, integrative, rehabilitative, healing 
practices.  Moreover, we are regularly encouraged to project our enslavement onto them, while 
pretending their freedom and individuality belong to us.  And this delusion keeps us striving to 
become part of the dominating class while turning us away from all collective forms of living, 
organizing, and being in the world.  This, in turn, keeps us engaged in Western pseudo 
                                                 
305 See also, Loy (2002: 254) on the topic: “once Reagan’s “evil empire” was history, people 
whose “goodness” depended on its “badness” felt adrift.  A new enemy was needed, but Iraq, 
China, and the war on drugs didn’t really fill the shoes.  This new holy war on worldwide 
terrorism is much more promising. … [W]e don’t feel we are good unless we are fighting against 
evil.  We can feel comfortable and secure in our own goodness only by attacking and destroying 
the evil outside us. …this is why we like wars: they cut through the petty problems of daily life, 
and unite us good guys here against the bad guys over there. … The meaning of life becomes 
clearer.” 
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separations from others, nature, and parts of ourselves, and keeps us engaged in the universal 
intolerance and rejection with which we are taught to view these allegedly separate parts (See for 
example, Loy, 2002: 250; DeVries, 2006: 411). 
     On the other hand, and at the same time, our alleged freedoms are the product of our being 
terrorized into conformity in virtually every aspect of our lives. Western society has gone to 
great extents to create non-conformist (internal or external) others among us.  The absence of 
integrative, rehabilitative, healing rituals that a healthy culture provides is not only compensated 
for with destructive forms of bonding against hated others, but also through an almost 
compulsive consumerism, through which we attempt to fill our internal voids with the temporary 
acceptance of conformity through consumption.  We thus mistake the alienation of our trauma 
and the destructiveness of our culture with individuality; and we confuse the process through 
which we internalize of our own colonialism, and become Foucauldian participants in the 
oppression of ourselves, others, and nature, all in the alleged name of “freedom.” 306
                                                 
306 On the destructiveness of Western culture, see for example: Hedges (BookTV: 2012), who 
argues that in the US we have no culture other than “commercialized junk” or unification 
through hatred and that we have lost all sense of community.  See also: Wise (2005: 145), who 
discusses “the unspoken and horrifying truth of white privileged: namely, that in order to access 
it, one first has to give up all the meaningful cultural and personal and communal attributes that 
once kept our various peoples alive in Europe and in our journeys here.” Or see Deloria 
(1969:185, 188), who notes that: “For many Indians, the white had no culture other than one of 
continual exploitation. … All the white man had succeeded in creating in his time on this 
continent had been a violent conglomerate of individuals, not a people;” and also noting: “White 
culture destroys other culture because of its abstractness.  As a destroyer of culture it is not a 
culture but a cancer.” Finally, see Litowitz (2000: 542) who notes that “domination is 
increasingly a matter of colonizing the internal world of the dominated classes.” 
   But the 
only freedom for the vast majority of internally-colonized Westerners is not in whether or not we 
chose to conform, but in how we chose to conform, or what sort of individuality we chose to 
purchase and display through the material products we place on and around us –something 
members of the Frankfurt school noticed decades ago (Horkheimer, 1996; Hormheimer & 
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Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964). As Marx (1972c  noted of capitalist society: “In bourgeois 
society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is dependent and has 
no individuality” (p. 347). Thus, even the alleged non-conformists are frequently conforming 
through consumption of a pre-packaged non-conformity.  They are also just as quick to reject as 
outsiders to their group –i.e., all who have not purchased and displayed the appropriate genre of 
clothing or accessories—as the “mainstream” conformists.  
     In summary, we struggle to avoid intolerable feelings resulting from the trauma of our 
oppression and colonization (and even to deny our oppressed and colonized state) in two ways.  
The first is through seeking temporary, superficial acceptance or approval of our choices as 
consumers, which we have so confused with temporary acceptance/approval of ourselves as 
persons that many Westerners say they don’t know who they are.  Many then spend incalculable 
time, effort and (often) money on further consumption through which they hope to “find” 
themselves.  This pseudo-escape route, like the route of the purposeful conformist, requires 
engaging in and perpetuating lies about who we are on a daily basis in our presentation of 
ourselves to bosses, coworkers, strangers, potential mates, and even friends, family members, 
intimate partners, and ourselves.  In many of these relationships, we are required to lie about who 
we are in order to become more acceptable to others, who will judge us harshly, as we them, for 
nonconformity. In all of these ways, we perpetrate perhaps the ultimate violence against 
ourselves and others, sacrificing both to support the delusions of the system.  As Forbes (2008) 
noted: 
When people learn to lie they no longer have a face.  That is, they do not have a 
single personality and character.  They become like a chameleon, changing color 
as opportunity or circumstances demand. Such a person cannot have any moral 
strength, because the latter demands a unified face.  This, incidentally, is what 
some modern psychology teaches –accommodation, learning how to disguise or 
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even destroy one’s own self in order to become acceptable to one’s corporate 
supervisors, colleagues, spouse, children, neighbors, and so on. (P. 43) 
 
     The second way that we struggle to avoid intolerable feelings resulting from the trauma of our 
oppression and colonization (and even to deny our oppressed and colonized state) is through 
identifying with the dominating, oppressor group, and seeking to become a part of it, thus 
legitimizing the system of oppression and turning ourselves into perpetrators.  This pseudo-
escape route also requires engaging in and perpetrating lies about who we are in relation to other 
people and other life on the planet, in relation to the pain and suffering of other people and other 
life forms, and in relation to who and what is responsible for this pain and suffering.  We engage 
in these lies, and identify with the perpetrator, because we have lost access to and knowledge of 
healthy coping and healing mechanisms.  By identifying with the perpetrator, we at one and the 
same time: separated from our own pain and suffering by projecting it outward upon others and 
separated from other people (and other life forms) and their pain and suffering, which we ignore 
and dismiss.  We further ignore and dismiss all of this intolerable pain and suffering (of 
ourselves and others) by 1) taking on the privilege of blaming others, like the perpetrator, and 2) 
enacting this privilege by blaming the victims for their own plight in order to “restore a sense of 
self-efficacy.”  Ascione (1999) summarizes part of this process as it relates to abused children: 
The psychological mechanism of identification with the aggressor suggests that 
when a child is victimized, he or she may seek out a more vulnerable victim to 
victimize including younger children or pets---powerlessness is frightening and 
demoralizing, and, unfortunately, exerting control over another can restore a sense 
of self-efficacy. (P. 55. See also: McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 35; Kelman, 
1973: 58)307
                                                 
307 See also, McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006):  
 
Western society’s “reactions [to trauma] seem to be primarily conservative impulses in 
the service of maintaining the beliefs that the world is fundamentally just, that people 
can be in charge of their lives, and that bad things happen to people who deserve them. 
Bearers of bad tidings are generally considered dangerous; thus, societies tend to be 
suspicious that victims will contaminate the social fabric, undermine self-reliance, 
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Yet, like the negative consequences involved in (the psychopathological coping mechanisms of) 
seeking acceptance through compulsory consumption, the attempt to deny one’s own pain and 
suffering and the pain and suffering other others is likewise psychopathological and destructive 
of both ourselves and others in at least two ways.  The first being that, by denying the pain and 
suffering of others and/or ourselves, we are extending and exacerbating –rather than healing—
the intolerable feelings and symptoms of our own unresolved trauma.  McFarlane and van der 
Kolk (2006) discuss this first harm: 
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at 
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.  
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and 
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes 
even compassion for others.  Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of 
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so 
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with 
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the 
wounded parts of themselves.  Identification with the aggressor makes it possible 




Secondly, we are reproducing old traumas and creating additional new traumas for ourselves and 
for others.  This is the case both because traumas that are exacerbated rather than healed are 
                                                                                                                                                             
consume social resources, and live off the strong. The weak are a liability, and, after an 
initial period of compassion, are vulnerable to being singled out as parasites and carriers 
of social malaise. (P. 35) 
And Kelman (1973): 
Both regimentation and oppression create a feeling of powerlessness, a loss of personal 
agency, a deprivation of a sense of identity.  Violence can offer a person the illusion 
that he is in control, that he is able to act on his environment, that he has found a means 
of self-expression. It may be the only way left for him to regain some semblance of 
identity, to convince himself that he really exists.  The sad irony is that violence is a 
response to dehumanization that only deepens the loss that it seeks to undo; it is an 
attempt to regain one’s sense of identity by further destroying one’s sense of 
community. (P. 58) 
308 Lifton (1975: 187-88) notes that Vietnam veterans learned that they had to “rediscover the 
Vietnamese as human beings, in order, as they put it, to “become human again themselves.” 
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frequently reenacted over and over again, producing new traumas (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 
2006; Bar-On et al., 1998), and because, by identifying with the perpetrator, we ourselves 
become perpetrators, thus creating a whole new set of traumas for ourselves which arise from our 
(physical, or even mental and symbolic) perpetration against others (see for example: Kelman, 
1973: 36-38, 46-47, 50-52; Lifton, 1975; McNair, 2005; Grossman, 1996; Diamond, 1974: 8-10, 
26; Martinot, 2003; Baldwin, 1965: 47).  
     In either case, our behavior and thought patterns serve only to legitimize and reinforce the 
social relations of domination that oppress us and alter our perceptions of reality. In our 
mentality of pseudo freedom, we desperately continue reaching for an illusive individuality; and 
in our mentality of pseudo individuality, we continue desperately reaching for an illusive 
freedom.  We narcissistically reject other peoples and their collective ways of life, mistaking our 
bondage for freedom and superiority, and their collectivity for bondage and inferiority.  Our 
colonized, alienated mentality thus automatically eliminates threats to Western society’s  social 
relations of domination,309
                                                 
309 Federici (2004:170-71), notes the “fear and repulsion” with which the dominating class views 
the “communal forms of life that had been typical of pre-capitalist Europe,” and the use of the 
witch hunt, in part, as a tool for destroying this collective resistance to the new social relations of 
domination. 
 while also eliminating our ability to change these relations of 
domination and end our own oppression.  We continually strive to become part of the 
dominating/capitalist class, despite the virtual impossibility of our upward social mobility.  Our 
illusions in this regard reinforce and legitimize the social relations of domination that immiserate 
us because striving to dominate others (which we are told is the pathway to “success”) only 
serves to enrich these dominating others, as does our compulsive over-consumption of material 
goods in the hope of appearing more successful and socially mobile than we are.  And in both 
cases we chase something outside of ourselves, further legitimizing the idea that happiness, 
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purpose and fulfillment are only found outside of us through consumption of material goods or 
“advancement” in social status, all of which only further immiserate and alienate us from who 
we truly are and from any possibility of healing from our own pain and suffering. 
 
 
The Myths of “Progress” and “Civilization” 
 
[F]aith in progress … justifies Western civilized men to themselves. … For 
[Western man] cannot surrender the notion of progress without destroying the 
rationale for his entire civilization. No matter how critical he may be of the 
realities of his society, he clings to his progressivism as he would to his sanity.  It 
is the notion of progress that mediates his alienation, and makes it possible for 
him to construct a reality which he does not actually experience. 
~ Diamond 1974, 39 
 
But since the retardation of moral progress, while it is actually taking place, is 
invariably hailed as itself moral progress, genuine advancement in our 
spirituality must depend on the proper resolution of psychological and social 
problems which we have not even confronted, much less mastered. In the 
meantime we ought to judge all Great Moral Programs, especially if backed by 
the power of Churches or States, by the inverse of the Anglo-American decision-
rule for judging defendants: immoral until proven otherwise. 
~ Szasz 1970, 275 
 
Various terms, such as “wild,” “savage” and “barbarian” have been used 
frequently to refer to violent, crude, brutal, cruel, destructive and aggressive 
behavior.  Ironically, such terms have often been used by European writers to 
refer to non-European peoples whose customs were different and therefore 
(because of that element of difference) called “wild” or “savage.”  The irony 
stems from the fact that few, if any, societies on the face of the earth have ever 
been as avaricious, cruel, violent and aggressive as have certain European 
populations. 
~ Forbes 2008, 23 
 
Civilization is a limitless multiplication of unnecessary necessities. 
~Mark Twain, quoted in The Free Dictionary 2012 
 
The Western concepts of “progress” and “civilization” are myths, or forms of magical thinking 
(and denial) in the Western cultural worldview that date back at least to ancient times, and have 
been consistently reproduced and recreated in every era of Western history. For example, the 
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concept of progress in the Western worldview dates back perhaps several thousand years, and 
consists of the ideology that utopia –a state in which all of the world’s problems are solved-- is 
possible and that human beings can arrive there by following a single, linear pathway.  This 
pathway requires sacrifices along the way of those people and things that stand in the way of this 
utopia-bound  “progress” but, we are told, these sacrifices are necessary and justified by the end 
goal (which is mythical and unrealistic, and can be reached) (Mohawk, 1997).310
     Indeed, the existence of constant spiritual crises is not only a defining aspect of Western 
civilization, but a central goal and byproduct of its expansion. Numerous Western scholars have 
  Richard 
Drinnon (1990) has linked this concept to the Judeo-Christian view of history as a “linear, 
continuous, irreversible Time of perpetual progress, in which place is largely irrelevant” and 
“time is reified, and has little or nothing to do with cycles of organisms”(p. xxiii); while John 
Mohawk (1997; 2000: 137, 96-97, 8) has traced this concept, as it is most commonly expressed 
today, to Plato’s pursuit of the ideal and his belief that human intelligence can uncover the single 
pathway both to truth and to an ideal, utopian world (while all other pathways or belief systems 
are erroneous). According to Mohawk (2000 & 1997) utopian religions and ideals of progress 
were incredibly popular in the two centuries before and after Christ, when “rootless, urban 
populations who had no consciousness of place” that had lost all cultural continuity and 
connection to their spirituality in “successive waves of conquest” were in the midst of a spiritual 
crisis (see also: Osborne, 2006: 116-17). Since that time, this concept has been a largely popular 
coping mechanism and a deeply entrenched part of the Western cultural worldview, as have the 
spiritual crises that precipitated its popularity.   
                                                 
310 Mohawk (1997) notes that the concept of progress involves a “belief system that says that 
what [its adherents] are doing is not only not wrong, but has to be done in order to create a world 
which will be able to solve all of human kind’s problems.” 
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remarked upon this, describing these spiritual crises as a lack or moral restraint, a lack of social 
integration, an iron cage, or some other malady associated with modernity (Loy, 2002: 226; 
Szasz, 1970: 275; Bauman, 2000; Christie, 2000; Berman, 1994: 143; Chompsky, 2011; Weber, 
1980: 182; Kelman, 1973; Deloria, 1969 & 1992).311  But these crises existed long before the 
modern period, as much of this chapter has been aimed at showing, and as has also been 
recognized by many others (see for example: Mies, 1986; Federici, 2004; Merchant, 1989; 
Forbes, 2008). For example, John Trudell (2001b & 2003) has traced the spiritual destruction of 
the peoples of Europe back several hundred years before the arrival of Columbus in the 
Americas, and has referred to the spiritual crisis at that time  as “the virus,” or the disease that 
was eating the spirit of Europeans when they began their invasions of other lands.312
                                                 
311 For example, Loy (2002: 266) notes that: “…the West has gradually lost faith in any 
transcendental world or transcendental dimension, creating a spiritual crisis that has taken a long 
time to ripen and may be far from over,” while Weber (1980: 182) argued that: “For the last 
stage of this cultural development, it might well be truly said: ‘Specialists without spirit, 
sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never 
before achieved’.”). 
  Vine 
Deloria, Jr. (1992: 63) has remarked upon the centrality of this concept to the Western 
worldview, the ethnocentric nature of the concept, and its formative role in guiding the direction 
312 “But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about him: who he 
was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus.  And the spirit was being 
eaten by disease.  And it affected the perceptional reality of the human. See, so when Columbus 
and them got here and we told him who we were, they didn’t know.  We said, “We’re the people.  
We’re the human beings.”  But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional 
reality … the idea of a human being and people in that kind of a way was no longer a part of 
their perceptional reality. … So by the time Columbus got here the descendants of the tribes of 
Europe had gone through [400 years] of having their spirit just completely attacked.  … So they 
became spiritually and physically now the possession of something else.  Before it was just 
physically.  Now they had become spiritually the possession of someone else.  So they had no 
clarity about reality.  So by the time Columbus got here, see, they didn’t know what it meant to 
be a human being anymore.  It was just not a part of their spiritual perception or relationship to 
reality.  They were possessed, they were owned, they were property.” (Track 18) 
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of European historical development.313
The European materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe is very similar 
to the mental process which goes into dehumanizing another person. … And what 
each process of dehumanization has in common for each group doing the 
dehumanizing is that it makes it alright to kill and otherwise destroy other people. 
… In terms of the despiritualization of the universe, the mental process works so 
that it becomes virtuous to destroy the planet.  Terms like “progress” and 
“development” are used a cover words here the way “victory” and “Freedom” are 
used to justify butchery in the dehumanization process …  Ultimately, the whole 
universe is open –in the European view—to this sort of insanity. 
 Russell Means (1983: 21-22, quoted in a previous 
section) has similarly remarked upon the longstanding nature of these crises, noting the 
“European materialist tradition of despiritualizing the universe,” which Westerners often 
consider “revolutionary.” Means further links the spiritual crises that are created through the 
ongoing despiritualization of the universe “to the mental process of dehumanizing another 
person” --another permanent fixture in the Western cultural worldview: 
     Most important here, perhaps, is the fact that Europeans feel no sense of loss in 
all this.  …  And it’s very difficult, or impossible, to convince a person there’s 
something wrong with the process of gaining when they lack the spiritual wisdom 




     Indeed, conditions in Europe prior to the invasion of the Americas largely reflect the results 
of these despiritualization and dehumanization processes, as has been noted by Jennings (1975: 
77-78)315
                                                 
313 “The very essence of Western European identity involves the assumption that time proceeds 
in a linear fashion; further it assumes that at a particular point in the unraveling of this sequence, 
the peoples of Western Europe became the guardians of the world.  The same ideology that 
sparked the Crusades, the Age of Exploration, the Age of Imperialism, and the recent crusade 
against Communism all involve the affirmation that time is peculiarly related to the destiny of 
the people of Western Europe.  And later, of course, the United States.” (P. 63) 
 and Forbes (2008: 77-78) –the latter of whom has also noted the devastation and 
314 Means, op. cit. pp. 22-23.  See also, Mies, p. 77: (“Our understanding of scholarly work or 
research follows exactly the same logic as that of the colonizers and scientists: they cut apart and 
separate parts which constitute the whole, isolate these parts, analyse them under laboratory 
conditions and synthesize them again in a new, man-made, artificial mode”). 
315 ”Since Europeans began to emerge from endemic wars and epidemic diseases of medieval 
times, they have acquired an outlook in which the present seems better than the past and the 
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destruction of these processes, as well as “the morbid, fearful strain in European culture. …the 
European’s justified fear of his own kind.”316
     As mentioned in a previous section, prior to setting out on a series of invasions of other 
peoples’ lands around the world, European society was characterized: by massive corruption 
among its spiritual and secular authorities; by extensive violence, brutality and repression; and 
by excessive inequality leading to gluttony among the wealthy, on one hand, and literal 
starvation, disease and death for large portions of the masses, on the other (see for example: 
Mohawk, 2000: 98, 95).  In terms of the latter, Stannard (1992) remarks that: “The rich ate, and 
ate to excess, watched by a thousand hungry eyes as they consumed their gargantuan meals.  The 
rest of the population starved” (p. 57). In fact, food prices fluctuated constantly, and in France in 
the seventeenth century, when access to food was far easier than the previous two centuries, it 
was still the case that “each ‘average’ increase in price of wheat or millet directly killed a portion 
of the French population equal to nearly twice the percentage of Americans who died in the Civil 
  It seems worthwhile to provide the reader with a 
very brief overview of these conditions before continuing to discuss the ways in which the 
Western concept of progress has been used as a (psychopathological) coping mechanism for 
denying, perpetuating and reproducing this trauma of despiritualization and dehumanization. 
                                                                                                                                                             
future will be an improvement over the present.  In this perspective, and against mountains of 
evidence, large-scale catastrophe becomes inconceivable.  …” (Jennings, 1975: 77-78) 
316 “The nature of European warfare and oppression must surely depress one who manages to 
realize that the slaughter of 70,000 Saxons, or of 200,000 Cimri and Teutons, or of 1,000,000 
Albigensians, or of 75,000 Parisian Protestants, or of 20 million Jews, Gypsies, and Slavs, and so 
on, ad infinitum, is not a recital of mere numbers but of millions upon millions of cases of 
individual humans suffering from the wounds of death or the tortures of imprisonment or the 
trauma of losing loved ones. It is apparently easy for European historians to treat such gross 
horrors as if they were merely part of a dramatic scenario which never actually took place, but if 
we pause and assimilate the fact that, indeed, each brutal killing or burning at the stake or rape 
did occur, then we must understand perhaps the morbid, fearful strain in European culture.  The 
fear of evil, in other words, should be understood as being based upon no mythical character 
(Satan), but rather upon the European’s justified fear of his own kind.” (Forbes, 2008: 77-78, 
emphasis in original). 
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war” (Stannard, 1992: 57-58). Poverty was such a widespread and persistent aspect of French 
society that, just as the Inuit, Igloolik and Aivilik have 31 different words to describe snow, so, 
too, did the French have an extensive vocabulary to describe “every nuance of 
poverty”(Elements Online Environmental Magazine, 2012; Stannard, 1992: 60).317 Similar 
poverty rates existed throughout Western Europe, making the dense, malnourished urban 
populations extremely vulnerable to recurring epidemics of disease318 and to high infant, child 
and adult mortality rates (Stannard, 1992: 57-61).319
     In such an environment of despair, suffering and death, it comes as little surprise that there 
was also extensive violence, brutality and repression.  The same mentality that despiritualized 
social life, dehumanized the masses, and produced recurring famine also brought recurring riots 
(Stannard, 1992: 59); and since this despiritualization destroyed moral restraints, there was little 
that could be done to quell the regular theft, violent perpetration, and the frequent mass hysteria.  
The latter resulted in violent conglomerates of people, temporarily united in hatred, pursuing and 
punishing near-random scapegoats, and even, not uncommonly, engaging in acts of cannibalism 
 
                                                 
317 The French “had a battery of formal terms to describe precise levels of indigence: pauvre, le 
vrai pauvre, le mauvais pauvre, pauvre valide ou invalide, pauvre honteux, indigent, misérable, 
nécessiteux, mendiant de profession, mendiant de bonne foi, mendiant volontaire, mendiant 
sédentaire, and more. At the top were those who ‘at best lived at subsistence level, at worst fell 
far below,’ while at the bottom were those described as dans un état d’indigence absolue, 
meaning that ‘one had no food or adequate clothing or proper shelter, that one had parted with 
the few battered cooking-pots and blankets which often constituted the main assets of a working-
class family.’ Across the whole of France, between a third and half the population fell under one 
of these categories of destitution, and in regions such as Brittany, western Normandy, Poitou, 
and the Massif the proportion ascended upwards of two-thirds.  In rural areas in general, between 
half and 90 percent of the population did not have land sufficient for their support, forcing them 
to migrate out, fall into permanent debt, or die” (Stannard, 1992: 60). 
318 Stannard, p. 57, suggests that massive, deadly epidemics may have recurred every 25-30 
years, and (p. 60) that plagues occurred regularly in Italy during the summers. 
319 Plagues occurred regularly in Italy during summers and massive, deadly epidemics may have 
recurred throughout Europe every 25-30 years. “[A]n individual’s life chances in Europe’s 
pesthouse cities were so poor that the natural populations of towns were in perpetual decline that 
was offset only by in-migration from the countryside” (Stannard, 1992: 57, 58-61).  
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after killing their targeted individual(s) (Stannard, 1992: 59-61).320 In Spain, the “military elite of 
Europe,”generation after generation of persistent warfare had left a grouping of people 
traumatized not only by the violence of constant warfare, but also by the violence “of its soldiers 
off the battlefield” (Mohawk, 2000: 121).321
     The terror and devastation that plagued Western Europe in the late Middle Ages was merely a 
continuation of the same from the early Middle Ages and the ancient period, as much of this 
chapter has already shown. Thus, just as the concept of progress gained wide popularity as a 
 Spain was not unique in this regard. Much of 
Western Europe was filled with “violence, squalor, treachery, and intolerance,” which was also 
reflected not only in relations among adults, but also in child-rearing practices that sought to 
subjugate and break the will of children through liberal amounts of physical punishment and 
humiliation, as well as through an ethic of forcibly-imposed obedience so strong that courts 
would execute unruly children over 16 if parents felt unable to impose the duty to obey upon 
them (Stannard, 1992: 57; Williams, 1982: 10).   
                                                 
320 For example, Lawrence Stone (1977. The Family, Sex and Marriage in England, 1500-1800. 
New York: Harper & Row, quoted in Stannard, 1992: 59-60) notes that Europe “was a place 
filled with malice and hatred, its only unifying bond being the occasional episode of mass 
hysteria, which temporarily bound together the majority in order to harry and persecute the local 
witch” (pp. 98-99).  Further, “in Milan in 1476 a man was torn to pieces by an enraged mob and 
his dismembered limbs were then eaten by his tormenters. In Paris and Lyon, Hugenots were 
killed and butchered, and their various body parts were sold openly in the streets.  Other 
eruptions of bizarre torture, murder, and ritual cannibalism were not uncommon. …  Such 
behavior, nonetheless, was not officially condoned, at least not usually” (Stananrd, 1992: 61). 
See also, Mohawk (2000: 125-26) remarking upon the cultural amnesia that allowed the Spanish 
conquerors, disgusted by human sacrifice and suspected cannibalism among the South American 
Empires, to forget their own history of cannibalism during the Crusades. 
321 The effects upon societies of sending soldiers to war, and the high rate at which soldiers 
traumatized by violence of war reenact wartime violence in peacetime civilian life, have been 
remarked upon frequently over the past decades, particularly in the past five-to-ten years as 
soldiers returning from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and suffering from post-traumatic 
stress disorder, perpetrate violence upon other civilians.  A few of the many news articles, 
reports and documentaries on the topic include HBO (2011), Goode (2009), Carey (2007), and 
Cassata (2012).  
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(psychopathological) coping mechanism for the “rootless, urban populations” of ancient Rome 
who were suffering from the destruction of their cultures and the despiritualization of their lives 
(Mohawk, 1997; Osborne, 2006: 116-17), so, too, has it continued to serve as a tool for denying, 
avoiding, repressing or otherwise attempting to control feelings of anxiety, insecurity, 
disequilibrium, disintegration and/or alienation. Richard Drinnon (1990: xxiii) has made a 
similar observation, interpreting the concept of progress as a result of Westerner’s attempts to 
“leave the growth-and-decay cycle of their own bodies behind.” Both Jennings (1975) and 
Forbes (2008) have also remarked upon the fears Europeans emerging from the late Middle Ages 
had of the wars and plagues of past centuries, and even of their own kind.  And Mohawk (2000: 
9), Gay (1993: 69) and Loy (2002: 266) have all remarked upon the Western attempt to achieve a 
(false but seductive322
The sixteenth century colonizer was a proud, disdainful person, but he was also 
insecure and needed to remind himself constantly of his own superiority by 
looking to the imputed inferiority of others. (P. 597) 
) security or “power-security” through the Western conception of progress, 
and Canny (1973) likewise remarks upon this insecurity: 
 
Along these same lines, Diamond (1974) and Szasz (1970) have commented on the existence of 
numerous, unresolved conflicts and social/psychological problems within Western society, 
which Western man seeks to avoid or deny through his conceptions of progress and his allegedly 
superior position in the world.  For example, Szasz (1970) argues that: 
 
[G]enuine advancement in our spirituality must depend on the proper resolution 
of pshychological and social problems which we have not even confronted, much 
less mastered. (P. 275) 
 
And Diamond (1974) notes: 
 
                                                 
322 “There is a certainty to this line of thought that is seductive, but ultimately flawed” (Mohawk, 
2000: 9). 
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Caught in the contradictions of society, Westerners see themselves as ciphers of 
history; incomplete and always waiting to be completed.  Disintegrated by the 
extreme division of labor, by competition for goods and services and status 
rivalries, they obsessively anticipate integration. The idea of progress is, above 
all, the precipitant of unresolved social and personal conflicts in modern 
civilization, conflicts that feed on themselves.  It is the awareness of this conflict, 
along with the effort at resolving that creates the sense of unresolved movement 
towards specific goals which are defined as progressive. … [C]ompelled by their 
conflicts, Westerners are always trying to find concrete evidence for their 
superiority; they feel that they represent the West, the logical inheritance of the 
past, civilization itself. (Pp. 40, 41-42, see also pp. 8-10, 39-42) 
 
     Others have also noted the role of this Western concept of progress in overcoming the shock 
and insecurity experienced by Europeans when they stumbled upon the existence of lands and 
peoples not previously accounted for in their cultural worldview (Keal, 2003: 61-64; Todorov, 
1982: 241).323 This “discovery” “unsettled conceptions of ‘knowledge’” long held by Europeans, 
including a deeply embedded inability to tolerate difference, and conceptions of progress that 
allowed for only one “true” way of viewing the world and/or of arriving at a mythical utopian 
society of the future (Keal, 2003: 64, 61-65; Mohawk, 2000: 137, 9).324
                                                 
323 As noted in the above section on Individualism and the destruction of culture, threats to a 
group’s cultural worldview produce considerable anxiety and can be traumatizing.  See, for 
example: de Vries (2006), McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006), Solomon et al. (2000), Schimel, et 
al. (2000), Goldenberg et. al. (2001), Arndt et. al. (2002).  
  Confronted with 
different cultures and perceptions of the world, the Europeans largely refused to engage with this 
difference --a refusal that served as “a way of avoiding really knowing” (Keal, 2003: 64). Unable 
to treat difference as equal, and holding deeply-entrenched concepts which required that 
everything fit somewhere in a hierarchy of inferiority/superiority (Keal, 2003: 58, 60, 64-65, 75; 
324 The latter source notes the Western belief that “true answers, when found, must necessarily be 
compatible with one another and form a single whole” (p. 9); and provide the following example: 
“When Cortes had urged Moctezuma to embrace Christianity and abandon indigenous practices, 
the emperor replied that the religion of the Spaniards would not be appropriate to his people.  It 
would not have occurred to the Christian West to discuss such an idea, since the Christian 
utopian enterprise was founded on the belief that there could be only on Truth, one right way.” 
(P. 137)  
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Todorov, 1982: 42, 146; Diamond, 1974: 41), the Europeans’ common internal struggle was 
perhaps most presciently summarized by Bernardino De Sahagún when he stated simply that 
“either it is the natives who tell their ’idolatries’ or it is the Holy Writ copied out into his own 
book –one of these voices tells the truth, the other lies”(Keal, 2003: 61; Todorov, 1982: 241). As 
they clung desperately to their rigid beliefs in their own security and superiority, the only 
possible conclusion Europeans could draw was, according to their view, predetermined and 
unavoidable.  Any other conclusion would destroy the rationale for their entire civilization 
(Diamond, 1974: 39) and thus would leave them standing “naked before the world” (Deloria, 
1992: 112).325
Those who came to Ireland had a preconceived idea of a barbaric society and they 
merely tailored the Irishman to fit this ideological strait jacket.  There were, of 
course, many aspects of Gaelic life that did not so easily fit this model, but the 
English refused to make any adjustment, lest, perhaps, it disturb their own 
position at the top of the ladder of cultural development. (P. 597) 
  Hence, they determined that their culture, their view of the world, and their 
interpretations of languages, traditions, and cultures that they could not (and would not attempt 
to) understand was the only “true” view.  Canny (1973) notes the lengths to which the English 
who invaded Ireland went in order to maintain this perception against empirical evidence to the 
contrary: 
 
     Clearly, then, Western culture’s obsessive-compulsive need to fit the world into its own, 
misguided vision of linear progression, through which Western society leads the world towards 
some future Utopia, is highly delusional –as remarked upon by scholar after scholar (Diamond, 
1974: 39-42; Means, 1983: 27-28; Szasz, 1970: xii; Hedges in BookTV, 2012; Mies, 1986: 74-77; 
                                                 
325 “The Christian religion and the Western idea of history are inseparable and mutually self-
supporting.  To retrench the traditional concept of Western history at this point would mean to 
invalidate the justifications for conquering the Western Hemisphere.  Americans in some manner 
will cling to the traditional idea that they suddenly came upon a vacant land on which they 
created the world’s most affluent society.  Not only is such an idea false, it is absurd. Yet without 
it both Western man and his religion stand naked before the world.”   
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Keal, 2003: 58; Federici, 2004: 14; Loy, 2002: 266; Black Elk, 1983: 156). And Western 
society’s insistence upon the validity of this progressive construct, despite all evidence to the 
contrary, is as delusional as it is predaceous.  In terms of the first, the first, obsessive-compulsive 
delusion has served as a mechanism for denial, avoidance, intolerance, dualism, magical 
thinking, self-aggrandizement and a number of other problematic (psychopathological) patterns 
of thought and behavior in the Western cultural worldview.  It has allowed Europeans to avoid 
engaging with difference, and thus to remain in a bubble of delusion, considerably disconnected 
from reality. Without dealing with the reality before them upon their encounter with different 
peoples –much less within their own societies and minds326
     In terms of the second, the insistence upon the validity of the first, the Western concept of 
progress, as part of a larger grouping of psychopathological coping mechanisms, served to justify 
numerous offensive attacks upon members of its own society, other peoples, other life forms and 
the earth itself (Mies, 1986: 74-77; Federici, 2004; Szasz, 1970; Gay, 1993: 47, 69; Mohawk, 
1997 & 2000: 137; Hedges, 2008: 156; Diamond, 1974: 25; Szasz, 1970: 238; Deloria, 1992: 54-
55; Baldwin, 1965; Hanke, 1959; Horsman, 1981; Jennings, 1976; Black Elk, 1983; Means, 
—they failed to deal with the 
longstanding existence of pervasive, endemic trauma throughout their societies, towns, families 
and individual experiences, and thus not only did they fail to resolve and heal this trauma, but 
they perpetuated and reproduced this trauma in their interactions with others inside and outside 
of their own societies, all in an attempt to avoid, deny, repress and control intrusive and 
intolerable feelings of anxiety, fear, paranoia and so forth (see: Baldwin, 1965: 47; Wise, 2005: 
1). 
                                                 
326 Indeed, as John Trudell (2001b and 2003) and Russell Means (1983) have noted, the spirit 
was being eaten by the disease. 
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1983; Trudell, 2003, 2001a & 2001b).327 In doing so, it came with a ready-made rationalization 
for its predations, presenting these perpetrations against (or sacrifices of) other peoples and life 
forms as normal, inevitable, and necessary “in order to create a world which will be able to solve 
all of humankind’s problems”(Mohawk, 1997 & 2000: 137; Means, 1983: 21-22; Diamond, 
1974: 1; Loy, 2002: 266; Gay, 1993: 47; Tocqueville, 2000; Horsman, 1981; Drinnon, 1990). It 
also came with a ready-made justification for Westerners’ participation in these predations, by 
positing that Europeans were the “most advanced” people and thus the ‘chosen’ group for 
leading the world to this future utopia (Deloria, 1992: 63; Keal, 2003: 65; Gay, 1993: 69; Mies, 
1986: 74-75; Means, 1983: 27-28).328
                                                 
327 For example, Gay (1993: 47) notes that Darwin, in the Descent of Man, argued against caring 
for those in need, because their extinction was inevitable.  Mies (1986: 74-77) notes:  “the 
progress of the European Big Men is based on the subordination and exploitation of their own 
women, on the exploitation and killing of Nature, on the exploitation and subordination of other 
peoples and their lands.” And Mohawk (2000: 137) mentions that: “The perfect world that Plato 
thought human intelligence had the capacity to create found its most political expression in the 
mid-sixteenth century as an argument to justify the horrors of rape, murder, torture, robbery, and 
genocide, which were, for the Indians, the lived experience of conquest,” while Hedges (2008: 
156( goes yet further, arguing that: “The belief that we can achieve human perfection, that we 
can advance morally, is itself an evil.  It provides a cover for criminality and abuse, a 
justification for murder.  It sanctifies war, murder and torture for an unattainable absolute.”  
 Meanwhile the Western crimes and perpetrations have 
328 Deloria (1992: 63) notes the assumption implicit in the Western concept of progress that “at a 
particular point in the unraveling of this sequence, the peoples of Western Europe became the 
guardians of the world,” while Gay (1993: 69) notes the Western “rage to improve the world 
whether it wanted improvement or not.” Keal (2003: 65) points out that “By implication, 
Europeans had access to truth and if they had not already done so could escape ignorance.  They 
were consequently superior beings while the other was trapped in ignorance and inferior.  This 
made it easier to discount non-European beliefs and customs.” Mies, (1986: 74-75) notes that the 
concept of progress is “unthinkable without the one-sided development of technology of warfare 
and conquest.  All subsistence technology… henceforth appears to be ‘backward’ in comparison 
to the ‘wonders’ of the modern technology of warfare and conquest.” Meanwhile, de Tocqueville 
(2000) provides a plethora of examples of this sort of delusional, predatory thinking as it was 
used to justify or hide the crimes of European descendants in the United States.  See, for 
example, the following statements: “Would one not say, on seeing what takes place in the world, 
that the European is to men of other races what man himself is to the animals?”(P. 303); “the 
Negro hardly feels misfortune; violence had placed him in slavery, the habit of servitude has 
given him the thoughts and ambitions of a slave; he admires tyrants more than he hates them and 
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been dishonestly reframed and/or concealed altogether. But the Western concept of progress 
could not have ‘achieved’ all of this devastation, destruction, exploitation, dispossession, murder, 
mayhem, pain, suffering and misery entirely on its own.  It relied upon the use of another, even 
more powerful, but closely related and inextricably intertwined concept: civilization. 
     Like the concept of progress, the concept of civilization can also be traced back to ancient 
times.  At this time, the term “civilization” was used to indicate those inside the Greek city-states 
or the Roman Empire, while the term “barbarian” encompassed everyone outside (“including 
Egyptians and Persians” in ancient Greece) (Jennings, 1976: 6-7; Keal, 2003: 69).329  Thus then, 
as now, the concept of “civilization” was used dichotomously, counter posing the “civilized” 
with the “barbarian” (or, later, the “savage,” the “Wildman,” or simply the wild/nature), and 
containing the presumption of cultural, technical and moral superiority/inferiority (Jennings, 
1976: 6-7, 9-10). The use of this dichotomy provided the “civilized” insiders with a sense that 
they existed “at the top of the evolutionary ladder”(Jennings, 1976: 9-10),330
                                                                                                                                                             
finds his joy and his pride in servile imitation of those who oppress him”(P. 304); “The conduct 
of the Americans in the United States toward the natives, on the contrary, breathes the purest 
love of forms and legality … with marvelous vacility—tranquility, legally, philanthropically, 
without spilling blood, without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the 
eyes of the world.  One cannot destroy men while being more respectful of the laws of 
humanity”(P. 325).  
 and to some extent 
served to justify the exploitation (demanding tributes, taxes) of the outsiders. However, the form 
329 The former source notes: “From very ancient times self-consciously “civilized” people have 
favorably compared themselves with their neighbors.  The Greeks invented the term barbarian to 
apply to outsiders—even such as Egyptians and Persians—and the Romans were not slow to 
adopt the idea.  As W.R. Jones has remarked, ‘The antithesis which opposed civilization to 
barbaraism was a highly useful cliché, and one which served equally well as a means of self-
congratulation and as a rationalization for aggression.’” (Pp. 6-7)   
330 “Whatever efforts are made to objectify its definition, civilization necessarily implies not only 
technical but moral superiority over the stages assumed to be lower on the evolutionary scale.  
Civilization is rarely conceived of in terms of empirical data, and although its phenomena might 
vary as widely as those of ancient Sparta and Victorian England, its essence is always its status 
on the top of the evolutionary ladder.” 
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of exploitation, the extent of this superiority/inferiority dichotomy, and the expected behavior of 
the former (“civilized”) towards the latter (“uncivilized”) were all conceived of quite differently 
in ancient times than they were in the Crusades of the late Middle Ages (see for example: White, 
1961; Keal, 2003: 68, 69; Mohawk 2000; Osborne, 2006; Tigar & Levy, 2000; Deloria, 1992: 
63; Gay, 1993: 69; Diamond, 1974: 8).331
                                                 
331 White (1961) argues that Greek city-states did not follow the imperialist/colonialist model 
followed today by western society, because Greek colonization was primarily carried out for the 
purpose of trade –gaining things for the city states that were produced in rural areas—and was 
not carried out in areas opposed to it.  To this end, while Greek colonization certainly created 
relations of dependency, it was carried out in a less exploitative way than the forcibly-imposed 
relations of colonization of later centuries (which were generally also characterized by mass 
murder and environmental destruction orchestrated on the part of European colonizers). On the 
use of the term in ancient Rome, see: Mohawk (2000) and Osborne (2006), who both note that, 
while the Roman Empire could be incredibly brutal to citizens and non-citizens alike, non-
citizens (falling outside of “civilization”) retained considerable autonomy. Tigar & Levy (2000)  
makes a similar point about Roman law and the possibility of becoming a citizen/ “civilized,” as 
does Keal (2003: 69), noting that: “The Romans distinguished barbarians as those who did not 
live under Roman law; but by submitting to Roman law ‘barbarians’ could gain citizenship and 
admission to civilization.” Further, Keal argues that in ancient Greece, barbarians were simply 
those who did not speak Greek, and that though Augustine saw Wildmen as inferior, he also 
argued that “even the most repugnant of men—barbarian, heathen, pagan, and heretic—had to be 
regarded as objects of Christian proselytisation, to be seen as possible converts rather than as 
enemies or sources of corruption, to be exiled, isolated, and destroyed” (p. 68). Thus, it was not 
until medieval times, and perhaps late medieval times with the start of the crusades, that western 
Europeans began to determine that they were “the guardians of the world” (Deloria, 1992: 63) 
and it was their duty “to improve the world whether it wanted improvement or not” (Gay, 1993: 
69).  However, contrast this with Diamond (1974): “it is always useful to remember that in 
Athens, at the height of its cultural achievement, there were at least three slaves to every free 
man.  The fact is reflected in the classic utopian projections of civilization, and instanced in the 
work of Thomas Moore, where it is assumed that a special class of the disenfranchised will 
engaged in the “black labor.” And in Plato’s Republic, that prototypical apology for the state, the 
workers and farmers constitute lower orders of being”(p. 8). 
 By the latter time, the ideology of 
superiority/inferiority, and of forcible exploitation, were much more deeply embedded in the 
everyday thinking and behavior of the Crusaders, who had pillaged, plundered and murdered 
Muslims, Jews and eastern Christians, using a form of this superiority/ inferiority dichotomy as a 
justification or rationalization for their behavior. Similarly, during the Inquisition, witch hunt, the 
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mentality of the Crusades first turned inward, facilitating advances in the techniques of torture, 
exploitation and accumulation by dispossession, only to turn outward again against all non-
Westerners whose lands were invaded by Europe.332
     Also like the concept of progress, the concept of civilization evolved over the centuries in 
ways that have not been beneficial or healthy for humanity as a whole (much less for plant and 
animal life on the planet, or the planet itself).  Today there are a variety of ways in which the 
term “civilization” is defined and used, from indicating the culture or society of a specific region, 
people, or time period (such as Mayan Civilization or Roman Civilization) or indicating a 
populated or urban area and/or the comforts associated with such an area (Jennings, 1976: 10; 
Miriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012; Free Dictionary, 2012; American Heritage Dictionary, 2009; 
Harper Collins English Dictionary, 1991; Dictionary.com, 2012).  But the first entry, and the 
primary definition for the term in each of these dictionaries, as well as the implicit meanings of 
the term as it has been and is most often used, contains clear connotations of the 
superiority/inferiority dichotomy inherent in Western concepts of progress.  The links between 
the terms progress and civilization became tighter during the 1700s with the rise of “stages of 
development” theories which attempted to categories the cultures of the world according to 
hierarchical stages of societal development.  According to these theories, Western culture was, of 
course, at “the top of the evolutionary ladder,” and thus “civilized” (Jennings, 1976: 10).  Such 
meanings are still visible today in the definition of the term civilized, which is always defined 
vaguely and non-empirically in ways that convey the idea of intellectual, cultural and moral 
“refinement” and through the use terms such as “advanced,” “high level,” “highly 
   
                                                 
332 Further examples of ways in which these myths have been reproduced and recreated in 
different historical eras can be found in: (Mohawk, 2000; Drinnon, 1990; Jennings, 1976; Keal, 
2003: 67-68; Horsman, 1981; Slotkin, 1973; Bodley, 1999; Elias (1998); Hitchen, 2001). 
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developed”(Miriam-Webster Dictionary, 2012; Free Dictionary, 2012; American Heritage 
Dictionary, 2009; Harper Collins English Dictionary, 1991; Dictionary.com, 2012; Jennings, 
1976: 9-10).333 None of these terms or ideas in such definitions is empirical. Each is relative, and 
is a matter of subjective interpretation.  The same is true of many of the elaborations provided, 
some of which include criteria such as: “complex” cultural, religious, legal, political and social 
organization and/or institutions; “progress in the arts and sciences;” intellectual, cultural and/or 
moral “refinement;” and the use of record-keeping and/or writing.334
     Despite the intended meaning of the term (which is implied but rarely stated outright), these 
elaborations fail to distinguish one society from another, particularly when considered from the 
perspective of members of non-Western societies.  After all, the indigenous societies throughout 
the Americas that were invaded by Western Europeans would have certainly all considered 
themselves to have complex systems for keeping records (including oral history); complex 
cultural, religious, legal, political and social organization; “advanced” art; “refinement” 
intellectually, culturally and morally; and elaborate forms of science and/or knowledge.  Further, 
there are numerous sources of empirical evidence to support these views (some of which will be 
discussed more in chapter 3).   
   
                                                 
333 The latter source notes that “[c]ivilization is rarely conceived of in terms of empirical data…”  
334 “1. An advanced state of intellectual, cultural and material development in human society, 
marked by progress in the arts and sciences, the extensive use of record-keeping, including 
writing, and the appearance of complex political and social institutions” (American Heritage 
Dictionary, 2009); “1. an advanced state of human society, in which a high level of culture, 
science, industry, and government has been reached; 2. those people or nations that have reached 
such a state” (Dictionary.com, 2012); “1. a society in an advanced state of social development 
(e.g., with complex legal and political and religious organizations)” (FreeDictionary, 2012); “1a. 
a relatively high level of cultural and technological development; specifically: the stage of 
cultural development at which writing and the keeping of written records is attained” (Merriam-
Webster, 2012); “1. (Sociology) a human society that has highly developed material and spiritual 
resources and a complex culture, political, and legal organization; an advanced state in social 
development” (Harper Collins Dictionary, 2009). 
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     As illustration, in terms of art and “refinement,” the Chinese traveled around the world in the 
early 1400s (and possibly before this) to trade not with the Europeans, who were seen as 
backwards and having nothing of interest or value, but with the peoples of Asia, Africa and both 
American continents, whose cultures produced art and other refined products coveted by wealthy 
Chinese (Menzies, 2004. See also: Stannard, 1992; Mann, 2005). When it came to politics and 
governance, David Stannard (1992) and other writers (Williams, 1982; Mann, 2005) have noted 
that the vast majority of Native societies throughout the Americas –some numbering into the 
thousands—functioned as participatory democracies, many of which operated on the basis of 
consensus, an incredibly complex method of decision-making.  Further, these societies little-to-
no crime, no police and no jails, but were governed by extremely complex systems of law that 
were intricately linked to spirituality (religion), culture, and the organization of social life (see, 
for example: McAdams, 2012b; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Mann, 2005).  And when it came to 
science and knowledge, Native societies were intricately familiar with the workings of the plant, 
animal and natural world around them, holding far more knowledge about these things than 
Western scientists do today.  Further, Native societies were able to live on their lands for 
thousands of years without destroying the air, water, earth and life around them upon which they 
were dependent --something Westerners have yet to learn.  This is evidenced in the fact that 
Western scientists remain baffled by various ancient rock formations, mounds and so forth 
throughout North and South America which demonstrate incredibly advanced understandings of 
astronomy; and it is also becoming common practice among Western botanists, zoologists, 
ecologists, and environmental scientists to seek out the knowledge of indigenous elders in order 
to broaden their understanding of ecological systems, plant and animal behavior, and other 
aspects of the natural world. (See also: Means, 1983; Black Elk, 1983; Cajete, 2000). In fact, the 
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only possible case in which it could be argued that some Native societies did not fit these vague 
and non-empirical definitions of “civilization” is in the criteria of written language –a criteria of 
only one of the five dictionaries.335 Yet, several Native societies had this as well.  Aside from the 
better-known Mayan and Aztec writing systems, numerous other Native nations in the Americas 
also had some form of writing, such as the died beads and strings of the Inca (called Quipu), the 
petroglyphs of the Ojibwe and Míkmaq, and the wampum beads, strings, and belts of the 
Haudenosaunee (Miller, 2009: 39; Hirst, N.d.; Wikipedia, 2012a; MacroHistory, 2007-2011).336
     Since most if not all societies would consider themselves to be refined and their cultures to be 
complex, we see clearly the point that both Jennings (1976: 6-10) and Keal (2003: 67, 72) have 
made: that there is no clear, empirical definition for the term “civilization.” And yet, most 
Westerners know exactly what is intended by the term, as well as by its various elaborations 
(“advanced,” “complex,” “high level,” and “refined”).  For Westerners, these terms are intended 
to refer to us, our culture, our society, and every culture or society that looks and acts just like us.  
Similarly, for many Westerners (particularly in North America), this term and its various 
elaborations are decidedly not meant to refer to those people and societies who do not look, think 
or act like Westerners do.  This narcissistic component to the civilized-uncivilized dichotomy has 
 
                                                 
335 Three of the five definitions do not mention writing at all.  Though the American Heritage 
Dictionary (op. cit., 1) mentioned writing, the definition makes clear that writing is only one 
form of record keeping (extensive use of record-keeping, including writing”).  Thus, only the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary actually makes “the keeping of written records” one of the criteria 
for “civilization.” 
336 Thanks to Barbara A. Mann for pointing out these additional sources on the topic: John 
Heckewelder, John. 1820/1876.  History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who 
Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States, The First American Frontier Series, 
New York: Arno Press, p.108; Hewitt, J. N. B.  1965. “Wampum,”pp. 904-909 in Frederick 
Webb Hodge (ed.), Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico. New York: Rowman and 
Littlefield; Arnold, Denise Y. with Juan de Dios Yapita. 2006. The Metamorphosis of Heads: 
Textual Struggles, Education, and Land in the Andes Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh 
Press, chapter 10; Sharer, Robert J. and Loa P. Traxler. 2006. The Ancient Maya, 6th ed. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 125-52. 
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been noted by a number of scholars337 as has the use of the psychological mechanisms of 
projection and delusion involved in differentiating “us” from “them” (see: Diamond, 1974: 1, 26; 
Gay, 1993: 69; Elias, 1998: 49; Keal, 2003: 60-61, 71-72; Stannard, 1992: 14-15; Fanon, 1959; 
Jennings, 1976: 10; Martinot, 2003a & 2003b; Szasz, 1970: 278; Loy, 2002: 254).338
     Indeed, an element present in most of these uses of the term –along with Western separation, 
intolerance, narcissism, projection and other forms of delusion—is the implication not just of 
superiority, but of domination and conquest. In other words, as noted by Jennings (1976: 10, 8, 
12) and Keal (2003: 67), by defining civilization by what it is not, we include or exclude others 
based upon our desire to dominate and/or conquer them.
    
339
At other times and on other occasions powers bent on conquest have been able to 
point to more substantial differences between their own cultures, always deemed 
as civilization, and the uncivilized societies of their opponents.  More frequently, 
  Jennings provides an example of the 
term’s unempirical flexibility in this regard, noting that when England wanted to conquer the 
Irish, they sought out the one small difference between the English and the Irish –hierarchical 
government structures—and made this the criteria for civilization.  Yet:  
                                                 
337 Fanon’s (1959) ‘Mr. Debre’s Desperate Endeavors’ is quoted in Stannard (1992: 14-15): “The 
colonialist … reaches the point of no longer being able to imagine a time occurring without him.  
His irruption into history of the colonized people is deified, transformed into absolute 
necessity.”Similarly, Elias (1998) noted: “Unlike the situation when the concept was formed, 
from now on nations consider the process of civilization as completed within their own societies; 
they see themselves as bearers of an existing or finished civilization to others, as standard-
bearers of expanding civilization. … Indeed, an essential phase of the civilizing process was 
concluded at exactly the time when the consciousness of civilization, the consciousness of the 
superiority of their own behavior and its embodiments in science, technology, or art began to 
spread over whole nations of the West.”(P. 49).  
338 Jennings (1976: 10) notes that the civilization-savagery dichotomy “so greatly distorted 
Americans’ perceptions of reality that they met constant frustration in dealing with the issues 
raised by the presence of Indians.”  
339 Keal (2003: 67) notes: “If we do not know what we think “civilization” is, we can always find 
an example of what it is not”(quoting White).  Similarly, Jennings (1976: 10) discusses the 
“myth of social structure in which civilization and savagery stood as reciprocals, each defined as 
what the other was not, and both independent of any necessary correlation with empirical 
reality.” 
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perhaps, the difference has been one of religion.  At other times it might have 
been nomadic instead of sedentary habitation or one mode of subsistence versus 
another: communities without agriculture—or those possessing horticulture but 
lacking animal husbandry—were barbarous or savage.  Some social scientists 
have tried to bring validity and precision to these conceptions by making literacy 
the criterion of civilization.  All of these floundering attempts at explanation only 
serve to obscure the essential fact that the civilized-uncivilized distinction is a 
moral sanction rather than any given combination of social traits susceptible to 
objective definition.  It is a weapon of attack rather than a standard of measure. 
There are other ways of using these terms, to be sure, although the taint of 
historical usage makes difficult any attempt to purify them. (P. 8, emphasis 
added)  
 
Jennings continues a few pages later: 
 
The very words used to express thought give it shape and direction as well as 
symbolic substance, and the words evolved from centuries of conquest have been 
created for the purpose of conquest rather than the purposes of knowledge. (P. 12) 
 
     Thus, what appears to be implied by the term civilization, but what often goes unsaid, is the 
justification for Western conquest and domination of other peoples.  In its most common and 
widespread use, the term “civilization” not only demarcates the boundary line between 
Westerners and the various, non-Western “others” that the former has targeted for domination.  
The term also characterizes the former as superior and the latter as inferior, as people in need of 
Western domination in order to aid their (forced) conversion to Western monoculture.340  Hence, 
through this term, the domination, exploitation, dispossession, conquest, and numerous other 
horrors perpetrated upon non-Western peoples by Western society (ruling elites) are presented 
not as organized, armed aggression for the purpose of plunder, (Mohawk, 1997 & 2000) but as 
Western benevolence.341
                                                 
340 “Another timeworthy legacy was the urgent sense of a mission to civilize—that is to say, 
Christianize—unenlightened heathen tribes overseas or the unwashed heathen poor at home” 
(Gay, 1993: 69). 
  Indeed, we can find ample evidence for the argument that this term is 
341 “[T]he purpose of organized, armed aggression is to plunder” (Mohawk, 1997). 
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primarily a justification for such actions in the writings of the scholars quoted in the above text 
and notes.342
    However, the term is not only a justification for conquest of other, non-Western peoples.  It is 
also --and was first and primarily-- a justification for the pacification and domination of Western 
populations by Western monied elites (Elias, 1998: 43, 56, 55).  Through the “centralization and 
monopolization of the use of physical violence and its instruments” (Elias, 1998: 43), the 
militarization of commerce (Mohawk, 2000:95), and the “taming of the warriors” (Elias, 1998: 
56) so that they were “dangerous only to [the] enemies” of Western dominating elites (Elias, 
1998:43), the latter accumulated militarized control over large areas. The concept of 
“civilization,” and the act of pronouncing some segments of the Western masses as “more 
civilized” (generally on the basis of money/property, or military skill)
     
343 thus served as a 
hegemonic justification for the new social relations of domination.344
                                                 
342 See for example, Elias (1998: 49): “And the consciousness of their own superiority, the 
consciousness of this ‘civilization’, from now on serves at least those nations which have 
become colonial conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of the non-
European world, as a justification of their rule, to the same degree that earlier the ancestors of the 
concept of civilization, politesse and civilité, had served the courtly-aristocratic upper class as a 
justification of theirs.” 
  Combined, this 
monopolized forced and hegemony solidified hierarchies of domination within Western society, 
which were used for the purpose of dominating, first, Western populations, and only later, non-
Western peoples.  Through these processes, both Western populations and non-Western peoples 
were turned into, and treated as, little more than “raw material to be used in [the] interests” of the 
343 Elias (1998: 49) notes that the knights and nobility were the first to be trained in the ways of 
politesse and civilité,  the “ancestors of the concept of civilization.” 
344 “And then it is not difficult to understand that with this monopolization of physical violence 
as the point of intersection of a multitude of social interconnections, the whole apparatus which 
shapes the individual, the mode of operation of the social demands and prohibitions which mould 
his social makeup, and above all the kinds of fear that played a part in his life are decisively 
changed” (Elias, 1998: 43). 
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few (Diamond, 1974: 39), wealthy and powerful individuals who managed to maintain control 
over the Western and non-Western masses (and “in whom superiority was vested”) (Anaya, 
2004: 26.  See also: Diamond, 1974: 8, 39; Engels, 2000; Mies, 1986: 90, 93, 76; Jennings, 1976: 
9; Trudell, 2003; Black Elk, 1983: 144-45).345
     Though populations always initially resist this exploitation and dispossession, they are 
generally forced to comply via physical force.
 
346  This forced compliance, overtime, leads the 
masses to internalize the social hierarchies of domination and their position within these 
hierarchies.  The masses become internally pacified, so traumatized by the death and destruction 
of the resistance all around them that they give up on resistance and begin to obey out of fear 
and, eventually, habit. At this point, force is no longer required to maintain the obedience of the 
masses (though, of course, the threat of force always lingers in the background) (Litowitz, 2000; 
Diamond, 1974: 8, 11-12, 17; Forbes, 2008: 47; Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Elias, 1998: 43, 51; 
Anaya, 2004: 26).347
                                                 
345 As Engels has noted: “civilization is founded on the exploitation of one class by another.” To 
this extent, Jennings (1976: 9) argues that the criteria for civilization is “the exploitation of one 
class by another.”  Diamond (1974: 39) adds to this criteria the a existence of a “territorial state 
with coercive power.” Diamond (1974) remarks further upon exploitation and hegemony on 
pages 2, 11-12, and 17. Black Elk (1983: 144-45) further adds that the standard of “civilization” 
appears to be “the ‘will’ and ability to accumulate material” and the compulsive “need to 
constantly arrange and rearrange material” such as by tearing up mountains for gravel and 
transforming non-Western peoples into the image of Westerners. 
 Several scholars have linked this process of creating habitual obedience, or 
of taming and pacifying the masses, to the processes of state formation and civilization itself.  
346 As Stanley Diamond (1974: 8) has noted, “[c]ivilization always has to be imposed.” 
347 The latter source (Elias, 1998: 43) notes “how important this internal pacification was for the 
civilizing process,” because, as Litowitz (2000: 524) also notes, “brute force still leaves the 
individual free to harbor rebellious thoughts, but complete conrol is both external and internal.” 
On resistance, Forbes (2008) notes: “What we have seen in the past 2,000 years is not the rise of 
civilization, but the rise of brutality and barbarism with, of course, numerous resistance 
movements led by such diverse people as Buddha, Yehoshu’a, Tecumseh, Handsome Lake, 
Crazy Horse, Chitto Harjo, Sarah Winnemucca, Emiliano Zapata, Mahatma Ganhi, and 
thousands of other forgotten, important and less important, non-wétiko, sane human beings” (p. 
47).   
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Elias (1998: 43, 48, 55) has linked these two processes as part and parcel of the same thing, and 
Litowitz (2000: 524) has remarked similarly that “domination is increasingly a matter of 
colonizing the internal world of the dominated classes” (see also: Anaya, 2004: 26; Keal, 2003: 
74; Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Diamond, 1974: 8, 11-12, 17; Jennings, 1976: 9).348
Despite the barbarity of some of the laws, despite the faults of the administrative 
principles, the increase in duties, their burdensome form, the harshness of fiscal 
laws, despite the pernicious maxims which direct the government’s legislation on 
commerce and manufacture, and finally, despite the persecution of the 
Protestants, one may observe that the peoples within the realm lived in peace 
under the protection of law. (P. 48, quoting Voltaire) 
  An example of 
this sort of habitual obedience is provided in Elias (1998):  
 
     Much of the rest of this chapter has been geared towards showing the ways in which 
civilization was imposed: first at home, then abroad, always for the purpose of capital 
accumulation by the wealthy and powerful few (though the exploitation and dispossession of the 
masses). The Crusades, Inquisition, witch-hunt, Enclosures, and so forth all served to define 
women and “Other” peoples into nature, and to conquer, dominate and subdue these various 
categories of peoples along with the natural world (Mies, 1986: 75, 76; Merchant, 1989; 
Cullinan, 2011; Serpell, 1999: 39, 48, 47; Keal, 2003: 67-68; Drinnon, 1990: xxvii; Mohawk, 
2000: 30; see also: England, 2012 for a modern example of this thinking).349
                                                 
348 “The legal idea of the state necessarily implies that of habitual obedience of its members to 
those persons in whom superiority is vested…” (Anaya, 2004: 26). 
 For example, 
civilization was explicitly linked to women’s subordination during the European invasions of 
349 Cullinan (2011) notes that our “legal and political establishments perpetuate, protect and 
legitimize the continued degredation of Earth by design, not by accident” and have “reduced 
other aspects of Earth and the other creatures that live on it to the status of objects for the use of 
humans” thus legitimating “the eternal extermination of species and the most profound disrespect 
and abuse of the Earth that sustains us. … [F]rom the perspective of our legal systems, the 
billions of other species on the planet are outlaws, and are treated as such.  They are not part of 
the community or society that the legal systems concern themselves with, and have no inherent 
right to existence or to have a habitat in which to live.”  
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other lands. British colonialists viewed the equality of men and women as a sign of societal 
backwardness, and included within their “civilizing mission” the act of subordinating and 
destroying the independence of colonized women, and teaching “the colonized men the ‘virtues’ 
of sexism and militarism” (Mies, 1986: 93.  See also: McAdams, (2012a, and/or 2011; Gay, 
1993: 38)350 The concept of civilization was also clearly linked to the oppression of working 
class and poor masses, who were referred to as “savages, beasts and incorrigibles in need of 
harsh discipline”(Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-71; Canny, 1979: 34, 19; Drinnon, 1990: 69; Serpell, 
1999: 39).351
                                                 
350 Mies (1986: 93) notes the account of a colonial officer in Burma in the late 1800s, who 
complains of “the independence of Burmese women, of the equality between the sexes, and of 
the peace loving nature of the Burmese people” and concludes that the failure of Burmese 
society to subordinate its women “is the mark of a young race.”  The colonial official further 
concludes that women should “surrender their liberty in the interests of man” and that “Burmese 
men should learn to kill, make war, and oppress their women,” and women should be “’brought 
down’ to the status of the civilized, dependent housewife.”  McAdams further notes that colonial 
officials in North America had a similar, explicitly negative view on the equality of the sexes and 
the need to subordinate Cree women in the process of “civilizing” the Cree people.  On the 
existence of similar views today, one need only refer to Representative Terry England’s (2012) 
comparison of women to cows, pigs and chickens.  In many ways the present war on women’s 
rights to contraception and abortion (and healthcare) parallels the attempts by medieval Catholic 
Church to control women, sexuality and birthrates (see Federici, 2004).  While rape of working 
and lower-class women has not been explicitly legalized today, violence against women is 
endemic in this society, and both violent crimes and sexual assaults against certain categories of 
women (in particular women of color and Native women) go largely unpunished when reported. 
  Such punishments might include being whipped and branded like livestock, or 
being imprisoned, and there were reportedly hundreds of possible offenses that were punishable 
351 Canny (1979: 34, 19) notes that English colonial organizers referred to the English lower 
classes as “wyld men of myne own nacione” and believed that martial law was necessary to 
govern over them in the colonies because “most of those who ventured overseas came from the 
poorest elements of society, and were considered by their superiors to be incapable of self-
discipline, to be barely civilized, and certainly not suitable instruments for transmitting 
civiliztion to others.”  Drinnon (1990: 69) found the same attitudes among the founding fathers 
of the United States, who “saw linkages between savages lurking on the frontiers and the 
rebellious commons at home.” Serpell (1999: 39) makes similar observations: “Also ripe for 
moral uplift were the working classes who were widely regarded as dangerous and disorderly 
rabble, governed by “brute” passions and addicted to vicious “blood sports” such as bull-baiting 
and cock-fighting.” 
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by execution (Lanier & Henry, 2004: 70-71).  Children were also seen as existing at the margins 
of civilization, and as beings that were “innately cruel and heartless and needed to be carefully 
socialized and ‘improved’ through exposure to morally uplifting activities and pastimes”(Serpell, 
1999: 39) or through efforts at breaking their will and keeping them in subjugation at school and 
at home through corporal punishment and/or humiliation (Williams, 1982: 10; Drinnon, 1990: 
xxv; Elias, 1998: 53, 41).352 Even a person’s inner nature was perceived as consisting of savage, 
beastlike and “brutish animality”that had to be risen above, brought under control and mastered 
in each person (Serpell, 1999: 39, 47; Drinnon, 1990: xxii-xxiii, xxv, 30; Keal, 2003: 67; Gay, 
1993: 69; Canny, 1979: 18, 37) .353
     Thus, again, as is clear from the ways the term was used and applied to various categories of 
people and/or nature within Europe, what was really meant by the process of “civilization” was 
the taming, the pacification, and/or the process of achieving the obedience of the masses through 
the forcible imposition of hierarchies of separation, domination and intolerance, which were 
eventually internalized by the masses, making their obedience habitual. In other words, being 
“civilized,” then, is not just the state of being conquered, but the state of being physically, 
  
                                                 
352 The European child’s primary obligation was to obey his or her parents (Williams, 1982:10), 
and “[t]he way the European governments treated their subjects mirrored the way European 
parents dealt with their children” (p. 12).   
353 “For Darwin and his contemporaries, “civilization” was a process clearly analogous to animal 
taming or domestication.  It could only be achieved through the active suppression of mankind’s 
original, savage or beastlike character, and the simultaneous cultivation of domesticity, gentility, 
and self-control” and poets such as Tennyson “exhorted his readers to ‘move upwards, working 
out the beast’” (Serpell, 1999: 39).  Further, “middle-class Victorians and their succesors had 
risen above, and brought under control, a world of nature that included their own potentially 
“brutish” animality” (p. 47). Drinnon (1990: xxii-xxiii) likewise noted that: “Long before their 
first landfall, European immigrants were alienated from the “howling Wilderness” that had to be 
mastered in themselves and in their new surroundings,” something which at least partially 
explained their fascination for total control over the self and others. Finally, Keal (2003: 67) 
notes the Western idea that: “The wild man was found ‘lurking within every man—clamouring 
for release’.” 
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mentally and spiritually colonized; of knowing one’s place in the hierarchy of domination and 
subordination, and of acting out one’s proscribed roles in this hierarchy without complaint or 
resistance.  This assertion is supported by the historical evidence, and even by some modern 
dictionary definitions of the term.354
     Though these hierarchies, statuses and roles were forcibly imposed at first, populations facing 
constant repression, injury and death, first at the hands of the Church, later at the hands of other 
forces of the consolidating state-commerce alliance, did eventually internalize them –realizing 
through generations of trauma, terror and loss, as John Trudell (2001b & 2003) notes, that if they 
wanted to survive at all the needed to go along (at least in their visible actions) with the newly-
imposed systems of domination.  By fitting themselves into the exploitative system that 
dispossessed them and turned them into raw materials to be used in the accumulatory interests of 
the wealthy and powerful, the masses, gradually and over generations, internalized the 
hierarchical system and their “inferior” positions, roles and statuses within it until all of these 
came to be seen as the normal, natural, given way that the universe works.
   
355
                                                 
354 For example, one of the five dictionaries consulted above deviated slightly from the accepted 
norm of defining “civilization” and “civilized” in terms of advancement and superiority.  The 
fourth entry for the term “civilized” (adjective) by Dictionary.com lists the term as meaning: 
“easy to manage or control; well organized or ordered.” (Emphasis added). 
 As such, they lost 
their sense of what it was to be human beings, being socialized into a system made up not of 
355 Marx (1972a) notes that in every epoch people imagine the social relations of production (or, 
here, the social relations of domination) to be normal and natural, to have always existed, and 
thus to be beyond their abilities and imaginations to change. These relations of 
production/domination are also, for Marx, equal tot he ideas of the ruling class: 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. … 
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the 
relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its 
dominance. (Marx/Engels Reader. 1972, pp. 136-37). 
See also: Gramsci (1971), Litowitz (2000) and Foucault (1995) on hegemony and the active 
participation of people in reproducing these ideas. 
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fellow human beings, but of only oppressed and oppressors, those who are treated as property, 
and those who treat others as property (Jennings, 1976: 3; Trudell, 2001b).356
     As mentioned above, the forcible-imposition of the conditions that brought about this view of 
the world, and the adjustments involved in internalizing such a view, were highly traumatic for 
those who survived these processes.  These processes were made more so by the process of 
individualization, which rerouted the resistance against these changes, transforming it from 
collective actions of the masses against the ruling elite to 1) individual acts of resistance that 
were criminalized and prosecuted, or 2) individual complicity in the civilizing processes. Seeing 
themselves as unable to effect the entire system of hierarchical domination, they gave up on this 
goal, and instead satisfied themselves with “self-improvement” –i.e, trying to effect a slightly 
better position within the hierarchies of domination. They could most easily do so not only by 
demonstrating themselves to be relatively more civilized (i.e., a “good worker,” “good Christian” 
or “good” whatever),
   
 357
The very structure of their [the oppresse’s] thought has been conditioned by the 
contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.  
Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors.  This is their 
model of humanity.  Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, 
 but also by engaging in the projection, scapegoating, and other 
psychopathological coping mechanisms encouraged and promoted by the present social relations 
of domination.  All of these actions require identifying with the perpetrator, as has been noted by 
scholars as diverse as Paolo Friere (1971): 
                                                 
356 “So by the time Columbus got here, see, they didn’t know what it meant to be a human being 
anymore.  It was just not a part of their spiritual perception or relationship to reality.  They were 
possessed, they were owned, they were property” (Trudell, 2001b) 
357 “That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human. 
That’s the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see ourselves 
clearly.  We do not see and recognize clearly who we are.  And we’re never encouraged to.  
We’re encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or “good” that religion, or 
good… workers, good [whatever].  But we’re never encouraged to be real about human beings.  
In a way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to ourselves” (Trudell, 2001a & 2003). 
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following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor. (P. 30-31, quoted in Forbes, 
2008: 55) 
 
And McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006): 
 
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, at 
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes.  
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and 
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes 
even compassion for others.  Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of 
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that is was not so 
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with 
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the 
wounded parts of themselves.  Identification with the aggressor makes it possible 
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others. (P. 36)358
 
 
     For Elias (1998), these choices and actions, which I have referred to as the result of trauma 
and (psychopathological) coping mechanisms, are a natural part of the socialization process (in 
Western society), which is passed down through the generations and equated with the civilizing 
process: 
[T]he specific process of psychological ‘growing up’ in Western societies, which 
frequently occupies the minds of psychologists and pedagogues today, is nothing 
other than the individual civilizing process to which each young person, as a 
result of the social civilizing process over many centuries, is automatically 
subjected to from earliest childhood, to a greater or lesser degree and with greater 
or lesser success. The psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized society 
cannot, therefore, be understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis 
of our ‘civilization’. By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his 
short history, passes once more through some of the processes that his society has 
traversed in its long history. (Pp. 41-42) 
 
Elias further emphasizes the role of emotions and feelings in the socializing/civilizing process, 
such as the emotions of “shame, embarrassment … displeasure, distaste, disgust, fear” (p. 53) 
                                                 
358 See also: Herman (1992: 7-8) “when traumatic events are of human design, those who bear 
witness are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to 
remain neutral in this conflict.  The bystander is forced to take sides. … It is very tempting to 
take the side of the perpetrator.  All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing.  He 
appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil.  The victim, on the contrary, asks 
the bystander to share the burden of pain.  The victim demands action, engagement, and 
remembering.” 
 234 
that become associated with our engagement in certain behaviors and eventually --through our 
desire to avoid the known repercussions of engaging in them— with these behaviors themselves 
(pp. 53-54). In this way, though children rarely have innate feelings of disgust and shame, the 
parental disapproval and external pressure and coercion they face upon engaging in certain 
behaviors moulds them “into conformity with a certain standard,”(p. 54, see also 39-54) and 
teaches them not only to associate these unpleasant feelings with these acts, but with all who 
engage in these acts (pp. 52-53). Since “the pressure or coercion of individual adults is allied to 
the pressure and example of the whole surrounding world”(p. 54), the codes of “civilized” 
behavior are passed on and reproduced throughout the generations, altering only when there is an 
alteration in the social relations of domination (“the structure of human relations”), at which time 
these standards are also gradually changed (“slowly raised”) to reflect these new standards (p. 
53). According to Elias, this “change is in the direction of a gradual ‘civilization’, but only 
historical experience makes clearer what this word actually means” (p. 41). 
     Thus, Elias recognizes the socially-constructed nature of concept “civilization,” and the fact 
that historical processes in society are “enacted in abbreviated form” in the socialization and “the 
life of the individual human being”(p. 54), as I have also argued above.  Yet, though Elias 
recognizes the socially constructed nature of the concept of “civilization,” he also seems to treat 
it as an objective category, describing the civilizing process as being “slowly raised … in the 
direction of a gradual ‘civilization’” (both quoted and cited above), and thus implying that 
civilization is some objective, external standard to be reached by the entire society, rather than a 
reflection of social relations of domination and a rationalization for exploitation and 
dispossession of the masses at the hands of the few.  Further, though Elias demonstrates 
considerable insight into the ways that these standards of civilization change over time (p. 41) as 
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well as how the European ideology of superiority was/is unconsciously reproduced over the 
generations (p. 49),359 he does not explain the depravity and the inhumanity inherent in the 
civilizing mentality.  The psychopathological perpetration that has characterized Western society 
in the various (and ongoing, literal and symbolic) wars that it has waged against women, nature, 
non-Christians, eastern or independent-thinking Christians, the poor and working classes, or 
other, non-European peoples goes almost entirely unacknowledged. But since, as Elias correctly 
asserts, the socialization/civilizing process in Western society is the “sociohistorical processes of 
centuries… slowly enacted in abbreviated form in the life of the individual human being” (p. 54), 
and since he also correctly asserts that the “psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized 
society cannot, therefore, be understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis of our 
‘civilization’”(p. 42), then this (depravity, inhumanity, domination, exploitation and 
dispossession in thought and action) is exactly what needs to be explained.  As I have argued, 
this can only be explained through the concept of unresolved, transgenerational trauma that is 
never confronted or resolved, but is coped with, perpetuated and reproduced primarily through 
the psychopatholocial mechanisms discussed in this chapter.360
                                                 
359 “Of the whole preceding process of civilization nothing remains in their consciousness except 
a vague residue.  Its outcome is taken simply as an expression of their own higher gifts; the fact 
that, and the question of how, in the course of many centuries, civilized behavior has been 
attained is of no interest. And the consciousness of their own superiority, the consciousness of 
this ‘civilization’, from now on serves at least those nations which have become colonial 
conquerors, and therefore a kind of upper class to large sections of the non-European world, as a 
justification of their rule, to the same degree that earlier the ancestors of the concept of 
civilization, politesse and civilite, had served the courtly-aristocratic upper class as justification 
of theirs.” (Elias, p. 49). 
    
360 Due to time constraints, I will have to leave out of this chapter a fuller illustration of how 
these concepts of civilization and progress, as well as the other psychopathological coping 
mechanisms discussed in this chapter, played out in European-Native relations in the Americas, 
as well as elsewhere around the world, during the beginning of the age of imperialism and 




Thus, as this chapter has shown, Western society and the Western cultural worldview have been 
shaped by various long-term, widespread campaigns of terror, torture, mass-murder, pillage, 
rape, plunder, and other dehumanizing and traumatic events –most of which have been 
orchestrated by people in positions of (Church and/or secular) power and authority for the 
purposes of enriching themselves, their organizations, and their relatively few allies at the 
expense of the majority of people, as well as the earth and all living things. These devastatingly 
traumatic experiences have been so pervasive in the formation of, and the perpetuation of, 
Western society and the Western cultural worldview that the impact of these unresolved events 
and their rippling impacts have continued not only to live on but, in some ways, to increase 
exponentially, as members of Western society at the individual, group, national, and societal 
levels have continued to (largely unconsciously) reenact and reproduce these traumas upon 
themselves, upon other members of Western society and, most damagingly, upon virtually every 
non-Western society existing today (as well as upon the earth and every non-human form of life 
in existence).  That these pervasive rippling effects of this ongoing, perpetually reproduced 
trauma are a –if not THE—central aspect to the Western society and the Western cultural 
worldview can be seen perhaps most clearly through an historical examination of the intended 
(but always implied, not stated) meaning of the term “civilization” –which, as a term of conquest 
rather than a term of knowledge (Jennings, 1976: 12), has actually been developed specifically to 
implicate this traumatizing process, in which those being “civilized,” as Norbert Elias (1998: 54) 
                                                                                                                                                             
illustration unnecessary, and that readers can build their own connections between these concepts 
historically and these concepts as they are further discussed in chapters 5 and 6. 
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remarked, experience or have enacted upon them “in abbreviated form” “the sociohistorical 
process of centuries” of Western “civilization.”361
     Thus, the civilizing process of Western society is the traumatizing process,
 
362
     Though some will point to the insatiable, and near-compulsive greed displayed by the 
European invaders of the Americas, the Caribbean, the coasts of Africa, and other lands and 
peoples as the overall problem historically and in the present, this greed cannot, alone, explain 
the barbarity, cruelty and inhumanity of the European invaders.  At the same time, this greed can 
be explained by the civilizing/traumatizing process through which compulsive, insatiable greed 
is but one form of expressing the desperate, compulsive need to gain control over the intolerable 
 which is 
synonymous with the process of dominating and internally colonizing the masses.  Only this 
understanding of the term, and of Western society in general, can explain the brutality, depravity, 
inhumanity and compulsion with which these processes were undertaken against/ imposed upon/ 
and perpetrated against the non-Western peoples of the Americas, the Caribbean, and the African 
coast during the Age of “Discovery” and Exploration (which might rightly be renamed as the 
Age of Invasion and Traumatization).  Further, this Age is still ongoing, as neither the invasions 
nor the traumatization inflicted upon non-Western and other Western peoples have ceased.  
Instead, they have been compulsively perpetuated, and from the looks of things presently, this 
perpetuation may well continue until everything that humanity depends upon for life is destroyed 
(along with humanity, quite possibly).   
                                                 
361 “By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes once more 
through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long history” (Elias, 1998: 54). 
“[O]nce such feelings are aroused and firmly established in society by means of certain rituals 
like that involving the fork, they are constantly reproduced so long as the structure of human 
relations is not fundamentally altered” (Elias, 1998: 53).  
362 Which is also, actually, synonymous with the process of internally colonizing the minds and 
souls, as well as the physical beings, of the masses of people. 
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(transgenerational trauma-induced) feelings of anxiety, fear, terror, insecurity, disgust, despair, 
and so forth that plague victims of unresolved traumas. Similarly, though many, like Niall 
Ferguson (2011) or Jarred Diamond (1997) point to technological developments, or combination 
of technology and disease, as the cause of this massive, ongoing Western-led destruction (which, 
nonetheless, neither seem to recognize as destruction), these factors are similarly unable to 
explain the psychopathological mentality behind the development of this technology, the 
direction in which this technology was developed, and/or the brutal and inhumane uses to which 
this technology was put.  As John Mohawk (1997) noted: “[w]hat we have is a pattern of 
behavior of utterly unbelievable cruelty in a society that claims to be civilized.” This pattern only 
begins to make sense, and only begins to be explained, when looked at through the lens of the 
massive and widespread transgenerational trauma that is the very foundation of Western society. 
     The next chapter (chapter 3) will examine –in a general way—some of the characteristics of 
societies that are not traumatized by centuries of conquest and “civilizing”/colonization.  That is, 
it will provide a general and brief glimpse into the majority of Native societies that existed 
throughout the Americas prior to the start of the European invasion. Some of these 
characteristics include the idea, common among numerous Native societies throughout the 
Americas, that healthy human beings desire peace, and that they feel (and should feel) pain and 
sorrow when killing another living being.  If “one does not feel that pain, one has become 
brutalized and ‘sick’” (Forbes, 2008: 12-14, 6-7; Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40). The contrast 
between, on the one hand, the traumatized (and psychopathological) nature of the Western 
worldview, as displayed in patterns of thought and behavior and, on the other hand, the majority 
of Native societies in the Americas prior to the European invasion will provide some further 
insight into the full extent to which Western society is suffering form past, unresolved, 
 239 
transgenerational trauma, by demonstrating the very different patterns of thought and behavior 
displayed in healthy societies.  This exploration will also provide a necessary framework for 
understanding the competing worldviews of Haudenosaunee people and Canadian non-Natives 
during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in Caledonia, Ontario, Canada.  Though the 
Haudenosaunee Six Nations, like other Native nations throughout the Americas, have been under 
attack by the forcibly-imposed traumatizing, colonizing, “civilizing” process of Western society, 
they have continued to hold strong to many of their traditional cultural beliefs, and their past 
treaty agreements with non-Native society.363
                                                 
363 These beliefs and agreements include the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace (of 
Kaianerekowa, in Kanien’keha, or the Mohawk language), the Covenant Chain, and the Two 
Row Wampum treaty of non-interference –all of which continue to guide traditional and semi-
traditional Haudenosaunee people in fulfilling their cultural responsibilities to protect and 
preserve the water, land, and other life forms for the past, present and future generations –a key 
motivation behind the 2006 protest. 
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Chapter 3: 
Pre-invasion Native Nations as Non-Pathological, Healthy Societies 
Any rational person would have to ask what’s so “primitive” about a people 
which managed to maintain a perpetually democratic way of life, which shared 
all social power equitably between both sexes and various age groups, which 
considered war essentially a sport rather than an excuse to indulge in the wanton 
slaughter of masses of people, which killed game only for food rather than as a 
“sport,” which managed to occupy its environment for thousands of years without 
substantially altering it (that is to say, destroying it). That same rational person 
would have to ask why any sane individual would not choose to live that way if 
the chance was available, or aspire towards such an existence if the chance 
wasn’t immediate. 
     That same rational person would have to ask what’s so “advanced” about a 
culture which generates authoritarianism and dictatorship as a social norm, 
which deprives its women, its ethnic minorities, its elders and its youth of any true 
social power, which engages in the most lethal warfare on a regular basis and 
has left perhaps a half billion mangled bodies in its wake during this century 
alone, which is eliminating entire species of plant and animal life forever and 
without real concern, and which has utterly devastated the environment of this 
continent in approximately two centuries. Finally, that same rational person 
would have to ask what sort of lunatic would choose to switch from the first way 
of life to the second. 
~ Black Elk 1983, 141-42 
 
But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about 
him: who he was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus.  
And the spirit was being eaten by disease.  And it affected the perceptional reality 
of the human.  See, so when Columbus and them got here and we told him who we 
were, they didn’t know.  We said, “We’re the people.  We’re the human beings.”  
But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional reality –the 
concept was no longer a part of their perceptional reality.  See, this is what 
happened to the tribes of Europe and the descendants of the tribes of Europe.  
And so I know that by the time Columbus got here –and I’ve got a pretty good 
idea of way before that.  But, but by the time Columbus got here, the idea of a 




By the time Europeans set sail in the voyages that would begin their invasion of the Americas, 
they had been through over a millennium and a half of continuous, ongoing conquest, warfare, 
mass murder, rape, plunder and pillage. They had lived under constant social relations of 
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domination, oppression, exploitation, terror, dispossession, and various other forms of large-
scale, natural and man-made devastation and destruction that had traumatized virtually all 
survivors. And these survivors, whether they survived as victims, perpetrators, bystanders or all 
three, passed these unresolved –and in many cases, repressed and unspeakable-- traumas down 
through the generations to their children, their children’s children, and so forth. These repressed, 
unresolved, and unspeakable traumas, along with their symptoms, have formed much of the 
fabric of Western society today, as they already had by the time Europeans set out to invade a 
new world.   
     It is little wonder, then, as John Trudell notes, that by the time Europeans reached the shores 
of the Caribbean Islands or the American continents, they found it difficult to comprehend the 
openness, generosity, autonomy, abundance, and so forth of Native peoples and societies they 
encountered. The conquerors could not relate to the Native peoples they encountered as fellow 
human beings to befriend, celebrate, learn from, or share with, because European society had, for 
so long, treated its people as property to be controlled and dominated. It had also long forced its 
members to separate themselves from the earth, nature, animals, and other peoples (the wealthy 
from the masses, men from women, Christians from non-Christians, Orthodox Christians from 
all other Christians, and so forth), and had held a deep intolerance for anything that did not 
resemble the Western ideal.  Thus, ideas of befriending, learning from, sharing with and 
celebrating with other peoples who were not like themselves (or their ideal image of themselves) 
were no longer a part of their perception of reality (Trudell, 2001b & 2003; Todorov, 1982: 42; 
Keal, 2003: 58, 59; Drinnon, 1990: xxv, xxvii, 12, 30, 56, 57, 69).364
                                                 
364 “What is denied is the existence of a human substance truly other, something capable of being 
not merely an imperfect state of oneself” (Todorov, 1982: 42). Drinnon (1990: xxv, xxvii, 12, 30, 
56, 57, 69) has noted the extreme revulsion of the Puritans towards celebration, dancing, physical 
  Instead, in their deep-
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seeded insecurities about the place of Europeans in the world and their own positions within their 
societal hierarchy upon their return (Canny, 1973: 597; Forbes, 2008: 77-78, 81; Martinot, 
2003a: 409),365
                                                                                                                                                             
passion, nature and their own bodies, viewing these as threats to their self-preservation and 
engaging in elaborate and Draconian efforts towards repression of all spontaneous enjoyment 
and the transformation of “bodies from instruments of rhythmic pleasure into instruments of 
domination and aggression” (p. xxv).  Drinnon further notes that: “The people of the European 
race in coming into the New World have not really sought to make friends of the native 
population or to make adequate use of the plants, or the animals indigenous to this continent, but 
rather to exterminate everything they found here and supplant it with plants and animals to which 
they were accustomed at home” (P. xxiii) 
 European invaders approached everyone and everything they encountered in 
their voyages as “raw materials to be used in their own interests”(Diamond, 1974: 39; Keal, 
365 “The sixteenth century colonizer was a proud, disdainful person, but he was also insecure and 
needed to remind himself constantly of his own superiority by looking to the imputed inferiority 
of others” (Canny, 1973: 597).  Similarly, on Western society’s millennia-long history of 
atrocities, Forbes (2008: 77-78) notes that: “if we pause and assimilate the fact that, indeed, each 
brutal killing or burning at the stake or rape did occur, then we must understand perhaps the 
morbid, fearful strain in European culture.  The fear of evil, in other words, should be understood 
as being based upon no mythical character (Satan), but rather upon the European’s justified fear 
of his own kind.” (Emphasis in original) 
Forbes concludes (p. 81) that: “The quest of many Europeans penetrate, subdue, and change the 
natural world must be viewed in part as a psychological phenomenon—that is, as a need 
fulfillment or compulsion which is non-rational or irrational in character.”Similarly,  Martinot 
(Martinot, Steve.  2003.  Patriotism and its double. Peace review. 15:4, 405-410) also notes the 
role of this anxiety, or racial paranoia, in the late 17th and early 18th century when wealthy elite 
plantation owners seeking to turn poor European and African masses against each other (rather 
than allow them to continue to unite against their common oppressors) by enlisting poor English 
farmers or laborers in slave patrols.  According to Martinot (p. 409):  
The patrols rapidly developed into a system of gratuitous violence.  Its members vented 
on the slaves their frustrations with the elite and gained social approbation for 
suppressing supposed rebellion.  Thus, the patrols perpetrated a culture of terror, 
producing a sense of social threat to be located in the slave labor force. … The violence 
of the patrols made their fear real, while generating a sense of well-being and self-
justification toward slavery within their own social solidarity [among wealthy and poor 
English].  Thus, a paranoia (as a self-induced fear generated by their own injustice) 
produced a demand for solidarity; social solidarity generated gratuitous violence; and 
the violence rationalized the solidarity by giving the paranoia concreteness. 
On the political and economic insecurity or anxiety of dominating groups who have removed 
themselves from direct production, and thus depend upon the labor of others, in general, also see 
Diamond, p. 8; Deloria, 1969, pp. 175-76; Keal, p. 64 (the discovery of America “unsettled 
[European] conceptions of ‘knowledge’”). 
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2003: 59, 60; Drinnon, 1990: xxiii).  These interests were, of course, the conquer, plunder, and 
pillage of the natural resources of these communities, as well as the torture, rape, and murder of 
all who got in the way of this and (in South America and the Caribbean, at least) the enslavement 
of anyone who survived –all in order to feed a compulsive greed and insatiable appetite for 
status, wealth and power (Drinnon, 1990: xxv, 25-26, 56-57; Forbes, 2008: 81; Stannard, 
1992).366
     In many ways, Native societies in the Americas resembled the polar opposite of European 
society.  Though there were a few empires in the south, the vast majority of Native societies in 
the Americas were egalitarian societies run as participatory democracies in which leaders were 
truly chosen and expected to serve the people, and the people “made sure that their leaders 
remained essentially powerless” (Stannard, 1992: 48, 110; Williams, 1982: 13 33; Akwesasne 
Notes, 2005: 34; Diamond, 1974: 9, 12).
 
367
                                                 
366 “The quest of many Europeans to penetrate, subdue, and change the natural world must be 
viewed in part as a psychological phenomenon—that is, as a need fulfillment or compulsion 
which is non-national or irrational in character” (Forbes, 2008: 81).  Drinnon (1990: xxv, 25-26; 
56; ) suggests that the European invader’s own sadistic compulsions (resulting from the extreme 
repression of their own desires and traumas) were also at play in these compulsive, 
psychopathological actions.  Remarking on a massacre of hundreds of Pequots by English 
colonists, for example, he finds that their “suppressed sexuality at last broke out and found vent 
in an orgy of violence.  Like men in a dream, they burned and shot the flesh they so feared and 
hated in themselves: the breaking of the dam filled them with delight, their mouths with laughter, 
their tongues with singing” and were likely to “become addicts, vengeance junkies” of such 
slaughters.   
  For example, Jean De Lery, Calvinist missionary, in 
the Amazon basin in 1550, remarked on the various egalitarian societies: “They have neither 
367 In the cited passage, Stannard is writing primarily about Native societies in South America, 
particularly the large societies of the Amazon Basin, while Williams (1983: 13) wrote more 
specifically about the “intensely democratic” nature of “societies of the Indian nations of 
Northeastern North America.” Akwesasne Notes focuses primarily on the participatory 
democracy of the Haudenosaunee, while Diamond wrote more generally that numerous scholars 
have observed that indigenous (“primitive”) societies are highly democratic.  See also, Canada 
Senate (2010) and the section on self-determination at the end of chapter 1 for more sources 
relating to the highly democratic nature of indigenous societies in past and present-day Canada. 
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kings nor princes and consequently each is more or less as much a great lord as the other” 
(quoted in Stannard, 1992: 47) and Paul Williams (1982) has made similar observations on the 
governance structures of Native societies in northeastern North America:  
The “royaner” of the Iroquois Confederacy and the “ogimah” of the Ojibways 
were servants of their people, leaders by example, whose positions brought them 
duties rather than powers.  They were not “princes” or “chiefs” in the European 
sense, and had as little power over their people, and as little ability to enforce 
obedience, as parents in their nations had over their children. (P. 12, see also 
33)368
 
   
In fact, becoming a chief, or a servant of the people, in many Native societies was often seen as a 
hardship, with chiefs giving away personal property, and saying that they had been made poor by 
accepting their title. Williams (1982) again remarks on this characteristic among the Ojibway 
chiefs, which could be equally applied to chiefs of many other Native nations throughout the 
Americas:  
It was because he had placed himself in a position where personal gain was 
irrelevant to him that he was trusted with the allocation of lands (among 




                                                 
368 More on parent-children relationships in these respective societies can be found below. 
369 Similarly, in Haudenosaunee society, women elders nominated chiefs (which were approved 
by their clans) from among the men they had observed for years, as children and adults, and 
nominated those who demonstrated characteristics of placing the interests of society above his 
own, of striving for peace, and so forth (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38, 32-35; Stannard, 1992: 29; 
Williams, 1982: 27).  The latter source further provides a quote, from a compilation of European 
observations on Native societies: 
The Chief of a nation is neither a supreme ruler, monarch or potentate.  He can neither 
make war or peace, leagues or treaties.  He cannot impress soldiers, or dispose of 
magazines.  He cannot adjourn, prorogue or dissolve a general assembly, nor can he 
refuse his assent to their conclusions, or in any manner controul them.  … The chief of a 
nation, even with the consent of his assembly, cannot raise one shilling of tax of the 
citizens, but only receive what they please to give as free and voluntary donations.  The 
chief of a nation has to hunt for his living, like any other citizen. (Williams, 1982: 12, 
quoting from: Loudon, Archibald, (ed). 1808. A Selection of Some of the Most 
Interesting Outrages Committed by the Indians in the Wars with the White People. New 
York: Arno Press & N.Y. Times, 1971, p. 239). 
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     Perhaps the vast majority of Native societies in the Americas were governed on the basis of 
consent, not coercion or even the principle of majority rule (Stannard, 1992: 47, 48; Williams, 
1982: 33, 12-15, 55, 58; Lyons, 1992: 39, 32; Canada Seneate, 2010: 32). The councils of the 
Ojibway and Haudenosaunee peoples sought consensus and unity of mind through the 
participation of all people --men and women, young and old alike—and unity of mind, both of 
which required considerable amounts of time and diplomacy (Williams, 1982: 14 and note 10, 
and 33; Lyons, 1992: 39, 34; Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34).370
                                                 
370 The former source notes that in Anishinabek society, “[a]ll men and women past puberty were 
included in the open discussions of the … council” (p. 14, note 10), while Akwesasne Notes 
(2005: 34) notes that in Haudenosaunee society: “Everyone in the Six Nations, wherever the law 
prevails, has direct participation in the workings of the government.” 
   As such, the governing councils 
of both nations proceeded with the attitude that “there is always time in this world to do things in 
the proper way” and with “enough deliberate thought” In other words, decisions did not have to 
be arrived at immediately, and there was always time to accommodate the needs of the minority 
in order to achieve unity of mind and singularity of purpose (Williams, 1982: 15, 55-56).  
Because chiefs (and, in Haudenosaunee society, clan mothers) did not have coercive powers and 
did not seek to command people to do anything, and because society sought to simultaneously 
cultivate in every person individual autonomy and communal generosity, decisions of the council 
were put off in cases where consensus could not be reached, and even when consensus was 
reached, council decisions could not be completely binding on individuals or dissenting groups 
without their consent (Williams, 1982: 12-14, 33,; Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Stannard, 1992: 29, 109-
10; Diamond, 1974: 47). Each person had a choice as to whether or not to conduct him/herself in 
accordance with the decision, and though each might also face some degree of pressure from 
family and community members to abide by consensus-based decisions, the “council’s decision, 
as a rule, avoided any form of interference in the personal affairs of individual citizens, just as 
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parents avoided uninvited interference in the activities of their children” (Williams, 1984: 14; 
Porter, 2008: 47).371
The Iroquois laugh when you talk to them of obedience to kings: for they cannot 
reconcile the idea of submission with the dignity of man.  Each individual is 
sovereign in his own mind; and as he conceives he derives his freedom from the 
Great Spirit alone, he cannot be induced to acknowledge any other power. 
(Williams, 1982: 14). 
 This observation is further emphasized in one colonial official’s remarks on 
Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) society: 
 
     As such, many of the diverse, egalitarian, democratic and even consensus-based societies in 
the Americas had no police force, jails or other organs of government coercion (Williams, 
1982:12-15, 33; Lyons, 1992: 32, 39; Forbes, 2008: 46) and some, like the Haudenosaunee, had 
reportedly eliminated all forms of capital punishment (Stannard, 1992: 28-29). 372
                                                 
371 The Haudenosaunee principle of personal autonomy and non-interference can be further 
illustrated in a modern day example of abortion. As Porter (2008: 47) has noted, for the 
Haudenosaunee, all life is sacred, and the taking of life –especially life of the young—goes 
against the Great Law of Peace.  But so does the act of preventing another person from making 
his/her own choices in life: 
 Many Native 
societies also had no word for “freedom” since, as Diamond (1974) noted, “freedom as a concept 
does not exist in [indigenous/land-based] society because society is not perceived as oppressive” 
(p. 17).  Many also had no words for rape or sexual assault, since such actions “were so unheard 
So you know right there that all Iroquois are against abortions.  It’s not permitted.  But 
on the other hand, there are medicines that grow that can cause abortions.  Well, we still 
know about these medicines.  So it’s up to you and me as individuals what our choice 
is, whether we want to be a killer or not.  So as an Iroquois, I’m on the for-life side, and 
I’m also on the other one that’s for abortions—although I will never do an abortion—
because that person has to have the freedom to make that choice.  So I’m on both sides, 
100 percent. Iroquois cannot be otherwise, ‘cause you can’t take away someone’s 
freedom or their decision to choose whatever route they want to take. 
372 “Indians maintained a fairly stable and violence-free society even though they had no police 
or state organs of coercion. In fact, freedom from coercion was one of the characteristics of 
Iroquois society that most impressed the European mind. It affirmed a growing belief among 
Americans that coercion was not, as it had been presented to them, a necessary service 
performed by the state to protect the people, but instead was a tool used by the state to control 
people” (Lyons, 1992: 32).   
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of” (McAdams, 2012a & 2012b). In fact, in many of these egalitarian societies, women had 
strong roles and voices in government --acting as the law keepers in Cree society, similar to the 
European judiciary (McAdams, Sylvia, 2011), and as leaders and titleholders of the land in 
matrifocal, matrilineal and matriarchal Haudenosaunee society (Woo, 2003; Stannard, 1992: 28, 
29; Williams, 1982: 16, 27, 25, 23; Akwesasne Notes, 2005; Lyons, 1992; Taylor, 2006; 
Johnson, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008).373
     Thus, while perhaps the vast majority of these societies had no coercive forces, and had 
governments that actively strove to “interfere as little as possible in the lives of their 
citizens”(Williams, 1982: 33), these societies experienced very little crime, and maintained 
themselves as “fairly stable and violence-free” societies (Lyons, 1992: 32; McAdams, 2012b).  
In large part, this is because these coercion-free societies were highly structured through 
elaborate systems of law founded not upon statutes written by the wealthy and/or powerful, but 
upon principles of peace and moral justice (McAdams, 2012a & 2012b; Lyons, 1992: 33-34).  
Under the laws of most Native societies throughout the Americas, one of the most basic and 
fundamental aspects of any system of law was the recognition that ‘all are related’ --i.e, that 
people are all related to each other and to all other forms of life (MCAdams, 2012a; Akwesasne 
Notes, 2005: 33, 85-91; Black Elk, 1983: 148, 153; Forbes, 2008: 22, 15; Means, 1983: 21-22; 
   
                                                 
373 Stannard (1992: 28-29) further elaborates, noting that Haudenosaunee society is matrilineal; 
that women are progenitors of the nation; that men and women follow the status of the mother; 
that women owned [are titleholders to] the land and soil; that women head agricultural 
production and distribution, as well as life in the longhouse; that women appoint chiefs who were 
responsible for hunting, fighting and intertribal/international affairs; that women could veto the 
decisions of the chiefs or remove chiefs from their positions, and so forth. While many European 
observers were unable to comprehend the power of women in Haudenosaunee society, some 
remarked upon it, such as Father Joseph Francis Lafitau, who noted that the chiefs seemed to 
“serve only to represent and aid the women in matters in which decorum does not permit the 
latter to appear or act” (quoted in Bonaparte, 2008).  Thanks to Barbara Mann for also pointing 
out this source: Mann, Barbara Alice. 2000. Iroquoian Women: The Gontowisas. New York; 
Lang Publishing, 115-82. 
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Porter, 2008: 339, 102; LaDuke, 1999).374 As such, all people and all living things have a right to 
the things they need for survival. Nothing belongs to human beings, and human beings have to 
measure their actions by the impact they will have not only on other people in the present, but 
also upon the past and future generations of all living things (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33; 
McAdams, 2012a; Williams, 1982: 14-15, 55).375
     The Haudenosaunee, in particular, lived (and traditional Haudenosaunee continue to live) 
under a system of governance founded specifically on the idea that the Maker of Life (or 
Creator) could not have intended for human beings to destroy life by killing each other 
unnecessarily, and that healthy minds always desire peace (Lyons, 1992: 33-39; Akwesasne 
Notes, 2005: 32-39; Forbes, 2008: 22).
 
376
                                                 
374 For example, Black Elk (1983) notes that: “Alienation is an impossibility within traditional 
Lakota culture; we are prevented, by the way we view reality, from taking those steps which 
would, sooner or later, produce the condition of alienation. Thus we are prevented, directly and 
concretely, from undertaking alienating and self-destructive steps such as industrialization” (p. 
153).  Porter (2008) similarly notes that for the Haudenosaunee, despiritualizing politics, or 
anything else, is a crime: “The minute you take spirit out of anything, you have already defeated 
yourself”(p. 339). 
 The purpose of government is to cultivate “a 
spiritually healthy society” and to establish peace by preventing the abuse of human beings and 
safeguarding the rights of everyone (and of other living things) (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33). To 
this end, the government and the society actively worked to eliminate “the causes of conflict 
375 “[T]he creation is intended for the benefit of all equally –even the birds, animals, trees, and 
insects, as well as the humans.  The world does not belong to the humans –it is the rightful 
property of the Great Creator. The gifts and benefits of the world, therefore, belong to all 
equally.  The things that humans need for survival—food, clothing, shelter, protection—are 
things to which all are entitled because they are gifts of the Great Creator. … Therefore all 
people have a right to the things they need for survival… and no person or people has a right to 
deprive others of the fruits of those gifts” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33).  
376 Forbes (2008: 22) writes of the similar observation from other Native societies that “[s]anity 
or healthy normality among humans and other living creatures involves a respect for other forms 
of life and other individuals.” 
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between individuals and between peoples” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34).377
     The diplomacy and values of the Haudenosaunee, certainly sophisticated beyond much of 
what is visible in the world today, were not unusual to Native societies in the Americas at the 
time of the European invasion.  For perhaps most of the thousands of vastly diverse Native 
 Under this cultural 
worldview, not only are all living things entitled to what they needed to survive, but everything 
is a gift from the creator, nothing belongs to human beings, no one has the right to deprive others 
of what they need to survive, “no one has a right to a greater share of wealth of society than 
anyone else,” and all members of society have an active responsibility to defend others against 
abuses of their rights (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Lyons, 1992: 32-39).  Because of this 
outlook, and its emphasis on peace, the Haudenosaunee also have numerous rules regarding war 
and peace: including that force should be used only as a last resort, to repel an attack, and wars 
should be carried on until the opponent agrees to peace –which it has an absolute right to do at 
any time by calling truce (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 37; Lyons, 1992: 37).  At the end of 
hostilities, the Haudenosaunee’s Great Law of Peace (or Kaia’nereko:wa in the Mohawk/ 
Kanien’keha language) also stipulated that the Haudenosaunee would not impose their way of 
life upon any peoples defeated in war, would not seize their territory, and would not “collect 
tribute from them nor subject them to any form of injustice” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 37; 
Lyons, 1992: 37). Instead, the Haudenosaunee would merely demand that all weapons of war be 
put away and that the two parties enter into negotiations for the purpose of finding agreeable 
terms to lasting peace.  
                                                 
377 The Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace “was conceived prior to the appearance of classes, 
and it sought to anticipate and eliminate anything that took the appearance of group or class 
interests, even in the form of clan or tribal interests, especially in the area of 
property”(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). 
 250 
societies throughout the Americas378 (including the large, hierarchical empires), warfare was 
highly ritualized: missions of peace were not attacked, it was considered cowardly to fight a 
weakened enemy, and intentions for war were announced in advance, along with the reasons for 
war, so that the offending party could usually avoid war by making satisfaction for the injury 
done (Stannard, 1992: 110, 78, 51-52; Mohawk, 2000: 121; Forbes, 2008: 77-78; Todorov, 1982; 
Keal, 2003: 60-61).379 Wars were often fought in response to a personal insult or to inter-tribal 
violence and were expected to last only a few days and to conclude in defeat, but not annihilation 
of the opponent (Stannard, 1992: 53, 78, 109-110; Mohawk, 2000: 121, 130). Throughout much 
of the American continents, it was generally expected that opponents adhered to the same rules 
of war (Mohawk, 2000:121). When wars were not avoided, the ultimate goal of warfare was to 
demonstrate bravery, skill and honor beyond what one’s opponent could demonstrate, leading to 
symbolic ascendancy for the group.  The highest form of this bravery was not to kill an 
opponent, but to touch him without hurting him (Stannard, 1992: 109-110, 53; Diamond, 1974: 
111; McAdams, 2012a).380
                                                 
378 Stannard (1992: 31) notes that in the early 1990s there were known to be at least 800 separate 
nations in North America alone.  Certainly there were many, many more than this before the start 
of the last 500 years of genocide and colonialism. 
 Large-scale battles, protracted warfare, wars for conquest, the 
379 The exception to this was war by large empires like the Mexica for obtaining captives for 
human sacrifice. These wars were also highly ritualized, and could only be undertaken at certain 
times of the year and under certain circumstances (Mohawk, 2000: 121).  As horrifying as 
warfare for human sacrifice is to modern day westerners, the slaughter of entire villages 
including men, women, children and elders, and the horrifying atrocities committed during these 
murderous rampages (such as feeding children alive to dogs, disemboweling living people in 
contests to see whose sword was the sharpest, raping women and cutting off their breasts or 
severing legs, hands, feet, noses, ears and other body parts from living human beings, and 
enslaving all survivors under conditions so harsh that few were able to survive them for more 
than a few years were all, perhaps, incalculably more terrifying to Native peoples who 
encountered these activities, and destroyed far more people in a far shorter period of time. 
380 Touching the enemy “with something held in the hand or with a part of the person was the 
bravest act that could be performed …  [This was known as] to count coup on—to touch or 
strike—a living unhurt man and to leave him alive, and this was frequently done…. It was 
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annihilation of one’s enemy or the harming of noncomattants were all unheard of and unknown 
objectives among Native societies prior to the arrival of Europeans (Stannard, 1992: 29, 78, 109-
10).381
     The peaceable and non-coercive values of perhaps the vast majority of Native societies 
throughout the Americas were reflected in virtually all other aspects of life, as well. Just as 
governments in northeastern North America (and beyond) avoided uninvited interference in the 
affairs of its individual citizens, so, too did parents avoid uninvited interference in the affairs of 
their children (Williams, 1982: 12, 14). Even when their children misbehaved, hitting or kicking 
their them, parents might, at most, as one missionary commented, “toss a little water in the 




“lest the martial disposition which is to adorn their future life and character, 
should be weakened; on all occasions they avoid anything compulsive, that the 
freedom with which they wish them to think and act should not be controuled.” 
(Williams, 1982: 11, 53)
 Another observer similarly noted parent’s concerns with promoting independence, 
not conformity, and thus the lack of beating or scolding of children in Haudenosaunee and 
Ojibway societies  
383
 
   
While these societies sought to inculcate an unshakable independence in thought and action 
among their children, they also taught communal generosity, pride, honour and avoidance of 
                                                                                                                                                             
regarded as an evidence of bravery for a man to go into battle carrying no weapon that would do 
any harm at a distance … and the bravest thing of all was to go into a fight with nothing more 
than a whip, or a long twig—sometimes called a coup stick” (George Bird Grinnell, quoted in 
Stannard, 1992: 109-10). 
381 However, Lyons (1992: 33) notes that, after the start of the European invasion, there were 
times that the Haudenosaunee did engage in some wars of conquest, and in other ways follow 
their ideals of peace imperfectly. 
382 Stannard is quoting Jesuit Pierre de Charlevoix in his writings on his travels through New 
York, Michigan and eastern Canada.  Charlevoix further noted that only the Christianized 
Indians, or Indians in settled colonies were known to chastise their children. 
383 Williams, is quoting James Long, and also citing Father Louis Hennepin.   
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shame through these non-coercive techniques with considerable success (Stananrd, 1992: 29-
30).384
     These values of communal generosity, individual independence, and moral justice were also 
reflected in societal life, where people had few material wants and daily enacted their values that 
all of creation was to be respected and shared among each other (and other life forms), and none 
were to be deprived of what they needed to live Stananrd, 1992: 48, 110; Means, 1983: 22; 
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34). The result of these values was a generosity among these Native 
societies that was remarked upon repeatedly by the shocked and astounded Europeans who 
arrived at the beginning of the invasion of the continents.  As Columbus noted of the people 
upon his arrival in Cuba:  
 
[T]hey are so artless and free with all they possess, that no one  would believe it 
without having seen it.  Of anything they have, if you ask them for it, they never 
say no; rather they invite the person to share it, and show as much love as if they 
were giving their hearts; and whether the thing be of value or of small price, at 
once they are content with whatever little things of whatever kind may be given to 
them. (Stananard, 1992: 63, see also: 52; Forbes, 2008: 21-22) 
 
Similarly, Vespucci in South America noted in 1502 that the people living along the coast 
“swarmed out to receive us … with as much confidence as if we had been friends for years,” and 
Cartier in northern North America was likewise greeted upon his arrival in 1535 by people who 
“freely and familiarly came to our boats without any fear, as if we had ever been brought up 
together” (Stannard, 1992: 52).  Others remarked upon the “fairness and dignity and self-control” 
of the Native peoples in the Americas, and Jesuit Joseph Francois Lafitau noted with some 
astonishment that: 
If a cabin of hungry people meets another whose provisions are not entirely 
exhausted, the latter share with the newcomers the little which remains to them 
                                                 
384 Stannard further notes the amazement of the Jesuits in how successful Native societies were 
in raising model individuals through these techniques. 
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without waiting to be asked, although they expose themselves thereby to the same 
danger of perishing as those whom they help at their own expense so humanely 
and with such greatness of soul.  In Europe we should find few [people] disposed, 
in like cases, to a liberality so noble and magnificent. (quoted in Stannard, 1992: 
31) 
 
     Because sharing with all even in times of need was a part of the fabric of the majority –if not 
all-- of Native societies in the Americas, the first Europeans found societies of abundance, not 
need. As Stannard (1992: 11, 67, 52-54) notes, despite the European’s self-image of being 
technologically and societally superiority, the food production, health, and life expectancy of 
Native peoples in the Americas at the start of the European invasion all far surpassed anything 
known to Europeans. So, too, did the apparent (and inordinate, from the European perspective) 
contentment and happiness of Native peoples, who lived in abundance, ordered by laws or moral 
justice and principles of individual liberty, so much so that difference was not feared but 
expected, encouraged and accepted (Stananrd, 1992: 47; Forbes, 2008: 56).  In other words, there 
was a “kind of thinking, respect for another’s life [that] is based ultimately upon humility and the 
sense of relatedness and equality of all creatures (but not equality equals sameness). Democracy 
can only exist with such a philosophy” (Forbes, 2008: 56) 
 
HEATLHY SOCIETIES WITHOUT PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 
Referring back to the above discussion on Native societies in the Americas, and the discussion in 
the previous chapter on problematic patterns in the western cultural worldview, it is abundantly 
clear that Native societies in the Americas stood in stark contrast to the societies of Western 
Europe in virtually ever way.  Most importantly, for the purposes of this discussion, Native 
societies in the Americas displayed virtually none of the problematic patterns of behavior that 
compose the western cultural worldview.  The following discussion will seek to address each of 
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these problematic patterns of thought and behavior discussed in chapter 2, by contrasting the 
very different patterns of thought and behavior in Native societies.385
     The vast majority of Native societies were non-hierarchical societies based not on the forcible 
imposition of obedience and law, but on the consent of the governed. Thus, most of these 
societies were built not upon social relations of domination like those experienced in European 
society, but upon principles of equality (but not, as Jack Forbes notes, “equality equals 
sameness”), participatory governance and consent of the governed. As noted above, some of 
these societies, such as the Haudenosaunee, actively worked to prevent the formation of any sort 
of divisions or points of conflict in their societies, including that of class or group interests, and 
“especially in the area of property”(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 34).  By eliminating the causes of 
conflict between individuals and peoples, they also eliminated the possibility of the development 
of groups of people who could or would oppress others.  In this way, many Native societies 
could arguably be said to have prohibited all forms of domination (which many traditional 
Native communities continue to strive to prohibit today). Societies such as the Haudenosaunee 
were built in clear opposition to such domination, and around the moral principle that peace was 
only achieved by the constant, active striving to end all forms of oppression and to achieve 
absolute justice for everyone (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-40; Lyons, 1992: 32, 34, 39; Stannard, 
1992: 47, 48, 110; Williams, 1982: 12-14, 25, 33, 53-58; McAdams, 2012a, 2012b & 2011.  See 
also: Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008; Porter, 2008). 
   
     Because, the vast majority of Native societies in the Americas lacked hierarchies of special 
class or group interests, and governed on the basis of consent rather than coercion, these societies 
                                                 
385 Admittedly, this means that the below section will be somewhat repetitious of the above 
section.  The material in this chapter was initially intended to be included in a fuller discussion –
and a more detailed comparison and contrast, in chapter 2.  But for now, it will have to be left 
here, in this form. 
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never developed the dualistic mentality of separation and isolation that had become so deeply 
entrenched in the Western worldview once social relations of domination had become a mainstay 
of Western culture.  In fact, an integral part of the cultural worldview of virtually all of the 
Native societies in the Americas –and a worldview common to traditional indigenous societies 
worldwide— is the understanding that everyone and everything is related (as the Lakota say, 
Mitakuye Oyasin: we are all related). This way of viewing the world precluded (and precludes) 
the formation of a mentality of separation from others –and thus precluded (and precludes) the 
formation of a mentality of exploitation of other people or life forms, or a mentality of 
accumulating for oneself at the expense of other people and/or other living things (Forbes, 2008: 
80-81; Black Elk, 1983: 153; Deloria, 1969: 185).386  Instead, as noted in the above section, this 
egalitarian, pro-life mentality held that all people and all living things have a right to that which 
they need to live, that no one has a right to deprive another person, and that none should ever 
take more than is needed.387
                                                 
386 “[T]he Lakota could despise no creature, for all were of one blood. He knew that man’s heart, 
away from nature, becomes hard; he knew that lack of respect for growing living things soon led 
to lack of respect for humans, too.” (Forbes, 2008: 80-81). See also p. 12: 
   
The animal had rights—the right of man’s protection, the right to live, the right to 
multiply, the right to freedom, and the right to man’s indebtedness … the Lakota never 
enslaved the animal, and spared all life that was not needed for food and clothing. 
(quoting Luther Standing Bear) 
387 Westerners, particularly environmental or animal rights groups, often confuse this respect for 
all life with a requirement that all adhere to a strict vegetarian diet, but this view fails to 
comprehend the full interrelatedness of all life, and the weakness and dependence of humans 
upon animals in numerous ways, including for food.  Rather than refrain from eating animals, 
traditional indigenous societies worldwide abide by traditional laws regarding when and under 
what circumstances and animal can be killed for food, prohibitions regarding the wasting of any 
edible part of an animal that is killed, and rules requiring ritualized respect be paid, and prayers 
of thanks be given to all animals for the sacrifice of those who are killed, etc.  See, for example, 
Forbes (2008: 11): 
Native Americans and many other “folk” peoples have struggled long and hard with the 
contradiction inherent in eating other living creatures.  Very simply, Native philosophy, 
based upon the recognition that all living creatures are brothers and sisters, came to the 
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     In addition, for Native societies in the Americas, as well as traditional indigenous societies 
worldwide, spirituality is not something that can be separated from other aspects of life; to do so 
--as Western culture has done in virtually every aspect of life-- would be a crime, since all parts 
of creation contain spiritual force and must be treated with respect and as part of the circle of 
everything that is related (Porter, 2008: 339, 102; Means, 1983: 19-33; McAdams, 2012a; 
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 85-91; Smithsonian, Protocols of Peace, 2012).388  In this way, 
spirituality was (and is) a deeply embedded part of daily life in Native societies, and is 
inseparable from the complex systems of law and principles of moral justice that structure 
thought and behavior in these societies (Forbes, 2008: 15). Spirituality, then, is not about a 
separate set of beliefs that are picked up once a week for a few hours, but about a way of 
thinking and being in the world; it is about what one does in one’s life.389
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusion that killing and eating, while unavoidable, can be done in such a way as to 
make it less ugly and less brutalizing.  As Juan Matus says, “we must be on good terms 
with all the living things of the world.  This is the reason why we must talk to plants we 
are about to kill and apologize for hurting them; the same thing must be done with the 
animals we are going to hurt.” 
  And what people are 
388 “Spiritual, social, economic, and political life are interwoven; one without the other is not 
considered whole or complete. (The spiritual and political are inseparable)”(Porter, 2008: 102).  
Further, the Haudenosaunee, among other traditional Native societies throughout the Americas, 
believe that “every living thing and every part of creation contains a spiritual force” --suggesting 
that people must be mindful of their actions in relation to everything around them, not just 
people, and not just “living things,” but everything, because everything has a spiritual force. 
(Smithsonian, Protocols of Peace, 2012). This belief, known to the Haudenosaunee as orenda, 
has also been recognized by some western scholars, such as Sheldrake et. al., (2001: 102, 101) 
who refer to it as the Hermetic tradition, which recognizes that “everything has a soul and souls 
are permanent.  Their occupation as animals or rocks or trees is temporary.” 
389 Forbes (2008) notes:  
Religion is, in reality, living.  Our religion is not what we profess, or what we say, or 
what we proclaim; our religion is what we do, what we desire, what we seek, what we 
dream about, what we fantasize, what we think---all of these things—twenty-four hours 
a day.  One’s religion, then, is ones life, not merely the ideal life but the life as it is 
actually lived.  
   Religion is not prayer, it is not a church, it is not theistic, it is not atheistic, it has little 
to do with what white people call “religion.” It is our every act.  If we tromp on a bug, 
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socialized to do in these traditional Native/indigenous societies is to walk the “pollen path,” or 
the “good, red road,” or to maintain the “good mind,” as the Navajo, Lakota and Haudenosaunee, 
respectively, refer to “living life in a sacred manner with continual awareness of the inter-
relationship of all forms of life” and all of creation (Forbes, 2008:22). Some have suggested that 
this inseparability of spirituality from everything else might explain why most Native societies in 
the Americas have no word for “religion.” As Jack Forbes (2008: 15) notes, “it may be that a 
word for religion is never needed until a people no longer have it.”  
     All of this does not mean that Native societies in the Americas never differentiated between 
members of their own societies, or between their own societies and other Native societies.  Just 
as in any society, there were (are) different roles that must be filled and that require the 
acceptance of different levels of responsibility.  Though Native societies were run on the basis of 
consent of the governed, many (if not all) of them had some form of government.  But service in 
government was an extra responsibility, and did not relieve a person from his responsibilities of 
hunting for a living to feed his family (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 38; Stannard, 1992: 48; 
Williams, 1982: 12).390
                                                                                                                                                             
that is our religion; if we experiment on living animals, that is our religion; if we cheat 
at cards, that is our religion; if we dream of being famous, that is our religion; if we 
gossip maliciously, that is our religion; if we are rude and aggressive, that is our 
religion.  All that we do, and are, is our religion. (P. 15) 
  In fact, as noted, such service was often considered a hardship, though 
an honorable one, since chiefs often gave away their personal possessions and were expected to 
place themselves in a position where material gain was irrelevant to them.  Their service often 
impoverished them in the interest of their people, rather than enriched them at the expense of 
their people. 
390 “The chief of a nation has to hunt for his living, like any other citizen” and cannot raise taxes 
or make decisions on his own, since he is a servant of the people, or a conduit for their voice 
(Williams, 1982: 12).  
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     There were also distinctions between young and old, women and men; and many of these 
distinctions came with separate sets of responsibilities.  For example, even in societies where 
women and men shared equally in governance, decision-making and/or running the activities of 
daily life, there were still, necessarily, recognized differences between men and women, and 
even different responsibilities attributed to each group. In matrilineal, matrilocal, and matriarchal 
Haudenosaunee society,391
                                                 
391 Some, such as Barbara Mann, prefer the term matriarchal.  Here I am also using the two terms 
that were used by speakers in the Smithsonian’s Protocols of Peace (2012) event.  Barbara Mann 
has suggested that interested readers consult her own book on Iroquoian Women, cited in an 
above note. 
 men were responsible for hunting, fighting in wars, and conducting 
deliberations between nations as chiefs, while women were in charge of agriculture and the 
distribution of food, the continuation of the culture, the running of local life in the 
village/longhouse, the selection of the chiefs and making all decisions relating to land. Because 
Haudenosaunee society was (is) matrilocal, matrilineal, and matriarchal, women actually had 
more power than men in many respects, overseeing the deliberations of chiefs; vetoing decisions 
made by chiefs, if necessary; determining the location of villages; deciding when to go to war 
and when to have peace; and even removing chiefs from office (referred to as dehorning the 
chiefs) if they failed to act in accordance with the will of the people.  But though Haudenosaunee 
women had more responsibilities and influence in their society, they used their power not to 
dominate men, but to ensure the equal exercise and sharing of power between men and women 
(Williams, 1982: 14, 16, 25-27, 33; Woo, 2003; Stannard, 1992: 28, 29; Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 
38; Proter, 2008: 115. See also: Lyons, 1992; Taylor, 2006; Johnston, 1964; Bonaparte, 2008). 
Thus, despite these distinctions and differences in roles and responsibilities among different (but 
equal) groups of people in Native societies, the cultural worldview that all things are interrelated, 
and that spirituality is inseparable from their daily lives, prevented the formation of anything 
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approximating the extreme, artificial, conceptual separations observed in Western culture 
between man and women, human and animal or nature, Christian and non-Christian (or eastern 
Christians), and man and his Church, religion, God, and parts of himself.  In fact, as already 
noted, the Native cultural worldview absolutely prohibited the forms of separation that have 
allowed Western men to mentally and spiritually justify their oppression and exploitation of 
other people and living things.  The Native worldview also prohibited the formation of any 
concept of isolation and alienation of oneself from other human beings, from other living things, 
from the Creator, or from him/herself (Black Elk, 1983; Means, 1983; Porter, 2008: 176; Forbes, 
2008).392
     Because they lacked this alienation and dualist separation, traditional Native societies in the 
Americas also lacked Western society’s concepts of universalistic domination, intolerance, and 
rejection.  Quite the contrary, individual difference was (and is) not only accepted, but expected 
and encouraged.  As Jack Forbes (2008) notes, the Creator has made all people, animals, and 
things of a kind different for a purpose: 
 
Animals and plants are taught by Wakan tanka what they are to do.  Wakan tanka 
teaches the birds to make nests, yet the nests of all birds are not alike.  Wakan 
tanka gives them merely the outline… All birds, even those of the same species, 
are not alike, and it is the same with animals and human beings.  The reason 
Wakan tanka does not make two birds, or animals or human beings exactly alike 
is because each is placed here by Wakan tanka to be an independent individuality 
and to rely on itself. (Pp. 55-56, quoting a Teton Sioux elder) 
 
                                                 
392 Porter (2008: 176) notes that in both Native and Western worldviews there is a force that 
makes things good for human beings and a force that makes things difficult.  But in the Western 
worldview the latter is considered “evil” and an enemy to be hated. Meanwhile in the 
Haudenosaunee worldview, each force controls half of the world, and each force is within each 
of us, so making enemies with the more difficult half of the world’s power would be absurd and 
rather unintelligent.  Instead, this latter force is considered mischievous, something to be 
watched and balanced: “So, it’s not evil, its just mischievous.  You’ve just gotta be careful. It’s 
like when your kids are teenagers: you have to be extra alert at that time.  And it’s not that 
they’re bad.  It’s just the fact that if you aren’t alert, the consequences are big.” 
 260 
The same difference and diversity that was expected and encouraged among individuals was also 
expected and accepted between societies.  Thus, as noted above, societies such as the 
Haudenosaunee had strict laws prohibiting the imposition of Haudenosaunee beliefs upon other 
peoples, even when these peoples were aggressors who had been conquered in war.  These same 
ideas of independence, autonomy and accepted difference were present among Native societies 
throughout much of the Americas (Stannard, 1992: 30, 47, 52, 63; Williams, 1982: 15, 33, 53-58; 
Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Lyons, 1992: 34; Diamond, 1974: 24-25), and were reflected in 
–among other things—the polite acceptance of European missionary prostelytizing along with 
the simultaneous rejection of conformity to Christianity. As such, the western belief that Native 
societies should submit to European kings and convert and conform to European religion might 
have been almost as incomprehensible to Native societies as their refusal was to European 
conquerors –a refusal that was fairly consistent among those Native societies with which 
European conquerors came into contact (Stannard, 1992; Mohawk, 2000).393  Examples of this 
refusal abound. When told by European missionaries that they had never worshiped the Great 
Spirit correctly, Haudenosaunee Chiefs responded that their Creator “has made so great a 
difference between us in other things; why may we not conclude that He has given us a different 
religion according to our understanding?” (Williams, 1982: 57).394
                                                 
393 Though, to be accurate, very little effort was made among early Spanish and English 
explorers to actually convert Native peoples, while much more effort was made to dominate, 
massacre, enslave and/or dispossess them by whatever means were possible –religion becoming 
merely a symbolic justification (Canny, 1979 & 1973; Mohawk, 2000; stannard, 1992).  This 
point will be returned to in chapter 5. 
  Similarly, John Mohawk 
394 The same source notes that the chiefs further added, perhaps sarcastically: “We are told that 
you have been preaching to the white people in this place.  These people are our neighbours.  We 
are acquainted with them.  We will wait a little while, and see what effect your preaching has 
upon them…”.  
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(2000) remarks on Cortez’ attempts to impose Christianity upon the Mexica (Aztec) Emperor 
and people: 
When Cortes had urged Moctezuma to embrace Christianity and abandon 
indigenous practices, the emperor replied that the religion of the Spaniards would 
not be appropriate to his people.  It would not have occurred to the Christian West 
to discuss such an idea, since the Christian utopian enterprise was founded on the 
belief that there could be only on Truth, one right way. (P. 137) 
 
     These concepts of monotheistic intolerance and domination simply did not have a place in the 
Native worldview, making the Christian religion, at least in the form it was practiced among 
Europeans in the late Middle Ages,395
                                                 
395 However, the Christian religion as it was originally founded, according to records of the 
words and behavior of Christ, may well have been compatible with the cultural worldview of 
many Native societies in the Americas. Some have even mistaken similarities between the two 
religio-cultural worldviews as demonstrative not of universal principles of moral justice common 
to all of humanity, but instead, of Christian origins of some Native spiritual worldviews (Wise, 
1971: 52-69, x).  However, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, under the Great Law of Peace was 
established long before the start of the European invasion of the Ameircas (Vachon, 1993; 
Porter, 2006; Mann & Fields, 1997).  Some versions of Haudenosaunee oral history present the 
Haudenosaunee Peacemaker as bringing the message of peace to the Haudenosaunee first, and 
then traveling across the ocean in an attempt to bring the same message there (see: Porter, 2008, 
who mentions these versions). 
 incompatible with these Native societies. Christianity, like 
Western thought and behavior more generally, had long rested upon a foundation of domination, 
separation, alienation, and extreme intolerance of all difference or deviation.  Likewise, 
Christianity’s hierarchical positioning of Church officials as the absolute authority and the sole 
mediators in any given churchgoer’s relationship with God would have been incompatible with 
the acceptance and encouragement of difference in Native societies, under which each individual 
“is sovereign in his own mind,” has his/her own, individual and unmediated relationship with the 
Creator and all of creation, and “derives his freedom from the [Creator] alone” (Williams, 1982: 
14).  Further, without these hierarchies of separation, difference, intolerance and 
authoritarianism, Native societies would not easily have yielded to the constant contradicting and 
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rewriting of the word of God, or misleading claims to be speaking for God, as were frequently 
made by Western Church officials who had long strayed from the original teachings of their 
religion.  In fact, even if someone were to make such claims, they would not have mattered much 
to many in Native society.  Because each individual was unique, had his or her own relationship 
with creation and the Creator, and had his or her own purpose or path to walk in life, it truly was 
up to each individual to determine what this path and purpose was, and to walk it, or not, 
according to his or her own choice (Porter, 2008; Stannard, 1992: 110).396
     At the same time that high levels of individual autonomy led each person on his or her own 
path in life, the communities were held together by strong, unifying moral principles and cultural 
worldviews.  Lengthy and detailed oral histories were (and are) recorded and passed on from 
generation to generation, and communities sometimes spent days or even weeks reciting 
particular events in their history.  Because the whole community was exposed to these histories 
repeatedly, and because those who recited these histories had to do so accurately, without 
making inadvertent changes, and in front of many elders who would know if such a change had 
occurred, the cultural amnesia and manipulative rewriting of history so common in Western 
society was likely unknown to Native societies throughout the Americas, whose oral histories 
have been found to be incredibly accurate (See McNeil, 2001-2002 on recognition of this by 
modern courts).  
   
     In addition, societies such as that of the Haudenosaunee, were founded on longstanding 
traditions of reason, which encouraged individuals to think for themselves, to participate and 
voice their ideas and concerns in deliberations, and to collectively deliberate and debate on 
                                                 
396 The latter source further notes the importance of this individualistic ethic in warfare, where 
autonomous individual warriors “might chose not to join in battle for this or that cause, and it 
was even common for an Indian war party on the march to ‘melt away as individual warriors had 
second thoughts and returned home’” (p. 110). 
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various issues so that the best possible answers to questions or solutions to problems could be 
found (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-39; Lyons, 1992: 32-39). This capacity of individuals to 
reason and of communities to benefit from the collective reasoning of all of their members was 
combined with centuries of accumulated knowledge and wisdom. Thus, these traditional 
societies had the capacity to withstand and survive through devastating, and even near-
apocalyptic events, to rebuild from the damage, and to continue on as healthy societies 
maintained their cultural values and beliefs despite various odds –something that is evidenced 
not only from the oral histories of various Native nations such as the Navajo, but also through the 
continuing existence of hundreds of distinct Native societies despite five centuries of colonialism 
and Western society’s concerted efforts to destroy Native peoples as individuals and as distinct 
peoples. 
     The strength of these communities in their ability to withstand adverse events was based 
largely on the collective contributions of their various, unique, individual members, these 
societies recognized that attacks on individuality would hurt the long-term survivability of the 
community.  Because individuality was so encouraged and valued in community life, which 
lacked the forms of dominations, separation and intolerances seen in Western society, individuals 
within these societies had absolutely no need to engage in the various psychopathological 
defense mechanisms of rejection and projection, avoidance of critical self-reflection, or various 
other narcissistic defense mechanisms based on the individual or societal denial of various 
aspects of reality, which include magical thinking, self-aggrandizement, or imperialistic needs to 
forcibly recreate others in one’s own image.  In fact, the spiritual worldview which holds that 
everything is interconnected and each individual is responsible for identifying and fulfilling (or 
choosing not to fulfill) his or her own life purpose –a worldview common to perhaps the majority 
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of Native societies in the Americas— would have absolutely discouraged any of these defense 
mechanisms as self and collectively defeating.  This is at least in part because any individual 
engaging in them would fail to engage in the sort of clear thinking and reasoning necessary both 
for contributing to communal life and for making rational choices pertaining to responsibility in 
one’s individual life.  Further, since individual and societal differences were accepted rather than 
rejected, there would be no reason to deny and project parts of oneself onto others, as there was 
no part of oneself that one needed to fear, reject and deny, and society did not depend upon 
creating ‘others’ onto which it could cast away these negative and intolerable aspects of itself, or 
against which its members could bond in hatred.  Indeed, such psychopathological patterns of 
thinking or behaving would have been unthinkable to Native societies in the Americas, as was at 
least partially evidenced by the generosity and friendliness shown to European conquerors 
simply because they were fellow human beings (Stannard, 1992: 30, 47, 52, 63; Todorov, 1982; 
Mann, 2005). 
     As such, and because Native peoples throughout the Americas were indifferent to material 
accumulation (Stannard, 1992: 110, 30, 52, 63) –or even saw it as a sign of false status (Means, 
1983: 22) -- the concept of accumulating material goods by dispossessing others of what is 
theirs, or of exploiting other people, other living things, or the earth, was non-existent in Native 
societies.  Indeed, it would have likely been considered a crime by many Native societies, since 
engaging in such behaviors would have required reducing these other people, living things and 
parts of nature to mere resources to be exploited, and thus would have required the 
despiritualization (and dehumanization) of these other people, living things and parts of nature.  
This, in turn, it would have required that Native societies had experienced the same traumas, and 
had been utilizing the same psychopathological coping mechanisms for denying these traumas 
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that members of Western society had long experienced and utilized.  Instead, as noted above, all 
along the coast of the Americas, European explorers, upon their first arrival, consistently found 
Native societies that were welcoming and generous with all that they had, and who treated 
material items as things to be shared with others (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32-38; Stannard, 
1992: 29, 30, 47, 48, 52, 109-10; Means, 1983: 22; Lyons, 1992:34; Williams, 1982: 5). 
     Likewise, the idea of progress, as it was conceived by Western Europeans, would have had no 
meaning or place in Native society –or any traditional indigenous society (on the latter point, see: 
Diamond, 1974).  Native societies in the Americas conceived of time as cyclical, conceived of all 
things as being related and having their own roles to play in the Creation, and even, in some 
cases, actively strove to eliminate all special interests or divisions that might result in conflict 
and the conceptualization of superiority/inferiority (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33, 34).  Thus, the 
concept of progress in non-Western, non-industrial, indigenous societies –if it can be applied at 
all—would have pertained to the personal growth and learning that occurs as an individual 
progresses through society and through the life cycle, during which the “inevitable conflicts of 
growth” are shared, understood, socially structured, and resolved (Diamond, 1974: 41-43). 
     The communal involvement in the personal growth of individuals, and in helping them 
through the life cycle and their varying roles in society, served to keep autonomous individuals 
integrated into society, and thus kept societal members insulated from some of the more harmful 
aspects of potential life traumas.  It thereby precluded the development of anti-social or 
psychopathological coping mechanisms. If any of these anti-social, psychopathological 
mechanisms did arise, such as through trauma, these societies, like other societies with intact 
cultures, had mechanisms in place to help individuals deal with and heal from psychological 
trauma and get back on their spiritual life paths.  The sweat lodge and the vision quest are 
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examples of cultural rituals intended to help individuals move through and learn from the life 
cycles and various challenges in society and the world, and the Haudenosaunee condolence 
ceremony was created specifically to help individuals suffering from unresolved grief or trauma.  
The latter is an integral part of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace (Kaia’nereko:wa), which 
united the original five Haudenosaunee nations (from east to west: the Mohawk, Oneida, 
Onondaga, Cayuga and Seneca) under the principles that roughly translate into power, 
righteousness, and reason (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 31-39)397 ended a long period of war and 
inter – and intra-familial violence (Lyons, 1992, 31-39) and is one of the oldest and longest 
standing democratic traditions in the world, as well as the only governing tradition founded upon 
the principles of peace, and the active striving for peace (Lyons, 1992: 33; Akwesasne Notes, 
2005: 33, 92; Johansen, 1998; Woo, 2003; Vachon, 1993).398 According to these concepts and 
this Great Law of Peace, “human beings whose minds are healthy always desire peace” 
(Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 32, 33). 
                                                 
397 Barbara Mann translates these as 1) health or well being, 2) honor or righteousness, and 3) the 
sacred will of the people. 
 While rage and grief are natural emotions for all humans, they 
“confuse people’s abilities to think clearly” (Lyons, 1992: 38). Thus, in order to ensure that 
decisions are made with clear minds, prior to treaty negotiations or other deliberations, it was not 
uncommon for the Haudenosaunee to first perform a condolence ceremony to clear eyes, ears 
and throat/mouth from dust, tears and strong emotions, or from anything else that might get in 
the way of the parties seeing and hearing each other clearly, and of speaking and communicating 
398 “Other political philosophers and organizers have come to the conclusion that government 
can be formed for the purpose of establishing tranquility, but the Peacemaker went considerably 
further than that.  He argued not for the establishment of law and order, but for the full 
establishment of peace.  Peace was to be defined not as the simple absence of war or strife, but as 
the active striving of humans for the purpose of establishing universal justice.  Peace was defined 
as the product of a society that strives to establish concepts that correlate to the English words 
power, reason and righteousness.” (Akwesasne Notes, 2005: 33). 
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clearly.  The condolence ceremony was (and is) also performed, along with other ceremonies, for 
relatives of members of the community who pass away, and in other circumstances in which 
conflict and/or strong emotions of rage or grief need to be resolved so that clear thinking could 
(can) proceed. 
     These cultural mechanisms for dealing with conflict, grief and trauma were further 
strengthened and reinforced by the worldview that all people and living things are related, and by 
the consensus processes that strove for societal unity on important issues.  Western literature on 
clinical work with trauma survivors has only in recent decades begun to catch up with the 
insights and cultural wisdom of the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples of the Americas in 
relation to the processes of healing from trauma and grief.  For example, in their work with 
trauma survivors, McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), Herman (1992) and Kelman (1973) have 
all found that what we do to --or tolerate being done to—others is, perhaps primarily, damaging 
to ourselves and our own humanity.399  Such insights have been inherent in the traditional 
cultural knowledge of the Haudenosaunee and other Native societies for centuries, though 
expressed in slightly different words (Porter, 2008: 173; Forbes, 2008: 12-14).400
                                                 
399 To this extent, Kelman (1973: 50-52) noted that the process of dehumanizing the victim 
requires the simultaneous (or, perhaps, preceding) dehumanization of the victimizer him/herself, 
as the former weakens moral restraints and causes the victimizer to “lose the capacity to act as a 
moral being” –thus also losing his/her sense of personal identity and community.  Likewise 
McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 36) have noted the deep-seeded connections between 
tolerating the victimization of others (and thus, of identifying with the perpetrator, since 
identifying with the victim requires a refusal to tolerate such victimization) and engaging in 
victimization of one’s self, noting that “[i]dentifying with the aggressor makes it possible to 
bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others.”  Similarly, Herman (1992: 9) has 
noted the societal connections between denying the pain and suffering caused to some with 
societal inabilities to acknowledge or deal with trauma, pain and suffering of any of its members. 
  Arguably, 
400 “Greed and gluttony, along with the cruel using of others’ lives without remorse, is seen as 
destructive of one’s own spiritual potential as well as a form of sickness” (Forbes, 2008: 12-14).  
     Porter’s insight, in a way about all of us being connected, and in a way about the harm to 
ourselves and our relationship with the Creator and the rest of the universe when we are 
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Western society has not yet caught up with the Haudenosaunee and other Native peoples of the 
Americas in relation to the processes of participatory democracy and the active striving for peace 
that is desired by all healthy minds.401
     Hence, of all of the problematic patterns of thought and behavior in the Western cultural 
worldview, there were only two that were present in a mere handful of the thousands of diverse 
Native societies throughout the Americas: the practices of ritual human sacrifice and/or the 
potential practice of cannibalism.  While these practices were understandably alarming and 
frightening to Europeans arriving on the shores of a strange land, both of these practices were 
also present in areas of Europe at various points in time.  For example, Stannard (1992: 51-52) 
and Mohaw (2000: 125-26) contrast the ritualistic human sacrifice of a few large empires in the 
Americas with the Inquisition and witch hunt that was ongoing throughout Europe and which 
also constituted a form of ritualized human sacrifice.  For example: 
   
The Spanish were more self-righteous than usual about the superiority of 
Christianity because they were repulsed by the idea of human sacrifice and 
disgusted by the evidence of cannibalism that sometimes accompanied the 
sacrifices.  They could disembowel a person without flinching, slaughter a village, 
or burn a person to death slowly over fires for days but could not stomach 
cannibalism in any form. (The acts of cannibalism by crusaders at Maarat an-
Numan and Niceae during the First Crusade were unlikely to have been preserved 
in popular memory.) (Mohawk, 2000: 125-26)402
                                                                                                                                                             
destructive towards others, can also be found in western religions, such as the teachings of 
Christianity. The difference, of course, is that the Christian Church became so separated from 
these teachings that they are often –thought not always-- only verbally expressed in Christianity 
during Sunday sermons.  But as Forbes (p. 15) remarks: “All that we do, and are, is our religion.” 
 
401 On healthy minds desiring peace and treating other people and life forms with respect, see 
Lyons (1992: 33-39), Akwesasne Notes (2005: 32-39), Forbes (2008: 22). 
402 “[T]he very plain fact is that the many tens of millions of people who lived in the Americas 
prior to 1492 were human—neither subhuman, nor superhuman—just human.  Some of the 
social practices of selected groups of them we would find abhorrent to our cultural tastes and 
attitudes at present, in the same way that we find loathsome certain social practices of earlier 
European and Asian cultures. Thus, for example, few of us today would countenance the practice 
of human sacrifice as a way of propitiating an angry god, as was done by a few of the highest 
urban cultures in Mesoamerica during the fifteenth- and early sixteenth century.  However, 
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Likewise, Stannard (1992) notes that ritual cannibalism was certainly not unheard of in 15th
Violence, of course, was everywhere, as alluded to above; but occasionally it took 
on an especially perverse character.  In addition to the hunting down and burning 
of witches, which was an everyday affair in most locales, in Milan in 1476 a man 
was torn to pieces by an enraged mob and his disemboweled limbs were then 
eaten by his tormenters.  In Paris and Lyon, Hugenots were killed and butchered, 
and their various body parts were sold openly in the streets.  Other eruptions of 
bizarre torture, murder, and ritual cannibalism were not uncommon. (P. 61) 
 
century European society, though it was “not officially condoned, at least, not usually”: 
 
     Thus, while Native societies throughout the Americas were imperfect, and at times deviated 
from their ideals and convictions (Lyons, 1992: 33), the vast majority of these societies were 
healthy societies with imperfect humans.  In many ways, “from methods of child rearing and 
codes of friendship and loyalty, to worshiping and caring for their natural environment,” to 
communal generosity and individual autonomy and liberty, they “appear far more enlightened” 
than Western society and its cultural worldview does today (Stannard, 1992: 52). In other words, 
Native societies in the Americas were healthy societies, not just in relation to the disastrous 
conditions that existed across the oceans and the destructive, devastating, and 
psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that composed the Western cultural 
worldview, but also in absolute terms: their members were happy, healthy, socially integrated 
and supported in all aspects of their life cycles, and living lives “of apparent total liberty” 
(Stannard, 1992: 47). Meanwhile, when viewed in relation to Native societies in the Americas, 
Western society and the Western cultural worldview, was, and continues to be, incredibly 
unhealthy physically, socially, mentally, emotionally, and spiritually.   
                                                                                                                                                             
neither would many of us support the grisly torture and killing of thousands of heretics or the 
burning of tens of thousands of men and women as witches, in a similar effort to mollify a 
jealous deity, as was being done in Europe, with theocratic approval, at precisely the same time 
that the Aztecs were sacrificing enemy warriors.” (Stannard, 1992: 51-52) 
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     This difference certainly did not go unnoticed by European colonists.  Whether they were part 
of colonial ventures to subjugate the Gaelic Irish or to establish colonies in North America, 
English soldiers and colonists deserted to the Natives in a “regular hemorrhage” from the late 
1500s to well into the eighteenth century.  They did so despite the harsh penalties for desertion 
and the likely execution that awaited those deserters who were hunted down and dragged back to 
the colony in Jamestown (Canny, 1979: 23-24, 30-35; Mohawk, 2000; Stannard, 1992: 103-05; 
Martinot, 2003b: 38).403 In fact, though English desertion from Jamestown stopped completely 
for a while after the Pequot attack on the colony in 1622 (Canny, 1979), it continued to be an 
ongoing issue for the colonies well into the 18th century, as New York writer Hector St. John de 
Crèvecœur noted in 1782: “thousands of colonists had left the colonies voluntarily to live with 
various indigenous societies, while not a single indigenous person was known to have left his or 
her society voluntarily to live with the Europeans.” Crèvecœur further stipulated that “there must 
be something more congenial [in the indigenous societies] to our native dispositions than the 
fictitious society in which we live” (quoted in Martinot, 2003: 38). Rousseau made similar 
observations about European colonial ventures more generally.404
                                                 
403 “They found Indian life to possess a strong sense of community, abundant love, and 
uncommon integrity—values that the European colonists also honored, if less successfully.  But 
Indian life was attractive for other values—for social equality, mobility, adventure, and, as two 
adult converts acknowledged, ‘the most perfect freedom, the ease of living, [and] the absence of 
those cares and corroding solicitudes which so often prevail with us.’ (Stannard, 1992: 104, 
quoting Axtell, James. 1985.  The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North 
America. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 303). For these reasons and more, deserters 
often refused to return to the European colony even when they were promised a pardon for their 
“crimes,” sometimes going to great lengths to blend into Indian society and hide from colonists.  
In addition, deserters came from all ranks of colonial society (Canny (1979: 32, 33).  
 
404 “It is an extremely remarkable thing for all the years that Europeans have been tormenting 
themselves to bring the savages of the various countries in the world to their way of life that they 
have not yet been able to win over a single one, not even with the aid of Christianity; our 
missionaries sometimes make Christians of them, but never civilized men. Nothing can 
overcome the invincible repugnance they have of adopting our morals and living in our way.  If 
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     This difference also did not go unnoticed by Native societies at the time.405 And though 
modern westerners, blinded by their own, unresolved, transgenerational trauma and 
psychopathological coping mechanisms, have been unwilling or unable to recognize the 
extremely unhealthy nature of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, modern 
Native peoples who continue to resist assimilation into (or further colonization by) this cultural 
worldview have not been so oblivious to this fact.  In his book, Columbus and other Cannibals, 
Jack Forbes (2008: xv) has analogized the destructive strands leading Western culture with “a 
plague, a disease worse than leprosy, a sickness worse than malaria, a malady much more terrible 
than smallpox,” and has likened it to cannibalism, or wétiko (cannibal) psychosis (where wétiko, 
a Cree term, is defined as “an evil person or spirit who terrorizes other creatures by means of 
terrible acts, including cannibalism”) (p. 24). Forbes’ observations are certainly apt, both in the 
context of the atrocities committed by the Spanish in the south and the English in the North of 
the New World406
                                                                                                                                                             
these savages are as unhappy as it is claimed, they are, by what inconceivable depravity of 
judgment do they constantly refuse to civilize themselves by imitating us or to learn to live 
happily among us—whereas one finds in a thousand places that … Europeans have 
voluntarily taken refuge among these natives, spent their entire lives there, no longer able to 
leave such a strange way of life ….”(Rousseau, quoted in Diamond, 1974: 24-25, emphasis 
added).  A similar account (by the same person) is quoted in Stannard (1992: 104): “Thousands 
of Europeans are Indians, and we have no examples of even one of these Aborigines having from 
choice become European!” 
 as well as in the modern day destruction promoted by military and corporate 
405 For example, when a Native leader in Hispanola named Hatuey was captured after fleeing 
Spanish massacres and atrocities with many of his followers, “a Franciscan friar urged him to 
take Jesus to his heart so that his soul might go to heaven, rather then descend into hell. Hatuey 
replied that if heaven was where the Christians went, he would rather go to hell” (Stannard, 
1992: 69-70). 
406 These histories include example after example, almost ad infinitum, of this sort of account: 
Wherever the marauding, diseased, and heavily armed Spanish forces went out on 
patrol, accompanied by ferocious armored dogs that had been trained to kill and 
disembowel, they preyed on the local communities—already plague-enfeebled—forcing 
them to supply food and women and slaves, and whatever else the soldiers might desire.  
At virtually every previous landing on this trip, Columbus’s troops had gone ashore and 
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profiteering ventures at home and abroad. Further, though the technological means of 
domination, colonization and destruction have changed over the centuries, the destructive, 
exploitative, and dominating mentality has not, something we’ve seen in the current wars on 
“terror” and non-Western peoples.   
     Similar to Forbes, John Trudell (2001b & 2003) has referred to the destructive mentality and 
actions of western society, first brought over the oceans by Columbus, as “the virus,”407
                                                                                                                                                             
killed indiscriminately, as though for sport, whatever animals and birds and natives they 
encountered, “looting and destroying all they found,” as the Admiral’s son Fernando 
blithely put it.  Once on Hispaniola, however, Columbus fell ill… and what little 
restraint he had maintained over his men disappeared as he went through a lengthy 
period of recuperation.  The troops went wild, stealing, killing, raping, and torturing 
natives, trying to force them to divulge the whereabouts of the imagined treasure-houses 
of gold. (Stannard, 1992: 69) 
 while 
Vine Deloria, Jr. (1969: 188) has referred to Western culture as something that is “not a culture 
Similarly, among the English colonists: 
[In Roanoke] when an Indian was accused by an Englishman of stealing a cup and 
failing to return it, the English response was to attack the natives in force, burning the 
entire community and the fields of corn surrounding it. … Such disproportionate 
responses to supposed affronts was to mark English dealings with the Indians 
throughout the seventeenth century.  … [In Jamestown] Indians who came to English  
settlements with food for the British (who seemed never able to feed themselves) were 
captured, accused of being spies, and executed.  On other occasions, Indians were 
enticed into visiting the settlements on the pretence of peace and the sharing of 
entertainment, where upon they were attacked by the English and killed.  Peace treaties 
were signed with every intention to violate them …   [And] [h]undreds of Indians were 
killed in skirmish after skirmish.  Other hundreds were killed in successful plots of mass 
poisoning.  They were hunted down by dogs…  Their canoes and fishing weirs were 
smashed, their villages and agricultural fields burned to the ground.  Indian peace offers 
were accepted by the British only until their prisoners were returned; then, having lulled 
the natives into false security, the colonists returned to attack.  It was the colonists’ 
expressed desire that the Indians be exterminated…. (Stannard, 1992: 105-06). 
407 “But the time Columbus got here in 1492 –see, people have many opinions about him: who he 
was or what he was but, whatever. See, he was really like the virus.  And the spirit was being 
eaten by disease.  And it affected the perceptional reality of the human.  See, so when Columbus 
and them got here and we told him who we were, they didn’t know.  We said, “We’re the people.  
We’re the human beings.”  But they didn’t know, because it wasn’t a part of their perceptional 
reality –the concept was no longer a part of their perceptional reality.  See, this is what happened 
to the tribes of Europe and the descendants of the tribes of Europe.” (Trudell, op. cit.) 
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but a cancer.”408  The contagious nature of the destructive patterns of thought and behavior in the 
Western worldview have further not gone unnoticed by these latter scholars409 (though, 
unfortunately, it seems likely that many Native peoples at the time of the initial invasion might 
have been unfamiliar with this concept of contagion410
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
).  These observations are entirely inline 
with Western revelations on the contagious nature of traumatic symptomology (Figley, 1997a & 
1997b; Gilbert, 1997; Williams, 1997; Remer & Ferguson, 1997; Catherall, 1997; Danieli, 1998; 
Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998; Warner & Weist, 1996). 
My hope is that this brief chapter has demonstrated the stark contrast between Western patterns 
of thought and behavior –patterns which result from and reflect the western “civilizing”/ 
colonizing/ traumatizing process—and the patterns of thought, behavior and being that were 
widespread among perhaps the majority of vastly diverse Native societies living throughout the 
Americas at the start of the invasion.  I also hope that this chapter, together with chapter 2, has 
given the reader a better sense of what I mean by healthy societies and pathological societies.  As 
will be seen more clearly later, this chapter has laid some of the groundwork necessary for the 
discussion in chapters 5 and 6, on Native-non-Native relations and the development of 
                                                 
408 “White culture destroys other culture because of its abstractness.  As a destroyer of culture it 
is not a culture but a cancer.” (Deloria, 1969: 188).  
409 To this extent, Deloria advocated separatism from white culture “as the only means by which” 
different groups, or individuals, can “gain time for reflection, meditation, and eventual 
understanding of themselves as a people” (Deloria, 1969: 188).  See also, Stannard (1992):  “just 
as their isolation from Old World diseases made the Indians an exceptionally healthy people as 
long as they were not contacted by disease-bearing outsiders, once Europeans invaded their lands 
with nothing but disdain for the native regime of mutual respect and reciprocity, the end result 
was doomed to spell disaster” (p. 109). 
410 As one Cree survivor noted of the small pox: “we had no belief that one man could give it to 
another, any more than a wounded man could give his wound to another”(Quoted in Stannard, 
1992: 53). 
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international law, and on non-Native reactions to the 2006 Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest in 
Caledonia, Ontario, respectively. 
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Chapter 4 
The Canadian and Ontario Governments’ War on Haudenosaunee Human Rights: An 
Atrocity Producing Situation 
 
In order to escape accountability for his crimes, the perpetrator does everything 
in his power to promote forgetting.  Secrecy and silence are the perpetrator’s first 
line of defense.  If secrecy fails, the perpetrator attacks the credibility of the 
victim.  If he cannot silence her absolutely, he tries to make sure that no one 
listens. To this end, he marshals an impressive array of arguments, from the most 
blatant denial to the most sophisticated and elegant rationalization.  After every 
atrocity once can expect to hear the same predictable apologies: it never 
happened; the victim lies; the victim exaggerates; the victim brought it upon 
herself; and in any case it is time to forget the past and move on.  The more 
powerful the perpetrator, the greater his prerogative to name and define reality, 
and the more completely his arguments prevail. 
~ Herman 1992, 8 
 
To perceive others as fully human means to be saddened by the death of every single 
person, regardless of the population group or the part of the world from which he comes, 
and regardless of our own personal acquaintance with him.  If we accord him identity, 
then we must individualize his death, …. If we accord him community, then we must 
experience his death as a personal loss, a sentiment expressed with beautiful simplicity 
by John Donne’s Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind. 
~ Kelman 1973, 49 
 
The question of how and why some groups of people commit atrocities against other groups of 
people has preoccupied academics since at least World War II, and a number of different 
potential explanations have surfaced over the last several decades. The explanations have ranged 
from those that focus on political, ‘tribal’ identities (Mamdami, 2002), to those that focus on 
individual and collective forms of denial (Cohen, 2005; Herman, 1992; Bauman, 2000), to those 
that focus on the ‘chain of command,’ or on situations of power and/or obedience (Bauman, 
2000; Haney & Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974).  While all of these potential 
explanations make important contributions to our understanding of the dynamics of atrocities,  
one of the most interesting ideas that has arisen out of this vast literature is the idea that human 
beings generally have in instinctive aversion to killing and/or committing violent atrocities --
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even in situations where violence and killing are required (Grossman, 1999; Watson, 1978; 
Eisenhart, 1975; Litz et al., 2009; Kelman, 1973).  Thus, it is the erosion of this aversion to 
victimizing and killing others that, some say, most needs to be explained. 
     In his examination of the atrocities committed by US soldiers during the Vietnam War, 
Herbert Kelman (1973) sets out to do just this, and argues that the root cause of these atrocities 
was the purposeful and calculated loosening of the normal moral restraints by government 
policies and practices.  For example, Kelman (1973: 29, 30, 31) identified three processes that 
could result in the loss of normal moral restraint in what he called “sanctioned massacres,” and 
he argued that these processes are always primarily the result of government policies and 
practices that are either purposefully aimed at destroying particular groups of people, or are 
geared towards the pursuit other policy objectives, which allows, encourages, promotes, or 
tacitly ignores attacks on the targeted group(s) of people.  For example, the purposeful 
destruction of entire groups of people was, in many ways, the explicit goal of government policy 
in Nazi Germany, while the pursuit of other policy objectives allowed, encouraged and promoted 
the decimation of entire villages of innocent civilians in Vietnam in the 1970s (as well as in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, today).411
     Though Kelman uses the term “sanctioned massacres” to describe the atrocities committed 
against innocent men, women, children, and elderly adults in Vietnam, he acknowledges that the 
phenomenon he is describing is not limited to massacres, but may also include other forms of 
death, injury, uprooting, and/or displacement of the targeted group(s) of people; as well as the 
destruction of their lands, the source of their livelihoods, their social structures, and/or their ways 
   
                                                 
411 “Massacres of the kind that occurred in My Lai were not deliberately planned, but they took 
place in an atmosphere that made it quite clear that the civilian population was expendable and 
that actions resulting in the indiscriminate killing of civilians were central to the strategy of the 
war” (Kelman, 1973: 32). 
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of life (Kelman, 1973: 32, 25).  For this reason, rather than use Kelman’s term, Lifton’s (1975, 
2004) concepts of atrocities and atrocity producing situations in my examination of Canadian 
federal and provincial government policies and practices that precipitated both the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest in Caledonia and corresponding behaviors of non-Native residents both 
preceding the protest and in response to it.  These latter behaviors will be discussed more 
thoroughly in chapter 6, while this chapter is primarily concerned with examining the behaviors, 
policies and practices of government officials and others in positions of relative authority (such 
local businessmen and news reporters and editors).  Further, the main purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the ways in which government officials have engaged in the problematic patterns of 
thought and behavior, discussed in chapter 2, in ways and to an extent that has normalized the 
conditions of atrocity producing situations in relation to the Haudenosaunee and other Native 
peoples throughout Canada.  I argue that atrocities are being perpetrated against Native peoples 
in Canada in the form of dispossessions, displacements, and uprooting of Native peoples, as well 
as the destruction of Native lands, livelihoods, culture and ways of life. All of this is being done 
in pursuit of policy objectives intended to further the accumulation of capital in the hands of a 
few at the expense of the vast majority of both Native and non-Native peoples throughout 
Canada. 
     There are three sections in this chapter.  The first provides a brief overview of Herbert 
Kelman’s (1973) theory regarding the pre-conditions for the production of atrocities. This much-
abbreviated discussion is intended to provide some context for the second and third sections in 
the chapter, as well as for the discussion in chapter 6. The second section applies aspects of 
Kelman’s theory to federal, provincial and county-level governments’ pursuit of policy 
objectives, as well as the explicit support for these objectives that has been demonstrated on the 
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part of businessmen and media representatives (i.e., other people in position of relative 
authority). Through this examination, I will argue that these authorities created (and/or 
maintained412
     In the chapter’s conclusion –as well as parts of the third section of the chapter-- some of the 
repercussions of these ongoing legal violations, and ongoing psychopathology, will be 
considered.  Such repercussions may include the loss of legal and political legitimacy at home 
and abroad, as well as the inevitable escalation of atrocities and atrocity-producing situations 
within Canada.  Such an escalation of atrocities in Canada can be expected if Canadian and 
provincial governments continue to violate their own domestic laws and their legally-binding 
international human rights commitments in pursuit of capital accumulation and the “superpower” 
status that is expected to accompany the intensification of resource extraction projects in Canada.  
If these process of accumulation by dispossession continue in Canada, Native peoples across the 
) the necessary conditions for the production of atrocities against the 
Haudenosaunee people in relation to their 2006 land rights protest. The third and last section in 
the chapter will examine some of the Canadian Supreme Court rulings and legally-binding 
international human rights laws that are routinely being violated by the Canadian and Ontario (as 
well as county-level) governments in pursuit of the policy objectives of capital accumulation 
through settlement, development and resource extraction on First Nations lands throughout 
Canada –i.e., the process of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003).  I will argue that the 
creation/maintenance of the conditions of atrocity in response to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest 
must be contextualized within the broader, long-standing context of ongoing violations of the 
rights of indigenous peoples in Canada.  Further, all of these must be contextualized within the 
psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior that were discussed in chapter 2. 
                                                 
412 Since, arguably, these conditions have existed almost as long as Europeans have lived on the 
continent. 
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country will be forced to either resign themselves to destruction as distinct peoples or adopt 
alternate, and increasingly confrontational means to protect their lands, resources, Aboriginal, 
treaty, and human rights.  Many Native peoples will quite understandably choose the latter.  
This, in turn, may incite many Canadian non-Natives, who are largely ill-informed about the 
domestic and international human rights of indigenous peoples, to mobilize in anger against what 
they perceive to be “special privileges” of Native peoples.  Following the lead of their 
government officials, these non-Natives may thus increasingly respond to Native rights 
assertions with escalating anger and violence, as was the case in Caledonia on 2006 (see chapter 
6 for a discussion of non-Native responses in Caledonia).   
THE CONDITIONS OF ATROCITY-PRODUCING SITUATIONS 
As mentioned above, Herbert Kelman (1973) argued that in atrocity-producing situations the 
normal human aversion to killing or committing atrocities against other peoples is overcome 
through official policies and practices that are either purposefully aimed at eliminating entire 
groups of people, or are geared towards the pursuit of other policy objectives that explicitly 
encourage, allow, promote or tacitly ignore attacks on one or more targeted group(s) of people.  
Kelman further identified three types of policy processes that serve to loosen these normal moral 
restraints, thus allowing and potentially leading to the production of atrocities. He termed these 
processes authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Kelman, 1973: 8).  Each of these 
will be briefly explained. 
For Kelman (1973: 39), the process of authorization is the process through which authorities 
perceived of as legitimate make it known that attacks on a targeted group of people are 
encouraged and promoted and/or will be allowed and tacitly ignored.  Through this explicit or 
implicit permission, Kelman argues, there is a lessening of the moral restraints that normally 
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prevent individuals and groups from engaging in violent actions that are otherwise perceived to 
be immoral, illegitimate or illegal.  At the same time, there is a heightened willingness among 
individuals or groups who identify with these perceived legitimate authorities to engage in such 
activities (p. 39).  Both this lessening and this heightening are further enhanced when members 
of the perpetrating group live within a hierarchically structured society in which obedience to 
authority is expected and required.  To this extent, Kelman (1973: 41-44) and numerous others 
(Haney & Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974) have found that unquestioned obedience 
to authority is an extremely widespread characteristic of US society413 (and Western society in 
general414
                                                 
413 “In a national survey of public reactions to the Calley [the Lt. in charge at the My Lai 
massacre] trial, conducted a few weeks after the conviction of Lt. Calley had been announced, 
we asked respondents what they thought they would do if they were soldiers in Vietnam and 
were ordered by their superior officers to shoot all inhabitants of a village suspected of aiding the 
enemy, including old men, women, and children. Fifty-one percent of our sample said that they 
would follow orders and shoot; 33% said that they would refuse to shoot.  We cannot infer, of 
course, from their responses to a hypothetical question what these individuals would actually do 
if they found themselves in the situation described.  Our data do suggest, however, that they are 
prepared, in principle, to engage in mass violence if faced with authoritative orders to do so.  
They are certainly prepared to condone such actions; they regard obedience to orders under these 
circumstances—even if that means shooting unarmed civilians—as the normatively expected, the 
required, indeed the right and moral thing for the good citizen to do.  In short, the cognitive and 
ideological grounding for mass violence in an authority situation seems to be present in large 
segments of the US population” (Kelman, 1973: 41) 
), and many members of US society feel that they have an “overriding obligation” do 
follow the orders of a superior, regardless of the immoral or illegal characteristics of such an 
order.  Certainly Canadian society is no less geared towards unquestioning obedience to 
authority, and there are convincing arguments that it is geared towards this much more so than is 
the United States (Chamberlin, 2002: 14-15). 
414 See for example: Mann, L. 1973. Attitudes toward My Lai and obedience to orders: An 
Australian survey. Australian Journal of Psychology. 25 (1), pp. 11-12, (cited in Kelman, 1973: 
41)which finds similar obedience-to-authority attitudes in Australia. 
 281 
     The willingness among individuals or groups to engage in attacks and atrocities against other, 
targeted people is further heightened when the groups explicitly or implicitly targeted already 
have a long history of being targeted by psychopathological projections as scapegoats, or when 
the group doing the targeting already has a long history of engaging in these psychopathological 
projections and scapegoating (Kelman, 1973: 32, 35, 37, 50).  Thus, though US soldiers in 
Vietnam may have never previously encountered Vietnamese people or culture, they had been 
exposed to a long history of targeting other groups of people –such as African Americans, Native 
North Americans, Mexicans, and Chinese immigrants—through psychopathological projection 
and scapegoating.  According to Kelman, this long history of targeting various groups of people, 
and setting them apart from the rest of society as “fair game” for attack, was easily transferred to 
Vietnam by US soldiers already long familiar with, and possibly participants in, this type of 
dynamic.   
     Kelman further stresses that, while targeted groups may have long-histories as victims of 
discrimination and attack, they are not, in the case of sanctioned massacre or atrocity-producing 
situations, being attacked for what they have done.  Rather, they are being attacked because of 
what they are, and/or because of what their relationship is to particular policy objectives (i.e., 
they are “in the way” of such objectives) (Kelman, 1973: 32, 37, 30, 49). John Mohawk (2000: 
5) has noted similar dynamics throughout the history of Western, utopian thinking, through 
which certain groups of people are seen as being both “in the way” of “progress,” and 
expendable in Western society’s pursuit of a distant (and impossible) Utopia.  Some of these 
ideas were discussed more thoroughly in chapter 2, particularly in the sections on projection, 
scapegoating and human sacrifice. In all of these examples, distant policy objectives (whether 
Utopian or not), together with established patterns of victimization and perpetration, serve as a 
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form of justification to the perpetrators that what they are doing is not only okay, but perhaps 
even necessary, moral, benevolent, or valorous.  Such patterns of thought constitute what 
Kelman (1973:44) calls a “transcendent mission,” the likes of which is easily illustrated in 
Himmler’s motivational speeches to Nazis in charge of exterminating various groups of 
people.415
                                                 
415 Kelman (1973: 45, quoting from Arendt) noted that Himmler motivated Nazis in charge of 
exterminating various ‘undesirable’ groups of people by praising the officers “for their courage 
and devotion to duty in carrying out repugnant acts” and for their involvement “’in something 
historic, grandiose, unique (‘a great task that occurs once in two thousand years’)’.” 
Transcendental missions are often just as vague as those invoked by Himmler, and have included 
(and continue to include) notions of “progress,” “civilization,” “national security,” the “war on 
terrorism,” and --before that-- the wars on communism, drugs, and narcoterrorism, as well as the 
wars against infidels, witches, heretics, non-Christians, and so forth (see chapter 2 for more on 
these latter wars and the policy objectives behind them). 
  Part of these transcendent missions, such as in the current war on terrorism, may 
consist of claims to self-defense against perceived potential attacks –claims that are invoked in 
an attempt to make the attacks and atrocities more morally acceptable. Of course, all of the 
above-discussed forms of justification are, when not entirely fabricated, always far out of 
proportion with any objective observation of the behavior of the targeted group (Kelman, 1973: 
32), as well as any objective observation on the proportional force required for the alleged self-
defensive of the perpetrating group. Despite the obvious lack of validity and proportion involved 
in such transcendent missions, authorities may, themselves, get caught up in these alleged 
missions (as opposed to simply using them strategically to manipulate the masses into supporting 
their stated or unstated policy objectives), and may come to view their efforts at mobilizing the 
population around these missions as part of a “popular mandate”(which, itself, reinforced the 
alleged legitimacy of these missions, at least in the eyes of deluded authorities) (Kelman, 1973: 
45).  In order to keep the masses mobilized in this fashion, all of the above-discussed processes 
of authorization generally must be repeated and reinforced perpetually, and in various forms. 
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     While the processes of authorization provide some forms of pseudo-justifications for the 
lessening the moral restraints against the commission of atrocities, the processes of routinization 
serve to encourage wide-spread dissociation pertaining to these atrocities and lessened moral 
restraints (Kelman, 1973: 47). Stanely Cohen (2005), Judith Herman (1992) and Zygmunt 
Bauman (2000) have all also written extensively on this concept and process, though they refer 
to it using slightly different terminology.  Max Weber (1995), also discussed this concept and 
process in his discussion of Western bureaucracy and the ‘iron cage’.   The process of 
routinization achieves this dissociation by transforming the various contributions that individuals 
and groups make to widespread atrocities “into routine, mechanical, highly-programmed 
operations” (Kelman, 1973: 46).   In order to do so, the contributions that individuals make to the 
entire atrocity-producing process are “broken down into discrete steps carried out in automatic, 
regularized fashion” (p. 47).  Individuals performing these steps are required to focus on the 
details of these steps and/or on notions of “efficiency” or “productivity,” rather than on the 
overall big picture.  In this way, the need for individuals to make decisions, and/or the ability of 
individuals to influence the larger picture, are virtually eliminated, as are concerns about 
individual responsibility or morals (p. 47).   
     Often the processes of routinization are helped along through language of illusion and 
dissociation.  For example, during the Vietnam war, government and military officials used 
terms such as “protective reaction,” “pacification,” and “forced-draft urbanization and 
modernization,” to refer in a dissociated way to the decimation of entire villages and the mass 
murder, rape and/or forced relocation of surviving villagers (Kelman, 1973: 48).  Similar code 
words were used in Nazi Germany, where the terms “final solution,” “evacuation,” and “special 
treatment,” served as euphemisms for the ongoing extermination of entire groups of people 
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(Kelman, 1973: 48).  In the present “war on terror” mass killings of innocent civilians is referred 
to as “collateral damage,” and a number of other euphemistic, illusionary words could also be 
quite easily identified. All of these various code words, part of the language of illusion and 
dissociation, were intended to allow participants to differentiate their own actions from “ordinary 
killing and destruction,” which they continue to recognize as clearly illegitimate, illegal and 
immoral, illegal.   
     The language of illusion or dissociation also contributes to the third process involved in the 
loosening of moral restraints: dehumanization.  For example, Goodwin (1989) wrote about the 
emotional deadness that was instilled in U.S. soldiers during bootcamp, demonstrating the 
linkages between this process of routinization and the process of dehumanization: 
This dehumanization gradually generalized to the whole Vietnam experience.  
The American combatants themselves became “grunts,” the Viet Cong became 
“Victor Charlie,” and both groups were either “KIA” (killed in action) or “WIA” 
(wounded in action).  Often many “slopes” would get “Zapped” (killed) by a 
“Cobra” (gunship), the “grunts” would retreat by “shithook” (evacuation by 
Chinook helicopter), and the jungle would be sown by “Puff the Magic Dragon” 
(C-47 gunship with rapid-firing mini-gatling guns). The nicknames served to 
blunt the anguish and horror of the reality of combat. (P. 10) 
 
The use of degrading words to stereotype groups of people based on racial, ethnic, gendered, 
national, religious, cultural or other categorizations, deprives the members of targeted groups of 
their identity by denying them the ability to define who they are individually and/or communally. 
Targeted groups and group members are also excluded from the community(ies) of those who 
degrade and stereotype them. Both this deprivation and exclusion dehumanizes targeted group 
members, while also setting them apart from the rest of society as “fair game” for attack –again, 
based not on what they have done, but upon what they are (Kelman, 1973: 50). And what they 
are, in the case of dehumanization, is always allegedly something “subhuman, despicable, and 
certainly incapable of evoking empathy” (Kelman, 1973: 50). 
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   Target groups are also further dehumanized in other ways through the routinization and 
authorization processes.  In addition to the routinization process’s language of illusion, the 
dissociation that this process produces desensitizes members of the perpetrating group to the pain 
and suffering of the targeted group.  Likewise, the authorization of atrocities against the targeted 
group, as well as any corresponding pseudo-justifications and transcendental missions, which 
view the targeted group as standing “in the way” of “progress,” dehumanizes members of the 
targeted group.  In addition to the contributions of these first two processes to the process of 
dehumanization, participation in the process of dehumanization itself further contributes to this 
process, since: 
[t]he only way [perpetrators or dissociated bystanders] can justify what is being 
done to these people, both by others and by themselves, and the only way they 
can extract some degree of meaning out of the absurd events in which they find 
themselves participating is by coming to believe that the victims are subhuman 
and deserve to be rooted out. (Kelman, 1973: 47) 
 
To decide otherwise, and to side with the victims, would require action. It would require 
confronting –perhaps in an ongoing fashion—the perpetrators, and such actions may result in the 
confronter becoming the target of attacks him or herself (Lifton, 2004).  However, a worse, 
though perhaps less obvious, fate awaits those who refuse to side with the victim and chose to 
side, instead, with the perpetrator.  As Herman (1992: 7-8) remarks, in conditions of atrocity and 
victimization, there is no middle ground.  In refusing to side with the victim, one is choosing 
(explicitly or implicitly) to side with the perpetrator.416
                                                 
416 “When events are natural disasters or ‘acts of God,’ those who bear witness sympathize 
readily with the victim.  But when traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness 
are caught in the conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to remain 
neutral in this conflict.  The bystander is forced to take sides. 
  And in doing the latter, one internalizes 
     It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator.  All the perpetrator asks is that the 
bystander do nothing.  He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil.  The 
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the dehumanization of the victim, therefore aiding one’s own dehumanization by constricting 
one’s community and involvement with humanity, as well as by losing a part of one’s moral 
restraint, one’s capacity to feel, and thus a part of one’s identity (Kelman, 1973: 50-52).  Jack 
Forbes (2008) made a similar observation, involving not just one’s capacity to feel for other 
human beings, but for all things: 
[O]ne should feel the pain and sorrow of killing a brother or sister, whether it is a 
weed, a tree or a deer.  If one does not feel that pain, one has become brutalized 
and “sick.” One is, in short, out of harmony with the Universe. (P. 14) 
 
     All three of the processes that Kelman (1973) identified as being necessary for the weakening 
of human being’s innate moral aversion to violence and killing are endemic in Western society, 
and have been normalized “in the structure of our political and social systems and reinforced in 
daily life” (p. 52), as much of chapter 2 has demonstrated.  In Canada, these processes have long 
been employed to target Native peoples whose lands, resources and trust funds have been 
coveted by non-Native settlers.  To these ends, Native peoples were historically categorized as 
“fair game” for non-Native perpetrations, including the settlement and development on Native 
lands. Campaigns were waged that had the explicit goals of exterminating Native peoples 
(Upton, 1977; Reid, 1993a & 1993b) and, more often, the pursuit of policy objectives (such as 
taking Native lands, resources and trust funds) did and has often lead to the ordered, encouraged, 
approved and permitted the commission of violence and atrocities against Native peoples.  Aside 
from instances of outright genocide (Upton, 1977; Reid, 1993a & 1993b), Native peoples 
throughout Canada have also been subjected to the atrocities of injury, uprooting, and/or 
displacement, as well as the destruction of their lands, the source of their livelihoods, their social 
structures, and their ways of life.  As a group with a long history of being victimized by non-
                                                                                                                                                             
victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain.  The victim demands 
action, engagement, and remembering.”(Herman, 1992: 7-8) 
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Natives, Native people make an easy, obvious target in Canadian society, and are the group most 
often targeted for non-Native projections and scapegoating.  Further, as a group with a long 
history of victimizing other peoples, non-Natives in Canada, and throughout Western society, 
frequently engage in projections, scapegoating, degrading and dehumanizing Native peoples as 
almost second nature, and without even being consciously aware of the fact that they are doing 
so.  In other words, the dehumanization of Native peoples in Canada has not only long been 
authorized, it has also long been routinized, becoming part and parcel of the fabric of Canadian 
society (as it is among other settler state populations, as well). 
     The next section will examine some of the ways in which these processes were reasserted by 
government officials and others in positions of authority during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest. 
THE LANGUAGE OF DEHUMANIATION AND DISPOSSESSION 
The Confederacy Council is not a splinter group or a special interest group.  We 
are the government of Six Nations: We hold these treaties and lands in our 
jurisdiction.  Canada has the ability to end this now --they've had the ability for 
300 years. We the Chiefs are sending this message back with Mr. Coyle, that the 
development of our land in Caledonia must stop and that talks between the 
federal government and the Confederacy Chiefs [must start] not only over this 
dispute, but over what has happened to our lands and trust fund. Canada must 
come to the table with people mandated to make decisions, not fact finding.  Our 
people have been waiting for 300 years.  Our neighbors are waiting and need 
their government to act. 
~ Mohawk Chief Allan MacNaughton, quoted in Smith 2006a, 1 
 
Incidents led by splinter groups are arguably harder to manage as they exist 
outside negotiation processes to resolve recognized grievances with duly elected 
leaders. We seek to avoid giving standing to such splinter groups so as not to 
debase the legally recognized government. Incidents are also complicated by 
external groups such as Warrior Societies or non-Aboriginal counter-protest 
groups. 
~ Indian and Northern Affairs Canada presentation to the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police, quoted in Diablo & Pasternak 2011 
 
All three of the processes that Kelman (1973) identified in the loosening of moral restraint --
authorization, routinization and dehumanization—were prevalent in the reactions of non-Native 
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authorities to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.  A thorough examination of the ways in which 
federal, provincial and local authorities engaged in these processes would require considerable 
space, and thus goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.  Therefore, the below section will 
primarily consider some of the ways in which one particular type of behavior, engaged in by 
federal, provincial and local authorities, contributed to the processes of authorization, 
routinization and dehumanization.  This particular type of behavior is the manipulation of facts 
through the use of language of illusion.  Examples of how various authorities engaged in this 
type of behavior, as well as some of the consequences of this behavior, are provided below 
merely to illustrate the concept, and to demonstrate the applicability of Kelman’s (1973) theory.  
The below discussion does not provide a comprehensive list of all possible examples of the this 
behavior, nor does it provide a full account of the other ways in which federal, provincial and 
local authorities engaged in the authorization, routinization and dehumanization processes. 
     The federal government employed the language of illusion to manipulate facts pertaining to 
the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest in a number of ways, all of which served to deny federal 
responsibility in resolving the protest, as well as discredit the claims of Haudenosaunee 
protesters and the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council.  For example, almost from the very 
start of the protest, the Minister of Indian Affairs, Jim Prentice, insisted that he had no 
responsibility to get involved in the dispute because it was not related to a land claim.  Instead, 
Prentice’s office characterized the dispute as a local dispute between the developer and the 
protesters or, alternatively, as a local dispute that “has nothing to do with the federal 
government” and should be resolved by the Ontario Provincial Police (Fragomeni, 2006; Legall, 
2006e; Muse, 2006h; Canadian Press, 2006i).  Though elsewhere federal officials acknowledged 
that the protest was related to a land claim (Best, 2006c & 2006e; Jackson, 2006h; Muse, 2006d 
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& 2007h), these officials generally kept to the line that the dispute should be resolved by 
Provincial Police rather than federal officials.   
     Though these incredibly inaccurate assertions may have been made with the sole intentions of 
protecting federal officials from public backlash by denying any federal responsibility in the 
situation, what they really accomplished was the creation of public backlash against the 
Haudenosaunee.  Members of the public who heard their government deny that the dispute was 
related to a land claim, were thus lead to believe that the protesters were lying about their 
grievances and disrupting the development and livelihood of the Henning brothers (the owners of 
the development company) without any justification whatsoever.  Failing to see any obvious 
motive for the Haudenosaunee protest, local non-Native residents began to fill in the blanks 
themselves, deciding that the Haudenosaunee were unjustifiably protesting and disrupting the 
lives of local developers purely out of a selfish need for attention or a criminal, thug-like desire 
to extort innocent non-Native residents.  Thus, the federal government’s denial of it’s own 
responsibility in the dispute, no matter what the original intent of this denial was, served to 
drastically escalate non-Native misunderstandings of the Haudenosaunee protest, as well as non-
Native anger towards (and non-Native willingness to commit violence against) the 
Haudenosaunee protesters/ Native people.   
     These federal denials also hurt relations between non-Native residents and the Ontario 
Provincial Police.  As non-Native residents repeatedly heard their federal officials insist that the 
matter was not related to land claims, and should be resolved by Provincial Police, local non-
Native residents became increasingly irate by the inaction of provincial police, even to the point 
of imagining themselves to be victimized by police inaction.  Some non-Native residents, in their 
anxiety-filled need to understand why the provincial police would not act when their federal 
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government had made clear it was their job to do so, attempted to construct stories that might 
explain this inaction.  One of the most common of these such stories was that either the 
Haudenosaunee (and Native people in general) were so incredibly thuggish that even the 
provincial police were “afraid” to act against them, or that the provincial police were so corrupt 
that they were working with the Haudenosaunee protesters, who were seen as organized crime 
(see Blatchford, 2010, for numerous examples of this sort of misguided thinking among non-
Natives who simply did not realize that their federal government was lying to them.  See also the 
third section of this chapter, for a fuller explanation on Canadian law in relation to Native land 
claims [and why it was absolutely, and solely, the federal government’s responsibility to resolve 
this dispute]). 
     Another tactic used by the federal government in denying its responsibility for getting 
involved in the dispute was to perpetuate misinformation and outright inaccuracies relating to the 
land under protest in 2006, and the corresponding land claims filed on that land.  These land 
claims and much of this misinformation was already discussed more thoroughly in chapter 1.  To 
summarize that discussion, the federal government –generally through anonymous federal 
officials—repeatedly told the media that the land under protest had been surrendered in 1841 
through an agreement with the full council of Haudenosaunee chiefs.  These assertions are, of 
course, entirely false (see chapter 1).  While it is possible that federal officials making these 
assertions were seeking only to protect themselves and their own jobs when they made these 
statements, the statements –like those discussed above-- served to enrage non-Native residents 
and pit them against the Haudenosaunee protesters.   
     Both types of denial discussed so far served to authorize non-Native attacks on 
Haudenosaunee protesters, as well as Native people in general.  Their federal government had 
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portrayed protester grievances as lies, and protesters as criminals (suggesting the protest was a 
matter for the police), and this signaled to non-Natives that the just and right thing was an end to 
the protest. When police did not step in to do this “just and right” thing, many non-Native 
residents sought to take it upon themselves to do this, feeling that this course of action had been 
authorized by federal statements (which, in many ways, it had).  Both types of behavior also 
served to reinforce the routinization of dispossessing Native peoples from their lands, resources 
and human rights.  As discussed in chapter 1, and examined more thoroughly in chapter 6, 
several non-Natives in town had built their livelihoods off of these dispossession processes, 
working in the development, construction, real estate or finance industries for decades, as others 
had done before them.  Non-Native development on Native land was a common, taken-for 
granted, normal activity that occurred daily.  Many non-Natives involved in these processes were 
largely unaware of the illegality of their actions, or of any pain and suffering they caused to 
Native people.  When the protest challenged this lack of awareness, the federal acts of 
authorization allowed non-Natives to remain dissociated from the consequences of their actions, 
and even to respond to potential reminders with anger (as if the reminders victimized non-
Natives, see chapter 6).  Finally, all of this inaccuracies served to dehumanize the 
Haudenosaunee protesters, and Native people in general, by portraying them, first, as people who 
dehumanize others (disrupting the lives of the owners of the development company for attention 
or for selfish personal gain through unjustified extortion), and second, as people who have no 
more rhyme or reason to their actions that these latter, selfish motives. 
     Haudenosaunee protesters were further dehumanized, and attacks against them were further 
authorized, by repeated federal and provincial characterizations of them and their traditional 
government as a “faction,” a small impatient group, or simply “the radicals” (Jackson, 2006k; 
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Dunfield & Howlett, 2006; Ontario, Legislative Assembly, 2006a).  This language portrayed the 
protesters and their traditional government as one-dimensional, selfish, dishonest, and 
manipulative (i.e., “subhuman”) individuals who were thus allegedly far different from non-
Native residents and their government.  This language also served as a signal to non-Natives that 
the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government were illegitimate, were part of a 
tiny group that did not represent the Haudenosaunee people as a whole, and were thus “fair 
game” for public derision, dehumanization and attack. Yet, as discussed in chapter 1, such 
characterizations were entirely inaccurate.  There was widespread support both for the protest 
and for the Haudenosaunee traditional government on the Six Nations reserve, the former of 
which is evidenced by the hundreds of people who flooded onto the protest site the morning of 
the police raid, in order to prevent the site from being taken out of protesters’ hands.  While, 
after 80 years of federal recognition and funding for the Six Nations Band Council, there was 
also some support for this federally-imposed government, this support is rather minor, by all 
appearances, and is certainly not more than the support for the Haudenosaunee Confederacy 
Council (on minor support for the Band Council, see: Burman, 2006a; Best, 2006b; Smith, 
2006a; Ahooja, 2008a; and the subsection on self-determination in the below section of this 
chapter).  
     Further evidence of the authorization and routinization of ongoing perpetrations against 
Native peoples within the geographical borders of Canada can be found in Paul Joffe’s (2010) 
article examining the Canadian government’s behavior during the negotiations around the 
adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). 
Domestically, Canada’s Harper government consistently made untrue or misleading claims to 
Parliament and provided information that was erroneous, contradictory, unjustly interpreted or 
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misinterpreted in ways which served to “generate public fear, opposition and discrimination,” 
against the UNDRIP and to pit non-Natives against Native peoples at home (Joffe, 2010: 166-68, 
170). For example, “Indian Affairs Minister Chuck Strahl publicly stated that the ‘rights of non-
native Canadians would have been threatened had the government not opposed’ the Declaration” 
and also claimed that the Declaration was incompatible with Western democracy (Joffe, 2010: 
167).  The Harper government also repeatedly refused to consult with indigenous peoples when 
preparing comments, reports, or proposals in relation to the UNDRIP or to Canada’s Universal 
Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council.  These refusals amounted to “repeated 
violations of the rule of law in Canada” in “both procedural and substantive terms” (Joffe, 2010: 
165), since the human right of indigenous peoples to consultation and accommodation, and to 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent were violated (see below section on these rights).  
Internationally, the Harper government engaged in similar behavior, omitting or providing 
erroneous and misleading information to other states regarding Canada’s support for the 
UNDRIP, 417 while secretly lobbying states with records of human rights abuses to vote against 
the UNDRIP.  In these and other ways, the Harper government “repeatedly violated the rule of 
law internationally,” by failing to “respect the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,” 
failing in its obligations to “uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of 
human rights,” and pursuing “the lowest standards of any Council member within the Western 
European group of States” (Joffe, 2010: 170).418
                                                 
417 For example, Canada told other states that it “supported the renewal of the mandate of the 
Special Rapportueur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous 
peoples,” but neglected to mention that Canada’s support was conditioned on the proposal that 
the UNDRIP not be implemented within Canada. (Ibid, 167-68). 
  All of these behaviors demonstrate a clear 
418 “During its three-year term [on the Human Rights Council], Canada pursued the lowest 
standards of any Council member within the Western European group of States.” (Grand Council 
of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee) et. al., quoted in Joffe, 2010: 170). Though Joffe largely attributes 
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pattern of manipulation, misinformation and dishonesty used to target Native peoples who ‘stood 
in the way’ of Canadian “progress” (i.e., accumulation by dispossession).  These patterns clearly 
existed long before the 2006 Haudenosuanee protest, and was applied to the Haudenosaunee 
protesters and their traditional government just as they were applied to the Harper government’s 
attempts to undermine the UNDRIP. 
       Despite the inaccurate nature of the federal government’s characterizations of the 
Haudenosaunee protesters and traditional government during the 2006 protest, local authorities 
were quick to utilize them.  To this extent, after six weeks of requesting the federal government 
to step in and resolve the dispute, Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer finally announced her 
agreement with Indian Affairs Minister Jim Prentice’s decision not to negotiate with “the 
radicals (in the subdivision) out there” because doing so would “just be giving… more power” to 
“the Mohawks or the ones causing this problem from all across Canada” (Best, 2006g; Jackson, 
2006k).  The Mayor further asserted the futility of attempting to negotiate with the protesters or 
their government when she characterized not just these groups, but the Six Nations community, 
in general, as factionalized, noting that there were “four different factions of Natives that have to 
be consulted” (Pearce, 2006a). Likewise, the owners of the local development company, John 
and Don Henning, referred to the protesters and their traditional government as “a splinter 
group” that blocked their development and held them hostage (Henning, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c; 
                                                                                                                                                             
the above-summarized behaviors to a decline in Canada’s commitment to the human rights of 
Native peoples caused by Harper’s Conservative government, the majority of these tactics also 
appear in Canada and Ontario’s Statement of Defense against the HSN 1995 lawsuit (which 
simply asked for an accounting of HSN lands, resources, rents and trust funds).  See: Attorney 
General of Canada.  1996.  Statement of Defence of the Attorney General of Canada.  From: Six 
Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada and 
Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario. Ontario Superior Court of Justice, Brantford Ontario, 
Civil Division.  Filed January 15.  Reference File No. 406/95. (as well as Ontario’s statement of 
defense) 
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Henco Industries Limited, 2006).  These latter assertions characterized the Haudenosaunee 
protesters not only as a group of one-dimensional (sub)people who were fair game for derision 
and attack, but also as victimizers who held others hostage.  Portraying the protesters an their 
government in this light served to further authorize (and even mandate) attacks upon them by 
non-Natives who valued ‘justice’ and felt it was their duty to fight for it. 
     Also like the federal and provincial governments, both Haldimand County officials and the 
Henning brothers adopted the narrative that the claims of Haudenosaunee protesters and their 
traditional government were fabrications.  For example, at one of the first non-Native rallies 
against the Haudenosaunee protesters Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, along with local 
real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy, told the assembled residents and the media representatives that 
“There’s no doubt [the 1841 General Surrender] was done legally” (Pearce, 2006a).  Trainer 
further portrayed the protesters and their government –rather than Canadian, Ontario and 
Haldimand County officials-- as the ones who were unreasonably refusing to confront (or admit) 
the reality of the situation.  Though Trainer had been informed numerous times of the relevant 
Supreme Court of Canada rulings that were being violated by the development (Muse, 2006f & 
2006d; Windle, 2006a; Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Best 2006e; and see more on this in the next 
section), she chose to ignore these rulings entirely, even feigning ignorance at times, and making 
inaccurate claims.  These inaccurate claims included the assertion that officials were only 
required to notify –rather than consult with and accommodate-- the Haudenosaunee prior to the 
start of the development (Windle, 2006h).  They also included the assertion that a former Band 
Council Chief had previously supported and approved the development that was under protest 
(Legall, 20061; Muse, 2006j), obscuring the fact that the Band Council had never been given a 
voice in whether or not the development would proceed (and that the former Band Council Chief 
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vehemently denied such accusations).  Both of these statements were entirely false, yet the 
Mayor ignored her own fabrication of facts, and projected it onto the Haudenosaunee protesters, 
arguing that: “I guess the Natives are not believing anyone or anything”(Pearce, 2006a).   
     The Hennings similarly presented the protesters as unreasonable bullies, and presented 
themselves as innocent victims.  Part of this latter presentation involved regular (implicit and 
explicit) assertions by the Hennings that they had never been notified by the Haudenosaunee that 
there was a claim on the land until after their development was already well underway (Hamilton 
Spectator, 2006c; Best, 2006c).  This assertion was entirely false (Muse, 2006d; Windle, 2006a; 
Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Ahooja, 2006b), as was the former assertion by the Hennings that 
they were innocent victims.  In fact, according to Cayuga Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, Haudenosaunee 
women approached the Hennings when they first arrived to begin construction on the land.  
Rather than engage in a conversation about Haudenosaunee land rights, the Hennings reportedly 
kicked dirt on the women and told them to “bring it on”(Ahooja, 2006b). 
     To non-Native residents unaware of these manipulations and fabrications, the Haudenosaunee 
protesters and their traditional government were further portrayed as one dimensional, selfish, 
criminals who had no justifications for their behavior and who couldn’t care less about “the 
truth” or about anyone else.  Such portrayals served to further dehumanize the Haudenosaunee 
protesters and heir traditional government, and to authorize attacks against them and the alleged 
injustices that they were perpetrating.  As members of a group with a long history of 
victimization and dehumanization at the hands of non-Native settlers, these dehumanization and 
authorization processes, in many ways, had already long been routinized in Canadian society.  
Because of this, many angry non-Natives could fall back on these behaviors without question, 
and without concerns for empathizing or sympathizing with Native peoples –much less Native 
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peoples who were (allegedly) degenerate, criminal, thuggish, and so forth.  Thus, the conditions 
of atrocity, which had long existed in Canadian society, were quickly escalated by non-Native 
officials less than two months into the Haudenosaunee protest, and the stage was set for the 
angry and violent behavior that came to characterize non-Native opposition to the 
Haudenosaunee protest in the weeks and months ahead.419
     The news media also aided in the escalation of these processes of authorization, routinization 
and dehumanization.  Often treated as sources of objective, fact-finding, reporters and editors for 
local and regional media sources unquestioningly repeated federal and provincial versions of the 
alleged 1841 General Surrender.  Adding supposed support for these assertions, Band Council 
Spokesperson Dan David was misquoted by at least one news article as having stated that the 
land under protest was not part of one of the 28 claims filed by the Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
(Legall, 2006g).  Though the Band Council sent letters requesting that the paper retract and 
correct this statement, no retraction was made, and at least one other newspaper picked up the 
assertion and re-reported it as news (Jackson, 2006h).  These instances of misreporting furthered 
the perception of non-Native residents that the Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional 
government were a small minority of radicals who did not represent the rest of the Six Nations 
reserve –and who were thus, also, fair game for public derision and verbal (or even physical) 
attack.  Reporters gave additional credence to these beliefs by referring to the protesters and their 
government in exactly this manner (Jackson, 2005, 2006h, 2006g; Legall, 2006q, 2006l, 2006g; 
Gamble, 2006g; Brantford Expositor, 2006e), as well as by making false claims that Band 
Council Chief David General did not support the protest (Brantford Expositor, 2006e; Gamble, 
  
                                                 
419 Some of the most inflammatory statements made by Haldimand County residents, as well as 
by the Hennings, were not touched upon here due to time and space constraints.  Some of these 
statements will be recounted in chapter 6. 
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2006g, 2006f; Legall, 2006l). Yet, publicly, the Chief voiced neither support nor opposition to 
the protest, while several members of the Band Council did voice public support for it (Legall, 
2006g, 2006o; Hamilton Spectator, 2006c; Morse, 2006a; Gamble, 2006f; Canadian Press, 
2006h; Best, 2006c). 
     Other examples of media neglect, omission, false reporting, and so forth abounded during the 
2006 protest.  Though providing a full discussion of these goes beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, two more examples are worth giving.  One of these is the example of the news 
media’s reporting on the Supreme Court of Canada rulings.  A federal or provincial government 
refusing to follow its own federal Supreme Court rulings would seem like a major news story, 
and there was certainly no loss of mention of the violations of these rulings by Haudenosaunee 
protesters (or by the local Native press).  Yet, only a single non-Native news article so much as 
mentioned that there were Supreme Court of Canada rulings relevant to the protest, and this 
mention was made only as a passing reference –failing to give the name of the specific rulings at 
stake and lacking any description or explanation of what the rulings stated or how the protesters 
felt they applied (Best, 2006e).  The widespread omission of all mention of these rulings, 
including that these ruling even existed, reflected both the deeply-entrenched routinization of the 
processes through which non-Natives regularly discounted anything that Native protesters said, 
and the complicity of non-Native reporters in the pursuit of federal and provincial policy 
objectives, and in identifying as “fair game” Native peoples who asserted their land and treaty 
rights.  Further, by denying information on Canada’s legal system to interested non-Natives who 
expected to be informed by media sources, the local and regional media not only aided in the 
authorization of attacks on Haudenosaunee protesters, but it actually steered non-Native anger in 
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the sole direction of denying Haudenosaunee claims and believing –unquestioningly—federal 
and provincial politicians. 
     The second and last example is that of the media’s portrayal of Native protesters as angry and 
potentially violent.  This example is discussed more thoroughly in chapter 6, so while it is 
important to mention here, it will not be discussed further in this chapter. 
     All of the above-discussed manipulation of facts through the language of illusion served to 
dismiss and dehumanize Haudenosaunee protesters and their traditional government (and Native 
people in general) during the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, as well as to authorize and further 
routinize attacks against them.  None of these would have been possible or permissible to the 
extent that they occurred if Native people had not already been historically set apart from 
everyone else in Canada and made “fair game” for attack –i.e., if attack against them had not 
already been a routinized part of non-Native life in Canadian society.  Put simply, Native people 
had long been “in the way” of various policy objectives pursued by the British-Canadian, and 
now the Canadian and provincial governments.  The primary policy objective pursued by these 
governments historically and today has been the accumulation of capital –i.e., land, resources, 
trust funds, and even cheap labor-- through the dispossession of Native peoples from all of these 
forms of capital.  The next section, which is the third and last section in this chapter, will provide 
an overview of the Canadian and provincial government’s efforts towards these ends in the past 
several decades, using the dispossession of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations as illustration. 
ACCUMULATION BY DISPOSSESSION AND ONGOING HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS IN CANADA 
The above examples of some of the ways in which government, media, and other authorities 
misrepresented (and fabricated) facts surrounding the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest must be 
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contextualized within a broader, more long-standing tendency within Canada to dehumanize 
Native peoples while authorizing and routinizing violations of their human rights.  Without this 
broad, recent and more distant historical context, it seems unlikely that non-Natives locally and 
nationally would have so quickly and unquestioningly discarded everything the Haudenosaunee 
protesters stated, while embracing as true everything government officials, media representatives 
and local authorities said.  In fact, throughout Canada’s history local, regional and national 
colonial authorities have repeatedly constructed narratives intended to discredit Native peoples 
and to justify and promote the interests of non-Natives.  These latter interests have generally 
been focused on making personal, corporate or government gains through the dispossession of 
Native peoples from their lands and resources.  While the motives for such acts of dispossession 
have largely remained the same over time, the internationally recognized human rights of 
indigenous peoples have undergone dramatic changes, even in just the last decade.  Further, 
though the Canadian government has consistently opposed the international recognition of the 
human rights of indigenous peoples (Joffe, 2010), it is nonetheless legally bound to follow these 
human rights requirements for a number of reasons, including: it became a party to treaties and 
conventions that have since been recognized to also apply to the human rights of indigenous 
peoples; it both sought out and held a position on the Human Rights Committee, which requires 
strict adherence to particular human rights standards; it is a party to the Organization of 
American States Charter, which requires adherence to regional human rights standards; and 
international customary law has recognized certain human rights standards as customary norms 
or even peremptory norms (jus cogens), which are binding upon all states.  Most of these reasons 
will be discussed in the following sections.  The next section will also examine the various 
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reasons why the Canadian government might not be adhering to its international obligations 
regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples. 
Possible Reasons for the Canadian Government’s Failure to Adhere to International Standards 
for the Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
     Despite the fact that the Canadian government is legally bound to uphold a number of 
standards regarding the human rights of indigenous peoples, the vast majority of these standards 
have not been implemented domestically, as the Canadian Senate itself noted in 2001: 
Canada is not entirely fulfilling its international commitments….  Canadians and 
international human rights bodies have begun to notice this gap. … [T]he 
continued failure of governments in Canada to systematically address the 
domestic legal implications of international human rights treaties it has 
voluntarily ratified could leave this country open to charges of hypocrisy and has 
the potential to diminish Canada’s moral authority as a leading voice for human 
rights in the international arena. (Canada Senate, 2001; see also Canada Senate, 
2007; Poverty and Human Rights Centre, 2007) 
 
While there are a number of reasons why these human rights standards have not been 
implemented the best overall explanation for this failure is the ongoing drive by government 
officials and their corporate partners to accumulate capital through the dispossession of Native 
peoples from their lands, resources and human rights.  To demonstrate this, the various factors 
influencing the Canadian government’s non-compliance with these human rights standards will 
be briefly discussed below before the section proceeds with a discussion of some of the various 
means through which the Canadian government is continuing to dispossess Native peoples from 
their lands, resources and human rights. 
     The Canadian government’s failure to implement its international human rights obligations 
has sometimes been attributed to Canada’s extreme dualist approach to international law (de 
Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008). Under Canada’s dualistic approach to international law, the 
executive branch can sign and ratify international treaties and conventions, but it is it is generally 
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believed that specific legislation must be passed before these can have an effect in domestic law. 
Though this approach represents perhaps the most extreme form of dualism of any developed 
nation (de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 582), Canadian governing bodies have argued that 
this approach “safeguard[s] the democratic legislative process by ensuring that the laws and 
rights of the people are not altered without the consent of their elected and appointed 
representatives” (Canada Senate, 2001; de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 581). Some have also 
argued that this approach has promoted a lack of knowledge of Canada’s international human 
rights obligations among legislators, in particular during the years from 1968 to 2008 when 
treaties and conventions ratified by the Executive branch were not even tabled for review or 
debate in the House of Commons (de Mestral and Fox Descent, 2008: 608-614).  
     As problematic as Canada’s extreme dualistic approach to international law may be, it cannot 
fully explain the Canadian government’s failure to implement human rights treaties and 
conventions because there are already a number of other legal mechanisms through which 
international law can be, and is, integrated into Canada’s domestic law.  Some of these 
mechanisms include adoption,420 the presumption of conformity,421 inferred interpretation,422 
and consultation before ratification423 (Joffe, 2010).  But even more importantly, international 
customary law424 is a part of Canadian law,425
                                                 
420 Through adoption customary or sometimes conventional international law is adopted into 
domestic law. 
 and it has long been a rule of customary 
421 Through the presumption of conformity, domestic law is presumed to have been made in 
accordance with Canada’s customary and conventional international legal obligations. 
422 Through inferred interpretation, interpretation of Canada’s constitution and/or domestic law is 
to be informed by customary and conventional international human rights law. 
423 Through consultation prior to ratification, the federal government does not ratify or bind 
Canada to international treaties without first assuring that these treaties are consistent with 
existing or developing domestic legislation. 
424 Customary international law is concerned with patterns of behavior that are so frequently 
followed by states as to be considered the norm.  Once this norm is solidified, it becomes 
 303 
international law that treaty obligations must be honored (Vienna Convention, 1969, Article 26) 
and that a state cannot use its internal law as an excuse for failing to implement the provisions of 
a treaty by which it has bound itself (Ibid, Article 27). In other words, Canada’s international 
human rights obligations are no less binding upon Canada simply because Canada has failed to 
implement them.426
     The lack of political will among members of the Canadian judiciary to promote and protect 
(rather than persistently violate) the international human rights of indigenous peoples might be 
partly explained through critical legal and historical-legal studies. For example, following in the 
tradition of Gramsci (1971), Litiowitz (2000: 549) has explored the role of the legal system in 
 And while some of the gap between the ratification and implementation of 
Canada’s human rights obligations might be explained by a widespread lack of knowledge (de 
Mestral & Fox-Descent, 2008: 611-12, 582; Canadian Senate, 2001) among legislators, judges 
and lawyers, these are the very people who are supposed to be the most knowledgeable on all 
recent developments in law.  In other words, the same factors that lie behind the government 
failure to implement Canada’s international human rights obligations also appear to lie behind 
this lack of knowledge.  This is clearly a problem of political will. 
                                                                                                                                                             
customary law.  On the other hand, Conventional international law is that law which is regulated 
by treaty agreements or conventions, each of which must be signed and ratified by individual 
states.  Those states that chose to sign and ratify these treaties and conventions are (depending on 
the terms of the treaties and conventions) then legally bound to adhere to --and to implement-- 
the terms of the treaty or convention domestically. 
425 Customary international law is a direct source of domestic legal rules unless the legislature 
takes explicit measures to ensure that a particular customary rule does not have the force of 
domestic law. de Mestral & Fox-Decent, 2008, pp. 576-77 (citing R. v. Hape [2007] SCC 26, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 292, 280 D.L.R. (4th) 385). 
426 The Canadian Senate (2001) has acknowledged this:  
International human rights obligations are no less binding upon us than our 
domestic guarantees.  … Signature and ratification of international human rights 
treaties carries with it an obligation to submit to international scrutiny.  But, in 
addition, we have an obligation to effectively implement the rights within Canada 
See also: Vienna Convention (1969, Article 26); Shelton (2008, pp. 59-60). 
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legitimizing the actions of the state, supporting the interests of the powerful, and hiding its own 
partial and unjust rulings through a “worldview dominant code in which [some] claims are not 
afforded the status of rights.” Similarly, Williams (1982: 6) has remarked that the judiciary acts 
as a mere reflection of extension of the “political will and attitude” of the state; Kennedy 
(1979/1982: 34-35) has noted that the “legal system maintains the social structure of the 
capitalist state;” and Lâm (2000: 16) has asserted that the Supreme Court is more than willing “to 
supply whatever justification is needed for the actions of Congress.” All of these views fall in 
line with Becker’s (1963) assertions that deviance is created/labeled by those with social power. 
     Other critical legal scholars concerned with the phenomenology of judging have noted that, 
contrary to popular (hegemonic) perceptions that judges “find” the law, laws are not found but 
made (Cohen, Haines, and Cardozo, in Shuchman, 1979). Further, they are made by individuals 
who are drawn from the wealthiest and most privileged sectors of society (Devlin, 1995) and 
who, drawing their legitimacy from the societal status quo, may have a strong tendency to avoid 
decisions that challenge the legitimacy of this status quo  (Williams, 2008). Because of this, 
Haines (in Shuchman, 1979: 256) has noted that: “[a]s a rule, judge-made law represents the 
conviction of an earlier age and is characterized by conservatism.” Judges have also been noted 
to have strong predispositions towards the communities and institutions with which they most 
identify (Shuchman, 1979: 235-262; Kennedy, 1987), and to have various personal biases that 
impact the direction of their judicial rulings (Shuchman, 1979: 235-262; Kennedy, 1987). 
Williams (2008) have even suggested that, in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples, many 
judges may have “deep psychological needs” to see a particular outcome to a given case. 
Because it is virtually always possible for a judge to decide “almost any question any way, and 
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still be supported by an array of cases” (Cohen in Shuchman, 1979: 244) these desired outcomes 
can frequently be easily justified by judges without any clear appearance of bias. 
     Yet, while this literature explains how and why judges acting in their own interests are also 
acting in the interests of the powerful (with whom they likely identify) and the status quo (that 
gives them legitimacy), it doesn’t explain why the Canadian status quo is stacked so steeply 
against recognizing the human rights of indigenous peoples. This only becomes somewhat 
clearer when one examines the tremendous profits that are being made from the dispossession of 
indigenous peoples from their lands, resources, and human rights. A single example should 
suffice to illustrate this point. The trust fund accounts missing from one First Nations community 
in Canada, the Haudenosaunee, when calculated using the same compound interest methods that 
governments and corporations use to calculate interest, exceed $400 billion (Six Nations Lands 
and Resources, 2010). Historical documentation shows that this money was taken by British-
Canadian government officials, without the knowledge or consent of the Haudenosaunee, to pay 
various government debts and to fund various public and private construction projects, and has 
never been repaid. But this is only the money taken from the Haudenosaunee trust fund accounts. 
When one adds in monies lost from resources taken from community lands without payment, 
from outstanding unpaid rents and from lands wrongfully taken, the amount owed to this 
Haudenosaunee community –when calculated at 6% compound interest-- is well into the trillions 
of dollars and would bankrupt Canada if the government was ever required to repay it (Ibid). 
Yet, the Canadian government continues to take from this community, approving, and even 
mandating, settlement and development projects on lands under registered claim by the 
Haudensaunee. Further, this community is only one of five Haudenosaunee communities in 
Canada; and the Haudenosaunee are only one Confederacy of Native Nations out of hundreds of 
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First Nations within Canadian borders –the vast majority of which also have extensive stories of 
historical and ongoing dispossession. Clearly the capital that is being accumulated through the 
dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and human rights throughout Canada 
is enormous. 
     The theoretical framework that best seems to explain what is happening here is David 
Harvey’s theory of Accumulation by Dispossession (Harvey, 2003).  According to Harvey, 
capital’s insatiable appetite for new profit-making ventures constantly requires the exploitation 
of something outside of itself in order to continue its process of accumulation (Harvey, 2003: 
141). This ‘something outside’ can either be actively manufactured from within (such as through 
budget cuts, austerity measures and/or massive lay-offs, which create downward pressure on 
wages, and thus new profit-making ventures), or they can be pre-existing, non-capitalist 
formations on the outside (such as new “empty lands,” new sources of raw materials, and/or non-
capitalist social forms that can be co-opted and privatized, for example, education).  In either 
case, “[t]he state, with its monopoly of violence and definitions of legality, plays a crucial role in 
both backing and promoting these processes” (Harvey, 2003: 145).  To put it another way, the 
Canadian government is aiding and abetting the dispossession of indigenous peoples from their 
lands, resources and human rights because the state “couldn’t grow if it had to pay, because it 
couldn’t afford to pay, so the simplest thing was just to take the land without paying.”427
Dispossession by Legislation and Judicial Silence 
 
     One example of how the Canadian government is dispossessing indigenous peoples of their 
lands, resources, and human rights is through the ongoing use of colonial era legislation that 
allows the government to infringe upon the human right of self-determination. Protection of the 
                                                 
427 Williams (2008: 246) is talking about the dispossession of indigenous peoples within the 
United States, but the same holds true for Canada. 
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right of peoples to self-determination is one of the founding purposes of the United Nations, as 
acknowledged in the United Nations Charter (1945).428
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development. 
 This right has also been enshrined in a 
number of international treaties and conventions to which Canada is a party (and by which 
Canada is legally bound).  For example, articles 1 of the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) (1967) and the International Convention on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1967) both state that:  
 
     Though settler state governments such as the Canadian, United States, Australian and New 
Zealand governments have argued that these rights apply only to states, the UN Human Rights 
Committee has stated quite clearly that these rights apply to indigenous peoples and have 
“bearing upon the obligations of states” towards them (Anaya, 2000:87). In fact, it would be 
discriminatory to construct a lesser right of self-determination for indigenous peoples than for 
everyone else (Lâm, 2006: 154; Joffe, 2010, 179-80, notes 321 and 322), and the Canadian 
government is bound by both conventional and customary international law to refrain from 
violating the norms against racial discrimination.429 Further, the inherent right to self-
determination is part of international customary law (Anaya, 2004: 97; Joffe, 2010: 133; 
D’Amato, 1997: 136-38)430
                                                 
428 See also: Harvard Law School (2010: 33, note 93). 
 and is considered by some to be such a foundational human right as 
429 See for example: the International Covenant for the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD) (1966); UN Charter (1945, article, 1 [on “respect for the principles of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”]); also see ICCPR (1967, article 2(1)) and 
ICESCR (1967) article 2(2)); Joffe (2010: 132 & 183, notes 65, 66, 344). 
430 The Canadian judiciary acknowledged the right to self-determination as customary 
international law in: Reference Re Session of Quebec ([1998]: para. 114)  
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to be a prerequisite to the exercise of all other human rights, as well as a peremptory norm431 and 
a part of jus cogens432 (Anaya, 2004: 97; Joffe, 2010: 133, Lâm, 2006: 155). As such, some have 
even argued that, in cases where human rights comprising jus cogens are violated, concerns over 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity “may be offset to the extent required by an appropriate 
remedy,”433 and international human rights law can take precedence over domestic laws that 
violate these.434
     Under its international legal obligations, Canada is not only required to refrain from violating 
Native peoples’ inherent right of self-determination, but it is also required to respect, protect and 
promote this right
   
435 and to provide judicial remedies for domestic violations of this and other 
human rights (ICCPR, 1967, article 2(3)). But though the Canadian government has 
internationally recognized the inherent right to self-determination of indigenous peoples,436 
domestically it has only recognized the lesser right to indigenous peoples’ self-government of 
indigenous peoples.437
                                                 
431 A norm from which no derogation is permitted. 
 And though it has recognized this right as an inherent human right that is 
432 The “compelling law” that all countries must follow. 
433 “[S]ince the atrocities and suffering of the two world wars, international law does not much 
uphold sovereignty principles when they would serve as an accomplice to the subjugation of 
human rights or act as a shield against international concern that coalesces to promote human 
rights. … [W]here there is a violation of self-determination and human rights, presumptions in 
favor of territorial integrity or political unity of existing states may be offset to the extent 
required by an appropriate remedy. Furthermore, heightened international scrutiny and even 
intervention is justified in the degree to which violations of human rights are prone to lingering 
unchecked by decisions makers within the domestic realm.” (Anaya, 2004: 109-10). See also: 
Joffe (2010: 183-84). 
434 “The right of self-determination is generally to be considered jus cogens…. Territorial 
integrity, on the other hand, while a fundamental principle… does not enjoy this status” (Lâm, 
2006, p. 155). See also: Anaya (2004: 109-10); Joffe (2010: 179-80, notes 321 and 322). 
435 UN Charter (1945, article 56), ICCPR (1967, articles 1(3) and 2), ICESCR (1967, articles 
1(3) and 2), Harvard Report (2010: 32, Note 87). 
436 Canadian Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights Working Group on the Draft 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Oct. 31, 1996 (quoted in Anaya, 2004: 111). 
437 Canada. Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development (MAAND) (1995/2005). 
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protected under s. 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982,438 it has continued to drastically 
limit this right for First Nations throughout Canada439 under colonial era legislation known as the 
Indian Act (1985 s. 74)440
     The case of the Haudenosaunee can offer an illustration of how the Canadian government 
attempts to limit the inherent right to self-determination. In 1924, after numerous attempts by the 
Haudenosaunee to get an accounting from the Canadian government for what it did with 
Haudenosaunee trust funds, lands, and resources, the Haudenosaunee sent a representative to 
Britain and then to the League of Nations to seek international support. Though the 
Haudenosaunee found some sympathy for their struggles abroad, their representative was not 
allowed to present Haudenosaunee grievances to the League of Nations.  Further, the Canadian 
government retaliated against the Haudenosaunee for this international embarrassment, 
outlawing the Haudenosaunee government (the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council) and 
orchestrating a raid upon the homes and Council House of the Haudenosaunee Chiefs by the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The RCMP arrested Chiefs, broke open the 
Haudenosaunee government safe, stole several Wampum belts,
  
441
                                                 
438 MAAND (1995/2005), Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) (2010: 38). 
 built an army barracks, and 
announced the imposition of a new system of government upon the Haudenosaunee people 
(Woo, 2003). According to Cayuga sub-Chief Leroy Hill, in the supposedly “free elections” that 
created the federally-funded, created and controlled Six Nations Band Council, only 13 or 14 
people voted, and several people voted twice, creating a total of 27 votes in a community of 
439 MAAND (1995/2005), Joffe (2010: 180-81). 
440For a fuller description of the various provisions of Canada’s Indian Act legislation see: 
Mathias & Yabsley (1991). 
441 Wampum belts are records of treaty agreements. 
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thousands (Hill, quoted in Ahooja, 2008). With this move, the Canadian government claimed to 
have brought “democracy” to the Haudenosaunee people.442
     Despite these claims, what the Canadian government really did was make it much easier to 
dispossess the Haudenosaunee people without accountability.  The Canadian Senate (2010) has 
acknowledged as much, admitting that Band Council systems of government are far less 
democratic than traditional Native systems of government, and far less accountable to their 
constituents than they are to the Canadian government.  For example, Menno Boldt remarked in 
a Canadian Senate hearing: 
   
[A]lthough band/tribal chiefs and councillors must seek the vote of their people, 
their mandate to govern comes from DIAND [the Department of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development]. This puts elected Indian officials (chiefs and 
councillors) and the appointed bureaucrats in an inevitable position of political 
subordination to DIAND officials, rather than to the people who elect and appoint 
them. (2010: 69)  
 
Regardless of these observations, the Canadian government refused to acknowledge the still 
existing and operating Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council for over 80 years, preferring instead 
to work with the federally created, funded, and controlled Six Nations Band Council.  By doing 
so, the Canadian government was able to bypass the Haudenosaunee’s traditional system of 
government which makes decisions based on consensus and which prohibits the sale or 
alienation of land. As a representative system of government, rather than a participatory 
democracy like the Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council, the Band Council can and does 
frequently strike deals with federal or provincial governments or with corporations without the 
approval of the Haudenosaunee community.  In addition, as a federally funded, created, and 
                                                 
442 In addition to the less than democratic voter turnout, the irony here also lies in the fact that 
most Native nations throughout the Americas were participatory democracies, and were far mare 
democratic and inclusive than any western elected system that has been imposed upon them.  
See, for example: Stannard (1992: 47-48, 110), Williams (1982: 12-13, 33), Akwesasne Notes 
(2005: 34), Canada Senate (2010). 
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controlled body of government, the Band Council is generally prohibited from seeking the 
“return” of lands claimed by the Haudenosaunee, because doing so goes against Canadian 
policy.443
Dispossession Contrary to Supreme Court Rulings 
 
     The Canadian judiciary has largely remained silent on indigenous peoples’ human right to 
self-determination, and on the lesser right, recognized (but drastically limited) by the Canadian 
government to self-government. But in other instances, members of the judiciary have been quite 
vocal in recognizing and protecting the some limited forms of the human rights of indigenous 
peoples.  While doing so may seem to break with the status quo in Canada, recognizing only a 
limited version of the human rights of indigenous peoples actually reflects a strong reformist 
strand within Canada’s societal status quo.  This reformist strand does not appear to be intent on 
disrupting or halting the ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples in Canada, as Canadian 
courts do not allow Native nations to veto infringements to their land rights (Haida, 2004 at 48) 
and do not require that Native peoples consent to these infringements (Haida, 2004 at 48-49; 
Delgamuukw, 1997 at 168).  Instead, the reformist strand seeks to end the use of force employed 
in the dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and human rights, as well as to 
more actively involve indigenous peoples in the projects that dispossess them through 
compromises that possibly address some of the grievances of indigenous peoples in relation to 
these projects (Haida, 2004 at 43-50). In other words, they seek to provide this process with 
some legitimacy by requiring that the Canadian or provincial governments compromise in some 
cases, depending upon “a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the 
                                                 
443 This policy will be discussed further in the section on “Dispossession through judicial 
assistance.” 
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existence of the right or title, and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the 
right or title claimed”(Haida, 2004 at 39, 43-45). 
     However, these Supreme Court of Canada rulings do require that federal and provincial 
governments engage in consultation with indigenous peoples at the earliest possible stages of 
projects that might adversely impact outstanding Native rights and interests (Haida, 2004; Taku 
River, 2004; Mikisew, 2005). Taking into account the extremely drawn out nature of Canadian 
court or land claims processes,444 and the Canadian government’s tendency to dismiss Native 
claims outright445 these court rulings have held that this consultation is mandatory regardless of 
whether Native rights or interests have yet been proven in court. And though there is no right to 
veto decisions and in some cases only a very minimal standard of consultation is required 
(Haida, 2004 at 39), even in these cases the Court has held that consultation must be meaningful 
(Mikisew, 2005 at 54); must be undertaken “in good faith, and with the intention of substantially 
addressing the concerns of the aboriginal peoples whose lands are at issue;”(Haida, 2004 at 42) 
and “cannot exclude from the outset any form of accommodation” (Mikisew, 2005 at 54).446
     These Canadian Supreme Court rulings meet a considerable portion of Canada’s legally 
binding international human rights obligations to consult indigenous peoples with the objective 
of obtaining their consent prior to making any decisions that might affect them (Human Rights 
Council, 2009 at 43-44, 46; International Labor Organization (ILO) C 169, 1989, articles 15 & 
   
                                                 
444 There are over 800 outstanding land claims registered in Canada, and new claims continue to 
be registered every year. Through the Canadian land claims process it takes an average of 13 
years to resolve a land claim, but claims can easily take two and even three decades before they 
are resolved (Canada Senate, 2006).  
445 See the next section on Dispossession through judicial assistance, which discusses Canada’s 
policy of extinguishment. 
446 “Consultation that excludes from the outset any form of accommodation would be 
meaningless. The contemplated process is not simply one of giving the Mikisew an opportunity 
to blow off steam before the Minister proceeds to do what she intended to do all along.” 
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6(2)). This duty to consult is “firmly rooted in international human rights law”(Human Rights 
Council, 2009 at 38), including several core international human rights treaties by which Canada 
is bound,447 as well as “the overarching right of indigenous peoples to self-determination” 
(Human Rights Council, 2009 at 41). This duty is further grounded in the right of indigenous 
peoples’ to sovereignty over natural resources (Harvard, 2010: 34 note 2) as well as the right to 
cultural integrity,448 (which is inextricably linked to rights to use their traditional lands and to 
participate in decisions relating to that land449) and the right to property and non-discrimination 
(Human Rights Council, 2009 at 41). But under international law, states have more than just the 
duty to consult Indigenous peoples, they have a duty to uphold a higher standard of Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent (FPIC),450 meaning that “even after the rights of others are fully and fairly 
considered, the FPIC of Indigenous peoples must prevail”(Joffe, 2010: 191; Haida, 2004 at 24). 
Both committees overseeing state adherence to the ICESCR and the ICERD have upheld the 
FPIC standard in all matters directly relating to the specific rights of indigenous peoples.451
                                                 
447 Article 1(2) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR, supra note 1 reads: “All peoples may, for their 
own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any 
obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence.” See also article 47 of the ICCPR and article 12 of the ICESCR, supra note 1 stating 
that: “Nothing in the present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the inherent right of all 
peoples to enjoy and utilize fully and freely their natural wealth and resources.” 
 In 
448 ICCPR (1967, article 27); Human Rights Committee (1994, para. 7); CERD (1997 at paras. 4 
(a) & (e)); CESCR (2009 at 7, paras. 36 & 37); Human Rights Council (2009 para. 41). 
449 Harvard (2010: 36). 
450 A few of the international human rights bodies and reports that have recognized FPIC as an 
international human right include: CESCR, General Comment No. 21 (2009 at 37); ILO c. 169 
(1989 article 4); UN Commission on Human Rights (2006 at 4, para. 11); United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) (2008 articles: 10, 11(2), 19, 28(1), 
29(2), 32(2)); among other sources; CERD General Recommendation 23 (1997 at para 5). 
451 CERD has called upon states to “[e]nsure that members of indigenous peoples have equal 
rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to 
their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent” (CERD General 
Recommendations 23, 1997); and the CESCR has stated that “[s]tate parties should respect the 
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fact, the committee overseeing state adherence to the latter also recommended that states take 
steps to return lands and territories taken from Indigenous peoples without free prior and 
informed consent.452
     Regardless of these binding international human rights laws, and regardless of Canadian 
Supreme Court rulings, the Canadian government has repeatedly refused to consult with Native 
nations,
 
453 instead pushing ahead with resource extraction, development and settlement projects 
on lands claimed by Native nations. These repeated refusals represent the other strand in the 
Canadian status quo: those who remain grounded in an archaic, state-centered, Euro-centric, 
positivist legal paradigm that justifies colonization and empire building through the use of 
physical force. Adherents to this paradigm not only refuse to recognize the full expression of the 
human rights of indigenous peoples (like most reformers), but also refuse to recognize that 
indigenous peoples have human rights at all other than what individual states decide to grant 
them.454
                                                                                                                                                             
principle of free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples in all matters covered by 
their specific rights” (CESCR General Comment No. 21, 2009 at 7, para. 37). 
 Though many Native nations will not accept anything less than a full recognition of 
their internationally recognized human rights, and thus criticize reformist efforts as being too 
little too late, the failure of the Canadian and provincial governments to adhere to these reformist 
efforts when expressed in Canada’s own Supreme Court rulings predetermines the further 
452 CERD General Recommendations 23 (1997) (emphasis added). See also: Maya Indigenous 
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize (2004 paras. 115 & 117). 
453 As has been repeatedly noted by both international human rights monitoring bodies and 
international law scholars, some of the most recent of which include: Joffe (2010), CERD, 
Concluding Observations (2012 at para. 20).  
454 Both the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights have held that the 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to their lands originate from the laws and customs of Indigenous 
peoples, and exist independently of a state’s conception or legal recognition of them. (Maya 
Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize (2004) at 117; Gunn, 2007, at 81).  They 
have both also held that states must take measures “aimed at restoring, protecting and 
preserving the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral territories” (Maya Indigenous 
Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115). 
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alienation of indigenous peoples in Canada. In the face of these anti-reform efforts, Native 
peoples in Canada are more likely to refuse to assimilate into Canadian hegemony and polity 
because both are clearly demonstrated to be illegitimate.455
     A prime example of this dynamic can again be found in the case of the Haudenosaunee. 
Though the first two of these Supreme Court of Canada rulings were passed in 2004 (Haida, 
2004; Taku River, 2004), in 2005 the Ontario government passed legislation mandating 
settlement and development quotas on lands on which the Haudenosaunee still claim ownership 
and outstanding rights. Though the Haudenosaunee repeatedly requested that the Canadian and 
Ontario governments fulfill their consultation duties, both governments persistently refused to 
engage in even the most minimal form of consultation, treating the lands in question as if they 
were provincial lands.  Similarly, after an additional Supreme Court of Canada ruling mandating 
consultation was passed in 2005 (Mikisew, 2005), various construction and development projects 
were approved and/or started on lands under Haudenosaunee claim. The Haudenosaunee again 
made repeated demands that both the Canadian and Ontario governments consult with them 
before allowing these projects to move ahead, but both the Canadian and Ontario governments 
repeatedly refused to even acknowledge their duty to do so. In many ways, these persistent 
 And since national court systems, 
like national political systems, are demonstrated to be incapable of delivering even a limited 
form of human rights to Native peoples within Canada, acts of protest and occupation become 
the only hope for many Native nations wishing to stop the illegitimate destruction of their lands 
and the plundering of their resources and trust funds (Barvara, 2010; Enemark, 2010; Nishnawbe 
Aski Nation, 2012; Diabo & Pasternak, 2011; Walker, 2011). 
                                                 
455 Nothing in this statement should be interpreted to suggest the author is advocating 
assimilation.  On the contrary, the author is advocating nothing less than full recognition, 
protection and promotion by the Canadian government of the entire range of indigenous peoples 
internationally-recognized human rights. 
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refusals by the Canadian and Ontario governments forced the Haudenosaunee to choose between 
giving up their lands forever or occupying construction sites in protest.  The Haudenosaunee 
chose the latter route, and began a peaceful yet determined protest on a tract of land in 
Caledonia, Ontario in February 2006, stating that federal consultation with their traditional 
government was one of the requirements for the end of the protest. Federal officials refused to 
oblige the Haudenosuanee, and instead launched a pre-dawn police raid on the protesters some 
two months into the protest. The federal government’s ongoing refusals to acknowledge the 
Haudenosaunee’s legitimate grievances gave non-Native residents the impression that there were 
no legitimate grievances, and sparked a series of anti-protest (and in some cases, anti-Native) 
counter rallies and “near riots” (Harries & Rusk, 2006) in the community which is still struggling 
to heal from this turmoil six years later.  
     The whole situation, which virtually destroyed otherwise amicable relations between Native 
and non-Native locals and cost the province millions of dollars, could have been easily avoided 
had the Canadian and Ontario governments simply consulted with the Haudenosaunee.  But 
government officials reportedly did not want to send the “wrong message” to indigenous peoples 
across Canada who may also have been contemplating protests over their own human rights 
grievances. 
Dispossession Through Judicial Assistance 
     Other members of the Canadian judiciary are not always as reform minded as Canada’s 
Supreme Court justices, and many lower court judges frequent demonstrate the same anti-
reformists tendencies as the Canadian and provincial governments. To provide an example of 
this I will turn again to the case of the Haudenosaunee. As mentioned above, when 
Haudenosaunee people felt symbolically forced into a corner in 2006, with both provincial and 
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federal refusals to recognize their Supreme Court mandated rights to consultation and 
accommodation (much less their human rights to FPIC), they occupied a tract of land under 
Haudenosaunee claim, halted development on the land, and demanded that the federal 
government enter into talks with their traditional government in order to resolve outstanding 
Haudenosaunee claims on the land. Under the Canadian Constitution, only the federal 
government can resolve Native land claims, and only the federal government has jurisdiction 
over  “Indians and Lands reserved for Indians” (Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(24); Wilkins, 
2003). However, the Canadian government persistently refused to acknowledge its sole 
jurisdiction in the matter, and repeatedly insisted that the protest was a local matter that needed 
to be resolved by the Ontario Provincial Police.  
     In the jurisdictional vacuum that resulted, a provincial court judge asserted his jurisdiction 
over the dispute. Entirely ignoring his constitutional lack of jurisdiction in the matter, as well as 
the above-discussed Supreme Court of Canada rulings, the judge issued a series of injunctions 
criminalizing the Haudenosaunee protesters and ordering police to remove them, using physical 
force if necessary. The provincial court judge –who also owned land under Haudenosaunee 
claim456
                                                 
456 The judge was asked by the Haudenosaunee to remove himself from the case on the basis that 
his ownership of several parcels of land under Haudenosaunee claim constituted a conflict of 
interest, but after a brief self-review process the judge said he found no evidence of a conflict of 
interest --noting that virtually all judges owned land under claim by the Haudenosaunee and that:  
“[t]he land I own was acquired through the legal system… it’s the only legal system we have 
here.” ( Legall, 2006, March 17; Gamble, 2006, March 18). The former assertion appears to have 
been true, as even the courthouse where the hearing was held was built on lands under 
Haudenosaunee claim. 
-- justified his assertion of jurisdiction over the protest by claiming that the issues in his 
court were not about land at all, but were about the protesters’ contempt of court for refusing to 
heed previous provincial court injunctions demanding they move off of the land (Legall, March 
17; Gamble, March 18).  Despite these assertions, the judge also admitted that the case was, in 
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fact, about land when he justified his injunctions against the protesters on the grounds that, under 
Canada’s policy and practice of extinguishment, the Haudenosaunee would never regain 
recognition of title to their lands anyway.  Therefore, the best course of action for the judge was 
to weigh the “balance of convenience” in the case, which required avoiding the ‘undue 
inconvenience’ that the Haudenosaunee protest was creating for the development company 
(Legall, March 18; Best, March 22).  This was exactly the type of scenario that the Supreme 
Court of Canada had sought to avoid in its rulings mandating government consultation, as noted 
by the court in Haida (2004 at 14):  
[T]he balance of convenience test tips the scales in favour of protecting jobs and 
government revenues, with the result that Aboriginal interests tend to “lose” 
outright pending a final determination of the issue, instead of being balanced 
appropriately against conflicting concerns (Haida, 2004 at 14) 
 
     Aside from his explicit disobedience to Supreme Court of Canada rulings (and the Canadian 
Constitution), in citing the Canadian government’s policy of extinguishment as part of the basis 
for his ruling, the judge also directly violated another of Canada’s international, legally-binding 
human rights obligations: Canada’s obligation to end its practice of extinguishment. Under 
Canada’s policy and practice of extinguishment, the Canadian government refuses to “return” 
lands wrongly taken from Native nations, and demands that Native nations sign away all title, 
rights, and interests on their lands before the Canadian government will enter into negotiations 
aimed at resolving their outstanding land claims (Orkin, 2003: 446, 448, 453; Epstein, 2002: 51-
2). By persistently reasserting this policy, federal and provincial governments and legal systems 
routinely operate as if they can entirely disregard Native title and/or rights on their traditional 
lands --because government policy basically requires that these be extinguished (Ibid). This 
government policy and practice, however, has also been repeatedly cited and condemned by 
 319 
international human rights monitoring bodies including the CESCR (1998 at 18),457 the UN 
Human Rights Committee (1999), and the CERD (2002 at 17). In response to these international 
criticisms, the Canadian government renamed the practice (Orkin, 2003 at 453; Grand Council of 
the Crees, 2001; Kairos, 2006) and continue it per usual while claiming that “extinguishment” 
was no longer the practice in Canada. This response provoked additional criticism from both the 
CESCR (2006 at 16) and the Human Rights Committee (2005),458
[T]hat no matter what is negotiated, the inherent and constitutional rights of 
Aboriginal peoples are inalienable and cannot be relinquished, ceded or released, 
and that Aboriginal peoples should not be requested to agree to such measures in 
whatever form or wording.
 as well as from the UN High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (2004 at paras. 99, 19-32) who noted that “from a human rights 





In fact, international human rights law is increasingly recognizing a right to restitution for 
violations of these human rights and/or for property wrongly taken. For example, CERD has 
called upon states to: 
[T]o recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources and, where they 
have been deprived of their lands and territories traditionally owned or otherwise 
inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take steps to return 
those lands and territories.460
                                                 
457 “The Committee… endorses the recommendations of RCAP that policies which violate 
Aboriginal treaty obligations and the extinguishment, conversion or giving up of Aboriginal 
rights and title should on no account be pursued by the State Party.” 
 
458 “The State party should re-examine its policy and practices to ensure they do not result in 
extinguishment of inherent aboriginal rights….” 
459 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Mission to Canada, Addendum: Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
Peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, UN ESCOR, 61st Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/88/Add.3 (2 
December 2004) at para. 99, also see paras. 19-32. 
460 CERD General Recommendation 23, (1997 para. 5) (emphasis added).  See also: Shelton 




The above is just a partial exploration into some of the ongoing violations of the human rights of 
indigenous peoples in Canada, and some of the legislative and judicial mechanisms involved in 
dispossessing indigenous peoples from their land, resource, treaty and human rights. While 
Canada’s extreme dualistic perspective to international law might explain a small portion of 
these ongoing human rights violations, the numerous other mechanisms available for 
domestically implementing Canada’s international, and legally binding, human rights obligations 
demonstrate that the problem is not merely about Canada’s internal political processes. Further, 
though the above-examined evidence clearly supports the historical-legal and critical legal 
studies literature that describe legal systems as tools of state hegemony and enforcers of the 
status quo, or that describes judges as upper class individuals with various institutional and 
personal stakes in seeing cases decided in a particular way, this literature does not explain why 
the Canadian status quo is what it is.  The theory that best describes the political and legal 
motives for continuing to dispossess Canada’s indigenous peoples of their land, resource, treaty 
and human rights is David Harvey’s (2003) theory of Accumulation by Dispossession.   
     Yet, while Canada’s ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples is, like outright theft, 
highly conducive to capital accumulation, the Canadian government has come under increasing 
criticism in recent decades for its plummeting human rights record pertaining to the human rights 
of indigenous peoples (Joffe, 2010).  Despite this escalating criticism, in the past decade the 
Canadian government has done virtually nothing of substance to curb these abuses and the 
resulting criticisms. Instead, it has escalated them both in opposing developments in the human 
rights of indigenous peoples abroad (Joffe, 2010) and in ignoring Supreme Court rulings and 
fast-tracking environmental oversight for settlement and development projects (McCarthy & 
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Ibbitson, 2012), many of which will take place on lands claimed by indigenous peoples.  In 
doing so, the Canadian government is setting the stage for increased conflict with and protests by 
First Nations peoples whose domestic and international human rights are being entirely 
disregarded.  The Canadian government is also violating additional, legally binding international 
human rights obligations.  As international legal scholar Paul Joffe (2010: 140-41) has noted: 
“[n]o other people in Canada are automatically subjected to such consistently adverse and 
discriminatory treatment.” Whether looking at indigenous peoples’ inherent right to self-
determination, their rights to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent, or their rights to enjoy their 
lands, resources and rights without the constant threat and requirement of extinguishment, the 
Canadian is persistently engaging in human rights violations that are “racially motivated” and 
“applied exclusively and prejudicially to indigenous peoples” who do not enjoy the same legal 
protections for their properties and human rights as all other people within Canada (Epstein, 
2002. 50, 53-54). Though indigenous peoples have collective human rights that are in some ways 
different from the individual human rights of the majority of the people living within Canada, the 
Canadian government should afford these rights the same level of protection as is afforded to the 
human rights of all other people within its borders.  To fail to do so is adversarial and 
discriminatory, as has been repeatedly noted by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD, 2007 at 21 & 22; CERD, 2002 at 17; CERD 2008).  
     For all of these reasons, there is a mounting crisis of political and legal legitimacy in Canada 
and it does not appear that steps will be taken to mitigate or reverse this growing crisis any time 
soon. It does, however, appear that there is a growing awareness and concern regarding Canada’s 
ongoing human rights violations internationally, as well as domestically (Canada Senate, 2001; 
Joffe, 2010), as well as a growing recognition that restitution and/or payment of reparations for 
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breach of international obligations is supported in international law (CERD, 1997 at 5; Maya 
Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115; Shelton, 2008: 59-60), and 
that the failure to provide restitution  “engages the international responsibility of the states” 
(Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 2004 at 115, 117; Gunn, 2007 at 
81; Lâm, 2006: 152) and may offset state rights to sovereign, territorial integrity to the extent 
required by international intervention towards finding an appropriate remedy (Anaya, 2004: 109; 
Joffe, 2010: 179-80, 183-84; Lâm, 2006: 55).  This means that the Canadian government has 
maneuvered itself into a difficult position, and unless it takes immediate steps to remedy the 
ongoing wrongs committed against indigenous peoples within its borders and to restore to them 
lands that have been wrongfully taken and rights that have been wrongfully disregarded, it may 
soon find itself in a lose-lose situation where its ability to govern is threatened by internationally 
and domestically plummeting legitimacy, and its ability to enhance this legitimacy is threatened 
by its inability to afford the restitution owed to indigenous peoples without bankrupting the 
country. Only time can tell if the Canadian government will wise up and acknowledge its 
responsibilities to indigenous peoples before it finds itself in this lose-lose situation. Judging 
from past and current government actions, however, the prognosis is quite bleak. 
CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
As has been demonstrated, the historical patterns through which non-Natives have accumulated 
gains through the dispossession indigenous peoples from their lands and resources are not only 
ongoing in Canada, but constitute a social norm that is deeply engrained in the Canadian psyche.  
Government policies and practices have perpetually reinforced this norm through the processes 
of authorizing and routinizing the dispossession and dehumanization of Native peoples, all for 
the pursuit of policy objectives (primarily, non-Native capital accumulation).  The effects of 
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these policies and practices upon non-Native attitudes towards Native peoples, in particular how 
these played out in the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, will be examined in chapter 6.  But first, 
chapter 5 will examine the underlying foundations of the above-discussed forms of 










We have every right to stand here and call ourselves a nation. We need that spirit 
to enter this. 
~ Haudenosaunee Confederacy Sub-Chief Leroy Hill, March 27, 2006, quoted in 
Best 2006b 
 
It is scarcely necessary to point out that as international law is a product of the 
special civilization of modern Europe, and forms a highly artificial system of 
which the principles cannot be supposed to be understood or recognised by 
countries differently civilized, such states only can be presumed to be subject to it 
as are inheritors of that civilization.  
~ Hall 1924 
 
The European description [of European-Native relations] has often been based 
on political expediency rather than historical fact, and governments have not 
hesitated to rewrite history where convenient. … [Laws are] merely a reflection 
of the political will of a government or a sovereign, which the court has limited 
powers to interpret…  It is rare that courts have acted as anything but an 
extension of the state’s political will and attitudes. When they have, the laws have 
been changed to set the courts back on course.  
~ Williams 1982 
 
The conflicting ideas represented in the fist two introductory quotes reflect the diametrically 
opposed worldviews that are at the heart of all of Canada’s ongoing violations of the rights of 
indigenous peoples (discussed in chapter 4).  The Haudenosaunee, like many Native nations 
throughout North America, insist that they never surrendered the sovereignty that they have 
exercised over their lands and resources since time immemorial.  Meanwhile, the Canadian 
government, like other settler state governments, has asserted that it holds sole sovereignty over 
all First Nations people and lands that are located within Canadian borders.  Also like other 
settler state governments, the Canadian government has largely justified this assertion through 
                                                 
461 Note to the reader: this chapter is really just a partial draft of a longer paper that still needs 
plenty of work.  As a result, much of the information that I would like to include to make my 
argument is, unfortunately, not included here, and much of what is included here is not nearly as 
complete or well-written as I would prefer.  My arguments here are therefore partial, and readers 
should look to future work rather than rely alone upon this chapter. 
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reference to an 1823 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that relied on interpretations of medieval 
Christian legal concepts such as discovery, conquest, and terra nullius (Johnson v. M’Intosh, 
1823).  However, this paper argues that, at the time Europeans invaded North American shores, 
these concepts did not have legal force that was attributed to them by U.S. Supreme Court Chief 
Justice John Marshall or successive legal scholars. Though these concepts were ever-present 
fixtures in settler rhetoric and anti-Native sentiment from the start of the European invasion of 
North America, these concepts did not form the basis of international law during the period in 
question, and thus do not provide a justification for European assertions of sovereignty over 
Native peoples and their territories. Rather, European assertions of sovereignty over territories 
that had not been acquired by Native nations constitute actions that ran contrary both to 
international law and, often, to the laws of the respective European sovereigns.  Consequently, 
there was (and is) no legal justification for these assertions of sovereignty, and settler state 
governments will eventually have to reconcile with this fact and begin the long and painful 
process of reexamining these assertions in light of this reality.  
CURRENT SOCIOLEGAL SCHOLARSHIP  
There is a growing body of literature that examines the doctrines of discovery, conquest, and 
terra nullius as they were used by U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s 1823 decision in 
Johnson v. M’Intosh to justify the past and ongoing dispossession of Native peoples within the 
borders then claimed by the United States.  Arguing that the concepts which formed the basis for 
Johnson’s 1823 ruling constituted a legal, but immoral, basis for European assertions of 
sovereignty over Native peoples, many of the preeminent scholars on this issue have been a part 
of the international campaign to raise awareness and to pressure the Catholic Church to renounce 
its historic and present day support for the doctrines. Such scholars include –but are not limited 
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to-- Miller (2006), Miller & D’Angelis (2012), Newcomb (2008 & 2010), Frichner (2010), and 
Keal (2003). While the Pope has consistently refused to meet with Indigenous activists on this 
issue, and the Catholic Church has not yet issued any formal statement either way on the 
continuing (and original) validity of these medieval concepts, the campaign has met with 
considerable success in other areas – such as through renunciation of the concepts by individual 
churches and denominations (see for example: Native News Network, 2012; Sison, 2010; 
Toensing, 2009), and condemnation of these concepts by international human rights monitoring 
bodies (which will be discussed more later). 
     While there is a generally agreement among scholars as to the problematic, racist, Christian- 
and Western-centric nature of these concepts, other scholars have expressed some disagreement 
on the extent to which particular concepts were relied on by Western Europeans who asserted 
sovereignty over Native lands and peoples during the half-millennium of European imperial 
colonization. For example, examining the British quest for property in nineteenth century South 
Africa, Bennett & Powell (1999: 458, 455-56) trace the evolution of the concept of terra nullius 
over time and argue that, according to both state practice and the original meaning of the term, it 
could never have justified taking the property of a people who had some form of social 
organization (including nomads), no matter when this concept was applied. McNeil (2000: 11) 
likewise argues that though discovery and effective possession allowed Europeans to acquire 
sovereignty over terra nullius lands, if these lands truly belonged to no other sovereign, Native 
nations in the Americas fit the criteria for sovereign nationhood just as much as fledging 
European nation-states did at the time (see also: Miller, 2009: 3; Lenzerini, 2006: 163). Thus, the 
doctrine of terra nullius could not have provided legal justification for European assertions of 
sovereignty over Native peoples on these continents. Of course, despite this, some Europeans 
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sought ways to define lands inhabited by Native nations as terra nullius, but according to McNeil 
(1999: 12) European discovery claims to lands that were not truly terra nullius were rarely taken 
seriously by other European nations unless these claims were also accompanied by effective 
possession and control over the territory.  
     Others, such as Lenzerini (2006: 164), argue that, with one exception, European nations 
routinely used the concept of terra nullius to justify taking lands from non-Western peoples and 
asserting sovereignty over them.462
                                                 
462 According to Lenzerini (2006: 164), the “only significant exception” to this was the February 
6, 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the Maori of New Zealand and the British Crown. 
  Damrosch et al. (2009: 377) make a similar argument but, in 
doing so, apply a conservative, nineteenth-century definition of the term to 1648 international 
law.  As such, they assert that terra nullius allowed European nations to take any lands that they 
discovered, so long as these lands were not already claimed by other European nations. Such an 
assertion directly contradicts the above-noted arguments of McNeil (2000) (who does not limit 
other nations to other European nations) and Bennet & Powell (1999) (who note that the concept 
of terra nullius in 1648 held a completely different meaning than the nineteenth-century concept 
associated with the same term). While these discrepancies have the potential to produce 
considerable confusion, most of these scholars note that, since the 1975 Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion, terra nullius claims –regardless of when they were made—are inapplicable to 
lands that were already inhabited by peoples with any form of social organization (Damrosch et 
al., 2009: 378; Lenzerini, 2006: 164; Bennett & Powell, 1999: 455, 459; see also: Lâm, 2006: 
152). The Australian High Court in Mabo v. Queensland (1975, paras. 40-42) reinforced this 
finding that terra nullius does not and never did serve as a legal justification for taking Native 
lands (see also Lenzerini, 2006: 167, 169; Lâm, 2006: 152; Borrows, 1999: 548).  In other words, 
regardless of how European sovereigns intended to justify their assertions of sovereignty over 
 328 
Native lands and peoples during their invasion of the Americas, the concept of terra nullius 
cannot serve as a justification for these assertions, and any assertions based upon this concept 
must be retroactively re-examined in this light. 
     While that seems simple enough, these is somewhat less agreement on the historical use of 
the other terms: discovery and conquest. Kades (2008: 9, 23), Williams (2008: 243),463
     As a result, many European Nations sought to supplement their discovery-based claims to 
exclusivity with other sources of authority, such as papal bulls or Crown charters (Lenzerini, 
2006: 164; McNeil, 1999: 11, 12).  But even when claims of discovery were combined with 
these other forms of “authority,” they were still frequently disregarded by other European nations 
[and eventually discredited by both the British Privy Council and the US Supreme Court 
 Berman 
(1992: 132), McNeil (1999: 14), O’Malley (2000: 10), and Wolfe (2006: 390) all agree that 
European claims to discovery were only ever intended to regulate intra-European relations, and 
that Europeans making such claims held no pretensions that the claims had an impact on 
European-Native relations. As such, it is difficult to see how anyone could reason that such 
claims did impact European-Native relations by superseding Native sovereignty with European 
sovereignty.  Further, many writers have agreed with McNeil’s (1999) assertions that European 
claims to have exclusive rights (among Europeans) to particular portions of the Americas were 
widely considered as invalid by competing European sovereigns when these claims were based 
on discovery alone. For example, Berman (1992: 133 note 28, quoting Geobel) argues that 
claims based on discovery were seen by competing European sovereigns as little more than 
“fugitive political argument[s] advanced by a chancellery that was unable to find adequate 
support in accepted international customs.” 
                                                 
463 Williams (2008) is primarily talking about the meaning of the term in Marshalls 1823 
Johnson v. M’Intosh ruling. 
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(McNeil, 1999: 13, note 20)].  As illustration of this point, the 1493 papal bull Intercartera was 
ignored by virtually all competing European states, including Britain (Berman, 1992: 132, 133 
note 27; Frichner, 2010: 9; MacMillan, 2006).  In fact, it was only when discovery claims to 
exclusivity were accompanied by actual, effective possession of the territory that other European 
sovereigns would take these claims more seriously (MacMillan, 2006; Jennings, 1988: 110), and 
even then there could be considerable disagreement resulting in warfare among European 
sovereigns, as was the case in the ongoing wars between the British and French (as well as the 
Spanish to the south, and the Dutch and Swedes in earlier periods of European invasion of the 
continent) (see for example: Berman, 1992; Taylor, 2006; Arneil, 1996).  To this extent, 
Williams (2008: 243-44) argues that Native lands weren’t taken through claims of discovery; 
they were taken through an immoral conquest that Americans haven’t yet been able to come to 
terms with because it contradicts their self-image of legitimacy and morally purity. 
     In fact, a number of other scholars have come to similar conclusions as Williams (2008), 
arguing that the only legitimate way for Europeans to have asserted their sovereignty over Native 
lands and/or peoples was to have first acquired these lands through conquest in a just war or 
through consensual agreement with Native peoples --i.e., treaty agreements of surrender. Kades 
(2008: 108) and McNeil (2000: 15) suggest that this was the black letter of Marshall’s 1823 
ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh (as well as his 1832 Worcester v. Georgia ruling), and a growing 
number of scholars have also held that the only two legitimate legal means for acquiring 
sovereignty and/or territory in North America (Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456; Berman, 1992; see 
also, to an extent, Jennings, 1988: 107, 111-12).  To this extent, Jennings (1976 & 1988) argues 
that the dispossession of Native nations in what is now the United States was accomplished not 
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through the normal course of conquest, but through a more ominous form of “double 
conquest”(p. 122).  
     However, according to many, during the time that Europeans were invading North America, 
there were numerous criteria that had to be met in order for territory to be taken through 
conquest.  For example, a war of conquest had considered “just,” and the behavior of conquering 
nations post-conquest was further limited by a wide number of restrictions, such as leaving 
conquered populations in possession of their property and, often, living under the control of their 
own laws, among other constraints (see: Berman, 1992: 133, note 29; Kades, 2008: 15, 108; 
Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456-57; Banner, 2005: 17-18).464
     To this extent, even Supreme Court Justice John Marshall acknowledged that the 
circumstances surrounding the dispossession of Native peoples throughout the Americas did not 
represent actual conquest.  Most historians concur, describing long-standing historical relations 
  Because of this, a number of scholars 
have argued that the conditions surrounding the dispossession of Native peoples in North 
America do not reflect conquest (Kades, 2008; Berman, 1992; Bennett & Powell, 1999; Banner, 
2005).  The United States Congress, and various Canadian Supreme Court rulings have 
concurredat least with regards to the vast majority of lands (see, for example: Kades, 2008: 17; 
R. v. Van der Peet, 1996; see also Banner, 2005: 26). 
                                                 
464 “Military conquest alone, however, did not give the conquering state sovereign rights.  
Sovereignty was the product of three factors in addition to military success: the conquest must 
have been firmly established –so long as warfare continued, no annexation could be effective in 
international law; subjugation must have been complete –the enemy must have ceased to exist as 
a political entity in the territory at issue and the fate of that territory left to the unilateral 
disposition of the conqueror; a formal annexation must have been effected, amounting to the 
assimilation of the territory to the dominions of the conquering state.  Even a total victory would 
not produce a transfer of sovereignty if the victorious powers disclaimed any intention to annex 
the occupied territory” (Berman, 1992: 133, note 29).  Banner (2005: 17-18) and Bennett & 
Powell (1999: 456) likewise remark upon the conditions required for a war of conquest to be 
just, though contrast this with Tuck (1999) and Keal (2003). 
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and conditions that do not fully reflect any of the requirements of conquest as it was understood 
by international law at the time. Thus, Jennings (1988: 122) refers to this dispossession as a 
“double conquest,” acknowledging that what was done to Native peoples in North America was 
quite different from the rules governing just causes of conquest and just behavior of conquerors 
at the time.  In fact, Jenning’s discussion of the long and painful process of dispossession are 
more reflective of fraud, coercion and vigilante violence, none of which reflect actual conquest 
through a just war, but reflect illegitimate actions and behaviors that would have been illegal 
under international laws as well as the laws of respective European sovereigns.  
     Taylor (2006), Harring (1998a & 1998b), and Stannard (1992: 104-15) likewise discuss the 
process of dispossession of Native peoples in the eastern United States and Canada.  Few of 
these processes reflect conquest through a just war, though European settlers of New England 
(see Stannard, 1992: 105-07) apparently made some attempt to forge the appearance of just war 
conquest –demonstrating that they understood there were laws governing just war conquest (see 
also: Banner, 2005; McNeil, 2000; Venn, 2002; Linden in Ipperwash Inquiry, 2005).  While 
some of these attempts resemble the behavior and justifications made by Europeans in South 
America over a century earlier (some of which were considered conquest) (Mohawk, 2000; 
Stannard, 1992; Miller & D’Angelis, 2012; Todorov, 1982), by the time the English were 
asserting their claims in New England the acceptable behavior of Europeans and the accepted 
causes of “just war” had changed considerably (see Jahn, 2000, also see below discussion on 
developments in international law).  Thus, according to this line of argument, with the exception 
of an extremely miniscule portion of North America, European sovereign powers did not achieve 
territorial sovereignty, nor acquire property, over Native lands and peoples through conquest 
(Berman, 1992: 133, note 29; Kades, 2008: 15, 108; Bennett & Powell, 1999: 456-57; Banner, 
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2005: 17-18; O’Malley, 2000; see also: Jennings, 1988).  As Banner (2005: 6) notes: “What kind 
of conqueror takes such care to draft contracts to keep up the appearance that no conquest is 
taking place?”  Banner’s answer to this question is simply: “A conqueror that genuinely does not 
think of itself as one.”  This paper suggests the answer to this question is: a conqueror that has no 
legal right to conquer, that is aware of this fact, and that desperately seeks to justify its actions by 
making the circumstances around them appear to be different than they were.465
     However, there is no consensus on this point in the literature, and scholars such as Keal 
(2003), Williams (2008), Miller (2006), Miller & D’Angelis (2012), Newcomb (2008 & 2010), 
Frichner, 2010), Lenzerini (2006: 164 & 2008: 11) and Wolfe (2006: 391) still rely heavily upon 
the concept of conquest –or upon some combination of conquest, discovery, terra nullius and 
possession/occupation—to explain the dispossession of Native peoples from their inherent 
sovereignty over themselves and their territories.  Further, even among those who argue that 
conquest was not a significant factor in the dispossession of Native peoples throughout North 
America, there is still not agreement upon what were significant factors.  For example, while 
Banner (2005), who invests considerable effort in convincing the reader that the territories of 
Native peoples were not acquired through conquest, discovery, or terra nullius, he nonetheless 
insists that, though Native lands were not taken through these means, Native sovereignty was.  
This is because, according to Banner, Europeans never recognized Native sovereignty and 
  As has been 
said of exclusivity claims based on discovery, assertions of sovereignty based on conquest 
appear to be little more than a “fugitive political argument advanced by a chancellery that was 
unable to find adequate support in accepted international customs” (Berman, 1992: 133 note 28, 
quoting Geobel on European claims of discovery). 
                                                 
465 In this way, we can say that very little has changed from the invasion of the Americas five 
centuries ago to the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan a mere decade ago. 
 333 
consistently held it as a given that European discoverers could and did impose their sovereignty 
upon Native peoples without their consent (p. 7).  Others, including Wolfe (2006: 391) and many 
other writers who rely on the concepts of conquest, discovery, terra nullius and 
occupation/possession similarly make this assumption, but all of these accounts lack further 
explanation, particularly in the face of the contradictory facts that abound.  
     The rest of this paper will consider these facts, as well as the differing conceptions of 
sovereignty between Native and non-Native peoples, and the changes in international law as it 
developed over time.  The paper will argue that none of these legal concepts –conquest, 
discovery, terra nullius (or “vacant lands”)—were applicable to the European assertions of 
sovereignty over lands and peoples in North America.  Instead, these legal concepts, even at the 
time of the European invasion of North America, had little-to-no bearing (outside of promoting 
European attitudes of superiority) on actual European-Native relations.  Further, there were no 
legal concepts that clearly justified the European assertion of sovereignty over Native lands and 
peoples, and this assertion was thus neither consistently nor unanimously made at any point 
before the Revolutionary War or the two decades which followed the war and preceded 
Marshall’s 1823 Supreme Court ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh.  Thus, in this ruling, Supreme 
Court Chief Justice John Marshall re- (mis-) interpreted these medieval concepts, and re-wrote 
them altogether, in ways that would justify the outcome that he sought. 
THE PAPAL BULLS AND BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEBATE 
Under the mentality of the Crusades, the Inquisition and the witch-hunt, massacring, enslaving 
and/or taking the lands of non-Western/non-Christian peoples needed increasingly little –if any-- 
specific justification. The blanket justifications long provided by the Church for such activities 
left those engaged in them virtually immune to criticisms from anyone who did not wish to 
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become a target (Mohawk, 2000; Jennings, 1976: 3-5). Thus, when the Portuguese killed, 
captured, enslaved, and seized the lands of the Gaunches of the Canary Islands, they did so 
without making even the slightest effort to justify their actions (Mohawk, 2000: 101-02).  A few 
decades into their rampage (which lasted from 1402 to the 1490s), the Pope gave his blessing 
nonetheless, through a series of papal bulls authorizing first Portugal to invade the lands of 
Muslims, pagans, “and other non-believers and enemies of Christ wherever they may be,” and to 
reduce them to “perpetual slavery,” to take their possessions, and to assert European/Catholic 
dominion over their lands (quoted from: Pope Nicholas V, 1452 and Wikipedia, 2012b.  See 
also: Pope Nicholas V., 1455 & 1456; Mohawk, 2000: 100-04; Miller & D’Angelis, 2012; 
Jennings, 1976: 4-5).466
     As mentioned in chapter 2, the Church was very much a --when not the-- dominant power 
over the lives of people in Western European throughout the middle ages, and in many ways the 
Crusades had been started in an attempt to maintain this power –by uniting western Europe under 
Catholic authority, turning the fighting and pillaging on external enemies, and thus (with the aid 
of consolidating sovereigns) securing trade routes for merchants whose wealth helped fund the 
Crusades and the lavish lifestyles of Church officials, as well as the development of guns and 
weapons that further aided both in the crusades and the consolidation of secular sovereign power 
(Mohawk 2000: 95, 100-01, 133; Tigar & Levy, 2000). Thus, in order to quell the growing 
dispute between Portugal and Spain, additional papal bulls were issued in the 1490s that 
 These declarations created a rift between Portugal and Spain, the latter 
of which wanted a piece of the action and took up the invasion of the Canary Islands in the 1490s 
(Mohawk, 2000: 100).   
                                                 
466 The latter source argues that this papal bull had been intended to apply to the Ottoman Empire 
(which fell in 1453), but that the Portuguese used the terminology “whatsoever” and 
“wheresoever” to justify their conquests on the western African coast. 
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supposedly divided the newly “discovered” Americas and other lands between Portugal and 
Spain and called for the subjugation of indigenous peoples in the New World and the 
propagation of Church doctrines there (Pope Alexander VI, 1493d, 1493c, 1493b, 1493a).467
     The papal license to murder, enslave, pillage and commit atrocities against the indigenous 
peoples in the Americas, combined with the Crusader mentality which needed little-to-no 
justification for such acts in the first place, led to treatment and conditions of life so atrocious in 
Spanish-invaded South America that Spain achieved international notoriety once these 
conditions were exposed internationally in the writings of Dominican Friar Bartolomé de las 
Casas and others in the school of Salmanca (Mohawk, 2000: 106-07, 136-37; Anaya, 2004: 15-
16; Keal, 2011: 69-70; Hanke, 1959).  As early as 1513, Las Casas was arguing that the Spanish 
had no rights to kill, enslave or take the property of indigenous peoples in the Americas, because 
they were rational human beings capable of receiving the teachings of Christ and becoming good 
subjects of the Crown (Mohawk, 2000: 136; Anaya, 2004: 17, 16; Keal, 2011: 71, 92; Miller & 
D’Angelis, 2012, note 99). As such, he argued, those Spanish colonists who were engaged in 
such illegal and immoral acts should be denied the holy communion (Mohawk, 2000: 136). In 
response, Pope Paul III issued another papal bull in 1537, which forbade the enslavement of 
indigenous peoples in the Americas (Pope Paul III, 1537),
   
468
                                                 
467 The agreement to split the world between Spain and Portugal was solidified in the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, June 7, 1494 (this treaty is also available in Davenport, 1917).  The dispute between 
the two states festered on for years, but further discussion of this goes beyond the scope of this 
paper.  For more on these papal bulls, see also: Mohawk (2000: 100-04), Jennings, (1976: 5), 
Mahmud (2010: 8), Miller & D’Angelis (2012).  
 and King Charles V of Spain –
468 “…notwithstanding whatever may have been or may be said to the contrary, the said Indians 
and all other people who may later be discovered by Christians, are by no means to be deprived 
of their liberty or the possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus 
Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the 
possession of their property; nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary 
happen, it shall be null and have no effect ...” (Pope Paul III, 1537; also quoted in Newcomb, 
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interested in avoiding international embarrassment and the consolidation of private interests into 
independent political power in the New World—issued the New Laws (Mohawk, 2000: 137; 
Anaya, 2004: 19 note 40).469
     Despite his retreat, Charles V temporarily suspended all conquest in the New World until an 
inquiry into/ debate on the justness of the Spanish conquest and dispossession of indigenous 
peoples could be held to determine how best to proceed with further conquest (Hanke, 1959: 36-
41).
  The latter outlawed the enslavement of indigenous peoples under 
punishment of death, and was so unpopular among Spanish colonists that widespread protest lead 
to the local suspension of many of the laws provisions, and the execution of a viceroy sent to 
Peru to enforce the laws. The mass rebellion eventually caused Charles V to revoke substantial 
portions of these laws altogether (Anaya, 2004: 19, note 40; Mohawk, 2000: 137). 
470
                                                                                                                                                             
2010; and Wikipedia.com, 2012d). Unfortunately it is incredibly difficult to find the full text of 
this document online.  The document has been referred to differently on occasion, being given 
the names Sublimus Deus, Sublimis Deus, and Sublimis Dei.  There seems to be some 
disagreement as to whether or not this papal bull was rescinded in response to the outrage 
expressed by Spanish colonizers in South America.  Others referring to this papal bull include: 
Drinnon (1990: 48), Mahmud (2011: 9, note 39),  
  The debate was held in 1550-51, and in it Las Casas continued his argument that 
indigenous peoples in South America were rational human beings who had the same rights to 
possessions as Spaniards and who could be made good converts to Christianity and subjects of 
the King (Hanke, 1959: 35).  He therefore argued that conversion should proceed by sending 
469 Spain also responded to early criticisms by Las Casas by requiring Spanish conquistadores to 
read El Requerimiento before invading the villages of indigenous peoples and slaughtering, 
enslaving and dispossessing the residents therein (Hanke, 1959: 41; Mohawk, 2000). Further 
discussion on this document and the horrors that followed it is beyond the scope of this paper, 
though it will be noted that indigenous peoples in the Americas did not know or understand 
Spanish, and conquistadores frequently read it quietly outside villages at night (if at all) so that 
villagers neither heard nor were aware of its reading.  For more on this document, see the latter 
source (Mohawk, 2000: 107-111), who quotes the entire text of the English translation of the 
document. 
470 “Probably never before or since has a mighty emperor –and in 1550 Charles V, Holy Roman 
Emperor, was the strongest ruler in Europe with a great overseas empire besides—ordered his 
conquests to cease until it was decided if they were just” (Hanke, 1959: 37).   
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priests and friars only, and in cases where the indiegenous populations resisted conversion, by 
building fortresses on their borders and gradually winning them over through peace, love and 
good example (Hanke, 1959: 42) but not by forced evangelization (Keal, 2011: 71). Opposing 
Las Casas, and strongly supported by the Spanish conquistadores and encomienderos, Juan Gines 
de Sepulveda [sometimes referred to as the father of modern racism (Mohawk, 1997)] sought to 
justify the dispossession, enslavement and genocide of indigenous peoples on the basis that they 
were barbarians and idolaters who had sinned against natural and divine law and whose natural 
rudeness made them natural slaves to more refined peoples (Hanke, 1959: 40-41; Keal, 2011: 
91).  As such, forcible conquest was necessary in order to spread the Christian faith and, 
allegedly, ‘save’ the “weak among the natives themselves” (Hanke, 1959: 40-41; Keal, 2011: 
91).471
     The terms of the debate were limited from the start, with Charles V posing the question to 
debaters: “is it lawful for the king of Spain to wage war on the Indians before preaching the faith 
to them in order to subject them to his rule, so that afterwards they may be more easily instructed 
in the faith?” (Hanke, 1959: 38).  Apparently, within the Western cultural worldview, it was not 
possible for Charles V or the debaters to even conceive of the idea that perhaps the Native 
inhabitants of the New World did not need to be converted to Christianity at all. After all, “the 
Christian utopian enterprise was founded on the belief that there could be only one Truth, one 
right way,” (Mohawk, 2000: 137) and had by this point dedicated several centuries to the 
eradication of all who were perceived to have strayed form, or resisted, this one true way.  
   
                                                 
471 Though, like the English in Ireland and later in the Americas, the Spanish conquistadores –
minus the priest and friars-- made virtually no effort to convert the Natives they killed, enslaved 
and dispossessed.  See: Canny (1973:588), Mohawk (2000: 107-111), Jennings (1976: 5).  On 
some (generally murderous) attempts at conversion, see Stannard (1992: 65, 69-70), and Gay 
(1993: 69, 87). 
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Further, at this time there was no clear established international legal doctrine at the disposal of 
the debaters.  So both Las Casas and Sepulveda framed their debate around ancient theories on 
the justness of enslavement verses a more compassionate form of conversion –which was largely 
focused on the supposed cultural characteristics of the indigenous peoples, as well as indigenous 
peoples’ rights and obligations under (European conceptions of) Natural and divine (see: Keal, 
2011: 89, 88, 69-70; Hanke, 1959; Mohawk, 2000).  
     The debate at Vallodid did not actually resolve the issue in any clear direction.  Both Las 
Casas and Sepulveda claimed to have emerged victorious, but the panel of judges who heard the 
debate avoided giving any opinion on the matter (Hanke, 1959: 74), thus leaving indigenous 
peoples in South America to fend for themselves in a struggle that is still ongoing centuries later 
(Mohawk, 2000:137; Adams, 2007).  Indeed, through Sepulveda’s arguments in the well-
publicized debate, a theory of cultural classification and Spanish/European superiority began to 
emerge (Mohawk, 1997; Canny, 1973: 593) which had an impact on later developments around 
the world.  Further, the debate at Valloidid set the terms of future debates, outside of which none 
would argue. Thus, neither Las Casas nor other theorists of that or later eras argued against the 
idea that the Spanish Crown held sovereignty over the New World.  But this does not mean that 
Europeans did not also recognize the sovereignty of non-Western peoples.  In fact, many legal 
theorists argued that the sovereignty of the King of Spain did not subsume indigenous ownership 
of land or indigenous governance over their own affairs (Keal 2011: 92, 88-97).   
     In the end, virtually all legal theorists renounced the idea that the pope had authority to grant 
to sovereigns lands that lay on the other side of the world (Anaya, 2004: 17; Keal, 2011: 92).472
DISCOVERY, CONQUEST, “JUST WAR,” AND TERRA NULLIUS 
 
                                                 
472 “Neither emperor nor pope… possessed lordship over the whole world” (Anaya, 2004: 18, 
paraphrasing Vitoria). 
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The Protestant Reformation was well underway by the time Charles V held the debate at 
Vallodid (Berman, 1983: 19), and emerging legal theorists such as those at the Spanish school of 
Salmanca were seeking to formulate and justify a system of law that would benefit the rising, 
wealthy merchant class (Tigar, 2000: 57). The arguments made in the debate at Vallodid 
continued to resonate with these legal theorists, who redeveloped some of these arguments in 
their own writings. Theorists also continued to revive and build upon ancient concepts in Roman 
law (gens gentium or jus gentium), which had governed relations among individuals through 
perceived standards of good that existed above and beyond any man-made law and that all 
rational human beings could agree to and were bound by –including feudal lords, emerging 
sovereign powers, the Church, and even God ‘him’self (Keal, 2011: 88; Anaya, 2004: 16-17, 18; 
Tigar, 2000: 56-57, 28).473  At the same time, sovereign powers were consolidating a positivist 
form of law was being developed which attempted to separate law from the Church and 
centralize it under secular sovereign powers that would prioritized the individual property and 
contract rights of the rising merchant class (and, if necessary, use militarized force to protect 
these rights externally and command obedience internally) (Mohawk, 2000: 133, 101; Tigar, 
2000: 52, 54-56; Berman, 1983: 29-30; Anaya, 2004: 26; see also Elias, 1998: 43, 51, 55).  This 
latter form of law began to predominate during the 18th century (Tigar, 2000:56), and has been 
associated with the rise of the sovereign state [which was not completed until “well into the 19th
                                                 
473 Grotius (1535-1645) apparently argued that even God was subject to, and unable to change, 
the law of nature (Anaya, 2004: 17, note 12).   
 
century” (McNeil, 2001-2002: 11)], as well as the rise of scientific racism and ‘stages of 
development’ theories (Keal, 2011: 72-75).  Elements of both forms of law were present in the 
writings of early legal theorists, and it is possible to make the generalization that, over time, as 
the interests of the rising merchant class and consolidating sovereigns –as well as available 
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technology-- advanced in the direction of accumulating capital through the dispossession of other 
peoples and life forms, international legal theorists sought to develop various ‘legal’ 
justifications for the actions that supported these goals (Anaya, 2004: 16, 34; Keal, 2011: 86, 84).  
In many ways, both forms of law also carried on the debate between Las Casas and Sepulveda at 
Vallodid, and moved increasingly towards favoring forms of the latter’s arguments as positive 
law and the sovereign-state came to predominate. 
     These ideas were fresh in the minds of the English when they arrived on the shores of North 
America.  Just as the Spanish had approximated a theory of cultural classification (in which the 
Spanish belonged to the superior culture) so, too did English colonizers in Ireland who followed 
the Spanish example and felt entirely justified in their efforts to massacre and make virtual slaves 
of the Irish –allegedly for the purpose of converting them to Christianity and subjugating them to 
the English Crown (Canny, 1973: 593-597; Drinnon, 1990: 48-49; Stannard, 1992: 98, 106). The 
English colonists who arrived in the New World also followed the example of Spanish 
conquistadores (but not the Spanish Crown) in embracing aspects of Sepulveda’s arguments at 
Vallodid, and ignoring Pope Paul III’s Sublimis Dues (which proclaimed that Native peoples in 
the Americas were “truly men” and should be treated with the rights of men) (Drinnon, 1990: 48-
49). Thus, though many of the early English colonists in the New World owed their lives to 
Native peoples who took pity upon them and helped them survive the winters (Stannard, 2000: 
53), colonial leaders who coveted land474
                                                 
474 And/or who wanted to stop the constant desertion of colonists –from all walks of life-- who 
fled the colonies to join and live with Native communities (Canny, 1975: 28-35).  Canny (30, 34) 
notes that instilling in colonists a fear of Native peoples –such as was instilled after the 1622 
retaliatory massacre of colonists-- was the only way that desertion was finally stopped.  Drinnon 
(1990: 51-52) similarly notes the various attempts of colonial leaders to instill such fear in the 
minds of colonists. 
 used virtually any excuse to wage war on and massacre 
the Natives around them, and broke their promises with Native peoples as soon as it was 
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beneficial to them to do so (Stannard, 1990: 116, 112-115, 104-05; Jennings, 1976: 6; Drinnon, 
1990: 51-52; Nammack, 1969; Taylor, 2006; Kades, 2008 paras. 12-15). But unlike the early 
Spanish conquistadores, even at the earliest stages of English colonization it is clear that colonial 
leaders believed they needed some form of justification for their actions, and they attempted to 
find these justifications in the various legal theories of their time.  Thus, it seems worthwhile to 
review some of the legal concepts and theories that were developing in international law before 
moving on to the historical analysis (which demonstrates that these concepts rarely applied to 
Euro-Native relations in the New World) 
The Doctrine of Discovery 
While early legal theorists, including Vitoria (1492-1546), Las Casas (1484-1566) and Grotius 
(1538-1645), argued that indigenous peoples held sovereignty over their lands, they also agreed 
with Charles V’s assertions of Spanish sovereignty in South America.  Yet, they were all in 
agreement that papal bulls could not be the source of this sovereignty –nor could the doctrine of 
discovery that was based on these papal bulls (Anaya, 2004: 18, 19; Grotius, 2001: 228, IX). 
Later theorists did not appear to have even concerned themselves much with discovery, and 
focused instead on conquest and the laws of just war, which will be dealt with momentarily. 
Competing European powers still asserted discovery over lands to which they sought exclusivity 
relative to other European powers, but these claims, even when combined with symbolic 
possession, had virtually no weight on intra-European relations, and were instead viewed as 
fugitive political arguments made by those with no legitimate basis for exclusivity assertions 
(Berman, 1992: 131-33 and 133 note 28; Kades, 2008: 9; McNeil, 2000: 12-13). 475
                                                 
475 Though see MacMillan (2006), who argues that in the 1500s these doctrines still played a role 
in the British Crown’s attempts to develop of legal justifications for ignoring the papal bulls and 
 In fact, these 
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claims were often largely exaggerated and transparent, often overlapped with the discovery 
claims of other European powers, and were entirely unenforceable.  Thus, as the weakest of all 
exclusivity claims, claims based on discovery were often entirely ignored by competing western 
powers. Further, European powers asserting exclusivity based on discovery (or discovery 
combined with symbolic possession) had no pretensions that these claims impacted European-
Native relations (Berman, 1992: 132); they related soley to intra-European relations (and rarely 
had an impact on even these) (Berman, 1992: 132-33 and 133 note 28; Kades, 2008: 9) –a fact 
US Supreme Court Justice John Marshall noted in his 1823 opinion (discussed further below). 
Conquest & “Just War” 
As neither papal grants, discovery, or discovery combined with symbolic possession could 
protect intra-European exclusivity claims to New World territories, and as none of these could 
provide European powers with sovereign rights over these territories, the rising merchant class 
and consolidating sovereign powers sought justification for their claims in other arguments.  
Legal theorists were quick to oblige, and it seems that, for the most part, after Vallodid, the later 
a theorist wrote, the more likely he was, and the more ways he tended to find, to justify the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples in the Americas. Though Vitoria, Las Casas and Grotius 
argued that the indigenous peoples in the Americas held title to their lands476
                                                                                                                                                             
sending Cabot to the northern coast of North America. See also, on the papal bulls: Frichner 
(2010). 
 and dominion over 
their own affairs, they began to part ways after this. Las Casas argued that the indigenous 
476 “Neither moral nor religious virtue, nor any intellectual excellence is requisite to form a good 
title to property. Only where a race of men is so destitute of reason as to be incapable of 
exercising any act of ownership, they can hold no property, nor will the law of charity require 
that they should have more than the necessaries of life.     
     “For the rules of the law of nations can only be applied to those, who are capable of political 
or commercial intercourse: but not to a people entirely destitute of reason, though it is a matter of 
just doubt, whether any such is to be found” (Grotius, 2001: 228, X). 
 343 
peoples in the Americas were civil human beings (Keal, 2011: 72), and though Vitoria mostly 
agreed with this (Keal, 2011: 92), he also suggested that they may exhibit “elements of 
barbarianism” (Keal, 2011:70-71).  Though on the one hand Vitoria had recognized that the 
indigenous peoples in the Americas had methods in their affairs, orderly and arranged polities, 
legal systems and magistrates, definite forms of marriage, and systems of trade which were all 
based on reason (Anaya, 2004: 17-18),477 on the other hand he argued that they might be 
incapable of forming a state and governing their own interests according to the European model 
(Keal, 2011: 71, 92, 93; Anaya, 2004: 18).478  When and where this was the case (according to 
European judgments), Vitoria argued, the Spanish Crown could assert its sovereignty over 
Native peoples to civilize them, so long as this was done for the benefit of the latter and not the 
personal profit of subjects of the former (Keal, 2011, 92; Anaya, 2004: 18).479
     Unlike later theorists, neither Vitoria nor Grotius made the existence of a European-model 
state the basis for the rights of indigenous peoples –their land ownership and self-government 
still existed and were still recognized by these theorists (Anaya, 2004: 22). Grotius and Hobbes 
  
                                                 
477 According to Vitoria, the Indians: “are not of unsound mind, but have, according to their kind, 
the use of reason.  This is clear, because there is a certain method in their affairs, for they have 
polities which are orderly arranged and they have definite marriage and magistrates, overlords, 
laws, and workshops and a system of exchange, all of which call for the use of reason; they also 
have a kind of religion” (Anaya, 2004: 17, quoting Vitoria). 
478 According to Vitoria, the Indians “are unfit to found or administer a lawful State up to the 
standard required by human and civil claims. Accordingly, they have no proper laws nor 
magistrates, and are not even capable of controlling their family affairs” and have no literature, 
arts, conveniences of life, “careful agriculture”, etc. (Anaya, 2004: 18). 
479 According to Anaya (2004: 18), Vitoria neither supported nor rejected this view outright. Of 
course, as noted in chapter 2, the “civilizing process” was always undertaken for the benefit of 
the wealthy and powerful, but these latter also often used Orwellian double-speak to justify their 
own perpetrations against others.  In addition, as noted in chapter 3, all indigenous peoples 
throughout the Americas did have their own system of law, government, art, entertainment, and 
so forth. Thus, it was only by holding up the European model of government as the pinnacle 
aspiration of all human beings that Vitoria, and later theorists, could make such an argument –
one that was so clearly self-serving while presented as not being so.   
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(1588-1679) further argued that in addition to their rights to property and self-government, the 
indigenous peoples in the Americas had the same natural law rights as all states, including the 
rights to enter into treaty relationships, to defend themselves against other peoples (Anaya, 2004: 
19; Keal, 2011: 78-79). But Hobbes provided a justification for ignoring these rights.  Building 
upon Vitoria’s differentiation between indigenous and European forms of government, Hobbes 
treated indigenous peoples in the Americas as if they had no form of government (a completely 
incorrect and self-serving assumption, see chapter 3) (Anaya, 2004: 22). And he argued that it 
was the duty of persons living in a “state of nature” to select one man or an assembly of men to 
represent them and make decisions on their behalf (Anaya, 2004: 20; Keal, 2011: 79).  Without 
doing this, Hobbes argued that European sovereigns were justified in assertion their sovereignty 
over Native peoples Keal, 2011: 80).  Locke (1632-1704) agreed (Keal, 2011: 82, 79), and both 
Pufendorft (1632-1694) and Vattell (1714-1769), writing after the Treaty of Westphalia, 
suggested that the law of nations focused on, or only applied to states/ nation-states (Anaya, 
2004: 20) and for the most part indigenous peoples could not qualify as such (Anaya, 2004: 21-
22).480
                                                 
480 Though some, such as the Inca and Aztec, already attacked and subjugated in Peru and 
Mexico, did qualify. According to Anaya (2004: 22-23), Vattel: 
  Thus, by the mid-seventeenth century, indigenous peoples were treated as mere 
individuals, without collective autonomous rights under the law of nations; and they did so 
despite the fact that even Europeans had not consolidated their own states under centralized 
defined states broadly to include “all political bodies, societies of men who have united 
together and combined their forces, in order to procure their mutual welfare and 
security.” Vattel clearly believed at least some non-European aboriginal peoples 
qualified as states or nations with rights as such. Bringing into question European 
expansionism in the Americas, Vattell remarked: “Those ambitious Europeans States 
which attacked the American Nations and subjected them to their avaricious rule, in 
order, as they say, to civilize them, and have them instructed in the true religion—those 
usurpers, I say, justified themselves by a pretext equally unjust and ridiculous. 
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sovereign power, and many would not do so until “well into the 19th
     European interpretations of indigenous peoples political systems were not the only factor 
allegedly justifying their dispossession, and even Grotius, who saw no difference between the 
rights of states and the rights of individuals under natural law, argued that failure to cultivate the 
soil could be justification for indigenous peoples’ dispossession (Keal, 2011: 77).  Vitoria and 
Las Casas before him made no such assertions, but theorists writing after him agreed with 
Grotius’ assertion that lands that remained uncultivated could not be considered property, and 
were thus open to the taking.  And though Grotius’ writing in this regard was not particularly 
interested in applying his arguments to indigenous peoples (Anaya, 2004: 19), Locke specifically 
made these arguments to justify the dispossession of indigenous peoples in the New World 
(Keal, 2011: 76-78, 80; Anaya, 2004: 23).  For Locke, a failure to cultivate the soil in European 
(English) fashion was equated with a lack of civil society, and one supposedly could not have the 
latter until one acquired property rights through the former (Keal, 2011: 78, 79, 82).  Without the 
former, no property existed and lands were open for the taking, and Europeans were justified in 
doing the taking, as well as in asserting their sovereignty over such lands and peoples (Ibid, 
Anaya, 2004: 23).
 century” (McNeil, 2000: 11; 
Miller, JR, 2009: 3-4). 
481
                                                 
481 “Locke’s theory of property … attached ownership to a ‘higher’ stage of development than 
that attained by Amerindians.  And since they were at a ‘lower’ stage, it was believed that 
European settlers were justified in ignoring both indigenous patterns of land use and the native 
rights attached to these patterns, and in dispossessing the original occupants” (Keal, 2011: 75).  
However, others have argued that Locke’s knowingly selected facts that supported his theories 
and rejected facts that did not lend support (Arneil, 1996), and further, that Locke’s theories 
actually had little-to-no impact on the practice of settlers and colonial governments in the 
Americas (other sources to be added). 
 Like Locke, Vattel also linked the cultivation of the soil to civil society, and 
argued that doing so was a requirement under natural law. And though Vattel left some room for 
the inclusion of indigenous peoples (for Vattel, the cultivation of the soil was not a specific 
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requirement for statehood), he did argue that the cultivation of the soil was a nation’s duty under 
natural law, and that those who cultivated the soil had greater rights to lands than those who did 
not (Anaya, 2004:23 and note 70).  The latter, thus, “may not complain if other more industrious 
Nations, too confined at home, should come and occupy part of their lands” (Vattel, quoted in 
Anaya, 2004: 23 note 70).  Though Locke and Vattel each demonstrated some degree of 
ambiguity when it came to determining which Native peoples “qualified” for state-status and 
natural law rights and which did not, later theorists entirely ignored any aspect of these 
arguments that might have recognized the rights of at least some indigenous or non-western 
peoples.  Instead, like the theorists before them, they picked out what was useful in justifying the 
dispossession and colonization actions of wealthy merchant-government interests at the time, and 
discarded everything that might call these actions into question. 
     One final aspect of early legal arguments that will be examined here is that of the “just war.” 
In the early-to-mid-1500s, Las Casas, Vitoria and others had argued against the idea of natural 
slavery, insisting that all people were human beings, not barbarians, and that the Spanish had a 
duty to love all people as their neighbors (Keal, 2011: 70- 72, 92).  However, Vitoria argued that 
the rights of non-Christian peoples were limited relative to the rights of Christians, and that such 
peoples also had duties under natural law.  One of these duties required that they to allow the 
Spanish free travel, trade, and evangelization among them (Keal, 2011: 71; Anaya, 2004:18).  If 
they did not do so, according to Vitoria, they were failing to uphold their duties under natural 
law, and since their rights were limited relative to the rights of Christians, such interference or 
refusal may constitute just cause for war –a point on which Las Casas vehemently disagreed 
(Keal, 2011: 71, Anaya, 2004: 18).  However, for Vitoria, actions contrary to natural law were 
not necessarily enough to justify war (Keal, 2011: 92).  Thus, he warned against “imaginary 
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causes of war” (Anaya, 2004: 18), and held out as one of the only just causes of war that which is 
waged to protect innocent victims –even if these victims did not seek or want protection (Keal, 
2011: 92).  Presumably this “protection” includes asserting Crown sovereignty over those 
peoples with “elements of barbarianism” who were presumed incapable of forming a state and 
governing themselves by European standards (see discussion at the top of this section). 
     Writing a few decades later, and seeking to justify actions of the wealthy merchants and 
sovereigns during his own time, Grotius disagreed on many points made by Vitoria and Las 
Casas.  He argued that some peoples were natural slaves (Keal, 2011: 94, 71), and he also argued 
that violations of natural law could be punished and were sufficient to constitute just cause for 
war (Keal, 2011: 92, 93).  However, Grotius sought to secularize legal theories, and so he was 
rather adamant that interference in evangelization, or refusal to accept the Christian religion, did 
not constitute just cause for war (Anaya, 2004: 19).  For Grotius, just war could also be waged 
for defense and the recovery of property (Anaya, 2004: 19) –and this theorization might explain 
the alleged justification in the minds of English colonists when they waged war against Native 
peoples for matters so simple as one Native person in a community being accused of stealing a 
cup.  For example, Stannard (1990) notes that in Roanoke: 
When an Indian was accused by an Englishman of stealing a cup and failing to 
return it, the English response was to attack the natives in force, burning the entire 
community and the fields of corn surrounding it. (P. 105) 
 
But theories of “just war” involved more than just an identification of provocations, there were 
also a number of other criteria that must be met in order for a war to be considered “just,”482
                                                 
482 I’d like to do more research in this area in the future (as with the other issues in early 
international law), but for now the discussion will be confined to only more recent, secondary 
sources, and will not provide an overview of how these theories changed over the centuries. 
 
including moral concerns over how war was waged, the proportion of violence used relative to 
 348 
the threat, the refrain from harming innocent non-combatants, whether war was declared in 
advance and waged by proper authority, and whether all avenues for a peaceful resolution were 
attempted before the war and arriving at a peaceful resolution –rather than profit or gain-- was a 
central motivation of the war483
     What’s more, Berman (1992: 133 note 29) and Epstein (2002) question the applicability to the 
term “conquest” to the activities in the New World, and in other European encounters with non-
Western peoples. Both note that conquest was a term that was intended to refer to “armies of 
contending states at war,” or to conquest and subjugation in a “just war” (quoted, respectively, 
from: Epstein, 2002: 48; and Berman, 1992: 133, note 29). And Berman further notes that in 
order to conquest to have any effect under law it needed to entail three factors : 1) a decisive and 
firmly established victory in warfare; 2) a complete subjugation of the conquered party such that 
the party “ceased to exist as a political entity in the territory at issue and the fate of that territory 
left to the unilateral disposition of the conqueror;” and 3) the conquering state had to formally 
annex the conquered territory and assimilate it into the dominion of the conquering state.  Failure 
to achieve any one of these criteria would equal a failure to achieve exclusivity –or sovereignty 
(Berman, 1992: 133, note 129).
  (Vitoria had emphasized this latter criteria in his speculations on 
just war, see above).  Certainly examples like the above fail to meet most of the criteria for a just 
war. 
484
     But aside from the criteria of just war and conquest, these medieval concepts were largely 
inapplicable to European-Native relations in North America for other reasons: Within a few 
  In virtually all cases in the Americas, these criteria were not 
met –and in no case were they met “justly.” 
                                                 
483 Wikipedia (2012c). See also sources cited below. 
484 Or failure to “produce a transfer of sovereignty,” (Berman, 1992: 133, Note 29 citing L. 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, vol. 1 (London: Longmans, Green, and Company, 
1905), 287-92). 
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decades of English colonization in North America both the Crown and colonial officials created 
prohibitions against conquest-based dispossessions of Native peoples (Kades, 2008 para. 15).485 
Instead, lands were to be secured solely through treaty agreements with Native nations, and only 
Crown or colonial officials were authorized to make such agreements (Kades, 2008: 24).486 
According to Kades, the former prohibitions (requiring payment for Native lands) were adhered 
to as soon as they were declared, even by colonists who argued against the prohibitions (Kades, 
2008: para. 15).  Encroachment on Native lands by wealthy land speculators and poor settlers 
continued to be a problem for colonial officials (when it was not directly encouraged by 
them487), but prohibitions against such actions were regularly reiterated by both the Crown and 
colonial governments –most famously in the Royal Proclamation of 1763.488
                                                 
485 Kades notes that Massachusetts Bay Colony passed such prohibitions as early as 1629, and 
the Crown reasserted these in 1660 and again, repeatedly, every few decades. 
 Thus, non-Natives 
who encroached on Native lands without permissions had an increasingly difficult time 
convincing anyone that they held title to these lands.  This was the case both before and after the 
Revolutionary War, even though settler resentment of these prohibitions was one of the 
contributing factors to the Revolution (Taylor, 2006: 8, 38-45, 79-81), as the new US 
government quickly recognized the same dangers that the Crown had almost two centuries 
earlier. As soon as it consolidated enough power to do so (about 1789) Congress renewed the all 
of these prohibitions and consistently refused to recognize land deeds that had been obtained by 
486 This was done at least as early as 1634, according to Kades. Part of the intention behind these 
prohibitions was to prevent a costly and unsustainable state of constant warfare in the colonies, 
as well as to prevent the emergence of wealthy, private monopolies on lands and thus colonial 
politics –both of which could arise from the unregulated taking of Native lands. 
487 Colonial authorities saw non-Native encroachment in Native territories as an effective means 
of clearing land, running off wildlife, depleting Native populations (via small pox and other 
contagious diseases) and forcing the surviving Natives to relocate to new lands –freeing up 
coveted lands for colonial possession. Taylor (2006, particularly 118, 142-166), Kades (2008: 
125), Nammack (1969), Harring (1998a, 1998b). 
488 Which, Borrows (1997) argues convincingly, was actually a treaty agreement. 
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non-Natives outside of the official processes (Taylor, 2006: 238-242; Kades, 2008: 25-29).489  Of 
course, Congress also wanted to expand US territory, protect the interests of wealthy land-
speculators,490 and maintain political legitimacy among settlers on the frontiers.491 To these ends, 
it did not entirely seek to halt non-Native encroachment on Native lands, only to regulate it.492
     However, even when non-Native encroachment on Native lands was allowed, or encouraged 
by colonial officials and/or the newly independent US government, Euro-Native relations in 
North America were, from the start, governed by treaties between Native nations and European 
powers –not by papal bulls, discovery, or alleged ‘just war’ conquests.  Early on, and for at least 
two centuries, the economic, political and social success and survival of European powers on the 
continent were entirely dependent upon Native peoples and the permissions and cooperation they 
 
And allowing non-Natives to settler right up close to Native territories meant that forests would 
be cut down, game would be driven away, and Native peoples near non-Native settlements 
would be hungry and vulnerable to non-Native offers to buy or coercion to relocate –a fact which 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall recognized well. 
                                                 
489 The types of profits reaped from gaining a monopsony on land can be demonstrated in the 
following example: in 1785 the New York State coerced the sale of land from members of the 
Oneida nation, who were already weakened and starving, by threatening that NY would not 
protect any of their lands from encroaching settlers if the Oneidas did not agree to sell a 
substantial portion of what they had.  According to Taylor (2006: 165) New York paid the 
Oneidas $11,500 for 460,000 acres land, and then sold 343,594 acres for $125,955 (Taylor, 
2006: 165). 
490 Unregulated, it was argued that poor settlers would take the best lands for themselves, and 
leave only piecemeal sections of land for the wealthy speculators.  Wars also “undercut the value 
of large, speculative land holdings elsewhere on the frontier” (Taylor, 2008: at 240, 239-41. See 
also: Kades, 2008: paras. 123-24; RJ Miller, 2006). 
491 Taylor (2006: 107), notes that, after the Revolutionary War, many settlers viewed their 
victory as evidence of their racial and cultural superiority, which allegedly gave them the right to 
further dispossess Native peoples.   
492 For example, Congressman James Duane expressed his understanding of the Revolutionary 
War in the same terms, noting that if supremacy was not imposed over the Indians then “this 
Revolution, in my eyes, will have lost more than half its value.”  See also Taylor (143; see also: 
40-45, 142-154), Kades (2008 paras 31-34), Nammack (1969), Harring (1998a, 1998b). 
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granted Europeans through treaty agreements (Miller, 2009: 4-5, 11-12; Berman, 1992: 133-34; 
Johnston, 1986: 10).493  In addition, for at least 200+ years, these treaty agreements were made 
according to the protocol of Native nations --and Europeans had to learn and abide by this 
protocol if they wished to engage in treaty negotiations at all (Williams, 1982: 3, 5, 36, 58; 
Johnston, 1986: 10; Berman, 1992: 150; Miller, 2009: 5, 11-12).  These treaty negotiations, with 
a limited number of exceptions,494 were based on nation-to-nation agreements along the same 
lines as those made between European powers at the time (Berman, 1992: 146; Coté, 2001: 15-
16; O’Reilly, 2009: 387)495
                                                 
493 “Each successive European state seeking to establish commercial or settler colonies 
necessarily as a matter of course entered into treaty relations with indigenous nations concerning 
territorial cessations, peace and non-aggression, military alliance, and the course of trade,” and 
“…these agreements and the continuing relationships they created were frequently decisive to 
the survival as well as the success of the European project,” (Berman, 1992: 128).  Private 
corporate interests understood this quite clearly as well, as Miller (2009: 12) notes: “Even though 
the Hudson’s Bay Company Charter awarded the Company rights to land and governance as well 
as trade, the directors had quickly learned that First Nations were the actual proprietors of 
territory.  It was necessary, they recognized, for their agents to obtain by means of a ‘compact’ 
Indian leaders’ permission to use the navigation routes and trading sites that were critical to the 
trade.” 
 –i.e, they were premised on the understanding that all parties had the 
capacity to act internationally (Berman, 1992: 133, 129; Gunn, 2007: 66), and they recognized 
494 Berman (1992) notes that the northeastern Algonquin entered into a protectorate with Britain. 
Such relationships did not necessarily entail a loss of sovereignty, as Martens (1788, quoted in 
Berman, 1992: 130 note 14) and Vattel (quoted in Anaya, 2004: 23) both acknowledged.  
However, according to the many theorists, including the latter, even under conditions of a 
protectorate, sovereignty and independence are not necessarily lost.  If the protected state 
maintains its own self-government, it also maintains its independence and sovereignty.  It is only 
when a state agrees to come under the laws of the protecting state, and thus to give up its self-
governance, that it loses its sovereignty and its international personality.  For variations on this 
assertion, see also, Bennett & Powell (1999), and others cited above on the rules of just war and 
conquest. 
495 “Indian nations in North America were unquestionably regarded as having requisite 
international personality to cede rights to other sovereign entities that then formed the root of 
European titles in international law. The treaty process that produced a cession merely 
memorialized the sovereign status of all involved parties,” (Berman, 1992 at 133, 129). In 
addition, see O’Reilly (cited in text): “By entering into treaties with native nations the Crown 
recognized the nationhood of its treaty partners”); and Coté (cited in text): “Early British colonial 
powers recognized the sovereignty of Indian nations by entering into treaties with them”). 
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Native nations as “fully independent and self-determined societies”(Berman, 1992: 126; Coté, 
2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 376-78, 387) that “possessed inherent, preexisting sovereign rights 
and conducted political relations in their own interests in the international plane”(Berman, 1992: 
131, 129; Epstein, 2002: 52; Hall, 2010; O’Reilly, 2009: 376-78, 387). Several of the earliest 
treaties, such as the Two Row Wampum treaty made between the Haudenosaunee and various 
European powers, were premised on the concepts of peace, friendship and respect, as well as and 
non-interference in each other’s affairs (Johnston, 1986: Williams, 1982; Berman, 1992: 149, 
146).496
     Treaties with Native nations were not only essential to the survival and/or success of 
European colonies or corporate ventures on the continent, but they were also far more legitimate 
means for intra-European claims to exclusivity than were such claims when based on the far 
more transparent assertions of conquest, discovery or papal grant (Berman, 1992: 131).
  These treaties still stand today, are still honored by British Royalty whenever they visit 
Canada (see for example, Miller, 2010), and have never been replaced nor abridged by either the 
Canadian or US governments. 
497
                                                 
496 “More substantively, the principles symbolized in the Two-Row Wampum demonstrate a 
well-developed indigenous philosophy of respect for what we now call the right of self-
determination of peoples as the basis for coexistence already in place at the inception of the 
Indian-European relationship in this region” (Berman, 1992: 149) 
 It 
should thus come as little surprise that, just as they did with these much less legitimate forms of 
exclusivity claims, European powers often greatly exaggerated the terms of their treaties with 
497 “By the mid-seventeenth century, treaties with indigenous nations had a dual purpose for 
European states.  In North America, they provided the formal intersocietal mechanisms for 
establishing and regulating evolving relationships consistent with the specific realities of 
international life on the continent.  Additionally, in the European context Indian treaties were 
increasingly employed by states to legitimize territorial claims in the western hemisphere against 
each other” (Berman, 1992: 131). European powers –whether funded privately or through a 
Crown grant-- understood that they could only possess derivative rights in the New World, and 
could only acquire these through international treaty relationships with the original inhabitants 
(Berman, 1991; Chamberlin, 1997; Miller, 2009; Borrows, 1999). 
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Native nations to other European powers. Examples of this sort of posturing abound, and 
European powers frequently made claims to have subjugated Native peoples in the written 
records of their treaties –texts that did not reflect the oral treaty agreements often written in a 
language Native peoples did not read.498
Reference to Indian “subjects” and promises to obey the “law” in written texts of 
the numbered treaties cannot trump the nation-to-nation relationship or the Indian 
perspective of the treaties as forming an alliance or partnership. Even leaving 
aside representations of Her Majesty’s commissioners during treaty negotiations, 
the entire context and tenor of most treaties clearly indicate that the Indian nations 
party to the treaty were to continue to govern their own internal affairs.  It follows 
that continued Aboriginal governance was, at a minimum, an implied term of the 
treaties which subsist to this day and is now a constitutionally protected treaty 
right. (P. 388) 
  Regardless, it is important to keep in mind that 
European texts were merely records of treaty agreements, they were not the treaty agreements 
themselves; these were made orally according to Native protocol.  Thus when Native nations 
signed these treaties, whether they were aware of the elaborate pretensions made within them or 
not, these pretensions had little impact upon the actual reality of Euro-Native relations (Taylor, 
2006; Berman, 1992).  Canadian courts have repeatedly recognized this fact when asserting that 
the written text / record of treaty agreements must be interpreted according to the intentions and 
understandings that Native nations would have had at the time treaty agreements were made, and 
that any “ambiguities or doubtful expressions… must be resolved in favour of the Indians” (R. v. 
Badger [1996] at 41; Hutchins, 2009: 444; Williams, 1982: 58; O’Reilly, 2009: 387-88). As the 
latter source further notes:  
 
     An illustration of these sorts of transparent pretensions exists in the European relationships 
with the Haudenosaunee.  Perhaps no Native peoples were more important to European success 
                                                 
498 See chapter 4 for a longer discussion on the recognition by Canadian courts that written treaty 
documents frequently differed from the actual treaty agreements and thus cannot be used alone to 
represent these agreements. 
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or failure in northeastern North America than were the Haudenosaunee, whose far-reaching 
hegemonic influence, fierce military prowess and extensive control over trade routes and hunting 
rights throughout their vast territories (Berman, 1992: 148-49, 134) made them at the same time 
a coveted and powerful ally and a dangerous and formidable foe to European powers attempting 
to trade or settle in the region.499  In fact, the Haudenosaunee were so influential and important 
to European survival on the continent that both British and French interests500
                                                 
499 The Haudenosuanee’s hegemonic influence over Euro-Native and intra-Native relations 
within their traditional territories --from the Hudson River in the east to the Mississippi River in 
the west, and stretching many miles north of the St. Lawrence seaway and four of the great lakes 
and as far south as North Carolina-- lasted into the 1790s. (Berman, 1992: 148). 
 quickly became 
fixated on attempting to gain an agreement of exclusivity with them. Had one or the other 
European state been able to secure a cession/surrender of the entire Haudenosaunee territory, or a 
submission of Haudenosaunee sovereignty, such as through an agreement of protection or 
vassalage, this would have been enough for either state to claim exclusivity (since such an 
agreement would give only that European state the ability to negotiate international agreements 
on behalf of the Haudenosaunee). This did not happen, however, as the ongoing rival between 
the two nations, and the ongoing assertions and actions of self-determination by the 
Haudenosaunee evidence.  But since they were both unable to secure an agreement of 
exclusivity, the British and French each attempted repeatedly to at least forge the appearance that 
they had done so, using grandiose language to claim they had made the Haudenosuanee subjects 
of their respective nations, or that they had gained agreements of protection or vassalage over 
them (See for example, Williams, 1982: 62). These claims were immediately transparent to all 
parties, as well as to other European states, even when the Haudenosaunee signed documents 
500 Sweden had ended its claims in North America around 1650, and Holland did so around 1675, 
leaving only the British and French to fight for the exclusive right to trade and make agreements 
with the Native peoples in the region. 
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containing such pretenses, or allowed such rhetoric into European speeches to them501
     In fact, regardless of any written documents or records of speeches with pretensions of 
making the Haudenosaunee subjects of one Crown or another, neither the British nor the French 
ever had the ability to limit or prevent the Haudenosaunee from forming military alliances or 
making commercial or other treaty agreements with other European powers; much less did either 
have the ability to enforce unilaterally Haudenosaunee compliance with their own respective 
interests and agreements (in fact, both Britain and France also routinely broke their own 
grandiosely-worded agreements with the HSN, demonstrating the agreements’ fictitious nature) 
(Taylor, 2006; Berman, 1992).  Instead, both Britain and France continued to rely heavily on 
Haudenosaunee consent for their various activities (such as the fur trade or settlement); both 
continued to court the Haudenosaunee in hopes of obtaining an alliance with them against the 
other; and both clearly understood that Haudenosaunee assent to any sphere of influence claims 
by either power was purely strategic, was based on consent (and the ability to withdraw consent 
the agreement), and did not give either power, authority, or ability to control any aspect of 
Haudenosaunee affairs. (Taylor, 2006; Berman (1992).
 –both of 
which, in some cases, were examples of the Haudenosaunee strategically playing British and 
French pretensions against each other (Miller, 2009: 51, and 51 note 31; Williams, 19182: 62, 4; 
Berman, 1992: 159; 151). 
 502
                                                 
501 In fact, allowing such pretensions in European speeches to them –such as allowing colonial 
officials to refer to them as “children” as occasionally happened-- fits with Williams’ (1982) 
description of Haudenosaunee protocol.  According to Williams, Haudenosaunee chiefs rarely 
contracted each other or their visitors directly, but instead tried more to build upon agreements 
among all parties. 
   
502 As Sir William Johnson, British superintendent of Indian Affairs remarked: 
[T]he Six Nations, however their sentiments may have been misrepresented, all along 
considered the Northern parts of North America, as their sole property from the 
beginning; and all although the conveniences of Trade (with fair speaches [sic] and 
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     These recognitions of Haudenosaunee sovereignty, as well as the sovereignty of most other 
Native nations in North America, continued for at least two hundred years, and in many cases for 
longer than this (Harring, 1998: 10; Johnston, 1986: 12; Coté, 2001: 15-16; O’Reilly, 2009: 378; 
Berman, 1992: 128), including after the Revolutionary War in both the United States and Canada 
(Taylor, 2006: 239, 115; Coté, 2001: 20; Borrows, 1999; Kades, 2008, note 75; Johnston, 1986: 
14).503 Early treaties such as the Two Row Wampum treaty of peace, friendship, respect and 
non-interference, still continue to stand, and have never been repealed or replaced in any other 
treaties.  Thus, it is clear that lands and/or sovereign powers were not obtained by European 
sovereigns through conquest, and both the United States and Canadian governments have 
recognized this one some level (Kades, 2008; Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004] at 25)504
                                                                                                                                                             
promises) induced them to afford both, us and the French settlements in their Country, 
yet they have never understood such settlement as a Dominion, especially as neither we 
nor the French have ever made a conquest of them: they have even repeatedly said at 
several conferences in my presence, that “they were amused by both parties with stories 
of their upright intentions”… to see who would become masters of what was the 
property of neither one nor the other… (Quoted from Berman, 1992:186). 
.  
The tendency of some historians to read these written agreements literally is thus highly 
problematic and contrary to actual practices in the region at the time (Berman, 1992: 150, 151, 
159). 
503 For example, in 1792 Upper Canadian official John Graves Simcoe assured the 
Haudenosaunee that the documents and treaties of the English all confirmed their status as an 
independent nation that had never yielded its sovereignty: 
This clearly chose, Brothers, that what we told you, is proved to be just and true: --- the 
Documents, Records and Treaties between the British Governors in former times, and 
your wise forefathers, of which in consequence of your request, authentic copies were 
transmitted to you, all established the Freedom of your Nations. 
Brothers: 
These authentic papers prove that no King of Great Britain ever claimed absolute power 
or sovereignty over any of your Lands or Territories that were not fairly purchased or 
bestowed by your Ancestors at Public treaties, they likewise prove that your natural 
Independency has been preserved… (Simcoe, quoted in: Williams, 1982: 159). 
504 “Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, and were never 
conquered.  Many bands reconciled their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through 
negotiated treaties.  Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights 
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  The honour of the 
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Further, in instances where hostilities did break out between European powers and Native 
nations, they were resolved through treaty agreements, not conquest. And these treaty 
agreements further solidified European recognition of Native sovereignty in North America.  
CONCLUSION 
     Further detailed discussion of the factors contributing to the changes in thinking among US 
and Canadian officials were planned but now lie beyond the scope of this chapter.  Thus it will 
have to suffice to say that these changes rested on the rise of social Darwinist theories of racial 
superiority and “stages of development” that had solidified in Western minds by the 1780s (Keal, 
2011: 72-74; Joffe, 2010: 145-46) and crept into western jurisprudence by 1766 (Keal, 2011: 75, 
citing Blackstone).  These theories certainly had their sources in the arguments of earlier legal 
theorists, as well as in centuries of domination, exploitation, mass murder and dispossession that 
came before and after the beginning of the European invasion of the Americas.  But despite legal 
theorists’ best efforts to justify the actions of their respective sovereigns and/or class interests, 
there continues to be no legal basis for settler state assertions of sovereignty over Native nations. 
Against this backdrop, Supreme Court Justice John Marshall recognized as much in his trilogy of 
rulings that began with his 1823 ruling in Johnson v. M’Intosh. In this ruling, Marshall referred 
to medieval legal concepts such as discovery, conquest, vacant lands and Christian missions, 
manipulating the actual meanings of each of these, but also acknowledging in his own way that 
none of these concepts were sufficient --alone or in combination with the other concepts-- to 
justify the assertion of sovereignty over Native lands and peoples.  Finding that the situation in 
the United States did not fully meet any of the criteria for these concepts, Marshall proceeded to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Crown requires that these rights be determined, recognized and respected.  This, in turn, requires 
the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation.  While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where indicated, accommodate 
Aboriginal interests” (Haida Nation v. British Columbia [2004] at 25). 
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make up new concepts, with the reasoning that because the ongoing dispossession of Native 
peoples was supported by no laws, but was practice of his country, new laws were required to 
explain it.  He then proceeded to make up new legal interpretations, arguing basically that 
whether or not these were moral, it was not for him to question the practices of his government.   
     Marhsall’s rulings have been adopted by settler state courts worldwide, including the 
Canadian government,505 to serve as legal justification --where absolutely none other exists—for 
their ongoing dispossession of Native peoples.506 And just as Marshall re- (mis-) interpreted 
medieval legal concepts to suit his needs (and just as medieval legal theorists did the same with 
the arguments of those before them), so, too, did later judges selectively re- (mis-) interpret 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall’s rulings --in order to justify increasingly more intense 
forms of dispossession and denial of basic rights to Native peoples (McNeil, 2000: 10).507
                                                 
505 St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888); Calder v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General) [1973]; Guerin v. The Queen [1984] at 378;  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] at 1103; 
R. v. Van der Peet [1996] at 31, 43, 117; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] at 41; and 
Mitchell [2001] at 9 & 80.  However, according to some, such as O’Reilly (2009: 380-82), Popic 
(2005: 151-2), Hutchins (2009: 451), this latter case left open the possibility that some limited 
forms of Native sovereignty could have survived (at 10).  See also: Haida Nation v. British 
Columbia [2004] at 17.   
 
However, legal scholars and international human rights law is increasingly recognizing that these 
506 The argument is somewhat reminiscent of the more recent, often sarcastic question relating to 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars: “How did our oil get under their sand?” I also have several 
paragraphs written on how the Johnson v. M’Intosh ruling made its way into Canadian law and 
was warped and twisted over time to fit Canada’s own form of dispossession, but I will also 
leave this out, since the writing needs more work and I am out of time. 
507 For example, manipulated and misinterpreted conceptions of “conquest” stretched beyond all 
recognition were retroactively applied to historic Native-US relations in the US Supreme Court 
Case Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States (1954) [in which the court insisted that “the very 
presence of whites in North America had effected a conquest over all the continent’s indigenous 
peoples”]. The term was similarly misinterpreted and stretched when the Supreme Court of 
Canada in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] upheld the reasoning of the lower British 
Columbia Supreme Court Judge McEachern, who stated that Native peoples “became a 
conquered people, not by force of arms, for that was unnecessary, but by an invading culture and 
a relentless energy with which they would not, or could not, compete” (Delgamuukw v. British 
Columbia (1991) at 342, also quoted in Borrows, 1999: 545).  
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settler state court rulings are little more than legal fictions that defy legal logic and are based on 
nothing more than raw assertion (Kades, 2008: 1; Borrows, 1999: 127, 562, 569, note 107; 
Berman, 1992: 127, 132; Joffe, 2010: 155, 145-46 notes 136, 137; O’Reilly, 2009: 373-74; 
Gunn, 2007: 4; Orkin, 2003; Green, 1995; Epstein, 2002; Frichner, 2010; McNeil, 1989: 107).  It 
has also recognized, as Joffe (2010: 145-46) notes, the presumptions of racial superiority 
inherent in assertions of western/ settler-state sovereignty over Native lands and peoples: 
It is well-established that countries around the world have sought to exploit, 
dominate and dispossess Indigenous peoples on the basis of presumed racial and 
cultural inferiority.  Under English and Canadian law, theories of dispossession 
evolved based on doctrines of European superiority.  Indigenous peoples were 
considered either too primitive or else heathens and infidels, and therefore 
disqualified from owning or controlling lands, territories and resources. Such 
racistrationales as the “doctrine of discovery” –which is still a part of the case law 
in Canada and numerous other countries—purportedly provided European powers 
with a rationale to claim jurisdiction and sovereignty over Indigenous peoples’ 
traditional territories. 
 
Given these recognitions, international human rights monitoring bodies have also condemned the 
legal doctrines upon which such claims to European/settler-state sovereignty rest: 
The concepts of ‘terra nullius’, ‘conquest’ and ‘discovery’ as modes of territorial 
acquisition are repugnant, have no legal standing, and are entirely without merit 
or justification to substantiate any claim to jurisdiction or ownership of 
indigenous lands and ancestral domains, and the legacies of these concepts should 
be eradicated from modern legal systems. (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council, 1989, para 40(b) at 10). 
 
     Despite these condemnations, settler state governments and their judiciary continue to refuse 
to re-examine their court cases based upon these faulty concepts, and their assertions of 
sovereignty over Native lands and peoples. Such refusals are calling non-Native land tenures into 
question (Borrows, 1999: 544; Epstein, 2002: 46: Wilkins, 2003: 103-111, and note 223) and are 
creating a growing –internal and external-- crisis of political and legal legitimacy for the 
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Canadian government.508
     Though many academics who study the Nazi Holocaust fail to see the links between that 
event and the Holocaust in the Americas,
  But much worse than this, settler state government and judicial 
refusals to re-examine their legally baseless assertions of sovereignty over Native lands and 
peoples are allowing these nations to perpetuate their mentalities of excepting themselves from 
common collective morality, and are allowing legacies of genocide to continue, unabated –for, as 
Lâm (2006: 149) and numerous others have noted: “The message indigenous peoples deliver is 
quite simple: their ability to survive as distinct peoples is inextricably tied to their right to occupy 
their traditional territories and control their resources.” 
509
                                                 
508 This legitimacy crisis is occurring both internally [as unjust Canadian courts and claims 
processes lead to an increase in Native protests over land and treaty rights, and non-Native 
businesses and residents increasingly demand that the Canadian colonial state repress Native 
protests and protect non-Native colonial interests] and externally [as the international community 
becomes increasingly aware of Canada’s human rights violations at home and its anti-human 
rights stance in international forums relating to the rights of Indigenous peoples (for example, 
see: Joffe, 2010)].  See also Moses (2002: 60), Epstein (2002: 45) and Borrows (1999: 581 Note 
320) on potential international consequences for Canadian sovereignty that is built upon an 
extralegal foundation of mere raw assertion. Such a legitimacy crisis could –if left unaddressed 
or improperly addressed long enough by the government and the judiciary—even lead to 
financial consequences for Canada [as potential investors become increasingly concerned with 
the growing potential for legal disorder and political instability in the country]. 
 certainly many similarities and differences between 
these two horrific periods in human/western history (see, for example, Kakel, 2011). Perhaps the 
most important differences, in the context of this paper, are in the fact that the Nazi Holocaust is 
over, ended by international intervention, and those responsible, when found, were brought to 
trial, while the perpetrating state was forced to make reparations to the survivors of those groups 
509 “All German historians… seem to look in the same direction.  None looks to the west.  But 
Hitler did.  What Hitler wished to create when he sought Lebensraum in the east was a 
continental equivalent of the British Empire.  It was in the British and other western European 
peoples that he found the models, of which extermination of the Jews is, in Nolte’s words, “a 
distorted copy” (Linqvist, 1996: 10).  See also: Mohawk, 2000, p. 75  
(“Of all the horrific genocides that have occurred in the twentieth century against the Armenians, 
Jews, Gypsies, Ibos, Bengalis, Timorese, Kampucheans, Ugandans, and more, none has come 
close to destroying this many—or this great a proportion—of wholly innocent people”). 
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they had victimized.  On the other hand, the atrocities committed against indigenous peoples in 
the Americas for centuries remain largely unacknowledged. No international intervention put an 
end to the Holocaust in the Americas, no perpetrators were found and brought to trial, and no 
governments have made reparations for the survivors of genocide.  Further, the atrocities against 
indigenous peoples throughout the Americas (and around the world) continue, unabated, though 
now in a different form –one that is more appropriate to the technology and western cultural 
worldview of today.  
Thus, while indigenous peoples are no longer subjected to mass murder, they are still faced with 
mass dispossession, and with all of the trappings of ongoing cultural genocide –i.e., the 
deliberate infliction “on the group of conditions of life calculated to bring out its … destruction.” 
While there were no existing laws –domestic or international—that were violated by the horrific 
atrocities in Nazi Germany, there is an ever-growing body of law relating to the international 
human rights of indigenous peoples that are being violated in the ongoing dispossession of 
Native peoples.  And yet, the horror continues.  
     By failing to act to stop these atrocities, we remain sided with the perpetrators, immune to the 
dehumanization and destruction of other human beings, and thus to our own dehumanization and 
loss of capacity to act as moral beings (Kelman, 1973: 52). As such, we are doing a grave 
disservice not only to indigenous peoples around the world, but also to ourselves, our children 
and our future generations who will be left to struggle with the increasingly psychopathological 
mechanisms associated with our unresolved and ongoing trauma as both the oppressors and 
targets/victims of our own internal mentalities of oppression.510
                                                 
510 As McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006), Kelman (1973) and others have noted, what we do to 
others we also, and primarily, do to ourselves.  By treating others with intolerance we lose our 
 Further, given the increasing 
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crises in the world around us, and the increasing possibility that we may have done so much 
damage to our environment as to have caused permanent, lasting, and increasingly violent and 
unpredictable shifts in climate, weather, and ocean levels, as well as long-lasting destruction to 
the quality and ingestability of increasing portions of our food and water sources, it is really not 
in our best interest to 1) continue on the destructive perpetrator path we are on or 2) destroy 
alternative models for structuring democratic societies and living sustainably in the world around 
us.  If we continue to refuse to recognize, honor, support and promote the rights of indigenous 
peoples, and continue to be unwilling or unable to see non-western peoples (as well as all other 
life forms) as equal partners and co-owners511
 
 of this planet then we are, quite literally, choosing 
the path of perpetration, destruction and extinction. 
                                                                                                                                                             
ability to care for and tolerate difficult parts of ourselves.  By acting as perpetrators against 
others, we similarly internalize and engage in perpetrations against ourselves and our loved ones.  
511 The Western concept of “ownership” is used here because of the weight of the rights that 
ownership implies, which have long had a much higher priority and much heavier weight in 
western society than the rights of human beings (or other life forms, which have no rights in 
western society).  Thus, the term is used with the intent of raising to the highest possible western 
standard, the right of all living things to have to an equal share of all that is, and to what they 
need to survive. At the same time, I am not using the term with any intent whatsoever of 







Non-Native reactions to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest 
 
They're scared.  You know, those people are scared, because basically they've 
been lied to their whole life. And now we're standing there telling them a truth 
that they've never heard, and it scares them to think about their future and their 
past.  What is the true history of their past?  And so out of this fear and this hurt 
of being lied to, it makes them angry. 
~ Wendy Hill, Haudenosaunee, on the intense responses of non-Native residents 
to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest, quoted in Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 
2007 
 
In order to escape accountability for his crimes, the perpetrator does everything 
in his power to promote forgetting.  Secrecy and silence are the perpetrator’s first 
line of defense.  If secrecy fails, the perpetrator attacks the credibility of the 
victim.  If he cannot silence her absolutely, he tries to make sure that no one 
listens. To this end, he marshals an impressive array of arguments, from the most 
blatant denial to the most sophisticated and elegant rationalization.  After every 
atrocity once can expect to hear the same predictable apologies: it never 
happened; the victim lies; the victim exaggerates; the victim brought it upon 
herself; and in any case it is time to forget the past and move on.  The more 
powerful the perpetrator, the greater his prerogative to name and define reality, 
and the more completely his arguments prevail. 
~ Herman 1992, 8 
 
The two introductory quotes above represent two different facets of the non-Native opposition to 
the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.  The first represents the fears, doubts and insecurities that the 
Haudenosaunee protest triggered in local non-Native residents.  In response to these 
uncomfortable or even intolerable emotions, some non-Native residents struggled both to deny 
their guilt, complicity, and responsibility for the historic and present-day harms caused to Native 
peoples and to maintain their privileges as dominant group members.  Thus, the second 
represents some of the processes through which those non-Native residents who move 
vehemently opposed to the protest sought to hide their own guilt and/or complicity in ongoing 
perpetrations against the Haudenosaunee people.  These processes primarily involved attempts to 
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discredit the Haudenosaunee protesters, as well as the Haudenosaunee people and Native people 
in general, so that their grievances could be dismissed without examination. These processes 
were largely inline with the similar processes of authorization, routinization and dehumanization 
perpetrated against Native peoples by government officials and other types of authority 
throughout Canada, which were discussed in more detail in chapter 4.  As discussed in that 
chapter, the rhetoric and actions of the representatives of authority in Canada (government 
officials, the media, corporations, and even smaller local businesses), have created an 
environment in which Native peoples in Canada have long been identified as “fair game” for 
attack, primarily through projections, scapegoating, and Western societal forms of human 
sacrifice (see chapter 2).  To this extent, the second introductory quote above can be used equally 
to describe 1) the processes of authorization, routinization and dehumanization that are promoted 
by government officials and other authorities within Canadian society, 2) the ways in which non-
Native residents responded to and went along with these government processes, as well as 
collectively created and enacted their own processes of authorization, routinization and 
dehumanization.  Some of these processes will be discussed in more detail in the text that 
follows. 
     Of course, not all non-Native people followed the lead of their government in this regard, and 
not all participated in the collective creation of processes authorizing and routinizing the 
dehumanization of Haudenosaunee protesters and Native people in general.  There were many 
non-Native residents who openly, and even loudly, supported the Haudenosaunee protest.  And 
there were many more residents who remained at least publicly silent on the issue, choosing to 
avoid taking a clear side in the debate. In the web of non-Native responses to the Haudenosaunee 
protest, both of these categories are complex and equally worthy of examination. For example, 
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non-Native residents who supported the protest, and who were a clear minority in the town of 
10,000, demonstrated a wide range of reasons and motivations in their support, as well as 
fluctuations in the level of support their felt or demonstrated over time.  Similarly, those 
choosing to remain publicly silent on the issue, who comprised a clear majority in the town, also 
likely had a wide range of reasons for their decisions from being too busy and focused on other 
aspects of their lives to get distracted by it to possibly taking the easy road, as many people often 
do, when faced with atrocities and perpetration.512  What proportion of the silent majority were 
motivated by which reasons is still largely hidden in their silence.513
     Originally, I had planned to write an entire dissertation examining the different non-Native 
views of the Haudenosaunee Six Nations protest, and relating these differing views of the protest 
to different ways of thinking and perceiving the world. To this extent, I found a number of 
factors corresponding with and/or influencing non-Native perceptions of and attitudes towards 
the Haudenosaunee protest, including: pre-existing worldview expectations and biases; 
government policies and practices towards, and treatment of, Native peoples; government 
statements; media reports and media responsiveness to correcting inaccuracies; and the actions of 
some of the Haudenosaunee protesters and non-Native interpretations of these actions. While 
 
                                                 
512 Herman (1992) and others (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006) have suggested that choosing to 
remain neutral in the face of perpetration and atrocities is equivalent to siding with the 
perpetrator: “[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in 
the conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this 
conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. … It is very tempting to take the side of the 
perpetrator.  All the perpetrator asks is that the bystander do nothing.  He appeals to the universal 
desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the 
burden of pain.  The victim demands action, engagement, and remembering.” (Herman, 1992: 7-
8) 
513 Those who agreed to be interviewed on the topic in 2009 were largely those who had voiced 
opinions in one direction or another, with the exception of the local clergy.  Many in this latter 
group attempted to maintain some degree of neutrality in the dispute, and had been actively 
involved in working to heal relations and/or bring people together from all sides of the conflict. 
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each of these factors corresponded with certain views on the Haudenosaunee protest, I quickly 
realized that each of these factors is much more complex and needs to be investigated on its own 
merit. For example, those most opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest appeared on first glance to 
unquestioningly believe everything the Canadian, provincial, or county governments said 
relating to the history of the land and the legitimacy of the Haudenosaunee protesters’ 
grievances. They used these government statements to frame their anti-protest rhetoric and their 
extreme displays of anger. Yet, this alone did not fully explain the extent of non-Native anger 
displayed by many anti-protest individuals, nor did it explain the anti-Native sentiment that often 
accompanied this anti-protest anger. What’s more, further investigation revealed that these non-
Natives were not so unquestioning in their adoptions of whatever government officials said. 
They were actually quite strategic and sophisticated in their outright rejection and condemnation 
of anything that conflicted with their anti-protest views, as well as in their outright embrace of 
anything that supported these anti-protest views and their selective use of portions of information 
provided by elected officials, media reports, local businessmen and other non-Native residents.  
By selectively adopting and/or rejecting bits of information from other sources (and taking the 
cue from government authorization, routinization and dehumanization processes), the non-Native 
residents who most strongly opposed the protest were able to construct piecemeal narratives that 
lent credibility to their own anti-protest stances while also undermining every other stance. Thus, 
they believed that they were able to justify their own displays of anger and intolerance toward all 
other stances or views on the protest.  
     These findings became somewhat more disturbing after I began my investigation into the 
legal and historical facts surrounding the Haudenosaunee protest.  As noted into the introduction, 
I expected to find that neither the Haudenosaunee protesters nor the anti-protest non-Natives 
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were entirely correct in their positions. I also expected that --given the predominance in media 
reports of facts and narratives that tended to diminish the Haudenosaunee protesters’ credibility, 
while supporting the Canadian governments’ version of events-- perhaps the latter had a stronger 
case, though the former likely did have some grievances.  However, what I began to find (and 
continued to find) was quite the opposite. In fact, the Haudenosaunee version of history and law 
is far more credible than that put forth by the Canadian government, the provincial government, 
the county government, the media and/or the development company. The media simply did not 
report on --and government officials at the federal, provincial and county levels simply did not 
acknowledge-- Supreme Court of Canada rulings mandating consultation with Native nations 
prior to approving or undertaking development projects on lands under claim.  As discussed in 
chapter 4, these rulings apply to all Native lands under claim, regardless of whether or not those 
claims have yet been proven in court.  In addition, as discussed in chapter 1, the “General 
Surrender” of 1841 is not a legitimate document of surrender --as admitted by the Upper 
Canadian government, itself, a number of times during the 1840s and 50s (see other examples of 
problems with the Canadian government’s official versions of law and history in chapter 4).  
What this information demonstrated to me was that non-Native Canadians who were most 
opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest were not only selectively adopting and rejecting 
narratives that fit a particular view that they wanted to have of the Haudenosaunee protest, but 
that the selective narratives they were creating were based primarily on inaccurate information.   
     Certainly, part of the reason why non-Natives were basing anti-protest (or anti-Native) 
arguments on faulty information was because they had been mislead by their government 
officials and by the media (which may also have been mislead by government officials) (see 
chapter 4).  In this sense, non-Natives were reacting to the protest within the context of 
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government policies and practices that authorized and routinized various processes of 
dehumanizing and proclaiming open season on Native peoples and their lands, resources, treaty 
and human rights.  However, all non-Native residents were equally subjected to this 
misinformation by government officials, the media, the developer and local businesspeople, but 
many nonetheless remained open to hearing other points of view and to adopting perspectives 
towards the protest that differed from the official, often-repeated versions of “facts.”  Thus, there 
are many other factors involved in the rigidity with which some non-Natives (in fact, a 
substantial portion of them514
     All of these dynamics should be of the utmost interested to any who are concerned about the 
present trajectory of Western society, with its countless symbolic wars at home and literal wars 
abroad, and with the rate at which it is rapidly destroying the planet and all life upon it.  As 
discussed in chapter 2, these patterns of thinking and behavior are rooted far back in the history 
of Western society, and form a large portion of the foundation upon which this society has been 
built.  Thus, while future attention also needs to be given to an examination of the motivations 
behind and dynamics involved in the varying levels of non-Native support for protest, as well as 
non-Native silence in the matter, this chapter will primarily focus its examination on the 
dynamics of non-Native opposition, all of which are contextualized within the problematic 
patterns of thinking and behavior that are common and even foundational to Western society.   
) selectively used facts to construct a particular anti-protest 
narrative.  These non-Natives further demonstrated both an angry intolerance of other points of 
view and an inflexible need to be “right” in the inaccurate narratives they had constructed.  
                                                 
514 As noted in chapter 1, in a town of 10,000 people, 2,000-3,000 people participated in the 
largest anti-protest rally (during which some speakers expressed considerable anti-Native 
hostility). See below note. 
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     To this extent, this chapter constitutes an examination into the various factors involved in the 
rigidity of anti-protest (and anti-Native) responses to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.  More 
specifically, this chapter seeks to explain why it is that a significant portion –20-30%515 -- of 
non-Native residents wanted, needed, and sought-out means (regardless of the correctness of 
information upon which these means were based) for delegitimizing and dismissing all 
Haudenosaunee grievances, while also justifying their own, sometimes extreme, displays of 
anger516
                                                 
515 Non-Native anger culminated in a series of ever-intensifying anti-protest rallies, some of 
which drew 2,000-3,000 people. (On there being 3,000 people at the April 24th rally, see: 
Bonnell, Gregory; Canadian Press.  2006.  Ontario land-claim protest turns ugly.  Breaking News 
from globeandmail.com.  April 25, 12:05AM EST. Section A, B, National, Front).  Meanwhile, 
from 500-1000 residents participated in one or more of the “near-riots” (described as such in: 
Harries, Kate and James Rusk.  2006.  “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about 
Six Nations protesters sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.”  The Globe and Mail 
(Canada).  April 26; Adams, Jim. 2006. Six Nations Reserve repels Ontario police. Indian 
Country Today, April 21). On the numbers, see: Harries (2006b & 2006a); Harries and Rusk 
(2006); CBC News (2006a) 
 over the continuation of the Haudenosaunee protest and the refusal (or failure) of the 
Canadian or Ontario governments to employ physical force to end the protest.  Thus, the rest of 
516 In some instances, hundreds of non-Native residents (see note above), shouting racial slurs at 
protesters and insults at police, attempted to force their way through police lines in order to 
physically confront and remove Native protesters.  These events were described by some as 
“near-riots” and by others as simply “intense, intense, irrational anger” (Harries, Kate and James 
Rusk.  2006.  “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about Six Nations protesters 
sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.”  The Globe and Mail (Canada).  April 26; Harries, 
Kate and James Rusk.  2006.  “Mayor loses speaking role on Caledonia; remarks about Six 
Nations protesters sideline Trainer, prompt council apology.”  The Globe and Mail (Canada).  
April 26).  In addition, non-Native businesses reportedly refused to serve Native customers, and 
non-Native kids’ sports teams refused to play neighboring teams from the Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations reserve (Muse, Sandra.  2006. Six Nations councils meeting on occupation. 
Tekawennake, April 12, page 4; Interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009).  At 
least some non-Native business owners, such as contractors, continued to refuse to do business 
with Haudenosuanee Six Nations people more than three years later (Interviews with Caledonia 
residents, February-June, 2009). Further, some non-Native residents stated that they had 
stockpiled Molotov cocktails in their backyards or planned to ship guns into the town in the 
event that “shit hit the fan” and a “civil race war” broke out in Canada (something that people 
were still talking about three years later) (interviews with Caledonia residents, February –June, 
2009). 
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this chapter will examine some of the various reasons why non-Native residents opposed to the 
2006 Haudenosaunee protest, as well as some of the various reasons why and how these 
opposing non-Natives expressed such intense angry opposition to the protest. It should be 
emphasized here, as it has been elsewhere in the dissertation, that though this chapter examines 
responses of a group of non-Native residents who vehemently opposed to the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest, and though many examples of behavior by individuals within this group 
are provided to illustrate these dynamics, the label of “psychopathological” is not intended to 
apply to the people in this discussion. Rather, it is the society, along with the patterns of thought 
and behavior that it produces and encourages in individuals, groups and an entire society, that is 
psychopathological, and that needs to be examined, understood and changed if humanity or any 
other life form is to have a chance of surviving into the next century. 
FINANCIAL GAINS 
 
If the small colonizer defends the colonial system so vigorously, it is because he 
benefits from it to some extent.  His gullibility lies in the fact that to protect his 
very limited interests, he protects other infinitely more important ones, of which 
he is, incidentally, the victim. But, though dupe and victim, he also gets his share. 
~ Memmi 1965, 11 
 
One of the most obvious reasons why non-Native residents opposed the protest and rallied to 
prevent the government from meeting any of the Haudenosaunee demands was the financial 
benefits non-Native residents experienced, or the financial gains they were expecting to 
experience through the ongoing dispossession of First Nations peoples from their lands, 
resources, treaties and human rights.  The town of Caledonia was one of the fastest growing 
communities in southern Ontario.  It had been experiencing rapid growth in the two decades 
previous to the Haudenosaunee protest, and was expected to more than double in size over the 
next two decades (see chapter 1, or see: Muse, 2005c; Hemsworth, 2006b; Harries, 2006b). With 
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residential development as the single largest industry in the area (Best, 2006a), many residents 
were expecting their housing values to dramatically increase, and had begun to build future life 
plans around this expected financial windfall: buying a newer, bigger house; paying for their 
children’s college education, starting a new business, or simply planning their retirement 
(Interviews with Caledonia Residents, 2009). Many residents had also expected the rapid growth 
to bring in new tax revenues for schools, children’s sports teams, and improvements to roads, 
sidewalks, water and other systems in the community.517  At best, the protest appeared to be 
putting a temporary damper on these plans for several dozen families who were employed on or 
had invested in the occupied/reclaimed construction site, and possibly for a few business owners 
who claimed that business was much slower than usual.518
                                                 
517 The majority of people who chose to be interviewed in 2009 who brought up the issue of the 
expected growth had wanted the growth.  However, there were also people who were not 
interested in (and were even opposed to) the new growth, which was expected to bring new 
problems as well.  Some did not want to deal with the politics of all kinds of new people moving 
in and changing the workings of the town (some had already experienced some tension between 
the wants of the new residents and the status quo comfort of the old residents).  Some wanted the 
town to stay small and rural for ecological and recreational purposes.  Some were frustrated that 
the influx of people would push farmers out and eat up surrounding farmland… (Interviews with 
Caledonia residents, 2009).  
  But as the protest dragged on, those 
developers who had invested in the site began to worry about bankruptcy, or about dwindling 
interest in their development among prospective homebuyers (Windle, 2006h; Best, 2006c; 
Legall, 2006d). Meanwhile, other developers and realtors began to worry about an adverse 
financial impact on the building and trades industry as a whole (Legall, 2006l), and some 
residents began to worry about the protest hurting their town’s image or their abilities to sell their 
518 Court documents filed by Henco Industries Limited, Inc., stated that there were as many as 75 
construction workers who were employed on the site (Legall, 2006d), though later news reports 
asserted that there were as many as 200 tradespeople (“such as carpenters, plumbers, roofers and 
bricklayers”) who lost pay checks (Howard, 2006).  On claims of slowed business, see: Canadian 
Press (2006u). 
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homes at a hefty profit, as previously planned (Brantford Expositor, 2006a; see also: Legall, 
2006l; Jackson, 2006a). 
     Once residents learned of the protesters’ demands for a moratorium on development on the 
site under protest, as well as on all Haudenosaunee lands under claim, these anxieties began to 
escalate (Jackson, 2006j), and residents mobilized to oppose this moratorium and to protect “the 
single largest industry (residential development) in our area”(Best, 2006a). Though the demand 
for a development moratorium on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim was never even 
considered by federal and provincial officials (see Appendix 1), provincial officials did appear to 
leave themselves open to at least the possibility of moratorium on development on the small tract 
of land under protest. The province made it clear that, in the event of such a moratorium, the it 
(together with the federal government) would fully compensate the developer, but this was 
entirely unacceptable to non-Native residents who feared that such a move would “set a 
precedent,” jeopardizing development on all lands under Haudenosaunee claim.  For example, 
local businessman Ken Hewitt argued that if a moratorium on development was allowed even on 
that small tract of land under protest, “then all other communities along the Grand River as well 
as across Canada will be equally compromised,” and Haldimand County Councilmember Craig 
Aschbaugh made similar emphatic insistences that “a moratorium on development cannot be 
allowed” (Smith, 2006c; Best, 2006a).519
     Intent on organizing support for these views, local developers, realtors, mortgage and 
financial brokers organized a counter-protest rally, appealing to residents’ fears with a flyer 
announcing that “[i]f this situation is not resolve quickly we could all be looking at significant 
  
                                                 
519 Real estate business owner and CCA organizer Bruce MacDonald similarly noted that the 
protesters’ demands “would indicate that all lands [in the Haldimand tract] are subject to their 
interference” (quoted in: Best, 2006a). 
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decreases in our property values” (Best, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a; Brantford Expositor, 2006a; 
Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006d).520  The flyer and speakers at the rally also encouraged residents 
to join with them in demanding that all builders, trades men, business owners, and home owners 
in the town –and not just the impacted development company-- should be paid a monthly stipend 
until the protest was resolved, to compensate them for the “inconvenience” the protest was 
causing them (Best, 2006a; Pearce, 2006a).521 One reporter even used his weekly column to 
argue that, whether tax payers liked it or not, there was no question that builders, developers, 
workers and home buyers should be compensated for their losses “and put back on even ground. 
End of story”(Jackson, 2006d).522
                                                 
520 The flyer was created by the Caledonia Citizens’ Alliance, a loose, grassroots coalition of real 
estate and construction businessmen in order to oppose recognition of Haudenosaunee Six 
Nations demands.  
  Yet, tellingly, not one speaker at the rally is reported to have 
extended these concerns for “just” compensation to the Haudenosaunee people, much less for 
seeing that land claims were resolved peacefully.  Instead, only adamant opposition to the 
protesters’ demands was voiced. To this latter extent, one resident even argued (incorrectly) in a 
letter to the editor that the Haudenosaunee had already been paid in full, or even over-paid, for 
the land under protest through tax credits; and further, that they never should have been paid in 
the first place because “throughout history subject peoples (including Scottish!) have rarely if 
ever been paid for their losses” (Flemming, 2006b). Another resident argued that the government 
should pay “interim compensation for the developer and inconvenienced home-buyers,” and then 
521 What inconvenience homeowners actually experienced from the rally at this point –April 4—
is entirely unclear, since the protest was peaceful and contained to a tiny area of land on the far 
edge of town.   
522 “There's no point in getting into a big debate about whether or not builders and developers 
should be compensated for losses.  Of course they should, now.  … None of our laws have 
prevailed to resolve an ongoing land dispute and because of that, people who stand to lose the 
most --the developers, workers and home consumers who followed the laws and regulations 
before them-- should be granted compensation and put back on even ground.  End of story. It 
doesn't mean that as a taxpayer or even a local business owner you have to like it.”  
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“simply [walk] away until cooler heads [prevail],” leaving the protesters with nothing and with 
no bargaining leverage (Howard, 2006).523
We don't believe you can be in negotiations when one of the parties is performing 
an illegal act by blocking one of the roads. Our town shouldn't be the victim or the 
tool to control the government. (Ken Hewitt, quoted in Harries, 2006a) 
  A third resident, and one of the leaders of the anti-
protest counter-rally, likewise insisted that the government should not be negotiating with the 
protesters at all: 
 
     Thus, many non-Native residents actively advocated the ongoing dispossession of 
Haudenosuanee peoples and ongoing colonial nation-building in Canada, and they did so 
because they were benefiting or were expecting to benefit financially from these ongoing 
activities.  To this extent, these same non-Native residents actively opposed the demands of the 
Haudenosuanee protesters, who asked simply that development on lands under claim stop until 
the land claims were settled. Further, some residents even appear to have actively opposed any 
redress for past wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee, by demanding that the 
government not talk to protesters, or by inaccurately asserting that the Haudenosaunee had 
already been paid for the land under protest and should not have been paid in the first place 
(since “subject peoples” are rarely compensated for such dispossessions).  Further, it appears that 
many of these residents did not feel the need to justify their opposition to the protest or the 
protesters’ demands at all. Their own perceptions that they might not gain financially in the ways 
they had been expecting to gain seemed more than enough justification for these residents.  Thus, 
they demanded (and eventually received)—financial compensation for the inconvenience of 
                                                 
523 The resident made this argument on the grounds that the protest had “rapidly turned nasty,” 
apparently referring to the protesters’ display of defiance when the local sheriff had read the 
newest injunction to protesters about a week prior. This statement was made on April 1, at a time 
when all the protest was peaceful by all accounts.  
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having been interrupted in their process of gaining financially from the dispossession of 
Haudenosaunee people. 
     Thus, many non-Native residents All of these double-standards and displays of a complete 
lack of empathy or sympathy for Native concerns clearly suggest a considerable degree of 
psychopathology at play. As discussed in chapter 4, government policies and practices had long 
authorized and routinized the ongoing dispossession of Native peoples throughout Canada so 
much and for so long that many non-Native residents were actually outraged when these 
processes were interrupted. Upon the slightest hint of this interruption, these non-Native 
residents demonstrated an urgent, emphatic concern for themselves, as well as any other non-
Native who claimed financial injury because of the peaceful Haudenosaunee protest.  Yet, they 
had no concern whatsoever for the Haudenosaunee people and the long-standing and ongoing 
injuries that they suffered, and were so lacking in concern as to not even feel it necessary to give 
symbolic lip service to the idea of justice for their Native neighbors.  All of these factors, as 
argued in chapter 4, have made Canada ripe for atrocity-producing situations on an escalating 
basis, not only in the policy-driven forms discussed in chapter 4, but also in the form of local 
interracial, intercultural settler-colonial conflict.  Further, non-native residents’ unquestioned 
complicity with, participation in, and active advocating for these ongoing perpetrations against 
Native peoples demonstrates a psychopathological dehumanization of Native peoples, which can 
best be explained through the prisms not merely of “siding with the perpetrator,”524
                                                 
524 “[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the 
conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this 
conflict. The bystander is forced to take sides. 
 but of 
   It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator.  All the perpetrator asks is that the 
bystander do nothing.  He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil. The 
victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain.  The victim demands 
action, engagement, and remembering.” (Herman, 1992, p. 8). 
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actively modeling one’s behavior after, and seeking to be the perpetrator, in whatever fashion 
possible. Such extensive dehumanization of others (and of oneself) is a result of the 
psychological processes of dissociation, splitting, and projection, taken to psychopathological 
extents, and observable not only in the complete lack of empathy for Native peoples and their 
concerns, but also in the various allegations levied against them: i.e., that they “turned nasty;” 
that they were lawbreakers and should be ignored; and that they were greedy, manipulative 
people seeking to get paid for things they were already paid for and should never have been paid 
for.  In fact, all of these accusations, when considered within the historical context of non-Native 
displacement and dispossession of Native peoples (as well as in the present context of settlement 
and development on Haudenosaunee lands in 2006), much more accurately reflect the behavior 
and psychological patterns of those non-Native residents who were most opposed to the protest.   
 
THREATS TO CULTURAL WORLDVIEW AND REASSERTIONS OF PRIVILEGE  
 
 Indeed, so strong was the drive to preserve slavery that, during the 1820s and 
1830s, its defense became synonymous with nationalism, and hence patriotism.  In 
response to European criticism that the U.S. was hypocritical in its claims to 
being democratic, many Americans argued that to be free, one must dominate 
others. In dominating absolutely, the U.S. was the freest of nations.  And others 
added that, since property right was inseparable from freedom, the U.S. exalted 
liberty in raising property right to its highest form (as property in persons). 
~ Martinot 2003a, 408 
 
The very structure of their [the oppresse’s] thought has been conditioned by the 
contradictions of the concrete, existential situation by which they were shaped.  
Their ideal is to be men; but for them, to be men is to be oppressors.  This is their 
model of humanity.  Thus, the behavior of the oppressed is a prescribed behavior, 
following as it does the guidelines of the oppressor.  
~ Friere 1971, 30-31 
 
His racism is as usual to his daily survival as is any other prerequisite for 
existence. Compared to colonial racism, that of European doctrinaires seems 
transparent, barren of ideas and, at first sight, almost without passion.  A mixture 
of behaviors and reflexes acquired and practiced since very early childhood, 
established and measured by education, colonial racism is so spontaneously 
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incorporated in even the most trivial acts and words, that it seems to constitute 
one of the fundamental patterns of the colonialist personality.  The frequency of 
its occurrence, its intensity in colonial relationships, would be astounding if we 
did not know to what extent it helps the colonist to live and permits his social 
introduction. The colonialists are perpetually explaining, justifying and 
maintaining (by words as well as by deed) the place and fate of their silent 
partners in the colonial drama. 
~ Memmi 1965, 70 
 
The above section examined motivations behind the explosive and sometimes violent 
expressions of non-native anger in Caledonia relating to real or imagined financial hardships said 
to have been caused by the Haudenosaunee protest and to have unfairly harmed non-Natives.  
However, though these types of claims continued to pepper anti-protest rhetoric throughout the 
duration of the conflict (which continues today), the bulk of anti-protest rhetoric quickly veered 
away from them and towards rhetoric that served to denigrate Native protesters (and Native 
people in general) through assertions of race, class, gendered, legal and nation-based dominance.  
In large part, these various assertions of privilege can be said to be reflective both of a cultural 
worldview that is based upon the subjugation and oppression of other peoples and is incapable of 
dealing with difference, and of a fundamental tendency within this western cultural worldview to 
reenact past societal trauma –on one’s self and others-- through what Elias has termed the 
“civilizing process” (see chapter 4).  Both of these are integral parts of the other, and both will be 
briefly explained before a review of some of the relevant actions and statements of non-Natives 
in this regard. 
Some of the Psychological Dynamics of Non-Native Assertions of Privilege 
 
     A large and ever-growing body of Social Psychological literature, often referred to as Terror 
Management Theory (TMT) has examined the importance of cultural worldviews on self-esteem 
and management of anxiety –particularly death-related anxiety (for an overview, see: Hayes, et 
al., 2010). Consisting of hundreds of articles, this body of literature holds that cultural 
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worldviews are essential to our abilities to manage anxiety and to feel good about ourselves and 
our place in the world.  When these cultural worldviews are threatened, people strongly 
identified with them are likely to experience increased anxiety and to respond defensively in 
order to protect themselves from the psychological threat that is posed to their sense of well-
being. Such defenses may include clinging to one’s cultural worldview despite contradictory 
evidence (Greenberg et al., 2003) and/or efforts to socially distance oneself from “undesirable” 
others (Schimel et. al., 2000: 446).  In both cases, people may engaged in various degrees of: 
derogating others to minimize the threat posed by their views, convincing them to 
abandon their beliefs in favor of one’s own (e.g., missionary activity), or 
annihilating them entirely, thus proving the “truth” of one’s own beliefs (Solomon 
et. al., 2000: 201). 
 
These findings are in line with Devries’ (2006) argument that culture provides us with positive 
social identity, shields us from stressful life events, and that threats to, or loss of, culture can lead 
to paranoia, aggression, identity confusion, negative identities, and socially regressive and 
exclusionary forms of bonding (see chapter 2 and/or appendix 2. See also: Hutchinson & Bleiker, 
2008; Greenberg et al., 2003).525
     These findings are also in line with various Sociological studies.  For example, TMT studies 
have found strong elements of nationalism, racism and other expressions of dominant group 
privilege are elicited when dominant group privileges are symbolically threatened.  When 
Schimel et al. (2007) exposed Canadians to materials that questioned or denigrated Canadian 
achievements and culture, they found that those who most strongly identified with Canadian 
nationalism experienced a significant increase in death-related thoughts (while those with other 
  
                                                 
525 The latter source reports that: “[T]houghts of one’s own death [and presumably also the death 
of one’s own cultural worldview] affect a wide range of human activities, including prosocial 
behavior, aggression, nationalism, prejudice, self-esteem striving, sexual attitudes, risk taking, 
and close relationships.” 
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primary identifications did not).  Meanwhile, Branscombe et al. (2007 & 1998) studied the 
impact on dominant group members of reminders of the privileges (versus the “disadvantages”) 
of dominant group status. The researchers found that being reminded of one’s group privilege 
produced greater levels of racism among dominant group members who most strongly identify 
with their dominant group category (while eliciting a social-distancing effect among other, less 
identity-invested dominant group members. Elsewhere, Sociologists have also found that when 
White Americans were encouraged to think of themselves as “American” they exhibited higher 
levels of prejudice than they did when they were encouraged to think of themselves as “White 
American” or “European American,” suggesting that “American” is a category that they feel 
needs to be defended for and by white people (Dach-Gruschow, 2006: 126).  Perhaps in partial 
explanation of this phenomena, West-Newman (2004: 190) has argued that dominant group 
members –particularly in settler societies—have long come to expect that social relations of 
domination in which dominant group members hold privileged positions relative to others will be 
reproduced and reinforced through government policies and practices.526
     Thus, they psychological defense mechanisms associated with threats to one’s cultural 
worldview, can be deeply intertwined with various race-, class-, gender-, nation-, culture-, and/or 
religious-based assertions of privilege and participation in oppression.  In part, this is due to the 
anxiety that challenges to one’s cultural worldview can produce, as well as, perhaps, the paranoia 
that accompanies the both the perpetration against others and the psychological defenses of 
  Likewise, Cramer 
(2006: 318, citing Gosset) has reported that dominant group members with the most to gain from 
the dispossession of Native peoples often exhibit the most hatred and contempt for Native 
peoples who assert their rights. 
                                                 
526 See also, Litowitz (2000), on arrests as symbolic reenactments of social relations of 
domination. 
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denial,  projection and scapegoating (Martinot, 2003a &2003b; Bladwin, 1965; Wise, 2005; 
Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977; Lifton, 1975).527
                                                 
527 For example, Lifton (1975) wrote about the societal-wide “fearful sense that various forces of 
change threaten to destroy or kill something in the American cultural-ideological essence, a 
perception that is itself called upon in order to ward off the unacceptable feeling that the process 
of decay is internal (nationally and individually). Broadly speaking, one could say that Watergate 
and My Lai represented desperate last-ditch efforts to maintain a faltering cosmology around the 
American secular religion of nationalism, which was inwardly perceived to be collapsing”(p. 
174). 
  These psychological defenses are likely to be 
particularly acute among dominant group members who, unlike non-dominant group members, 
may have experienced little prior exposure to alternative cultural worldviews (whereas non-
dominant group members generally have these forced upon them). Further, as noted in chapter 2, 
Western society is built upon a foundation of psychopathological extremes of these various 
coping mechanism, and it provides its members with few healthy collective methods for 
resolving trauma or worldview-related anxiety.  Instead, the defense mechanisms of choice, into 
which we are all socialized, are more likely to based on the regressive social bonding talked 
about by Devries (2006), Schimel et al, (2000) and others, noted above. Thus, in the face of 
challenges to their cultural worldview, or to their privileged status, dominant group members in 
Western society are already deep into the psychopathology of the Western worldview.  In their 
Western-characteristic confusion, anxiety, fear, and paranoia, they may well feel justified in 
asserting their own claims of victimhood –as if those who challenge the Western cultural 
worldview are victimizers for “provoking” these uncomfortable emotions (see, for example: 
Lipsitz, 2008; Sommers & Norton, 2006). To this extent, Doane (2006: 269) has noted how, 
“Politically, casting whites as victims provides a strong base for neutralizing minority claims for 
racial justice and for activating white counter-mobilization for the defense of racial advantages.” 
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(Guilt also plays a central role in many of these dynamics, and will be examined on its own in 
the next section). 
     In reasserting their dominant group privileges, or their alleged positions of domination over 
other, non-dominant groups, residents are at one and the same time seeking to defend these 
privileges and reenacting past societal traumas.  The “civilizing process” in Western society, 
reenacted in abbreviated form in the lifelong socialization of each of its members, had long ago 
taught these residents about social hierarchies, social relations of domination, and how to act 
respectfully and deferentially towards their hierarchical “superiors.” This is among the most 
essential lessons taught to members of Western society –as the existence of hierarchies of 
domination is largely the factor that set Western “civilized” peoples apart from those deemed 
“uncivilized” (see chapters 2 and 5.  See also: Jahn, 2000).  Even today in Western society, those 
who fail to learn their “place” in the hierarchies of social domination, and to act accordingly 
(with the requisite respect for their alleged “superiors”) generally also fail to find “success” in 
schooling, in the workplace, and in gaining employment in the first place –unless, of course, they 
are independently wealthy, or wildly successful in their creativity.528
                                                 
528 Success in their creativity would require producing a product that was widely coveted by 
those with money, such as art, or producing a product that earned one lots of money, such as a 
dot.com or other such creation, and thus made him/her independently wealthy. Thus, in either 
case, according to the Western social hierarchies of domination, these individuals would deserve 
deference and respect rather than owe it to others –and thus did not actually fail to learn anything 
in this regard. 
 After all, Western standards 
of “success” require obedience to authority and hard work for others, and Western myths hold 
that by following these rules and being “good citizens” one can gradually move up in the social 
hierarchy, gaining dominance over others as a reward. [To this extent, Jahn (2000: 56) noted that 
according to the social hierarchies of Western society upon their discovery of the New World, a 
 382 
man’s position in these hierarchies was determined by how much authority (domination) he 
commanded over animals, women, and other men (see also p. 59; and Todorov, 1999: 152-53)]. 
     The 2006 Haudenosaunee protest challenged all of these assumptions around which many 
non-Native residents had built their entire lives --constantly playing by the rules and, if they were 
anything like perhaps the majority of people in Western society, repeatedly repressing their own 
desires, and even dissociating from the essence of who they each were as people, all in an 
attempt to move up the social hierarchy.  To many of these by-the-rules non-Natives, the 
Haudenosaunee protesters demonstrated a blatant disregard for the rules and the socially 
accepted hierarchies of Western society.  As such, they had not “earned” the right to demand 
deference from others, as perhaps many non-Natives imagined themselves to have done through 
their long lives of hard work, obedience and deference to “superiors.”  Further, in refusing to 
recognize, much less abide by, these hierarchical constructs, the Haudenosaunee protesters were 
challenging these cultural assumptions, thus threatening not only the cultural worldview and the 
privilege of non-Native residents, but the very meaning of their lives –lives that had been spent 
following, adhering to, conforming to the (arbitrary) rules.  As Native protesters who either did 
not know or care about the place in Western society that had been assigned to them demanded to 
talk to federal officials, non-Native residents who had been lifelong obedient conformists in the 
social hierarchy of Western society were struggling to even be heard by their local mayor and 
county councilors.  For at least some of these non-Native residents, the protesters’ actions and 
demands absolutely could not be seen for what they were –legitimate grievances regarding 
ongoing and egregious violations of Haudenosaunee rights—because viewing them in this regard 
would require that non-Natives discard all of the assumptions around which they had built their 
obedient, rule-abiding, self-repressing lives.  For some, the entire meaning of their lives, and to 
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the society and culture around which they had built their identities as good, moral, upstanding 
citizens, was under threat. 
     The protest thus also challenged the Western beliefs in moral purity (of Western society) and 
in a just world (that bad things happen to bad people, and vice versa).  If non-Native residents 
opened themselves up to the possibility that the Haudenosaunee grievances were legitimate, both 
of these aspects of the non-Native worldview immediately fell apart.  The entire nation of 
Canada –like western society itself-- has long been built upon the forcible dispossession of 
people(s), other life forms, and parts of the earth; but these facts had been conveniently forgotten 
long ago through the Western practices of rewriting history and the Western myths of progress 
and civilization.  The protesters’ grievances threatened to bring these intolerable, long repressed 
and denied facts to the surface, and this would completely invert Western assumptions regarding 
who was morally righteous and just and who was not.  Haudenosuanee protesters were not only 
presenting grievances, they were presenting a version of reality that had long been denied, but 
that –even while actively repressed-- still held so much resonance of truth that it threatened the 
entire fabric of the lives of those most strongly identified with Western and/or Canadian 
mythology. Many of these non-Natives were thus among the most opposed any recognition of 
Haudenosaunee grievances, and actively demanded a forcible, violent end to the protest.  When 
seeing that no end was in sight, these non-Native residents sought to take matters into their own 
hands by physically confronting and removing the Native protesters in vigilante fashion.  They 
would have done anything to prevent the threads of their illusory lives from unraveling.  As 
Haudenosaunee community member Wendy Hill remarked in the first quote introducing this 
chapter, non-Native people were terrified of what they might see, of themselves, of their society, 
of everything they had known in their lives, if these threads unraveled: 
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They're scared.  You know, those people are scared, because basically they've 
been lied to their whole life. And now we're standing there telling them a truth 
that they've never heard, and it scares them to think about their future and their 
past.  What is the true history of their past?  And so out of this fear and this hurt 
of being lied to, it makes them angry. (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007) 
 
     The rest of this section will explore some of the assertions of privilege, and some of the 
claims to victimhood, made by non-Natives desperately seeking to hold onto either their 
privilege, their worldview, identity, and the meaning of their lives, or all of these.  Only a few 
examples will be given for each point made, in the interest of time and space. 
Examples of Non-Native Assertions of Privilege 
 
     Some of the ways that non-Native residents reasserted their privilege and defended against 
threats to their cultural worldview was by bonding together around a common national identity 
that implicitly (or explicitly) excluded Native peoples and that contextualized Haudenosaunee 
grievances within the broader Canadian project of nation-building through the dispossession of 
Native and non-Western peoples (see also: Dudas, 2005). For example, at one anti-protest rally, 
organizer Ken Hewitt sought to energize the Canadian-flag-waving crowd by asking them to 
think of the Olympics and to remember the troops in Afghanistan, adding:  
Reach out to all your political people and let them know we are not willing to 
stand still any longer.  It’s time the Canadian ideology that exists within these 
flags take precedent. (Ken Hewitt, quoted in Smith, 2006c) 
 
Both the war in Afghanistan and the 2010 Olympics represent national imperialist and/or 
colonial ventures.  At the time this statement was made, the 2010 Olympics in Vancouver were 
being built upon unceded First Nations lands, against the will of many First Nations people.  
Meanwhile, the war in Afghanistan was being carried out to promote the hegemonic dominance 
and strategic economic positioning of Western countries and their corporate elites. Thus, for Ken 
Hewitt and other non-Native residents at this rally, these colonial and imperialist activities were 
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to be celebrated, and their own “struggle” against Haudenosaunee protester demands was 
contextualized within the ideologies of Canadian nation-building and Western (White) 
supremacy.  Other residents repeated this message, asserting to reporters, for example that: “I’m 
proud of my Country, I’m proud of my race, I’m proud of my town” (unnamed non-Native 
resident quoted in: Hayley & Harries, 2006; Horn, 2006). 
     At the same time that non-Native residents sought to exclude Native peoples from their 
collective, socially-constructed, national identity, they also attempted to reassert the dominance 
of this identity over Native peoples.  They did so, in some instances, by repeatedly denouncing 
protesters’ claims that the Haudenosaunee were (are) a sovereign people.529  To this extent, one 
resident remarked in a letter to the editor that “Contrary to some protesters' beliefs, they are 
subject to the laws of Canada. Just ask any of the natives currently serving time in Canada's 
prisons,”(Lupton, 2006). Another non-Native editorial columnist asserted, oddly: “I keep reading 
media reports about the "peaceful" protesters in Caledonia and their claims to sovereignty. … 
[T]he natives are no more sovereign than breasts on a woman” (Jackson, 2006c).530
     Further in line with the “Canadian ideology that exists within these flags,” many non-Native 
residents who opposed the protest rhetorically advocated punishments for Native peoples 
asserting their sovereign status.  One non-Native resident suggested that: “if natives are not 
Canadian, and do not deem themselves to be subject to the laws of Canada, then they should not 
be receiving the billions of Canadian tax dollars that they do now” (Shaver, 2006).  Though the 
concept of providing funding to other nations only on the condition that these nations do what 
 
                                                 
529 Protesters made statements about Haudenosaunee sovereignty to the press throughout the 
protest.  Some media mentions closest to this time are included in: Canadian Press, 2006a, 2006u 
& 2006s).  
530 The implicit gender-based assertions of privilege here are also interesting, and there are a 
number of other, similar examples of this type of assertion.  These will be explored in a future 
work. 
 386 
Canada wants was not lost on this resident, these comments display a willful ignorance of the 
fact that historic treaty agreements with Native nations often explicitly stipulated that Europeans 
pay annuities and share in promoting the well-being of particular Native nations in exchange for 
permission to use portions of these nations’ lands.  Another non-Native resident went even 
further in her denunciations of Haudenosaunee claims to sovereignty, insisting that there could 
be no grey area on the topic: “If these people are not Canadians then they're bloody terrorists” 
(Lisa Parent, quoted in Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c), again towing the general assumption 
in the Western cultural worldview today that those nations and peoples who act contrary to 
Western interests are self-evidently terrorists.  
     Of course, non-Natives’ defense of the western cultural worldview and assertions of privilege 
over Native peoples did not rest solely on constructions of (white) Canadian nationalism.  They 
also sought to denigrate Native protesters (and peoples in general) through the use of stereotypes 
which perpetuated idea of Native peoples as low on the social hierarchy, and as less “civilized” 
than non-Native Canadians.  For example, at their weekly anti-protest (anti-Native) rallies, non-
Native residents intent on confronting Native peoples and venting their anti-Native anger arrived 
holding signs with slogans such as: “Get a job you filthy Indians” and “How ‘bout Some 
Whiskey?” (Tekawennake, 2006b). Other signs proclaimed the protesters to be “cowards, 
thugs… half-wits, and terrorists,” and proclaimed the protest site to be “Loserville” (signs shown 
in: Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007).  Letters to the editor and editorial columnists further 
played on stereotypes of Native peoples as lowly and “uneducated” “loafers” or slum-dwellers 
who have nothing better to do than to destroy the investments of more civilized businessmen.  As 
one resident remarked: 
If the police had shown any foresight in this matter they would have acted when 
there was only a handful of these clowns at Douglas Creek Estates.  Now we have 
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dozens of loafers living in a mini slum at the edge of town. Meanwhile, a local 
businessman is watching his investment circle the drain. (Thompson, 2006a) 
 
Further, an editorial column proclaimed: 
 
Educated people who have bought homes are being held hostage as are the 
builders and developers who need to work to earn a living. And non-natives are 
getting increasingly frustrated with natives in general when they should be 
concerning themselves with a group of people who don't know any better and 
have nothing better to do. (Jackson, 2006c) 
 
Other non-Native residents focused on stereotypes of Native people as welfare recipients, 
dependent upon non-Native hand-outs and needing to “finally learn that life is somehow more 
satisfying when you have to pay for your own lunch”(Flemming, 2006a); and even the local 
mayor advanced such stereotypes, suggesting that, unlike non-Native residents, Native protesters 
did not understand what it was like to have to work for a living: “[The non-Natives] don’t have, 
uh, monies coming in automatically every month.  They’ve got to work to survive.  And, and the 
Natives’ have got to realize that” (Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in: CBC News, 2006a; Harries 
& Rusk, 2006; Rook, 2006f). 
     Numerous other residents utilized racial slurs and race-based assertions of dominance, 
directed at Native protesters as well as Native people in general who attempted to patronize local 
businesses. For example, one non-Native resident yelled urgently to his fellow non-Natives: 
“Don’t let Indians get through that door!”(Hayley & Harries, 2006; Horn, 2006). Some of these 
race-based assertions of privilege and dominance will be further explored in the section on 
dehumanization. 
     As part of their cultural worldview of non-Native privilege and dominance, non-Native 
residents who vehemently opposed the Haudenosaunee protest had expected to see a show of 
force against the Native protesters, and many of them lined the roads around the protest site on 
the days of this expected show of force in order to get a good view of the symbolic reenactment 
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of Canadian society’s social relations of domination.531
GUILT, SELF-ESTEEN, REFRAMING LAW, REWRITING HISTORY  
  When this show of force did not 
materialize, non-Natives’ sense of entitlement and privilege within the social hierarchy of 
Canadian society was threatened.  Many non-Natives responded to this sense of threat by 
reasserting their sense of entitlement, by simultaneously dismissing Native grievances outright, 
and by making exaggerated claims to non-Native victimhood.  Some of these exaggerated claims 
will be explored in their own section, further below. 
 
The subject [that] would try to obtain liberation through oblivion from something 
that actually happened, looses a part of its history, and therefore a part of its 
identity.  In this way, the subject walks around without a shadow and becomes 
“face- and history-less” and is yet permanently in restlessness and fear of being 
caught by its own shadow and its true face. 
~Hardtman 1998, 92 
 
People who imagine that history flatters them (as it does, indeed, since they wrote 
it) are impaled on their history like a butterfly on a pin and become incapable of 
seeing or changing themselves, or the world. … They are dimly, or vividly, aware 
that the history they have fed themselves is mainly a lie, but they do not know how 
to release themselves from it, and they suffer enormously from the resulting 
personal incoherence. 
~ Baldwin 1965 
 
Guilt and the struggle for self-esteem are important aspects of the dynamics discussed in the 
above section.  Part of chapter 2 examined the loss of culture and the adverse impacts of that 
upon the people who experience it.  It was also asserted in that chapter that cultural identities that 
were constructed from this loss were often built upon regressive forms of social bonding and 
other exclusionary and psychopathological patterns of thought and behavior.  These assertions 
fall in line with the observations of others, such as Tim Wise (2005) and Vine Deloria, Jr. 
                                                 
531 For more on this sort of phenomena, see Litowitz (2000) and West-Newman (2004).  For 
some media accounts of this behavior, see: Windle (2006f) and Greenberg (2006a).   
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(1969),532
To define yourself, ultimately, but what you’re not, is a pathetic and 
heartbreaking thing.  It is to stand denuded before a culture that has stolen your 
birthright, or rather, convinced you to give it up. And the costs are formidable, 
beginning with the emptiness whites so often feel when confronted by 
multiculturalism and the connectedness of people of color to their various 
heritages.  That emptiness then gets filled up by privileges and ultimately forces 
us to become dependent upon them.  We are not ourselves anymore, but the 
overpaid, overfed, overstuffed slaves to a self-imposed, self-chosen system of 
cultural genocide.   
 who have both found that “white” Western culture is based more on exclusion and 
destruction than on the self- and other-affirming aspects associated with culture in indigenous 
and other non-Western societies.  As such, Western culture in many ways fails to provide its 
members with any but the most fragile foundations for social support, for successfully navigating 
life’s many stages, for the development of a “positive evaluation of the self in the social 
context,” and for keeping its members sane and human (Diamond, 1974: 254; Devries, 2006: 
400).  In fact, as argued in chapter 2, the main means that Western culture offers its members for 
the construction of social identities are exclusion, domination and consumption (Horkheimer, 
1996; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964; Deloria, 1969; Wise, 2005).  Wise (2005) 
elaborates on the fragile foundations of identity-construction in Western society, as well as one 
of the key problems of concern in this section: 
     I can’t help think that at the end of the day, we, too, got played. (Pp. 145-46)  
 
Some of the Psychological Dynamics of Guilt 
 
     Because, as noted above, reminders of group-based privilege are often experienced as threats 
both to privilege and self-esteem, privileged group members frequently respond in ways intended 
to defend both of these, while also denying (repressing) associated feelings of guilt.  Such efforts 
                                                 
532 “As far as we could determine, white culture, if it existed, depended primarily upon the 
exploitation of land, people and life itself.  It relied upon novelties and fads to provide an 
appearance of change but it was basically an economic Darwinism that destroyed rather than 
created” (p. 179).  
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may well include increased displays of racial or cultural prejudice among those most strongly 
identified with one’s cultural worldview or in-group status and/or other forms of clinging to the 
cultural worldview that affords them privilege (Branscombe et. al., 1998; Branscombe et. al., 
2007; Hayes et al., 2010).  In part, some have argued, this is because feelings of guilt and 
acknowledgement of one’s responsibility for past or ongoing atrocities can be “deeply painful” 
(Williams, 2000).  Those who are not strongly invested in the dominant group identity may seek 
to socially distance themselves from the dominant group in order to relieve themselves of at least 
some of these feelings (Arndt et. al., 2007; Williams, 2000; Branscome, 1998 and 2007).  Others 
who are more invested in these dominant group identities may attempt to repress feelings of 
guilt.  Some do so out of fear that the negative emotions they will experience will be so great that 
they will never be able to recover from them, or out of fear that if they acknowledge these 
atrocities to any extent, they will be required to give up their “cheerfulness and liveliness” 
forever, and will be required to live their entire lives focused on past horrors that can never be 
undone (Bar-on, Ostrovsky, and Fromer, 1998; Goodwin, 1989).  Others do so out of a need to 
maintain feelings of moral purity and superiority (Williams, 2008; Litz et al., 2009), or a need to 
adhere to cultural worldview myths of Western benevolence in imposing destruction upon non-
Western peoples.  Thus, by denying all guilt, these privileged group members are denying the 
reality of past and present perpetration, and thus construct identities around and adopt the 
mentality of justifying perpetration –referred to by Herman (1992) as “identifying with the 
perpetrator.”533
                                                 
533 “[W]hen traumatic events are of human design, those who bear witness are caught in the 
conflict between victim and perpetrator.  It is morally impossible to remain neutral in this 
conflict.  The bystander is forced to take sides.  
   
     It is very tempting to take the side of the perpetrator.  All the perpetrator asks is that the 
bystander do nothing.  He appeals to the universal desire to see, hear, and speak no evil.  The 
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     Unfortunately, the willful (or even unconscious) adoption of this mentality is conducive to 
future acts of perpetration and atrocities, and the efforts required to repress and deny knowledge 
of past perpetrations is likely to evoke feelings of resentment and anger (Williams, 2000; 
Halloran, 2000; West-Newman, 2004; Lifton, 2002) which can “inevitably become sources of 
identity” themselves (Hutchinson and Bleiker, 2008: 396, 391).  These can in turn evoke 
symptoms of paranoia, attack imagery, imagined persecution and/or imagined threats of 
disintegration (Williams, 2000: 137-38; Litz et. al. 2009: 699; Martinot, 2003; Lifton, 1975 & 
2002: 67; Doane, 2006: 269), requiring psychopathological processes of blaming, blame-shifting, 
and scapegoating to maintain the illusion of cultural moral purity and righteous benevolence 
(Williams, 2000; Litz et. al., 2009; Bar-On, Ostrovsky and Fromer, 1998).  All of these 
psychopathological mechanisms can serve to justify symbolic or actual physical assaults on 
already victimized groups in attempts to ward off otherwise intolerable feelings of guilt that 
one’s fragile identity and sense of self-esteem cannot otherwise survive intact (Kelman, 1973; 
Martinot, 2003a; Williams, 2008; Hardtmann, 1998).534
     Non-Native residents in Caledonia who adamantly opposed the Haudenosaunee protest chose 
the former option, constructing temples of illusion to protect their fragile identities, self-esteem, 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
victim, on the contrary, asks the bystander to share the burden of pain.  The victim demands 
action, engagement, and remembering.” (Pp. 7-8) 
534 “For the children, the second generation in Germany, this means that they grew up with 
partially “face- and history-less parents.” Insofar as they have identified with them, as, for 
instance, the right-wing radical youth, their own identity depends on an illusionary and brittle 
foundation.  It is difficult for them to develop a defined identity of their own, to live a different 
history, and show a different face. To the extent that they develop this identity, they have to 
question the parental models and thus the yearning and loving feelings attached to them.  They 
are orphans inside, reliant on surrogate mothers and fathers. The story of these surrogate mothers 
and fathers has not yet been written.  From the psychoanalyst’s perspective, it is not rare for the 
psychoanalyst to take over that function” (Hardtmann, 1998: 92). 
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and cultural worldview, and to reassert their privileged positions.  The following discussion in 
this section will examine some of the ways in which they did so. 
Applying the Dynamics of Guilt Repression and Denial to Non-Native Opposition to  the 
Haudenosaunee Protest 
     Though the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest was a peaceful protest of perhaps a dozen or so 
people confined to a small plot of land on the outskirts of town (at least prior to the failed police 
raid), it confronted non-Native residents with a version of local and Canadian history that many 
had long sought to deny.  Because of this long-standing denial and repression, many non-Natives 
were entirely unprepared for the feelings of guilt that arose within them when they were 
confronted with reminders of their deep, collective and personal, complicity in these harms.  
Perhaps without understanding the source of these feelings, but wanting to get rid of them 
quickly, many non-Native residents immediately opposed the events that provoked these 
feelings.  The forced surfacing of these intolerable feelings of guilt with which they were wholly 
unprepared to deal may even have been one of the motivating factors behind non-Native 
opposition to the protest, particularly for non-Natives who were more dissociated from their 
emotions and less willing to engage in critical self-reflection necessary for processing 
unexpected emotions.  Other residents, whose opposition may have been motivated by different 
factors (financial gain, desires to protect privilege and/or assert domination), were similarly 
forced to respond in some way to feelings of guilt associated with their opposition to justice for 
Native peoples, and many of these latter likely also sought to deny and repress feelings of guilt 
rather than confront and critically reflect upon them. 
     Thus, regardless of whether guilt was a motivating factor in opposing the protest or an 
unpleasant emotion that needed to be neutralized, non-Natives seeking to avoid intolerable 
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feelings of guilt utilized a number of psychological defense mechanisms for doing so.  For 
example, as briefly mentioned above, some non-Natives who intensely protested the interruption 
in colonialism-as-usual denied that colonialism was present at all, or sought to shift blame away 
from their own behavior towards that of Native protesters (who had turned “nasty” or were 
“violating the law”).  Other non-Native opposing the protest acknowledged that colonial 
perpetrations against Native peoples had existed in the past, but denied that non-Natives had any 
responsibilities to make up for them (since “subject peoples” allegedly do not have rights to 
redress, or since they weren’t alive when these harms occurred) (Flemming, 2006b; Jackson, 
2006b; Howatt, 2006b).  Non-Native residents further denied the existence of ongoing colonial 
perpetrations in the present and projected their own acts of, or complicity in, present day 
perpetrations onto the peaceful Haudenosaunee protesters.  According to these projections, the 
Haudenosaunee protesters –and not non-Natives who promoted the settlement and development 
on lands under Haudenosaunee claim-- were the ones who were attempting to acquire 
illegitimate gains from other, such as by allegedly demanding to be paid yet again for land that 
they (a resident inaccurately claimed) had already been paid in full, and even over-paid 
(Flemming, 2006b). Thus, through the psychopathological mechanisms of Western thinking, the 
peaceful protest was the victimizing action, and morally degenerate Haudenosaunee protesters 
were victimizing morally pure non-Natives. 
     Thus, to aid in their denial of past and/or present wrongs that their society had inflicted upon 
Native peoples, and to avoid intolerable feelings of collective and personal guilt with which they 
were wholly unprepared to cope, non-Natives engaged in elaborate attempts to construct 
alternate versions of reality in which non-Natives were morally pure and Native protesters 
victimized non-Natives. Many of these alternative versions of reality hinged on partial-truths, 
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such as was the case in locally constructed narratives of “law,” “law and order,” and history.  
Both of these will be explored briefly below. 
Local constructions of law 
Following the lead of their government, non-Natives constructed local narratives of law or “law 
and order” that entirely ignored relevant Supreme Court of Canada rulings, issues of Canadian 
constitutional law and treaty law, and international laws pertaining to the human rights of 
indigenous peoples that Canada is legally bound to uphold. Chapter 4 provides an overview of 
these various types of law, as well as the various ways in which government officials and media 
outlets ignored all of these. Since many non-Natives relied on the media and their government 
officials for information, it is understandable that many were mislead in relation to the actual 
laws that were applicable to the 2006 Haudenosaunee protest.  Yet, non-Native residents were all 
equally exposed to this misleading information, and many non-Natives supported the 
Haudenosaunee assertions of rights or at least admitted that they did not know who was right or 
wrong.  Many non-Native residents also willingly acknowledged the problematic history in their 
governments’ past dealings with Native peoples and the need to repair past wrongs.  However, 
those non-Native residents who were most opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest were not 
willing to acknowledge either past wrongs or their own present uncertainty.  Instead, those most 
opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest framed issues of law and order with absolute certainty, 
asserting that they (morally degenerate Native protesters) were wrong, and we (morally pure non-
Natives) were right.   
     In order to create such a narrative, these non-Native residents needed to ignore entirely 
everything that did not fit into the view of the world that they wished to construct. And so they 
did: insisting that the protest was an “illegal occupation” and that Haudenosaunee protesters had 
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“clearly broken the laws that we as Canadians abide by,” (unnamed residents quoted in Rook, 
2006e) or the “law of the land,” as one non-Native resident remarked five weeks into the protest: 
I understand they have a cause.  As Canadian citizens, they also have to abide by 
the law of the land.  The only thing I don’t understand is why the army, the police 
or somebody else in authority doesn’t go in and put a stop to it. (Unnamed 
resident quoted in Legall, 2006f) 
 
Interestingly, the phrase “law of the land” is generally associated with constitutional law [as in, 
“The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada” (Constitution Act, 1982: s. 52(1))], 
though this resident is ignoring the Canadian constitution, which assigns to the federal 
government –and not provincial police or provincial courts-- sole jurisdiction over matters 
relating to “Indians and lands Reserved for Indians” (s. 91(24)).  Though this provision would 
indicate that provincial laws against protesting or “trespassing” are not applicable to Native land 
claims protests (see chapter 4 and also: Wilkins, 2003), the resident’s rhetoric served its purpose, 
and numerous other non-Natives chimed in with similar statements or demands.  For example, 
one argued that: “Sure, there is the spirit of some native people, but there is also the spirit of the 
law. Today’s law,”(Jackson, 2006b), while others demanded that police at immediately to “Get 
those outlaws out of there”(non-Native resident quoted in Edwards, 2006a) and “Put an end to 
this now!”(protest sign quoted in Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a).  
     There were, of course, a number of non-Native residents who were not blindly opposed to the 
protest, and who attempted to bring a more factual basis to locally constructed narratives of law.  
For example, one local resident who argued that the protesters’ assertions that:  
"Canadian law doesn't apply to natives" is a fairly accurate statement. Under 
Canadian law, if you were to sell a parcel of land to someone, then they refused to 
pay for it, the government would help you either get the money that is owed to 
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you or remove the person who is illegally on your land. That same protection 
however has not been afforded to Six Nations. (Davis, 2006)535
 
 
Other non-Natives who supported the protest also noted the longstanding history in Canada of 
criminalizing activists of all stripes whenever they attempt to assert their rights, thus confronting 
the locally constructed narratives of law and order: 
In our experience, where people stand up for their rights –including the labour 
movement—it gets turned into a law and order issue and we get criminalized.  We 
stand with [the Six Nations].  It [the protest] should be resolved with discussion. 
(quoted in Pearce, 2006c)536
 
 
     Yet, despite these attempts by some non-Natives to contradict the black-and-white narrative 
of legal certainty that was being constructed by local non-Natives opposed to the protest, the 
latter continued to intensify their opposition to the protest, and expanded their feelings of anger 
to encompass not just to the allegedly “lawbreaking” protesters, but also police, elected officials, 
and even media accounts that diverged from this law and order narrative. For example, one non-
Native resident responded angrily to the suggestion of another non-Native resident that 
politicians pay compensation to non-Natives and then “walk away,” insisting instead that police 
violently force “law breaking” protesters off the site: 
I can't believe The Spectator would advocate that the law not be enforced. The 
developers have a legal court order for the removal of the protesters. They should 
                                                 
535 It should be mentioned again here, however, that the Haudenosaunee never sold this land: 
there is no evidence that they ever intended to /agreed to sell it, and there are no legitimate 
documents of surrender/sale (see the summary in chapter 1).  Thus, the question here is not 
whether the Haudenosaunee were fairly compensated (they were not), but why the government 
has wrongfully treated the lands as if they were sold.  The writer’s confusion may have stemmed 
from the fact that the Six Nations Band Council was only seeking financial compensation for 
these lands at this time, which was against the wishes of vast numbers of traditional and non-
traditional Haudenosaunee people in the Six Nations community (and was thus also one of the 
motivating factors for the protest, as noted in chapters 1 and 4). 
536 Pearce (2006c) is quoting Hamilton Steelworker and member of United Steelworkers Local 
1005, Paul Lane.  On the unions present, see also: Hamilton Spectator (2006e) and The Marxist-
Leninist (2006a & 2006b) 
 397 
not "walk away until cooler heads prevail." They should insist these lawbreakers 
be removed now.  
     It's time for the OPP to do their job and enforce the court order. Contrary to 
some protesters' beliefs, they are subject to the laws of Canada. Just ask   any of 
the natives currently serving time in Canada's prisons. (Lupton, 2006) 
 
Another resident, holding fast to local claims that the protest constituted an  “illegal occupation,” 
lamented the failure of police and elected officials to “uphold the law and protect citizens” and 
further demanded that while officials compensate non-Natives for the inconvenience, they 
likewise ignore entirely Haudenosaunee grievances.  The resident justified these demands on the 
basis that law-breaking protesters were bullies who should not be catered to: 
I agree that those financially disadvantaged by the illegal occupation require 
government compensation to make up for the local, provincial and federal 
governments’ failure to uphold the law and protect citizens. 
     However, to turn the land over to the protesters, or even to leave it vacant, is 
not a viable solution. … If you give in to bullying and intimidation, it does not 




     In this same vein, while some non-Natives characterized the lack of police action (at least 
prior to the failed April 19 police raid on the protest site) as a “display of weakness” by law 
enforcement and other local authorities,538
                                                 
537 Meyer, Ann. 2006. The bullying must stop. Hamilton Spectator, April 18, Final Edition, 
Opnion. 
 many others turned it into an alleged wrong that was 
being committed against them by police and local politicians.  In constructing this narrative, 
local non-Native residents argued that the lack of police action against Native protesters 
demonstrated police favoritism towards Natives and discrimination against non-Natives.  
Residents argued repeatedly that: “[i]f that was us sitting out there holding a protest, we could 
have been taken out on the first day”(quoted in Nolan, 2006c) and “if it were any other group 
except natives, they would have been removed on Day 1” (Lupton, 2006).   
538 Thompson, Bryan. 2006. Action should be taken now. Regional News. April 12. Page 6. 
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     A few non-Native residents who did not blindly oppose the protest again attempted to point 
out that these assertions were actually not true.  They gave examples of the Red Hill Valley 
protest, a few years back, in which tree-sitting non-Natives blocked construction of a highway 
for 105 days, (E. Marion, 2006).539 But those non-Natives vehemently opposed to the protest 
completely ignored such reminders and instead ratcheted up their rallying cries against the 
Liberal government (Nolan, 2006c) and its alleged “state-sponsored racism” regardless of actual 
objective evidence.  Further, the construction of this narrative of “state-sponsored racism” was 
begun a mere two weeks after the protest had started --long before the police actually had the 
authority to remove protesters.540
[T]he Federal government should enact legislation abolishing state-sponsored 
racism.  Giving special privileges to people because their great-grand parents 
belonged to the "right" racial group is morally indefensible.  
 The resident who can be credited with this invention (at least 
as the concept relates to this particular protest) wrote in a letter to a local paper that:  
                                                 
539 “The letter writer is wrong to say that only natives could persist in civil disobedience for any 
length of time. None of the tree-sitters in the Red Hill Valley were native, and that lasted for 105 
days, ending only when the last tree-sitter came down.” 
540 As noted in Chapter 1, the March 3 order was merely a civil injunction pending trial of the 
merits of the case, this trial being scheduled on March 9 (Coyle, 2006; Legall, 2006i).   The 
March 9 permanent, interlocutory injunction was apparently also a civil order (also pending trial 
of the merits of the case) rather than a criminal order, and thus the provincial police said they had 
no authority to enforce it (Canadian Press, 2006i; Legall, 2006j). The trial on the merits for the 
March 9th order was held on March 16 and 17, and the order that came out of that hearing, citing 
protesters for contempt of court, apparently contained an error that prevented police from 
enforcing it.  After the March 22 deadline passed, Crown Attorney John Pearson noted that the 
March 17th order erroneously stated that protesters would be fingerprinted and photographed 
under the Identification of Criminals Act, though this act could did not apply to contempt of 
court cases. Pearson thus asked Marshall, after the March 22 deadline, to clarify the order by 
including in it both the statement that the fingerprinting and photographing would be done under 
a probation order, and the statement that protesters would be guilty of criminal as well as civil 
contempt. The order was amended on March 28.  On Pearson’s comments regarding the 
Identification of Criminals Act and his request to the judge, see: Legall (2006b).  On 
irregularities in the March 17th order, the amending of the order, and the March 28th date of the 
order being amended, see: Best (2006f). For additional sources on the judge clarifying the order 
and/or ambiguities in the order, see also: Harries (2006c), Canadian Press (2006l), Bonnell & 
Canadian Press (2006d), Legall (2006n), Burman (2006b).  
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     Everyone would benefit, especially the natives who would finally learn that 
life is somehow more satisfying when you have to pay for your own lunch. 
(Flemming, 2006a) 
 
Another resident lent his own version of this commonly-expressed them, expanding the category 
of alleged victimizers to include not only Native peoples and the police and government officials 
who refused to “enforce the law” upon them immediately, but also all non-White peoples: 
 
Any non-natives who decided to trespass on someone's property would be 
arrested without a court order, but if you're a minority living in Canada you can 
stay for eons. All police do is sit at the side of the road. (Jackson, 2006c) 
 
     After the Ontario Provincial Police failed in their attempted raid against the protesters, non-
Native residents added to their long list of alleged victimizations against them the assertion that 
the provincial police and politicians had abandoned them and their town.  They persisted in these 
claims despite the obvious fact that large numbers of police were actually everywhere in the 
town from that day until the road blockades were removed a couple months later.  Thus residents 
asserted that police had abandoned their post and abandoned “our community, our safety, our 
business, our property values and our rights as Canadian citizens” (Edwards & Gombu, 2006; 
Edwards, 2006a).  This alleged abandonment was further equated with forcing the rights of 
Canadian citizens to “take a back seat” to Native rights, because presumably the two could not 
be equally honored, but one (the former) had to predominate over the other. (Mayor Marie 
Trainer, quoted in Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c.  See also: Healey & Nolan, 2006). 
     By perpetuating claims that they had been victimized by Native protesters, as well as police 
and elected officials, non-Native residents were able to avoid feelings of guilt and blame for their 
own complicity in the ongoing perpetrations against Haudenosaunee people, largely by 
projecting this guilt and perpetration onto Native peoples and anyone who did not engage in 
behavior aimed at immediately and forcefully ending the Haudenosaunee protest and returning 
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things in town to dispossession and colonialism-as-usual. Further, because these psychological 
mechanisms are frequently taken to psychopathological extremes in Western society, many non-
Native residents may have been entirely unaware of the existence of their denied guilt, and may 
well have convinced themselves that they were the innocent, morally-pure victims suffering by 
the wrongs done to them by everyone else around them who did not do what they 
wanted/demanded. Indeed, these non-Native residents may well have felt like suffering victims, 
as this is characteristic of the psychopathological mechanisms for denying, repressing and 
projecting onto others intolerable feelings (Hardtmann, 1998; see also Appendix 2). 
     Further, the alleged failures of police and politicians to do what non-Native residents wanted 
represented, for some of these residents, a violation of their cultural worldview expectations of 
privilege that had long been reinforced by government policies and practices of dispossessing 
Native peoples.  The conditions for atrocity (discussed in chapter 4) had long been present and 
normalized in the national consciousness of Canadian society’s dominant group (and in Western 
society in general), and non-Native Canadians, long socialized into these conditions, had 
expected police and government authorities to reenact these conditions locally through displays 
of domination that would immediately end any interruption in Canada’s ongoing norm of 
dispossession and colonialism-as-usual.  When these reenactments did not occur, non-Natives 
felt betrayed, not only because they were then confronted with long-repressed and denied 
feelings of guilt and complicity in these perpetrations against Native peoples (as the only ones 
demanding the forced end to the protest), but also because the expectations they had long been 
socialized to expect were not being met. Because their locally constructive narratives of law and 
order had left them completely blind to the actual domestic and international laws that were most 
relevant to the conflict, these anti-protest non-Native residents were unable to understand why no 
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one was acting as they demanded.  Filled with intolerable emotions that were not being assuaged 
but were only making them increasingly more uncomfortable and anxiety-filled, these non-
Natives came to the only conclusions that their denial and intense emotions would allow: 
everyone was victimizing them in horrible, morally and legally degenerate ways.  That the extent 
of this believed victimization, and the exaggerative lengths that non-Native peoples went to 
express their actual feelings of victimization, far outweighed any possible empirical 
interpretation of reality was of little concern to these residents, because they were struggling so 
intensely with intolerable anxieties and fears as to be wholly incapable of seeing empirical reality 
(something quite typical of people in such a situation, as noted in the discussion on trauma, 
above).  Some of the more extreme and exaggerated claims to victimhood made by non-Native 
residents will be further explored more in another section below.  But first, local versions of 
historical facts, as they were constructed by non-Native residents who opposed the 2006 protest, 
will be examined. 
Local constructions of history 
     While claims regarding the legality of the Haudenosaunee protest took front and center in 
non-Native rhetoric against it, in order to be fully convincing in these claims –as well as in their 
claims to moral purity and victimization—non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed 
the protest also had to neutralize and counter Haudenosaunee grievances pertaining to the status 
of the lands under protest.  As already noted above, some non-Natives were able to satisfy 
themselves with (entirely false) claims regarding the alleged compensation (or “over-
compensation”) received by the Haudenosaunee (Flemming, 2006b).  But the majority of non-
Natives opposing the protest and demanding a return to colonialism-as-usual, even these 
admissions of past colonialism were risky.  Thus, to ease their collective guilt in their own eyes 
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and the eyes of others, they sought to discredit Haudenosaunee claims to injury entirely.  To 
these ends, just weeks after the start of the protest, non-Native residents opposing the protest 
began constructing an elaborate local version of history as it pertained to the Haudenosaunee 
land base.  For example, in his March 22nd
some 150 chiefs signed the document giving away title to the land, and the natives 
should come to the realization that, just as for other Canadians, they cannot and 
could not always trust their leaders. (Pickup, 2006) 
 opinion column, reporter Bill Jackson confidently 
(and incorrectly) asserted to his readers that “[m]ost of the land Six Nations held originally was 
sold legitimately” (Jackson, 2006b).  Jackson further bolstered this false assertion with further 
false assertions, arguing that the Haudenosaunee had only filed land claims on a “relatively small 
fraction” of their original 950,000 acres, and that any past wrongs the Haudenosaunee had 
suffered were at least partially their own fault.  After minimizing Haudenosaunee claims in this 
way, Jackson then sought to dismiss them entirely, asking his readers if it was really “wise to let 
misappropriation –both native and non-native—dating back centuries get in the way of good 
judgment”(with “good judgment” apparently meaning non-Native accumulation through the 
dispossession of Native peoples) (Jackson, 2006b). About a month later the editor of the paper 
took Jackson’s statements even further, asserting a new, and entirely inaccurate, version of 
history, which held that:  
 
     Though many of Jackson’s assertions could have been easily debunked by any non-Native 
residents who were interested in knowing what really happened,541
                                                 
541 For example, all of the Haudenosaunee claims to land are posted on the Six Nations Lands 
and Resources website, and even a quick glance at the site would have revealed that claims have 
been filed on most of the original 950,000 acres.  Further, almost all of the rest of the land that is 
not under registered claim would be under registered claim, if the federal government had not 
prevented the Haudenosaunee from filing additional claims in response to the Haudenosaunee’s 
1995 lawsuit against Canada and Ontario.   
 other residents quickly 
followed Jackson’s lead of attributing to the Haudenosaunee at least equal blame and 
 403 
responsibility for their own past injury.  For example, another resident argued in his letter to the 
editor that the situation was really quite ambiguous, that there had been broken treaties “on both 
sides,” and that non-Natives could not really be blamed for never being able to “grasp the fact 
that striking a deal with one tribal chief didn't necessarily mean a deal had been reached with the 
whole tribe” (Dreschel, 2006).542 This version of history, though wildly inaccurate, clearly made 
a better story for angry non-Natives than did the version generally accepted by historians and 
Canadian courts alike, but it still acknowledged some guilt and responsibility on the part of non-
Natives for the Haudenosaunee grievances. Thus, not surprisingly, other versions history were 
constructed that were much less “ambiguous” on this point (and, of course, much less accurate). 
Examples of this latter historical narrative was demonstrated at one of the first rallies organized 
by local developers and realtors, when local real estate lawyer Ed McCarthy emphatically and 
confidently (and also incorrectly) told a crowd of several hundred non-Native residents that the 
Haudenosuanee had “absolutely” surrendered the lands under protest in 1841, and that both the 
protest and the police failure to remove the protesters were flagrant violations of the law:
                                                 
542 In fact, considerable historical evidence demonstrates not only that non-Natives were fully 
aware of the fact that striking a deal with one person did not equate striking a deal with an entire 
Native nations, but that they routinely and purposefully sought to exploit this fact –preferring to 
find individual non-Natives who had no authority over anything, to bribe them to sign documents 
of surrender, and then to attempt to pass these documents off as legitimate surrenders. Far from 
being a result of non-Native naïveté, the practice was often the preferred method for obtaining a 
(fraudulent) surrender from Native peoples, since the laws of most Native nations prohibited the 
alienation of land, and the consensus basis on which many of these communities were run was 
not otherwise corruptible (McNeil, 2001-2002). Further, the desire to avoid dealing with entire 
communities and their democratic or consensus-based decision-making processes was a primary 
motivating factor behind the passage of the Indian Act, which authorized the Canadian 
government to forcibly impose elected systems of government upon Native communities (as a 
way to get around working with traditional systems of government) (Reid, 2004). See chapter 4 
for more on Native laws prohibiting the alienation of land, and on recognition by Canadian 
courts that these fraudulent practices were routine and purposeful –but that documents obtained 
through such practices are not legitimate documents of surrender. 
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The laws are being flagrantly violated…. There’s a need to bring this to an end 
and to bring it to an end promptly…. The law of the land has to be enforced….  
This land belongs to Henco Industries Ltd.  Nobody has the right to interfere with 
it. (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a)543
 
 
Though the local real estate lawyer was not a historian, and apparently knew very little about 
Canadian court rulings regarding the validity of purported surrenders (see chapter 4), the local 
mayor and other residents quickly jumped on the bandwagon of claiming (without evidence) that 
“there’s no doubt” the land was surrendered legally; that the Haudenosaunee protesters were 
“from a legal standpoint … wrong;” and that, despite “the evidence,”  “the Natives are not 
believing anyone or anything” (Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in Pearce, 
2006a; and Caledonia resident Doug Flemming in Flemming, 2006c).  Of course, all of these 
assertions that allegedly described Haudenosaunee protester behavior far more accurately 
portrayed the behavior of non-Native residents.  In large part this is because the latter, in an 
almost desperate need to believe their own fabrications, projected their revisionism upon the 
Haudenosaunee protesters, claiming it was they –and not the non-Native residents-- who had 
falsely constructed versions of history that had no relation to facts, and who refused to “believe 
anyone or anything” With this reconstructed version of history in hand, non-Native residents 
who opposed the protest were able to more confidently label Haudenosaunee protesters as 
criminals and outlaws (Mark Roberge, quoted in Jackson, 2006i; unnamed non-Native resident, 
quoted in Edwards, 2006a).  They were also more able to justify their vehement (and non-
objective) anti-protest anger.  Thus, after establishing their fabricated local versions of history, 
non-Native residents proceeded to refer to the land under protest not as contested land, but as 
“other peoples’ [i.e., not Native] land,” “crown land” and even “our land” 
                                                 
543 Articles estimated that from 250-500 residents attended this first anti-protest rally.  See: 
Bauslaugh (2006a), Pearce (2006a), Windle (2006b), Smith (2006b), Fragomeni (2006), 
Canadian Press (2006o), Graham & Canadian Press (2006), Graham (2006), Nolan (2006c).  
(Mark Roberge, 
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quoted in Jackson, 2006i; unnamed non-Native resident quoted in Rook, 2006e).544
     Some local non-Natives who did not oppose the protest attempted to call these false 
constructions of history into question, asking for example why media assertions that the lands 
under protest had been surrendered in 1841 only ever cited “anonymous” federal or provincial 
authorities, and further questioning why “is the public not pushing for the government to look at 
the claim objectively and why such disdain for Six Nations people?”(Hirota, 2006). This line of 
questioning made it clear that no federal or provincial official was willing to go on record with 
assertions that the land was sold in 1841.  It also pointed out that local anti-protest hostilities and 
locally-constructed versions of history were both disproportionate and out of touch with a reality 
in which there was, at best, considerable confusion pertaining to the ownership of the lands 
under protest.   
 In doing so, 
non-Native residents were able to insinuate that they were being directly victimized by the 
ongoing protest, because it was the Haudenosaunee protesters who had no legitimate grievances, 
who enjoyed privileges, who behaved as “unruly children,” and whose “Native tradition of 
constantly identifying themselves as victims [was] getting old” (Thompson, 2006b).  All of these 
accusations were, again, more applicable to the behaviors of non-Natives who vehemently 
opposed the protest, but these latter actors avoided any acknowledgement of this fact through 
their psychopathological mechanisms of denial and projection.  And so long as non-Native 
residents were able to discredit the Haudenosaunee protesters through these projections, they 
were able to avoid a conversation with these parts of themselves.  
                                                 
544 “‘My sign signifies the fact the government is doing nothing about a bunch of criminals 
taking up crown land in the middle of Highway 6,’ Said Mark Roberge” (Jackson, 2006i).  And 
the unnamed resident: “We do not support the protesters' illegal occupation of our land and 
illegal occupation of our public streets. They have clearly broken the laws that we as Canadians 
abide by” (Rook, 2006e). 
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     Thus, historical rewrites pertaining specifically to the ownership of the land could not, 
themselves, suffice, and other rewrites were necessary.  Some of these attempted to paint non-
Natives and their government as benevolent and morally pure.  For example, one non-Native 
resident argued in a letter to the editor that Canadians had “given” the Haudenosaunee their lands 
in the first place and that the Haudenosaunee should be thankful rather than holding “for ransom 
the country that gave them shelter and gifts.”(Howatt, 2006a). The letter writer then went even 
further, asserting claims of trans-generational victimization of non-Natives by Natives: 
Several generations of Natives and European/British decendents [sic] have been 
and are being punished for errors that were made in the past.  Whether a few 
native leaders got together and sold land that had been given to their people or a 
few 'Whitemen' took advantage and bought it at a disgusting price is really a non 
issue [sic].  The land was originally given as a gift and unfortunately was 
somehow bartered away.  That land cannot be given back due to development. 
 
     Such claims to white benevolence and victimization at the hands of Native peoples fly in the 
face of historical facts, but were psychologically useful for local non-Natives who, angrily and 
with an increasing willingness to employ violence, were doing everything they could to maintain 
narratives of non-Native innocence and suffering at the hands of guilty, criminal Native 
protesters.  Such claims also follow the lead of elected officials who entirely dismissed, 
discredited and demeaned the traditional government of the Haudenosaunee people (see chapter 
4).  To this extent, the resident argues that, after all, it was likely “native leaders” themselves 
who “got together and sold the land that had been given to their people” by benevolent whites –
i.e., Native people did it to themselves, and it is not the fault of non-Natives (this theme will be 
taken up again later).  Though such claims would not stand up to historical scrutiny, among non-
Natives who were seeking out any means for denying guilt or responsibility, they found fertile 
ground and were able to flourish and proliferate.  So, too, were the assertions by this resident 
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that, regardless of what happened, history cannot be undone, and the land cannot be given back, 
“because of development” –assertions that will be reviewed in the next section. 
 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL MISSION OF “PROGRESS” OR: “IT’S HISTORY, GET OVER 
IT!”   
[W]e cannot change history that happened in the past two hundred years.  It is 
physically and financially impossible to remove all non natives from the 
Haldimand Tract because of what happened over the last 200 years.  I feel badly 
about how the land was transferred and the Natives lost.  However, I feel we must 
now put this behind us and learn from our mistakes and move on. 
~ Local non-Native resident Gerald Stoneman 2006 
 
For he cannot surrender the notion of progress without destroying the rationale 
for his entire civilization. No matter how critical he may be of the realities of his 
society, he clings to his progressivism as he would to his sanity.  It is the notion of 
progress that mediates his alienation, and makes it possible for him to construct a 
reality which he does not actually experience. 
~ Diamond 1974, 39 
 
A few days after the Ontario Provincial Police failed in their attempt to remove Haudenosaunee 
protesters from the land they had reclaimed, the Ottawa Sun polled reader opinions on the 
conflict.  Readers were given two choices: (a) the protesters have a “legitimate cause” and “land 
deals made in the past should be examined,” or (b) the protesters were “breaking the law” and 
the land claim issue was “ancient history” (Sun Media, 2006).  The wording of the first part of 
the question was based on the assumption that a deal had been made, and the only question was 
whether past deals should be subject to reexamination.  In fact, the Haudenosaunee protesters 
had repeatedly stated that no deal had ever been made, and that the land under protest had simply 
been taken against the will of the Haudenosaunee people.  The wording of the second part of the 
question suggests that land claims filed by First Nations could actually be considered “ancient 
history.” This suggestion contradicts the entire concept of land claims in Canada. The very 
existence of Canada’s land claims process is an acknowledgement that lands were wrongfully 
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taken from First Nations and that the ongoing problems that First Nations face because of this 
need to be resolved in the here and now.  The misleading and one sided wording of this poll 
suggests not only that a conservative element runs the Ottawa Sun, but that for all it’s 
government’s rhetoric about reconciliation, the Canadian people are largely ignorant of issues 
pertaining to First Nations land claims.  This ignorance persists despite the fact that virtually 
every First Nation in Canada has either filed claims or has the potential to do so, and that there 
are well over 800 Specific claims already filed, several hundred Comprehensive claims filed, and 
many hundreds more claims that in the process of being researched and filed across Canada (see 
chapter 1, second footnote).  Some argue that as much as 90% of Canada is unceded Native 
territory to which the Canadian government has no legitimate legal claim according to its own 
laws (Chrisjohn, N.d.)  The general, nation-wide ignorance of the epidemic of past wrongful 
dealing that the present Canadian and provincial governments are responsible for resolving 
demonstrates the degree to which First Nations and First Nations’ concerns have been singled 
out as both dismissible and fair game for attack in Canada (see chapter 4). 
     Given the misleading conceptualization and wording of the poll, as well as the longstanding 
government authorization and routinization of verbal (and physical) attacks against Native 
peoples, it is hardly surprising that 69% of poll respondents answered “b” while only 31% 
answered “a.” In fact, further inspection of the wording of the poll demonstrates the role of 
Western society’s transcendental mission in dispossessing Native peoples –i.e., the myths of 
Western “progress” and mythical western conceptions of “civilization.” As discussed in chapter 
2, through both of these myths, Western society is perpetually reenacting its centuries-long 
history of trauma and perpetration upon other peoples and other life forms through the “civilizing 
process” which it inflicts upon these non-Western others. And by “civilizing” these other peoples 
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and life forms (i.e., forcing them to conform to Western patterns of use), it directly or indirectly 
pursues the elimination of everything other than itself, either because these non-Western forms 
are simply in the way of what Western society wants to do, or because the transformation of 
these non-Western forms into potential or actual capital is what Western society wants to do (see 
Harvey, 2003).  John Mohawk (2000 & 1997) has discussed these processes in the context of 
utopian thinking (also see chapter 2), through which it is reasoned that in order to arrive at the 
future utopia, sacrifices of other peoples and life forms will have to be made for the greater good, 
to which only Western society can lead the world.  Kelman (1973) similarly discusses these 
processes, using the term “transcendental mission” to describe the exact same process of killing 
and “sacrificing” others in order to read some future, unobtainable goal (see chapter 4).  As both 
authors argue, in this type of thought process, characteristic of Western thinking, the vague and 
never-achievable ends are used to justify whatever means are necessary to move “towards” this 
vague and never-achievable ends.  Thus, taking Native lands and squashing Native assertions of 
land and treaty rights are all in a days work towards this transcendental mission of progress, or 
capital accumulation in the name of progress (Harvey, 2003) and, according to this line of 
thinking, Native peoples would be better off understanding this and accepting it. 
     While these problematic mythical forms of thinking present themselves everywhere 
throughout this history of Native-non-Native interactions (see, for example, Toqueville, 2000), it 
is sometimes less obvious to the casual observer that these old, colonial and genocidal mythical 
justifications remain alive and well today.  Yet, examples of these myths, and their reenactment 
in various forms abound in the rhetoric of non-Native residents who opposed the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest. This section will provide an overview of a few of the ways in which 
they were applied and reenacted in this conflict. 
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     Though examples of this myth abound in the rhetoric of non-Native residents opposed to the 
protest, some of the best examples of local expressions of this myth appeared in two March 
editorial columns written by reporter Bill Jackson.  In the first of these, which appeared about a 
week after the Haudenosaunee protest had begun, Mr. Jackson began by asking his readers how 
far back in history one can legitimately go to “form a basis for contemporary reality?” (Jackson, 
2006a).  Not very far, he concludes, after taking his reader through a series of exaggerated 
examples and faulty reasoning.  A portion of his column is quoted here: 
[I]n today's fast paced world where forward thinking dominates our society, it's 
interesting a land deed dating back to 1784 is getting so much attention, press and 
respect.  Just how far can we go back in history and legitimately form a basis for 
contemporary reality, more specifically future land development?  Well, judging 
from the fact construction workers have stopped building on a Caledonia 
subdivision because of a 'peaceful protest' by Six Nations Confederacy members, 
at least 221 years. Here you thought we were moving forward when all along we 
should be adhering to the rules and regulations of Upper Canada or maybe even 
the New World.  Or maybe even the Vikings.  
… 
It's just that if you're going to go back 221 years and start living with the rules of 
that day, you should also live like people did back then.  Don't be a mennonite 
[sic] with a microwave. (Jackson, 2006a) 
 
In the quoted portion, Jackson juxtaposes Western assumptions about progress and “moving 
forward” with Native assertions of historical treaty rights, presenting the latter to be the opposite 
of the former, and presenting the former as the obvious and only desirable thing to do.  Jackson’s 
assumptions about progress and “moving forward” will be further examined below.  But first, it 
seems worthwhile to examine Jackson’s juxtapositioning of the present and the future as states 
that are completely separate from the past. Through this line of (faulty) reasoning, Jackson 
argues that one can only live according to anything in the past if one lives according to 
everything in the past.  As such, Native assertions of historic treaty rights can be presented as 
acts of victimization, perpetrated against non-Native peoples by hypocritical (morally 
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degenerate) Native protesters who want to force the former to live back in time, but who do not 
themselves live like their ancestors did 200 years ago.  According to this reasoning, because 
Native protesters go to Tim Horton’s for coffee, or sleep in campers or cars (on the protest site), 
they are enjoying modern conveniences and are thus hypocritical for demanding that non-Natives 
honor treaties made in the past.  Further, by making this latter demand, Jackson claims, Native 
protesters are trying to force progress-loving non-Natives to adhere to all rules and regulations 
from the past –perhaps even going back as far as the Vikings.  When will this unreasonableness 
end? He seems to be asking. 
     Yet, despite applying this arbitrary rule to the protesters (if you are going to live according to 
anything in the past, you have to live according to everything in the past), it is clear that neither 
Jackson nor the non-Native residents who adopted his rhetoric ever intended to apply this 
arbitrary rule to themselves.  After all, most institutions in Canada are based on rules and 
documents that date back in history, some hundreds of years.  (And certainly the attitudes and 
opinions expressed in Jackson’s comments date back at least that far!)  Yet, Canadians still 
celebrate historic events like Canada Day, or various historic war victories.  Further, a portion of 
the Canadian Constitution dates back to 1982, but the column’s author would not have argued 
that judges, lawyers or citizens who apply the constitution must abide by all-things-80s: music, 
clothes, hairstyles, and so forth.  Instead, these arbitrary rules were created and selectively 
applied to a particular group (the protesters, or all Native people who refer to historical 
documents) in a particular situation (this protest, or any assertion of treaty rights) so that non-
Native residents could label the former “hypocrites” and claim victimization at the hands of 
hypocrites.  The hypocritical nature of applying to other people arbitrary rules that one does not, 
him or herself, plan to ever follow, escapes non-Native residents entirely –at least in so far as it 
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might apply to themselves—because they have dissociated from their own actions and projected 
them onto other people, in this case the Haudenosaunee protesters.  Such hypocrisy further 
allows non-Natives to dismiss outright Haudenosaunee grievances without ever having to 
address historical facts that did not fit with the view of reality they sought to construct, thus 
further victimizing the Haudenosaunee people. Thus, the behaviors Jackson describes: creating 
arbitrary rules and applying them hypocritically to others in order to victimize these others, is far 
more applicable to Jackson’s argument than it is to the Haudenosaunee protest –once again 
demonstrating the use of denial, projection, blame-shifting, and the complete lack of critical self-
reflection displayed by those non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed the protest.  
Thus, despite the obvious faulty character of the reasoning employed in these arguments, 
numerous non-Natives adopted them uncritically, and used them to stir up further non-Native 
anger and resentment in an effort to bolster their anti-protest (and even anti-Native) stance 
(Interviews, 2009).545
     Some local Native and non-Native residents who were not blindly opposed to the protest 
attempted to point out the logical flaws in this line of reasoning. To this extent, George Beaver, a 
freelance Haudenosaunee journalist contradicted the idea that looking back in history is 
regressive and we should all only look forward: 
 
Recently in Caledonia, some people have questioned why a document written in 
1784 should still be relevant today. The Declaration of Independence was written 




                                                 
545 See, for example, See also any number of letters to the editor or editorial columns, including: 
Blizzard (2006), whose asked her readers: “So who's running this place? A ragtag bunch of 
activists who are acting like bullies? First they defy a superior court injunction. Now they want 
to roll back history 150 years.” 
546 Beaver, George. 2006. Six Nations land protest brings pride. Brantford Expositor. April 10. 
Local News, Our Town,  Page A4. 
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Yet, despite these more clear-reasoned rebuttals, the local constructions of the narrative of 
victimization and progress continued to be utilized, and often involved a number of intertwining 
(and often contradictory themes).  In this way, attacks on one or two strands within the narrative 
could thus easily be ignored, and non-Native who needed to believe these narratives simply 
shifted their attention to other strands within the narrative without admitting the incorrectness of 
any part of the whole.  These contradictory strands can be seen in the same column written by 
Jackson and quoted above.  Towards the end of this column, Jackson summarized and concluded 
his argument: 
Now I think it’s fair to say times have changed.  Relations between natives and 
the ‘white man’ are better today.  None of us living had anything to do with what 
happened centuries ago.  What we do have is a county called Canada.  And we 
can all work together to make it a better place, or put up fences and prevent 
progress. … The Land Claim group's message is borderline racist.  … Trying to 
prevent responsible development by affecting people who had nothing to do with 
rules set out 200 years ago or today is only creating a divide that I thought we’d 
all overcome for the most part. (Jackson, 2006a) 
 
     Here, the themes of progress are even more overt.  Again, themes of non-Native suffering and 
victimization at the hands of Natives are intertwined with these themes in the author’s claims 
that, while non-Natives have worked to overcome divisions and racism, Haudenosaunee 
protesters are regressively putting up fences to prevent progress and creating a “borderline 
racist” divide.  Though the writer doesn’t explain how the “Land Claims group is borderline 
racist” (because he can’t.  It isn’t547
                                                 
547 The Haudenosaunee protesters’ message had nothing to do with non-Native people, with the 
one exception being that local non-Natives were asked to pressure the government to resolve 
land claims. The rest of their message was directed at the Canadian and Ontario governments, 
demanding that lands that Canada could not prove it had acquired legitimately not be treated as if 
they belonged to Canada (or Ontario) until a resolution to these past wrongs could be negotiated. 
The Haudenosaunee protesters were quite clear about the fact that their grievances were with the 
government, and repeatedly stated that their issues were not with non-Native residents.  There 
was absolutely nothing racist, or even conceivably “borderline racist” about it. 
), his assertion that it is is enough to encourage non-Natives 
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to deny and project their own racism onto the Haudenosauene protesters, and thus to feel 
justified in claiming moral purity and victimhood.  This need among some non-Native residents 
who vehemently opposed the protest to rid themselves of all moral impurity, and to rid the 
Haudenosaunee protesters of all moral purity, suggests a struggle that these non-Native residents 
were having within themselves.  They appear to have desperately needed to repress, deny, and 
otherwise avoid any acknowledgement of their own complicity in past and present wrongs, and 
their own responsibility for ending and resolving these wrongs.  This need was so great that all 
logical reasoning was abandoned, and any fragment of an argument that could be used to protect 
non-Natives from their repressed and unresolved feelings of guilt and complicity were used.   
     At the same time, the Western narrative of progress had long been used to justify the gains of 
Westerners through the dispossession of everyone (and everything) else, and has long ago 
become an important part of the Western cultural worldview.  Westerners who have long 
adhered to this cultural worldview and its unquestioned assumptions about “progress,” are likely 
to experience negative emotions when these are questioned or challenged.  Thus, though the 
Haudenosaunee protesters were not making the ridiculous anti-progressive demands of which 
they were accused, apparently the very accusation that they were (however faulty the reasoning) 
was seen as a challenge to the ways of life of those non-Native residents who already opposed 
the protest and were searching for a justification for their opposition. 
     Thus, the Haudenosaunee grievances elicited feelings of guilt and shame in non-Native 
residents who had long repressed and denied them, and who were entirely unprepared and 
unwilling to deal with them.  Unable and unwilling to tolerate these feelings, and entirely 
unaware of their internal source, local non-Native residents responded as if the Haudenosaunee 
protesters had caused these feelings, and as if the protest was somehow a personal attack upon 
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local non-Natives. The intensely unpleasant feelings that arose within some non-Native residents 
when they were confronted with past –and ongoing—wrongs likely felt like an external attack, 
particularly for those non-Natives who, clinging to denial, had long ago dissociated themselves 
from portions of the reality around them.  These latter then projected their own “borderline 
racist” thoughts and behaviors onto Haudenosaunee protesters, who had no issues with non-
Native residents, but had always made convenient scapegoats in Canadian society, and thus were 
already an appropriately authorized and routinized target of attack. 
     Yet, though they were able to remain in complete denial regarding their complicity in ongoing 
wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee, they were unable to fully convince themselves of 
the complete absence of past injustices –even despite the local historical rewrites and the locally 
manipulated versions of law.  Thus these past wrongs –and any link to non-Native guilt in the 
past—were dismissed entirely as things that were in the past.  Looking into the past at these 
wrongs was likened to “putting up fences to prevent progress.” Both of these were likened to 
refusing to work together to make Canada a better place, such as by overcoming “borderline 
racist” divides that progress-loving non-Natives had long worked to overcome, and had thought 
“we’d all overcome for the most part.”  
     Given the prominence in Westerns society of myths of “progress” and “civilization,” it is 
hardly surprising that these myths arose in some form.  Yet, the logic through which these myths 
found expression in local narratives was so inconsistent and contradictory as to fall apart upon 
examination by external others.  For example, any sociological study of transgenerational wealth, 
income and social capital could easily belie the notion that there is no connection between past 
wrongs and the present privileges of non-Natives living today in settler colonial states.  Further, 
it is Western society, not Native society, that has the long history of quite literally “putting up 
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fences” to keep other people out –from the enclosures of the Middle Ages to the privatization of 
virtually everything everywhere that belongs to other people, including indigenous lands 
worldwide.  Locally, the development company was most certainly interested in putting up 
fences and keep the Haudenosaunee out, but in all of these cases putting up fences was 
interpreted by Western non-Natives as progress. It was only when the Haudenosaunee (or other 
Native peoples throughout Canada, or other non-Western peoples elsewhere in the world) assert 
their own claims to property, which exclude Western non-Natives, that such behavior is 
interpreted by the latter as halting or standing in the way of progress. Thus, it becomes clear that 
--as has always been the case with the Western myths of “progress” and “civilization”-- what 
Western non-Natives really mean by impeding progress is getting in the way of what wealthy 
Western non-Natives want to do.  After all, as discussed in chapter 2, the term progress in 
Western society has always referred to the accumulation of capital by wealthy Western elites 
through the conquering, plunder and dispossession of other peoples, life forms and the earth.  
This is still true today: progress means the growth of capital, and the growth of capital requires 
the transformation of (other peoples’) lands, resources and/or labor power into products, as well 
as the privatization and exploitation of non-capitalist social forms (Harvey, 2003). 
     Furthering their local narratives of progress in this way, Jackson and other local non-Native 
residents suggested “better things” that Haudenosaunee protesters could –and supposedly 
should—be doing with their time.  For example, in this same column, Jackson suggested that: 
Native protesters would be better using their time to address Six Nations' garbage 
woes, or perhaps join the fight for safer drinking water.  That would be a lot more 
worthwhile. Six Nations is recycling only two per cent of its garbage.  It's rather 
strange that they choose to fight for land when they have so many problems 
associated with their own land to begin with. (Jackson, 2006a) 
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Other non-Native residents similarly points out the various social ills associated with Native 
reserves in Canada (including: sexual abuse, unclean water, obesity, poverty, drugs, alcohol), and 
one resident concluded that the reserve system itself is the problem –not ongoing colonialism or 
the dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources, trust funds and human rights.  
Claiming that the congregation of Native peoples on the few small parcels of land still reserved 
for their exclusive use548
     The looting of every last bit of wealth that is collectively controlled by Native peoples, and 
their complete destruction as distinct peoples, is thus seen as “desirable” and “progressive” by 
this resident, because this type of dispossession and destruction is exactly what the Western myth 
of progress has always served to rationalize and justify.  Though occasionally the results of this 
line of thinking are recognized as genocidal (Powell, 2011; Kakel, 2010; Sartre, 1967; UN 
General Assembly, 1948),
 --and not Canadian colonialism that seeks to dispossess Native peoples 
of even these lands-- promotes segregation and should be abolished.  Thus, rather than returning 
wrongfully taken lands to Native peoples, the author advocates taking whatever has not yet been 
taken, in the interest of ending segregation (and forcing assimilation) (Howatt, 2006b), 
apparently because she believes that this course of action is benevolent and just.  Though these 
views are taken right out of the 1800s (see for example, Tocqueville (2000) for an almost word-
for word expression of the same ideas), they are considered “progressive” by the author and 
other non-Native residents who are complicit in the ongoing dispossession of Native peoples.   
549
                                                 
548 As noted in chapters 1, 4 and 5, the Canadian government claims to own all the land within its 
geographical borders (despite the fact that up to 90% of this land was never ceded (Chrisjohn, 
N.d.), including those areas of land set aside as Native reserves. 
 Westerners have long denied the connection between the two, 
549 “[T]here may not be so much difference between the anti semite and the democrat. The 
former wishes to destroy him as a man and leave nothing but the Jew, the pariah, the 
untouchable; the latter wishes to destroy him as a Jew and leave nothing but the man, the abstract 
and universal subject of the rights of man and the rights of the citizen” (Sartre, 1977: 57).  The 
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sometimes through the aid of an appropriated form of Multiculturalism, which seeks to mitigate 
tension between, for example, settlers and Natives (see Veracini and Hage, both cited inMoses, 
2011: 150).550
                                                                                                                                                             
UN General Assembly (1948) has defined genocide as including the commission of acts “with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group” (Article II). 
  Thus, the resident insists that, though they will be plundered and destroyed as 
distinct peoples, they can still keep their “cultures, music and art alive through festivals, 
concerts, restaurants and numerous other venues” (that non-Natives enjoy) (Howatt, 2006b).  
Unwilling or unable to look outside of her Western myth of superiority and progress, the writer 
missed (or ignored) entirely the fact that being reduced to occasional displays of traditional art, 
music, and dress was exactly what the traditional Haudenosaunee people were struggling against, 
and this was exactly why they were protesting and demanding a return of lands that were unfairly 
taken: so they con preserve their culture and their identity as distinct peoples, and regain their 
independent self-sufficiency. Writing in the spirit of Western liberalism, which has long been 
intolerant of anything that is not Western and liberal, the writer suggests that she knows better 
than Haudenosaunee people what should be done with all that is owed to them: it would be better 
used on improving “health care, poverty, education and drinking water” for all Canadians.  After 
all, she argues (correctly), “there is no amount of money that can pay for what happened in the 
past,” and non-Natives certainly aren’t willing to part with their money anyway. Hence, “moving 
forward” and “progressing” --i.e., doing what non-Natives want to do-- is the only solution, 
according to this line of reasoning (Howatt, 2006b).  This section of the resident’s letter is worth 
re-quoting here, for what comes before it: 
550 For example, Moses (2011: 150) notes that Veracini argues that multiculturalism is “easier 
than insisting on the need to decolonize settler colonial sovereignties … and disturbing the 
foundational determinants of settler colonial polities,” and Hage argues that such policies have 
“effaced genuine immigrant otherness by requiring it to become sociologically ‘white’ to qualify 
for citizenship participation.” 
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A very important step in healing rifts between groups is to be forgiven for past 
transgressions and move on from there.  There is no amount of money that can 
pay for what happened in the past.  Wouldn't that money be better spent on 
improving health care, poverty, education and drinking water for all Canadians? 
(Howatt, 2006b) 
 
Equally in the spirit of Western liberalism and progress, the writer’s version of reconciliation 
requires not that non-Natives make amends for past the wrongs they have committed against 
Native peoples, but that Native peoples forgive non-Natives, because they need “to be forgiven.” 
In other words, the group of people who have perpetrated past historical wrongs against 
Haudenosaunee people (and Native people in general) should get something out of this process 
(being forgiven), but should not, themselves, be required to give or do anything at all, except for 
those things that they already want to do: demolishing reserves and thus taking all that currently 
remains in the hands of struggling Native communities.  Further, Native people should not only 
give their forgiveness and all that remains in their possession, but should entirely give up on 
seeking redress for past wrongs or seeking to maintain what they currently have –i.e., they 
should “move on from there” in the name of Western progress.  This, according to the resident, is 
the only solution.  Thus, she did not ask, listen to, or even leave space open for Native people to 
voice what they needed for reconciliation to occur.  And though the protesters had already begun 
to give voice to some of these needs, it was more convenient for the resident (and more in line 
with Western liberalism and progress) to ignore entirely what Native people said they needed. 
After all, according to this line of thinking, Westerners always know best, because they are 
“civilized” and can thus lead the rest of the world in their transcendental mission of “progress” 
towards an always-unreachable utopia.  Denial, dissociation, splitting, projection, projective 
identification and a complete lack of critical self-reflection are all at play in this non-Native 
resident’s line of reasoning.  This is not reconciliation at all, this is a continuation of the 
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devastation, dispossession, and destruction of non-Western peoples, with the added extra element 
of demanding that Native peoples who have had everything taken from them now give yet one 
more thing: their blessing for past, ongoing and even escalating future perpetrations.  Yet, any 
other path, according to many non-Native residents who opposed the protest, would be harmful 
to all parties.  As one resident summarized his own “progressive” views on the matter of what 
should be done about the protest: 
[O]nly one thing prevents me from passionately arguing for, at all costs, more 
tolerance, more patience and more restraint on the part of the authorities as we go 
forward into the uncertain future.  
     To my sensitive ears, that sounds very much like a patronizing modern version 
of the white man's burden. (Dreschel, 2006) 
 
 
ENTITLEMENT, EXAGGERATED CLAIMS TO VICTIMHOOD, PROJECTION, AND 
AVOIDANCE OF CRITICAL SELF-REFLECTION  
[E]very generation of Anglo-Americans down to the present has followed the 
pattern set then and has repeated, with minor variations, such justifications for 
burning natives in their villages and rooting them out of their swamps. 
~ Drinnon 1990, xii 
 
The self, mutilated and amputated by projection, is permanently threatened from 
the inside, by the reappearance of the suppressed parts, and from the outside by 
the fact that the object normally resists the projective identification. It thus lives 
in a two-front war, threatened from both the inside and the outside, cleft and torn 
from itself. 
~ Hardtmann 1998, 92 
 
Another tactic non-Native residents used for denying potentially threatening feelings of guilt, 
and defending against threats to their cultural worldviews and self-esteem, was to make greatly 
exaggerated their claims to victimhood. By presenting themselves as victims, and by greatly 
exaggerating their victimization claims, non-Natives sought to overshadow and drown out Native 
grievances in their own chorus of complaints.  But aside from merely seeking to down out Native 
grievances, non-Native residents engaged in an elaborate projection or blame-shifting, which 
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allowed them to project all of their moral impurities onto the Haudenosaunee protesters (or 
Native people in general).  Freed from their moral impurities and in denial the existence of 
ongoing wrongs committed against the Haudenosaunee (or about non-Native roles in these 
wrongs), local residents who opposed the protest were able to treat the Haudenosaunee as 
victimizers, and to claim for themselves a status as morally pure victims.  Many of these non-
Native residents’ exaggerated claims to victimhood were based on the entitled expectations of a 
privileged dominant group that was both furious to see their privileges threatened and desperate 
to defend these privileges to themselves and others.  This behavior is in line with that described 
by Branscombe (1998 and 2007), who found that dominant-group members struggle to avoid 
reminders of their own privilege, and can sometimes resolve this struggle when they imagine 
“drawbacks” to their own membership in the dominant, privileged group, or imagine the 
“deservingness” of members of disadvantaged groups.  Thus, as was the case in the above 
discussions of other behaviors, feelings of threat may have been very real to non-Native 
residents, but the cause of these feelings (non-Native complicity in, privilege from, and morally 
compromised status due to ongoing colonialism) remained repressed, unexamined, denied and 
projected onto the Haudenosaunee protesters.  Some of the various ways in which non-Natives 
did this will be examined below. 
Minimizing, Denying and Supplanting Haudenosaunee Grievances with Exaggerated and 
Unrealistic Claims of Non-Native Victimhood 
     One of the main issues around which non-Native residents demonstrated expectations of 
entitlement and claimed victimhood when this entitlement was perceived as threatened was the 
police and government failure to immediately end the Haudenosaunee protest “on day one.”  As 
one resident, who described the protest as “lawlessness at its finest,” remarked: 
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I’ve been unhappy about this (the protest) since day 1.  I hoped they would be 
kicked out.  I’m very disappointed in the police.  It should have been on day 1.  
Not day 60. (Caledonia resident Kevin Clark, quoted in Legall and Morse, 2006) 
 
Like many other non-Native residents, this resident based his anger and frustrations upon 
unexamined and/or purposefully manipulated versions of law and order (discussed above).  By 
providing a completely one-sided view of the law, and entirely ignoring constitutional issues, 
Supreme Court of Canada rulings, and binding international human rights requirements, the 
resident was able to present the protest as “lawlessness.” In doing so, he felt justified in wanting 
to see the protest forcibly ended on day one, when it was entirely legal under even local and 
provincial laws.551
     Another resident expressed these same sentiments more clearly by arguing that the police 
should have ended the protest sooner, adding: “I’m not against native rights, but what about my 
right to go about my life and drive down the road without getting turned back at a roadblock?” 
(unidentified resident quoted in Harries, 2006e).
 The sense of entitlement expressed by this resident is visible in just behind 
the resident’s assertions: the status quo that benefits him should not be disturbed, even through 
peaceful, legal protests held by a group of people whose rights are being violated by this status 
quo.  
552
                                                 
551 See chapter 1.  The OPP did not have an enforceable criminal order to remove protesters until 
the end of March –many weeks into the protest. 
  Like the first resident, this resident voices 
his expectations not to be disturbed in his daily routine, even if this status quo routine is 
destructive of the rights of others.  In fact, the resident minimizes the rights violations being 
552 The full context provided with this quote is as follows: 
Others, less sympathetic, thought the police action was overdue.  “If they were going to go in and 
do this, they should have done it sooner,” said a Caledonia-area resident who did not want to be 
identified. 
   “Now [the protesters] have had a chance to get organized.  I’m not against native rights, but 
what about my right to go about my life, and drive down the road without getting turned back at 
a roadblock?” 
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perpetrated against the Haudenosaunee, while elevating his own personal preferences to the 
status of “rights.” By this line of reasoning, his preference of not being inconvenienced in his 
daily routine is presented as being at least equal to the international human rights, constitutional 
rights, and Supreme Court mandated rights of the Haudenosaunee protesters. Yet, the resident’s 
preference for not being inconvenienced is not a right, it is an expectation of entitlement that is 
worth some examination.  When this resident voiced his frustrations with the interruption of this 
entitlement, the road blockades had only been up for one or two days.  Further, while some roads 
were blocked by police and protesters, there were a number of alternate routes for getting around 
town which resulted in, at worse, a seven-minute detour (Interviews, 2009).553
                                                 
553 Further, evidence suggests that when non-Native residents really needed to get through the 
Native roadblocks, and when these people went to Native protesters with their concerns, these 
concerns were addressed and residents were allowed to go through.  Such was the case with 
emergency vehicles, church services, residents living close to roadblocks, and even residents 
who had friends coming to feed their fish and water their plants.  Of course, residents who felt 
their privileged status or financial interests were threatened by the protest, and/or who engaged 
in various reassertions of privilege and denigration of Native protesters (or Native people in 
general) were the least likely to approach Native protesters and talk to them like fellow human 
beings.  Doing so would not have occurred to those who needed to establish Native protesters as 
enemies and/or who were more interested in promoting anti-protest/ anti-Native rhetoric and 
halting any movement whatsoever on Native grievances. 
  Thus, the resident 
is suggesting that his expectations that he not be forced to take a seven minute detour for one or 
two days is somehow at least equal in stature to Haudenosaunee protesters’ grievances: that 
hundreds of thousands of acres of their lands have been stolen and are being built upon; that their 
culture and existence as a distinct people has been threatened for centuries by this theft and by 
the forcible imposition of a colonial system of government upon them; and that the Canadian, 
Ontario and Haldimand county governments are refusing to recognize not only their 
internationally recognized and legally-binding human rights, but their Constitutional and 
Supreme Court mandated rights.  Clearly any objective observer can see that the alleged injury to 
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this non-Native resident is nowhere near the injury that has been (and is being) done to the 
Haudenosaunee people. And yet, the resident not only minimizes the latter and greatly 
exaggerates the former in an attempt to make them seem equal.  He then proceeds to imply by 
his very complaint that perhaps his “right” to not be inconvenienced is a bit more important than 
the various Haudenosaunee rights involved. 
     Along these same lines, a number of residents made similarly exaggerated claims, insisting on 
the first or second day of the road blockades that these blockades were preventing non-Natives 
from living their lives.  To this extent, one resident yelled angrily at police:  “Hey, you guys 
what’s the matter with you.  You guys are standing around like a bunch of bozos.  At least clear 
the road so we can get on with our lives” (Nolan, 2006d).554
                                                 
554 The full context with the quote is as follows: 
  Such expressions of anger at the 
police and claims of alleged victimization at the hands of both police and protesters was rooted 
in the same sense of entitlement as that displayed by other residents, above. It also relied on the 
same minimization or outright denial of Haudenosaunee grievances, and the same exaggeration 
or outright fabrication of non-Native victimization. Further examples of this sort of entitled 
expectations, minimization/denial and exaggerated claims to victimhood abound, and can be 
seen in the county mayor’s comments that residents felt their rights were “taking a back seat” to 
Native rights (Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c).  It can also be seen in assertions made by local 
residents on the first or second day of the road blockades, which were located in one far corner 
of the town.  One resident claimed that the protest was “closing our town down” (Nolan, 
While calm had returned to the scene, there is still evidence of frustration and tension 
over the affair.  One man hollered angry comments this morning at four OPP officers 
standing by a cruiser at the police perimeter line. 
   “Hey, you guys what’s the matter with you,” he said.  “You guys are standing around 
like a bunch of bozos.  At least clear the road so we can get on with our lives.” 
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2006d),555 another suggested the town had been taken away from residents and they needed to 
take it back (Nolan, 2006c; Bauslaugh, 2006a),556 and yet another resident insisted that the 
protest was “stopping our way of life in town” (Dunfield, 2006).557
     In all of these examples, preeminence was given to the desire of non-Native residents not to 
be inconvenienced, while serious ongoing violations of Haudenosaunee rights were completely 
ignored.  Various non-Native residents attempted to equate an inconvenient detour of a few 
minutes with an end to residents’ way of life, or with a loss of the residents’ town, while 
Haudenosaunee concerns about encroachment on their lands and the ongoing assault on their 
existence as distinct people –i.e., concerns that were actually about a threatened way of life and a 
real loss of land-- were dismissed completely as unworthy of attention.  Thus, the sense of 
entitlement in these various non-Native manipulations –i.e., the demands that non-Natives should 
   
                                                 
555 Nolan is quoting Caledonia resident Kelly Muir. The full context of this quote is as follows:  
The occupation drew the curious, even into the small hours of the morning. Kelly Muir, 
19, Rachel Binek, 17, and Rob Weatherstone, 21, found a piece of grass in front of the 
nearby Tim Hortons, sat down and covered themselves with a sleeping bag. They 
planned to stay the entire night to see if there might be another police raid on the site, 
but left after a few hours. 
    They weren't too impressed with the standoff and, like many Caledonia residents, 
wished the authorities would close it down permanently.  
   "They're closing our town down over this," said Muir. "People are scared in this 
town."  
    She said she has a lot of friends from Six Nations and they do not support the 
occupation. "They think it's ridiculous," she said. 
556 The sources are quoting signs carried by anti-protest non-Native residents, one of which read: 
“We want our town back!”  
557 Dunfield is quoting Caledonia resident Amanda McSkimming. The full discussion of 
McSkimming’s comments are as follows: 
Amanda McSkimming, a resident of Caledonia, said people are shocked and said that 
this is happening in their community.  A business owner, she complained that she had to 
close business yesterday.  As well, she said, her children are missing school because 
schools in the area have been closed.  Ms. McSkimming wants to see the occupation 
ended by police.  “We need them out of here, it is stopping so many businesses, it is 
stopping out way of life in town, you know?” 
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always get what they want, even to the detriment of others-- is clear, as are the exaggerated 
claims to victimhood, which will be further explored below. 
Exaggerated Claims of Victimization and Allegations of Police Discrimination and “State-
Sponsored Racism”  
       Because such a large number of non-Native residents felt entitled to a continuation of 
colonialism-as-usual, and expected this to take place at any cost, many residents were quickly 
angered by the failure of police to act immediately according to these entitled expectations.  The 
disappointment of these expectations led many of these non-Native residents to feel betrayed or 
even “victimized” by the police (Nolan, 2006a).558  Some of these residents accused police of 
having “deserted” them or having “abandoned their post” (Edwards & Gombu, 2006; Healey & 
Nolan, 2006).559
                                                 
558 For example, Nolan reported that: “Some Caledonia residents are upset the government has 
let the protest get this far and believe the victims are the people who live in the community.”   
 The fact that police were maintaining a large presence around the town and 
around the protest site was ignored by residents, because what they really meant by these claims 
of victimization was that police did not do what residents opposed to the protest had wanted: i.e., 
forcibly evict the Haudenosaunee protesters.  Other residents made even greater exaggerations, 
with one claiming that “in no other country or province or state are there roads being blocked off 
and businesses closed due to a militant group of disgruntled people” (Huges, 2006).  Other 
residents who opposed the protest satisfied themselves with only slightly less exaggerated 
claims, such as the claim that the failure of police to do what non-Native residents had wanted 
was equal to “state-sponsored racism.” In rallying against alleged police discrimination against 
559 Edwards, Peter and Phinjo Gombu (With files from Richard Brennan, Rob Ferguson, Sean 
Gordon).  2006.  Standoff at Caledonia.  The Toronto Star.  April 21, News, Page A01 [quotes an 
area resident claiming police “abandoned their post.”]; Healey, Deirdre and Daniel Nolan.  2006.  
Angry Clash; Natives, townspeople in a faceoff after police arrests spark fires, anger.  The 
Hamilton Spectator.  April 21 (SISIS) [quotes a resident claiming police ‘stirred up a hornets 
nest and then deserted’ them]. 
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White non-Native residents, or against a conspiratorial system that allegedly granted “special 
privileges” to people belonging to the “right” racial groups (Flemming, 2006a; Jackson, 2006c), 
non-Native residents who opposed the protest were able to project their own racism elsewhere.   
     By accusing others of racism in this way, non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed 
the protest seem to have freed themselves to express outright racist views, so long as these views 
were couched in the language of their own alleged victimization.  The expressions of these views 
quickly expanded to include not only Haudenosaunee protesters and Native people in general, 
but also immigrants and minorities throughout Canada --i.e., non-White and non-Western 
people.  As one local reporter complained, in Canada “even newly landed minorities are granted 
more support than lifetime citizens” and while “flags of foreign countries are proudly stuck on 
back bumpers before a maple leaf” “certain races and religions are given special privileges” 
(Jackson, 2006a).  Of course, the writer was not talking about the obvious privileges of White 
Canadians, which non-Native residents denied and dismissed completely.  Rather, he was 
complaining about the interrupted entitlement or jealousy that White non-Native Canadians like 
him apparently experienced subjectively whenever someone other than them appeared to gain 
something they did not have.  Through these exaggerated claims to victimhood, those who 
fancied themselves non-minorities and “lifetime citizens” (i.e., White Canadians) expressed their 
racism and resentment towards virtually every other group, conflating the groups into a common 
“them.”  They further engaged in the socially-regressive bonding that DeVries (2006) and others 
(McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006; Shiva, 1997) have identified as psychopathological defense 
mechanisms resulting from a loss of culture. Though these non-Native residents were not 
experiencing a loss of culture, they were experiencing a threat to their cultural worldview, which 
was identified in chapters 2 and 3 as being an unhealthy and psychopathological shell of a 
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culture (see chapters 2 and 3, including the quotations from Deloria, 1969; Wise, 2005; Baldwin, 
1965; Forbes, 2008).  In bonding regressively and psychopathologically –the primary means of 
bonding in the bankrupt Western culture (see also: Szasz, 1970; Sartre, 1977)—these non-Native 
residents voiced their anger and resentment towards not just the Haudenosuanee protesters, but 
all Natives, all non-White Canadians, and all non-Canadians in general. They then transformed 
their hateful verbal attacks on all these other groups into a narrative of their own alleged 
victimization by these other groups, which further fueled their angry, hateful, regressive and 
psychopathological bonding. 
     Other non-Native residents continued making claims in this vein, projecting their own 
behaviors onto the Haudenosaunee protesters while completely failing to engage in any form of 
critical self-reflection.  One example of this, already mentioned in a section above, was in the 
statement by one angry non-Native resident that “the native tradition of constantly identifying 
themselves as victims” was getting old (Thompson, 2006b).  Another resident, equally oblivious 
to his own projections and devoid of any critical self-reflection, demanded to know “Why is it 
that the very people who insist on flexing their own rights have so little regard for the rest of 
us?” (Matthews, 2006).  Indeed.  Continuing with his projections and complete lack of critical 
self-reflection, he continued: 
I'm angry because they're breaking the law to get their own way. They're telling 
the rest of society to go to hell because it's only their point of view that matters. 
… [I]n a democracy we don't get to pick and choose the laws we like and then 
obey only them. (Matthews, 2006) 
 
It probably doesn’t need to be pointed out that each of these complaints the resident had seem far 
more applicable to the attitudes and behavior of non-Native residents who opposed the 
Haudenosaunee protest than to the attitudes and behavior of Haudenosaunee protesters.  
Meanwhile, other residents made increasingly exaggerated claims to victim status at the hands of 
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Haudenosaunee protesters: the county mayor claimed the entire town was being held hostage or 
held for ransom (Bonnell & Canadian Press, 2006c), some non-Native protesters suggested that 
Haudenosaunee protesters might next try to take over the homes of non-Native residents 
(Bauslaugh, 2006a),560
Non-Natives Alleging Victimization for the Loss of Harmonious Relations 
 and others even made comparisons that likened the Native protesters to 
Nazi Germany (Interviews, 2009). 
     Another common claim made by non-Native residents who opposed the protest was that the 
protest was “creating a rift” and had to be ended “before it causes resentment”(Unnamed resident 
quoted in: Canadian Press, 2006t & 2006c). Variations of this complaint were that the protest 
was polarizing the town and leading to mistrust (unnamed resident quoted in: Oliveira, 2006), 
driving “a wedge through the community” (Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in: 
Bauslaugh, 2006b), and that the Haudenosaunee protesters were “creating a divide that’s only 
going to get bigger as the days go by” (Jackson, 2006a & 2006c).  Interestingly, the residents 
making these assertions uniformly blamed the protest or the Haudenosaunee protesters for 
creating whatever problems existed between Natives and non-Natives in the town, never 
considering for once that perhaps the non-Native behavior –including vehement opposition to the 
protest, demands that protesters grievances be ignored, insistence on the continuation of 
settlement and development on Native lands, complete lack of concern for whether 
Haudenosaunee land claims were resolved justly, outright racist remarks, and blatant 
discrimination against Native customers in local businesses—was the actual cause of whatever 
                                                 
560  Residents at an anti-protest rally allegedly demanded to know: “What’s to say they won’t 
come and try to take my house?” The Haudenosaunee Confederacy Council and protesters had 
repeatedly assured residents that they were not interested in dispossessing non-Native residents 
already living in the town, but that they simply wanted to prevent more non-Native residents 
from moving onto the lands under claim. 
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“divide” they saw growing.  In other words, the terms rift, divide, mistrust, polarize, wedge, and 
so forth were code words to indicate non-Native anger that Native people were getting in the way 
of what non-Natives wanted to do.  Equally interesting, as pointed out by some non-Native 
residents who were not vehemently opposed to the protest, racial tensions had always existed in 
the town and, according to these latter residents, had been the result of non-Native prejudice 
against Natives.  As one non-Native resident pointed out:  
I know a lot of guys in town that have a prejudice against natives, they feel they 
get too many privileges.  There’s a lot of fights at hockey games.  Some of the 
natives don’t stand for the anthem and it bothers a lot of people.  You hear things 
like, ‘If you don’t stand up for Canada you should get … out of the rink.’ This 
conflict is just going to fuel that hate even more. (Resident Pat McKillop, quoted 
in: Oliveria, 2006). 
 
Instead of blaming the protesters and the protest for all of the growing animosity, this resident 
was clear that the source of the problem was anti-Native hatred among non-Natives, and that this 
hatred was bound to grow as a result of non-Natives becoming angry at the protest, just as it 
grew any time Native people did something many local non-Natives did not like. 
     Reminders that racial tensions had always existed, and that non-Natives were largely 
responsible for these tensions, had little effect on those non-Native residents who sought to 
blame the Haudenosaunee protesters and people for all of their anger.  These latter residents were 
too caught up in projective blame shifting to critically self-reflect on their own behavior, and 
narratives that implicated them in any way in the growing “rift” would destroy the identity they 
had been constructing for themselves as morally pure victims.  These narratives allow non-
Native residents who vehemently opposed the protest to claim that they were justified in their 
demands that authorities end the protest, because they were making these demands benevolently 
–i.e., they were merely concerned about worsening relations between Natives and non-Natives.  
Such narratives of victimization and moral purity, and such claims of benevolence, allowed the 
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angriest non-Native residents (who were, in many cases, the most prejudiced against Native 
people) to deny their own racism, and even to project it onto Native protesters, thus confusing 
the issue in the realm of public opinions and avoiding the stigmatization that comes with more 
behavior more obviously motivated by racism.  Tellingly, though, while these residents 
demanded in the name of benevolence that the protest be ended immediately, how the protest 
was ended was of virtually no concern to them, so long as it was ended.  Thus, the alleged 
morally-pure justification for ending the protest –benevolence in one’s concern about resentment 
and souring relations—was betrayed with the complete lack of concern for any resentment that 
forcibly ending the protest and returning to colonialism-as-usual would create for the 
Haudenosaunee. In other words, those non-Native residents who subscribed to this justification 
when demanding an end to the protest were solely concerned with non-Native feelings: non-
Natives did not want to feel resentment (i.e., feel like they had gotten the short end of the stick), 
which they would feel if the protest continued, and so the protest needed to end before they were 
forced to feel this. To this extent, these non-Native residents were not really concerned with a rift 
at all, since certainly one would be created by forcibly ending the protest and continuing 
colonialism-as-usual.  If these non-Native residents had really been concerned with positive 
relations (rather than just with how non-Natives felt), they would have acknowledged the 
Haudenosaunee’s grievances and demanded a just resolution to Haudenosaunee land claims.  
They would also have supported –at the very least-- a partial or temporary development 
moratorium on lands under claim until this just resolution was found.   
     However, such concerns were never voiced by many of the non-Natives who used this 
narrative to justify their demands for an end to the protest.  Neither the ongoing anti-Native 
racism not the ongoing perpetrations against the Haudenosaunee people had any relevance in the 
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minds of these residents, who only appeared to care about ending the interruption in what non-
Natives wanted to do, so that they did not feel resentful.  Further, because Haudenosaunee 
protesters had made it absolutely clear that they were not willing to leave the protest site until 
their grievances were fairly resolved, those non-Natives who demanded an immediate end to the 
protest also seemed to be demanding an end to negotiations aimed at finding a peaceful 
resolution to the protest.  Thus, they appear to have been advocating a forced end to the protest.  
In such a case, not only were Haudenosaunee grievances to go unaddressed, they were to go 
unheard.  It is thus difficult to see how any person could expect that these non-Native demands 
would not be responsible themselves for creating a rift –as advocating armed violence against 
one’s neighbor generally does.  For this reason, other residents who demanded an end to the 
protest perhaps voiced the true nature of these concerns more accurately when they complained 
not so much about a rift, but about the “tremendous harm” being done to non-Native residents 
and businesses in their town (resident Carol van Imp, quoted in: Edwards & Gombu, 2006).  As 
two different residents argued: "Something has to be done or it's going to hurt Caledonia. People 
won't want to come here" (unidentified resident quoted in Brantford Expositor, 2006a); "The 
government needs to come in, bring in the army and clean it up," she said. "This is not going to 
be solved peacefully" (resident Carol van Imp, quoted in: Edwards & Gombu, 2006). 
Exaggerated Claims of Financial Victimization and Assertions of Entitlement 
In addition to the above exaggerated claims to victimization, many non-Native residents seeking 
to fuel anti-Native resentment preyed upon non-Native misconceptions and exaggerations about 
tax credits that benefit Native people. Under the Indian Act (Canada, 1985), the historic relation 
between the British Canadian government and Native peoples of North America has been 
deemed to qualify Natives in Canada to certain tax breaks.  For example, individual Natives 
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living on Native reserves do not pay property taxes to non-Native municipalities, and Native-
owned businesses that operate and/or do most of their business on Native reserves are not 
(supposed to be) required to pay income taxes.  In addition, when making certain purchases, 
particularly purchases of services rendered on Native reserve lands, registered Natives are not 
charged sales tax, or (off reserve) are not charged full sales tax (BDO, N.d.; First Nations Tax 
Commission, 2007).  Though many of these tax breaks are based on long-standing, historic 
relations and agreements between Native nations and the British-Canadian government,561
                                                 
561 Some of these tax breaks are based on long-standing, historic relations and agreements 
between Native nations and the British-Canadian government, while others may be based on 
government attempts to break long-standing agreements. For example, on first guess, one would 
assume that the property tax exemption arises out of treaty agreements and recognition that all 
lands derived from First Nations, and those lands still owned by First Nations, do not fall under 
Canadian jurisdiction.  However, the Canadian government claims that it owns all of the land 
within its borders, whether or not it ever received these lands through treaty agreements (and up 
to 90% of the land in Canada was not surrendered by First Nations [Chrisjohn, N.d.]).  
Therefore, it may well be, according to the Canadian governments’ rationale, that Native people 
do not pay property tax on reserve lands because the Canadian government claims that they are 
not the owners of the property, only have occupancy rights, and are using property that belongs 
to the government.  More research would be needed to fully draw any conclusions on what the 
government’s exact legal narrative is on this issue, but it seems clear that –though certainly 
Native people should not pay property tax to non-Naïve governments for lands that still belong 
to Native people—the Canadian government’s legal intent behind the tax exemption may be 
something entirely predatory rather than beneficial to First Nations. 
 there 
has been a long-standing campaign among resentful non-Natives to abolish all “special” tax 
privileges that apply to First Nations people.  This campaign has provided selective information 
to the general public with the intent of fueling further non-Native resentment and anger towards 
Native peoples (i.e., regressive social bonding) in order to pressure government officials to 
repeal all Native tax breaks.  However, because those involved in this campaign selectively pick 
and choose what information they present to the public, they fail to provide an accurate picture 
of the “benefits” Native people actually gain from these tax breaks.  Some discussion of the 
actual tax breaks to First Nations peoples is thus in order before going on to examine the ways in 
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which local non-Native residents who were opposed to the protest sought to build upon already-
existing non-Native resentment on the tax issue in order to generate further resentment and anger 
towards the Haudenosaunee protest. 
     The anti-Native-tax-break campaigners have spread the claim that Native people don’t pay 
any taxes at all, that non-Native people financially support Native people through their taxes, and 
that this form of “welfare” unfairly benefits and privileges Native people at the expense of non-
Natives.  However, this information is absolutely incorrect.  For example, the vast majority of 
Native people pay income tax at the same rates of non-Natives.  The only Native people who do 
not pay income tax are those who work in a business that is Native-owned at that operates on 
reserve lands, which are legally exempt from federal taxes.  However, even though reserve lands 
are legally exempt from taxation, federal and provincial governments periodically harass Native 
business owners whose businesses operate on reserve lands, threatening them with loss of their 
business if they do not pay taxes.562
                                                 
562 This assertion is based upon an informal review of six years of coverage on the issue by the 
Tekawennake and Turtle Island News, as well as other news sources.  Specific examples and 
news articles can be provided to interested readers, and may be compiled for a future article on 
the topic. 
  While this harassment is not legal under Canada’s own 
Indian Act, it does generate revenue for the Canadian and Ontario governments in that many 
Native business owners give up and start paying federal and provincial income taxes –estimating 
that these payments are potentially less costly than court cases against these governments.  To 
this end, the multi-million dollar business, Grand River Enterprises, on the Six Nations reserve 
calculated that it would simply be less costly to pay these taxes than to fight the constant 
harassment, seizure of product, court costs, and so forth.  Grand River Enterprise now pays 
upwards of $60 million a year in taxes to the federal and provincial governments.  This amount 
far exceeds the funding that federal and provincial governments provide annually to the Six 
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Nations community by tens of millions of dollars.563
     A large number of Native people, perhaps a majority, also pay property tax either because 
their local (often federally-imposed) government collects these taxes from those living on reserve 
or, more often, because they live on lands that are not recognized by the Canadian, provincial, 
and local governments as reserve lands.  Often times these latter lands are, in fact, unsurrendered 
lands that should be considered reserve lands (see chapter 4 on extinguishment and jurisdiction).  
Further, often the small parcels of lands that are recognized by non-Native governments as 
reserve lands are too small to accommodate all Native peoples who wish to live within their own 
communities.  On the Six Nations reserve, there is a 10-year waiting list for housing loans, and 
far more Haudenosaunee Six Nations community members live off reserve than one it 
(Alcantara, 2005).
  Clearly the Six Nations community and its 
members are thus paying far more in income tax than their community receives in government 
funding.  Income tax generates about 41% of all tax revenue in Canada (First Nations Tax 
Commission, 2007: 7). 
564
                                                 
563 Interview with Caledonia and Six Nations residents, February-June, 2009. 
  Thus, the majority of Six Nations people pay property taxes to local non-
Native municipalities.  And while Six Nations people who live on reserve do not pay property 
taxes, this actually has no impact at all on non-Natives.  This is because property taxes stay 
within the community or municipality that collects them, to fund street repairs, and other local 
improvements  (First Nations Tax Commission, 2007: 7).  Because the Six Nations reserve is not 
564 There are an estimated 25,000 Haudenosaunee Six Nations members, but less than 10,000 of 
these people live on the Six Nations reserve because of a shortage of land in the area officially 
recognized as reserved for the Haudenosaunee.  Many lands that were long ago set aside for the 
use of future community members were sold by non-Native governments and are presently under 
claim.  But as the claim process drags on for decades, non-Natives are settling on and developing 
these lands as if they are non-Native lands, when at best they are contested lands, and most likely 
are Haudenosaunee lands.  This issue was, of course, a key motivating factor for the 2006 
protest. 
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under the jurisdiction of any local non-Native municipal government, even if inhabitants of the 
Six Nations reserve were to pay property taxes, local non-Native governments would not gain 
any tax revenues from these payments, and thus cannot claim to be losing any tax revenues 
because these payments are not made. 
     Some non-Natives have attempted to get around these facts by arguing that the exemptions 
from property taxes paid by Native people do impact them, because Native communities receive 
funding from the federal government.  It is true that the federal government is obligated under 
treaty agreements to pay certain annuities to, provide for the well being of, and/or fund certain 
services for Native communities (such services include education, health care and so forth).  And 
according to disgruntled non-Native logic, since non-Natives have fewer tax exemptions than 
Native people, these funds are coming out of non-Native pockets. However, this logic falls apart 
when subjected to further scrutiny, in part because the federal government provides all 
communities with funding –and these federal dollars do not come from property taxes, they 
come from income tax (which the vast majority of Native people pay) and/or from sales tax 
(discussed momentarily).  Further, Native communities actually receive disproportionately less 
funding than do non-Native communities, because the latter receive far more funding from 
provincial governments.  For example, in Toronto, combined government spending (federal, 
provincial and municipal) per resident is about $24,000 per year, while in some reserves in 
Ontario, which primarily rely upon federal funding, government spending equaled only $11,355 
per capita (Land, 2011).  Further, government spending increases for First Nations has been 
capped at 2% since 1996, despite the fact that Natives comprise the most rapidly growing 
population in Canada, and that much of government spending for First Nations goes to paying 
salaries for Aboriginal and Northern Affairs Canada bureaucrats, and consulting fees for third 
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parties (Land, 2011).  This dramatic funding disparity between Natives and non-Natives has 
resulted in catastrophes such as the emergency housing situation routinely suffered in Ontario’s 
Attawapiskat reserve (Lux, 2011), and ongoing, ‘non-emergency’ conditions such as the lack of 
clean drinking water and indoor plumbing in a large portion of houses the Six Nations reserve 
(something common to many Native reserves, see: Stastna, 2011).  In addition to all of this, as 
mentioned above, the Grand River Enterprises on the Six Nations reserve pays many millions 
more in federal and provincial taxes than the Six Nations reserve receives in funding from both 
governments combined. Thus, if anyone should complain about funding the other group’s 
lifestyle, or about special privileges and financial discrimination as it relates to federal and 
provincial funding, it should be Haudenosaunee people complaining about funding non-Native 
lifestyles, and not the other way around. 
     Sales tax exemptions are therefore the only form of tax exemption that is enjoyed by 
registered First Nations members and not equally enjoyed by non-Native citizens.  This sales tax 
exemption is conditioned upon, a long history of Euro-native relations and treaty agreements that 
recognized Native independence from the British-Canadian government, that pledged non-
interference in each others’ affairs, and that required the latter to provide for the well-being of 
the former in exchange for permission to use of certain areas of First Nations’ land.  This form of 
tax exemption is certainly a benefit to First Nations people.  However, it is not as beneficial as 
non-Natives opposed to First Nations treaty rights would present it.  This is because the various 
provincial governments are constantly attempting to find ways around these sales tax 
exemptions, such as through creating other forms of sales tax that do apply to First Nations 
people, or through “harmonizing” all forms of sales tax into one, causing confusion among 
business owners as to which taxes do and do not apply, and leading to inapplicable taxation of 
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First Nations people (CNW, 2010; Alexander & Glasner, N.d.).  Finally, a commonly recurring 
story among Native people is that some non-Native merchants refuses to honor sales tax 
exemptions of First Nations people, either refusing to serve the customer who insists on these 
exemptions or refusing to accept Native status cards and charging full sales tax on all customers 
(Interviews, 2009). Certainly this is a form of discrimination that seems unlikely be reproduced if 
it were a group of non-Natives who exclusively had this exemption, but because this sales-tax 
exemption is associated with a distinct group of people (the group most often targeted for 
derision and scapegoating in Canadian society), it infuriates non-Native people, who 
conveniently ignore their own forms of privilege, and can’t stop fixating on the fact that another 
group that is supposed to be lower on the social hierarchy has something they do not.565
     Early on in the protest non-Natives used the issue of Native tax exemptions to assert claims to 
victimhood and to create and mobilize non-Native resentment and anger towards the 
Haudenosaunee protesters or towards Native people in general.  To this extent, non-Native 
 
                                                 
565 The fact that many non-Native people feel –quite intensely and angrily—that Native people 
should be lower on the social hierarchy than they are is evident in media coverage of Native 
issues, and was also quit evident in interviews with non-Native residents (February-June, 2009). 
For example, many non-Native residents would angrily tell anecdotes about seeing a Native 
person or various generalized Native people driving nice, expensive cars. Often these anecdotes 
were immediately related in some way to alleged “special privileges” –with non-Native residents 
all but stating (or sometimes actually suggesting outright) that it had been them who had 
purchased those cars for Native people –through their taxes. In their telling these anecdotes, it 
was always simply assumed that I would immediately understand and commiserate with their 
anger at such an injustice as a Native person driving a nice, expensive car that “even” the non-
Native resident could not afford to drive (“even I couldn’t afford that” –clearly the suggestion in 
“even I…” is that “I” should be better and have better in everything than a Native person).  This 
expectation of my immediate understanding was evidenced in the fact that many angry anecdotes 
about how a Native person had something nice (or nicer than even the storyteller had) were not 
accompanied by any explanation, and were told as if the injustice was self-evident.  In these 
cases, it was only after further inquiry that I was made to understand that the anger came from 
the fact that the non-Native person had convinced him or herself that he/she had paid for the 
Native person’s nice item through taxes –even though there are no government programs that 
help Native people purchase automobiles or other consumer goods, much less very nice 
automobiles or consumer goods. 
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residents used the term “taxpayers” as if it were an exclusive category synonymous with non-
Native residents.  They carried signs to anti-protest rallies proclaiming: “We work and pay 
taxes!”(Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007), and organizers of these rallies played upon 
potential non-Native resentment over the issue with statements such as: “We feel its time that 
Canadians hear from the tax-paying community of Caledonia” (rally organizer Ken Hewitt, 
quoted in Harries, 2006a).  Other non-Native residents voiced related, exaggerated complaints 
that “the natives get everything for free with their special cards” (Toronto Star, 2006b), or wrote 
letters-to-the-editor complaining about the financial advantages Native peoples allegedly “enjoy 
over non-natives,” and telling Native people: “I wish no hardship on you people.  I just want you 
to pay your way like the rest of us do”(Flemming, 2006c).  Even the Mayor got in on the action 
(as noted above), implying on national TV that Native people didn’t understand what it was like 
to have to work to survive: “[The non-Natives] don’t have, uh, monies coming in automatically 
every month.  They’ve got to work to survive.  And, and the Natives’ have got to realize that” 
(Haldimand County Mayor Marie Trainer, quoted in: CBC News, 2006a; Harries & Rusk, 2006; 
Rook, 2006f). 
     The misinformed and exaggerated assertions of Native “special privileges” and non-Native 
victimhood did not stop with the issue of taxes, but escalated from there.  Non-Native residents 
angrily opposed to the Haudenosaunee protest painted Native people in general as extortionists, 
or more accurately, “hypocrites wailing about assimilation, native traditions and living with 
nature while they use the system to extort the government”(Lupton, 2006). Others, as mentioned 
in a previous section, insisted that “the natives” were extortionists because they had already been 
paid –even over-paid-- for their land through tax credits, and should never have been paid in the 
first place (Flemming, 2006b). And still other residents played upon these issues of tax credits 
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and non-Native victimization in their exaggerated and misinformed complaints that the federal 
government “has done nothing but throw money at the native community for years and they still 
are not satisfied” (Thompson, 2006b) or their complaints about an alleged “millions of tax 
dollars and generations of time wasted by Aboriginal people and their disputes” which were 
ultimately “settled in the courts at our expense” (Smith, 2006c, quoting and paraphrasing Ken 
Hewitt). 
    Other non-Native residents expressed claims to have been financially victimized by 
Haudenosaunee protesters in yet another way, equally demonstrative of their sense of 
entitlement.  For example, within the first two days of the roadblocks which forced residents to 
take a seven or so minute detour around town, one resident demanded to know “Who is going to 
pay our wages when we can’t go to work?”(Janet Whintemute, quoted in Healty & Nolan, 2006).  
Now, certainly the day of the failed Ontario Provincial Police raid was extremely chaotic, with 
schools being closed and many residents being forced to come home early from work to watch 
their kids and worry over the events in their town. Many schools were also closed on the day 
following the failed police raid, as well (which was a Friday).  But both the mayor and the 
county council had assured residents that schools and everything else in the town would be 
functioning normally on Monday, and had insisted that residents should go on with their lives 
regardless of whether the roadblocks remained. In addition, though there were roadblocks up on 
some of the streets at one far end of the town, residents were still able to get anywhere they 
wanted, including work.  They simply to take streets other than those they would normally travel 
to get there.  So the suggestion by this resident that people in the town would not be able to go to 
work was an exaggeration.  However, of even greater interest is this resident’s suggestion that 
someone is responsible for paying the residents’ wages if they could not go to work.  This 
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resident clearly felt that non-Native residents are entitled to get what non-Native residents expect 
to have.  There is no fault in this expectation, except in that it is not equally applied to the 
Haudenosaunee protesters.  Though non-Natives in this resident’s unrealistic scenario should 
have whatever it is that they expect to have, and should have any losses in these expectations 
recouped, Haudenosaunee protesters, who are dealing with an actual loss far more sizable than a 
couple days pay, should be forced off the land and given nothing, so as not to inconvenience 
non-Native residents. The sense not only of entitlement, but of exclusionary privileges, speaks 
volumes, as does the discriminatory double-standard and complete lack of critical self-reflection.  
DEHUMANIZING THE TARGET GROUP AND SETTING THE STAGE FOR VIOLENCE  
 
In dehumanizing his victims, he loses his capacity to care for them, to have 
compassion for them, to treat them as human beings.  He develops a state of 
psychic numbing and a sense of detachment which sharply reduce his capacity to 
feel.  Insofar as he excludes a whole group of people form his network of shared 
empathy, his own community becomes more constricted and his sense of 
involvement in humankind declines.  ….  As he gradually discards personal 
responsibility and human empathy, he loses his capacity to act as a moral being. 
~ Kelman 1973, 51-52 
 
Once [some non-Natives] don’t get their way then, not all of them, but some do 
the racism, thing, and, you know [argue] that these are … you know, they’re not 
normal, they’re not real people. They have some lesser rights or have some 
characteristic different than the rest of us. 
~ Ralph Gerstenberger, President Local 1005 United Steal Workers Union, 
Hamilton Ontario, quoted in Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f 
 
Afterall, violence is the last resort of the incompetent. 
~ Caledonia Resident Lorrie Harcourt, Harcourt 2006 
 
In the beginning of chapter 4, some of the dynamics and impacts of government polices and 
practices of violence were discussed and it was noted that such policies and practices often result 
in what Herbert Kelman (1973) calls the authorization and routinization of attack against and 
dehumanization of a group of people who have been set apart from the rest of society as “fair 
game.” Together, all of these processes work to diminish or destroy the moral restraints that most 
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individuals normally have when it comes to committing acts of violence against other human 
beings.  The non-Native residents who most angrily and vehemently opposed the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest cannot be said to have participated in sanctioned massacres against the 
Haudenosaunee people, but the Canadian and Ontario governments, with the complicity of these 
non-Native residents, can be said to be engaging in ongoing atrocities against the Haudenosaunee 
and other Native peoples throughout Canada.  Similarly, some of the non-Native residents who 
most angrily opposed the Haudenosaunee protest did engage in acts of violence that would not 
have been acceptable without these government-authorized and routinized processes of targeting 
and dehumanizing (indirectly, in pursuit of policy objectives) Native peoples in Canada.  As 
Kelman (1973) and others have noted, these processes work on a continuum.  The examination 
of these processes can serve to explain incidents like Abu Ghraib, or massacres in Vietnam, but 
they can also serve to explain much lower-level attacks, such as those seen in the Standford 
Prison experiment, Stanley Milgram’s famous experiment, and the escalating hostilities and 
periodic violent attacks upon Native protesters by local non-Native residents. This section 
examines some of the ways in which local non-Native residents –clearly playing off of the 
government and media example— collectively participated in these processes and fueled the 
lessening of their own moral restraint, particularly by engaging in collective dehumanization 
ceremonies aimed at Native people, with the intent of legitimizing non-Native demands for 
violence and justifying non-Native incidents of attempted or actual violence.  As with the rest of 
this chapter, the vast majority of the examples provided in this section are from statements and 
actions that occurred within the first two months of the protest, and thus this discussion is not 
entirely reflective of the intensified anti-Native rhetoric and violent tendencies that developed 
after this two month period, examination of which will have to be reserved for future work. 
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Dehumanization Ceremonies 
     One of the primary ways in which non-Native residents who opposed to the Haudenosaunee 
protest authorized and routinized the dehumanization of Haudenosaunee protesters and 
increasingly violent expressions of this anger was through their regular gatherings as close as 
they possibly could to the protest site.  Gathering almost every Friday night, as well as on other 
nights and days of the week, non-Native residents yelled racial slurs at Native protesters and 
insults at police officers, and sometimes proclaimed their intent to physically confront and 
forcibly remove Native protesters from the site vigilant-style.  But their main audience was each 
other and their primary purpose was to bond in socially-regressive ways, feeding off of their 
common anger and hatred towards Native protesters and Native people. 
     Many non-Native residents who regularly rallied at the barricades considered these gatherings 
to be social events.  They saw friends they hadn’t seen in a while, bonded with strangers, brought 
their children along with them, and attended the events as families (Interviews, 2009).566
                                                 
566 Three years later, some parents spoke proudly of the fact that they were one of those families 
that attended the events together (interviews with Caledonia residents, February-June, 2009). 
  These 
regular gatherings also became hotspots for local youth looking for excitement, and local youth 
some times made up to 3/4ths of those present (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009).  Yet, though 
many non-Natives who attended these rallies did so on a social level, the underlying purpose of 
the gatherings was clear in the signs, statements, and actions of residents present.  For example, 
many residents attending these regular gatherings carried signs with messages that intended to 
denigrate Native protesters or Native people. Signs bore remarks such as “I agree with 
Marie”(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j), referring to the mayor’s off-color remarks implying that 
Native protesters did not understand what it was like to have to work for a living, rather than 
having checks coming in automatically every months. Signs played upon and reinforced 
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stereotypes of Native people as criminals and car thieves,567
     It was not just the signs that non-Native residents carried that turned these gatherings into 
dehumanization ceremonies.  It was also what non-Natives said and did at these rallies.  For 
example, video footage of one of these rallies shows a large number of youth gathered around a 
barrel fire, singing alternatively the Canadian national anthem and a set of four words chanted 
over and over again in the style of mocking Native music: “Hey-how-are-ya, hey-how-are-ya, 
hey-how-are-ya.” These chants and songs were simultaneously intended to exclude Native 
 such as signs demanding: “Get off 
our land and give back my ATV,” implying not only that Native people were car thieves, but that 
Native protesters were also trying to steal non-Native (“our) land.  Another sign playing upon 
this stereotype read: “Lost, 1 white mini van,” and the individual carrying the sign simply 
assumed (correctly) that everyone present would get the intended meaning of the joke 
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j).  Other signs present at the protest were even less subtle in the 
non-Native racism they expressed, reading, for example: “CAUTION: running rampant, please 
do not feed the animals” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009), or: “Where is John Wayne when you 
need him?”(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j).  And other signs emphasized the carriers’ desire to 
see violence against the Haudenosaunee protesters by asking for United States intervention or 
asking:  “What would W do?” referring non-Native residents’ perception of US President George 
W. Bush as a violent war monger (who would quickly end such a protest just as he quickly 
started wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007). 
                                                 
567 A number of stolen vehicles are found abandoned, sometimes after having been thoroughly 
torched, on the Six Nations reserve every year. The assumption among non-Native residents has 
always been that Six Nations people (or Native people) are responsible for all of the car thefts.  
This may or may not be the case, but there is at least some evidence that non-Natives use the Six 
Nations reserve –which has left much of the original forest still in tact, and thus provides 
numerous isolated hiding spots-- as a dumping ground (Interviews with Caledonia and Six 
Nations residents, February- June, 2009). 
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people from the Canadian nation and to denigrate Native singing and Native people.  As the 
youth stood there, various older adults walked by with their signs that make derogatory 
comments about Native people in the same manner as described above.  One of the teens, 
referring to a John Wayne sign, proclaimed “cowboys and Indians,” obviously suggesting that 
the non-Native residents were the cowboys.  Another youth present responded to this comment, 
asking if anyone has any feathers they can throw on the fire.  The rest of the youth broke out in a 
spontaneous, repeated chant of “burn, Natives, burn!” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006j).   
     Other video footage shows non-Native residents attempting to get as close as they can to the 
police barricades, and responding furiously when provincial police stop them from crossing the 
barricades onto the Native protest site (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006l). A sizeable portion of 
those stopped then searched for ways to sneak around the police barricade and onto the protest 
site.  Another video shot that same weekend shows a group of male non-Native teenagers, 
accompanied by a non-Native adult, trying to sneak onto the protest site by climbing a fence 
away from the police barricades, all the while talking about how they want to shoot the Natives 
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a). When the police eventually stepped in to prevent these non-
Natives from climbing a fence and entering the protest site, the latter accused the police of 
discrimination against non-Natives.  Non-Native teens are then shown continuing to talk about 
wanting to shoot Natives, as a non-Native adult who was later identified as a member of a White 
Supremacist organization tells them that he understands, but that they need to pick their battles.  
For example, a portion of the discussion follows.  Each line indicates a different teenage speaker, 
while the adult’s statements are indicated with the word ADULT: 
They always surround the white guys.   
Ya.   
That’s discriminatory, why are you always surrounding us?… 
How discriminatory is that? 
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I want to fucking shoot every single one of them… 
ADULT: Exactly.  But you can’t do it today.  
We still gotta try. 
ADULT: Not today. You have to pick your battles. 
This is our tribe, this is our white tribe.   
This is our tribe, ya. 
White tribe.   
White power!   
White power! 
Ha ha. 
Ya. (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a at 3:00 min to 3:30 min) 
 
     These regular gatherings/ dehumanization ceremonies were also breeding grounds for all of 
the various behaviors discussed above in this chapter –particularly non-Native residents’ 
exaggerated claims to injury and victimhood.  exaggerated claims to victimhood (and lack of 
critical self-reflection).  For example, one video shows a woman, standing in an angry mob of 
non-Native residents gathered as close as possible to the Native protest, screaming angrily that: 
“[we’re] not frightening their children, but they’re frightening ours!”(Autonomy & Solidarity, 
2009 at about 14:30min).  Another resident, a non-Native teenager, claimed that her university 
acceptance was going to be cancelled because the protest caused her to miss two days of school 
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009), while other residents compared the Native protesters to Nazis 
(ignoring the presence of several actual neo-Nazis with in the mob of non-Natives) (Autonomy 
& Solidarity, 2006c). 
     While these dehumanization ceremonies offered residents a chance to physically congregate 
and to bond in their socially-regressive (and psychopathological) hatred towards Native 
protesters, the socially regressive bonding, projection, scapegoating and so forth was not limited 
to these dehumanization ceremonies, as much of the rest of the chapter has demonstrated.  These 
nightly dehumanization ceremonies worked in conjunction with other daily activities in the lives 
of non-Natives, and local non-Native residents who vehemently opposed the protest engaged in 
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numerous other actions in their daily lives that demonstrated their collective expressions of 
opposition to the protest and to Native people, in general.  Through these daily activities, non-
Natives authorized and routinized for themselves and each other the actions that attacked and 
dehumanized Native people in was that would not otherwise be acceptable.  These daily 
activities thus served to intensify the anger, hatred and willingness to commit violence at the 
frequent nightly gatherings near the protest site. Examples of this sort of behavior include the 
discrimination displayed by some local non-Native businesses against Native people who 
attempted to shop in their establishments. The Kentucky Fried Chicken in town, along with 
several other non-Native businesses, refused to sell food to Native people (Autonomy & 
Solidarity, 2006i).  Non-Native businesses that did not follow suit were threatened with boycotts 
by angry non-Native residents who wanted all business to Native people in their town refused 
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006a).  In similar discriminatory fashion, on the day of the failed 
police raid school administrators asked Native students to leave school (on that day) “for the 
safety of everyone” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006i).  And elsewhere, before and after the failed 
police raid, non-Native residents threw trash out their car windows at Native people walking on 
the sidewalk (Haudenosaunee Confederacy, 2007). Despite all of these acts of aggression (and 
more not mentioned here), non-Native residents insisted that it was they, and not the 
Haudenosaunee people, who were discriminated against.  To this end, non-Native residents 
complained about the alleged discrimination they suffered when police and politicians  did not 
do what they wanted (Lupton, 2006), and others carried protest signs at rallies and regular 
gatherings intended to make this same complaint.  For example, one sign bore the word: 
“Discrimi-nation?” surrounded by question marks (Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007) though 
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the primary “special treatment” that Native people experienced was the racist refusal of service 
of non-Native establishments. 
     The local media also played a key role in fueling the daily dehumanization of Native people, 
and in setting the stage for violence at the regular non-Native gatherings and rallies (see for 
example, Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f). For example, particularly after the failed April 19 
police raid on the protest site, but also weeks before (and almost from the start of the protest), 
non-Native papers attempted first to call into question the peacefulness of the protest, and then to 
declare it outright violent.  Some of the first news articles taking this angle can be found in the 
Regional News.  In fact, months before the protest even began, the editor of that paper seems to 
have attempted to portray an informational picket by Haudenosaunee people as less than 
peaceful (Regional News, 2005).568
                                                 
568 For example, below an image of this peaceful informational picket, a caption read, in part: 
 Months later, and a mere week into the Haudenosaunee’s 
small, peaceful protest on the edge of town, the columnist for that paper used single quotation 
marks around the words ‘peaceful protest,’ implying that the protest was something other than 
peaceful, but offered no further explanation for the quotation marks (Jackson, 2006a).  The paper 
continued utilizing these quotation marks in other weekly editorial columns (Jackson, 2006b & 
2006c), while also dialing up the accusations. For example, in his April 5 column he stated that: 
“It makes me laugh every time native protesters off Highway 6 say they're peaceful.  Nothing 
could be further from the truth” (Jackson, 2006c). What had the protesters done, according to the 
author, that qualified them as less than peaceful?  They made demands that were supposedly 
equal to threats, and some protesters had insulted local police officials.  
While the group of about 15-20 people said they were conducting a peaceful 
protest, they were also handing out flyers that say “it is fully legal for Six Nations 
to reclaim the land and issue eviction notices, without restitution to the 
homeowners.”  
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     Early into the protest, other residents also jumped on board the “not peaceful” trend, with 
some insisting that things were “just a heartbeat, or a momentary flash of temper, away from 
violence”(Howard, 2006).  Residents also insisted that when Native protesters repeated 
statements that non-Native residents had made at an anti-protest rally, this was “reckless and 
inflammatory” (Howard, 2006).  The Native protester in question was summarizing comments 
by non-Native residents demanding police force and/or asking: “So we can shoot them when?” 
(Nolan, 2006c).   In summarizing these comments, the protester allegedly remarked that “They 
want the OPP to ‘get over there and shoot the hell of dem bad Injuns’” (Howard, 2006).  For the 
offended non-Native resident, it was the act of repeating these statements, rather than the fact 
that they were made in the first place, that was “reckless and inflammatory.” The fact that these 
statements had been made at all –repeatedly—did not even merit consideration.   
     Thus, again, in the minds of non-Native residents seeking to project their undesirable traits 
onto others, those targeted for attack were guilty and wrong no matter what they did, while the 
behavior of the allegedly morally pure non-Natives needed no scrutiny.  After the failed police 
raid on the protest site, this sort of thinking escalated along with escalating claims that the 
protesters were violent (and criminal, and thugs, and terrorists…).  The Non-Native media called 
Caledonia “a town under siege” (Rook, 2006d) and liberally peppered their news stories with 
references to alleged Native violence.  The protest was described as “bigger and angrier than 
ever”(CTV News, 2006h), or as as “burning rage” (Hamilton Spectator, 2006a) frustrations that 
had “blown wide open” (CTV News, 2006h).  It was just a matter of time, the non-Native media 
implied, before Native protesters brought in guns.  As one news host stated: “No guns visible 
yet, but [the protesters are] now saying they won’t back down, and they’re ready for whatever 
comes” (CTV News, 2006h).  While these accusations of violence were being levied at Native 
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protesters, most of the violent rhetoric was coming from angry non-Native residents, such as the 
resident who wanted to know: "Have (the police) shot them all yet?" (Oliveira, 2006),569
     Other residents took a different angle on the same “not peaceful” line of accusations, arguing 
that they were not so much concerned with themselves, but were benevolently concerned for the 
“majority of the” Haudenosaunee people, who were allegedly victimized by the protesters.  
According to this narrative, because many of the protesters were from other Native reserves 
around Canada (including many of the other Haudenosaunee reserves), they did “not represent 
Six Nations”(Jackson, 2006b),
 or the 
countless residents who demanded military force to end the protest (see, for example: Edwards & 
Gombu, 2006; CTV News, 2006h; Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007). 
570 and were even victimizing the people of the Six Nations 
reserve.571 Some non-Native residents even claimed that the Natives on the site were paid 
“professional protesters” (Haudenosuanee Confederacy, 2007),572
                                                 
569 The full context of this quote is as follows: 
 or at least a “ragtag bunch of 
activists who are acting like bullies” (Blizzard, 2006; Dreschel, 2006.  See also: Best, 2006g), 
"We've been here all day and (the protesters) have done nothing wrong," said one 
woman who asked not to be named.  
   She said she was disgusted by stories she heard of police raiding the compound early 
Thursday morning, allegedly using Tasers and tear gas to subdue the crowd.  
   "I'm embarrassed to be Canadian right now," she said, and added she was horrified to 
hear one woman matter-of-factly ask, "Have (the police) shot them all yet?" 
570 “[T]he protesers do not represent Six Nations.  Many of the most vocal are from reserves 
miles away from here.”  
571 “They’re being victimized, because, like he says to me, it’s the Mohawks who don’t even live 
here that are causing all the trouble.  If the people on the reserve start to speak out, they’ve been 
threatened with violence, they’ll be beat up, they’ll be assaulted.  They’ll even go to the point 
where you know they’ll burn –I’ve heard that they’ll burn their homes down with them in it” 
(Interviews with non-Native residents, February-June, 2009).   
572 For example, one sign shown in the cited video spun off from a credit card commercial:  
“Imported professional protesters: $400/week; 1 OPP Constable: $1330/week; The value of our 
kid’s safety and peace in our community: PRICELESS!  Open the Roads.”  
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and a bunch of terrorists “holding us hostage” and seeking war (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2009).  
As residents remarked in one video: 
“It’s a terrorist attack.  That’s what it is.  They’re holding us hostage,” stated  one 
non-Native resident at an anti-protest rally. “You know what, this would not 
happen in the United States.  They wouldn’t put up with this shit there, you know 
what I mean?  It’s a terrorist attack on us.  And you know what, it’s not our 
problem, it’s the frigging government that has to step in here and clean up this 
shit… It’s got nothing to do with Caledonia, just get out there and clean up the 




“They’re not leaving. They want war…  They want war.” (Autonomy & 
Solidarity, 2009) 
 
Other residents complained angrily about “the bloodshed protesters seem so eager to see happen” 
(Thompson, 2006a).  According to this narrative, then, since Native protesters were not peaceful, 
and even wanted violence and war, this is what they should get.  Thus, in perhaps the only time 
that non-Native residents opposed to the protest sought to give to Native people something they 
allegedly wanted, these residents advocated just this (see above examples). As terrorists, bullies, 
anarchists, and criminals, it was clear to non-Native residents (as it generally is to White 
Westerners) that absolutely no negotiations should take place with those who disagree with them, 
and this sentiment that was repeated again and again in only slightly varied ways, such as asking 
for George Bush or US intervention, or demanding: “No negotiations or discussions should be 
made with disrupters of the peace”(Huges, 2006) and: “Negotiating with criminals not only gives 
legitimacy to their false claims but also will encourage future illegal acts”(Thompson, 2006b; see 
also: Meyer, 2006)573
                                                 
573 According to this last source: “ If you give in to bullying and intimidation it does not stop. … 
The intimidation and bullying of law-abiding citizens and businesses is not acceptable.” 
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     According to non-Native residents, negotiations were not possible anyway, because the 
Haudenosaunee people allegedly couldn’t get along with each other and couldn’t effectively 
govern themselves because they had no idea who was in charge or because  “the unruly 
individualism of their spiritual ancestors” that was living on in the present was yet merely “a 
convenient excuse for pure anarchy” (Jackson, 2006b; Dreschel, 2006).574 Further, the 
Haudenosaunee community couldn’t competently manage the land they had (Jackson, 2006a; 
Stoneman, 2006).575
                                                 
574 The latter source asked rhetorically: “who do you try to strike a conclusive agreement with 
when you’re dealing with a longhouse divided against itself?”  The former source stated 
ignorantly: “It sounds like natives on Six Nations have a hard enough time getting along 
themselves.  Between different tribes, a band council, confederacy council, a group of Mohawks, 
the Haudenosaunee people, hereditary chiefs and clan mothers, no wonder they have no idea 
who's in control.” 
 Thus, as this anti-protest narrative went, “no matter who owns the 
land”(Mark Vandermaas, quoted in vidkid1983, 2007) it would not be “a viable solution” to turn 
the land “over to protesters, or even leave it vacant” (Meyer, 2006) (because this was not what 
non-Natives wanted to do).  The insistence on not negotiating also played upon illusionary 
wording that was intended to obscure the issue of land ownership altogether, such as by referring 
to the land as “our land” or discounting the concept of land ownership altogether when 
acknowledgement of the Haudenosaunee claim was unavoidable.  For example, one non-Native 
resident confronted with potential Haudenosaunee ownership of the land quickly dismissed this 
possibility by referring to the land as everyone’s land: “It’s all our land… we’re all human 
beings, we all live on this earth.  How the hell can they said it’s their land… I’m just as native to 
this land as they are.  I was born and raised on this land…” (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006e).  He 
575 The first source was already quoted in an above section.  The second source complained that: 
“As Keepers of the Land you seem to have a lot of Smoke Shops and Strip Malls close to reserve 
borders.” 
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then quickly reverted back to assertions of non-Native ownership: “We’ll get our land back” 
(Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006e).  
     Despite these persistent refusals of non-Native residents to acknowledge or deal with 
reminders of the Haudenosaunee claims to ownership, according to the Local President of the 
Steel Workers Union in Hamilton, non-Native residents of Caledonia knew when they purchased 
their homes that the Haudenosaunee claimed ownership of the land: 
[I]t turns out that all of the residents of Caledonia know that there’s an issue of a 
land dispute.  Like, 20-30 years ago, the reason you could buy houses cheaply in 
Caledonia was because you weren’t really sure if you owned the land or not. So, it 
turns out everyone in Caledonia knows that.  And, uh, they may not have liked it, 
but they know that this is the six miles on each side of the Grand River, they knew 
that. (Ralph Gerstenberger, quoted in Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006f) 
 
Years later, when confronted with the claim they had known about all along, the only response of 
non-Native residents was to demand that their government “come in, bring in the army and clean 
it up” because no other, less violent solution was allegedly possible (Carol Van Imp, quoted in 
Edwards & Gombu, 2006; see also: Howatt, 2006).  
     Such sentiments were widely-expressed at the anti-protest rallies, where non-Native residents, 
waving Canadian flags and demanding the forceful intervention of the army, became 
increasingly vocal of their anger and willing to engage in violence.  In some cases this violence 
was taken out on police officers, as non-Native residents demanding “law and order” jumped on 
police cars or threw punches at police officers (Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006i).576
                                                 
576 Talking about a previous rally, one non-Native resident noted nonchalantly: “[I]t was just 
mostly townspeople getting a little bit rowdy, just crossing that yellow tape, and nothing really 
happened –a couple people threw a couple punches at a couple police officers, but it was nothing 
totally out of control.” 
  Non-Native 
anger was also directed at other non-Native people who supported the protest. Some of these 
non-Native supporters of the protest were called traitors, “Indian lovers,” or other racial slurs.  
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They were also subjected to loud accusations about their sex lives (such as speculation that the 
person must be “fucking an Indian”), and to verbal and physical threats and intimidation and 
outright physical assaults (Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006g, 2006h, 2006d).  In 
fact, non-Native residents who opposed the protest were apparently so angered by the existence 
of non-Native support for the protest that they spoke in anti-protest meetings about finding the 
homes of people who had supported or given money to the protesters in order to do damage to 
the homes or physically intimidate and threaten them into ending their support activities 
(Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006h). As a result, at least some of these local non-
Native residents experienced various low-level attacks on their homes, as well as verbal and 
physical assaults on the street  (Interviews, 2009; Autonomy & Solidarity, 2006h). Yet, 
according to those committing the attacks, the Native protesters were the ones who were thugs 
and bullies, and non-Natives opposed to the protest were the ones who should not give in to 
intimidation and threats.  Or, at least, this was the version of the world that these non-Natives 
engaged in projection, scapegoating and a complete lack of critical self-reflection chose to 
create. 
     Similarly, non-Native residents who were upset with the lack of police force, frequently 
suggested taking matters into their own hands, and clearing the Native protesters off the site 
themselves --either with permission of the police: 
You know this is just going to escalate.  You’re gonna bring people from all over 
the province.  You guys can’t do your jobs? Give your job up, hand your arms 
over to us, we’ll take care of it. (Non-Native resident shown in Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy, 2007) 
 
Or without this permission: 
 
"Come on," said one instigator carrying a large Canadian Flag at the end of the 
rally.  "There's 1,500 of us, let's go over there and get them out ourselves if the 
OPP can't do it." (Non-Native resident quoted in Windle, 2006c) 
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In some cases they appear to have had partial permission from the police to escalate their angry 
anti-protest and anti-Native rhetoric to action. For example, according to one non-Native resident 
living near the protest site, the OPP gave him permission to arm himself (Autonomy & 
Solidarity, 2006d). Other residents, particularly in the neighborhood closest to the protest site, 
did just this, lining their back fences with Molotov cocktails that were ready to light and throw at 
Native protesters, cleaning large gun collections openly in their backyards to intimidate 
protesters (Interviews, 2009) and even making plans to have guns shipped in from Hamilton or 
elsewhere in the event that the “shit hit the fan” and non-Natives needed to fight a race war with 




     Non-Native residents who were vehemently opposed to the protest expected to see a symbolic 
enactment of Canadian social relations of domination through a quick, forceful end to the 
Haudenosaunee protest.  These expectations were reinforced by the rhetoric government officials 
and local authorities employed, which dismissed entirely the Haudenosaunee grievances and, 
along with policy practices, authorized and routinized the targeting of Haudenosaunee protesters/ 
people for dehumanization and attack (see chapter 4). When the expected symbolic enactment 
did not occur, residents who were most vehemently opposed to the protest were faced with a 
number of uncomfortable and even intolerable emotions that bubbled up from their 
subconscious.  Those most unwilling or unable to face or tolerate these emotions dissociated 
from their emotions and projected them onto Native protesters and Native people in general, who 
had long been identified as “fair game” for targeted attacks in Canadian society.  By dissociating 
from their own socially-unacceptable thoughts and behaviors, and from the root of the emotions 
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they experienced, and by projecting their guilt, aggression, and moral impurities onto Native 
protesters, non-Native residents psychopathologically discarded aspects of themselves through 
projective identifications. These projective identifications allowed the most angry non-Native 
residents to view themselves as morally pure victims, and thus to feel justified in their rage and 
hate-filled rhetorical attacks on the Native protesters and Native people more generally.  The 
resulting feelings of justification and “victimization” led many of these residents to begin taking 
matters into their own hands --playing off the rhetoric by government and local authorities and 
further engaging in their own, collective forms of authorization, routinization and 
dehumanization.  All of these activities set the stage for the various instances of attempted and/or 
actualized, racialized violent aggression that followed.   
     Thus, through this imagined, attempted, or actualized aggression and violence, local non-
Native residents appear to have been seeking to compensate for feelings of, on the one hand, 
guilt, fear, anxiety and paranoia and, on the other hand, powerlessness, loss of identity, and 
threats to their cultural worldview/ self-esteem.  This imagined, attempted, and/or actualized 
aggression and violence provided non-Native residents with the illusion that they were in control 
(Kelman, 1973: 58; Litowitz, 2000),577
                                                 
577 As Kelman noted: “Both regimentation and oppression create a feeling of powerlessness, a 
loss of personal agency, a deprivation of the sense of identity. Violence can offer a person the 
illusion that he is in control, that he is able to act on his environment, that he has found a means 
of self-expression. It may be the only way left to him to regain some semblance of identity, to 
convince himself that he really exists. The sad irony is that violence is a response to 
dehumanization that only deepens the loss that it seeks to undo; it is an attempt to regain one’s 
sense of identity by further destroying one’s sense of community.” 
 and thus was a way for many non-Native residents to 
attempt to reclaim and/or defend their privilege.  Yet, though these dissociations and projective 
identifications allowed non-Native residents to hide from themselves their guilt, complicity and 
criminality in the ongoing dispossession of the Haudenosaunee (and other Native) people, they 
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did not hide much of this from the casual outside observer.  Or, at least, they did not hide any of 
this from those who have not been indoctrinated into the Canadian status quo, which sees Native 
people as permanent “fair game” for attack in Canadian society, and treats Native peoples as 
permanently “in the way” of government and other authorities’ pursuit of policy objectives –i.e., 
of “progress”-- such as the accumulation of capital from the theft of Native lands and resources.  
To these latter observers, non-Native residents who were most actively opposed to the 
Haudenosaunee protest, and who made up at least 20-30% of the small town of 10,000 residents, 
frequently behaved in ways that were much more reflective of the accusations they hurled 
towards Haudenosaunee protesters than the protesters did themselves. 
     This chapter has focused on the patterns of thought and behavior exhibited by large numbers 
of non-Native residents in Caledonia during the first two months of the 2006 Haudenosaunee 
protest, and while many of these patterns of thought and behavior are rather reprehensible, the 
non-Native residents of Caledonia and surrounding areas cannot bear the weight of this 
reprehensibility alone. As others have noted (see chapter 4), the conditions for the production of 
atrocities rely upon government policies and practices to authorize and routinize the targeting 
and dehumanization of particular groups in society (Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975; Kakel, 2011).  
As chapter 2 has attempted to demonstrate, the existence of conditions for the production of 
atrocities is an inherent part of Western society.  This society and its cultural worldview have 
been built upon more than a millennium of societal trauma and atrocities that have yet to be 
acknowledged and examined, and form which Western society has yet to heal. These traumas 
and atrocities, and the psychopathological responses coping mechanisms that accompany them, 
are not only integral parts of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, but comprise 
the foundation upon which these have been built.  As such, it should be little surprise that these 
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patterns of psychopathological thinking and behavior are reproduced and reenacted daily in the 
behaviors of large portions of the individual, group, and national members of Western society 
and/or adherents to the Western cultural worldview.  Non-Native residents in Caledonia are mere 
products of this society, socialized into their patterns of thought and behavior throughout their 
lifetimes.  In other words, the:  
psychogenesis of the adult makeup in civilized society cannot, therefore, be 
understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis of our ‘civilization’. 
By a kind of basic ‘sociogenetic law’ the individual, in his short history, passes 
once more through some of the processes that his society has traversed in its long 
history. (P. 42). 
 
     As I have argued elsewhere in this chapter and in this dissertation, it is not the people in 
Western society who are psychopathological, it is the society itself, and the patterns of thinking 
and behavior that it instills in each and every individual and group within reach of its socializing/ 
“civilizing” processes.  This is not to say that non-Native residents who engaged in the above-
discussed behaviors are not individually responsible for their behaviors.  They definitely are.  
And as also mentioned above, all non-Native residents in Caledonia were exposed to Western 
socializing/ “civilizing” processes, and were exposed to the same levels of government and 
authority-promoted authorization, routinization and dehumanization targeting Native people.  
Yet, many non-Native residents chose to follow a different path, either supporting the protest to 
greater or lesser extents, remaining neutral, or simply remaining silent and refraining from 
(public) participation in the behaviors described in this chapter.  Thus, despite the very valid 
observations on hegemony and the near futility of resisting it (see for example, Litowitz, 2000; 
Kennedy, 11982; Gramsci, 1971; Foucault, 1995; and perhaps also: Horkheimer, 1996; 
Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; Marcuse, 1964), resistance is always thinkable, if one is willing to 
think.  Part of the problem is, as John Trudell (2003) has frequently pointed out, independent 
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thinking is somewhat of an anomaly in Western society,578
     Of course, none of this is stated to suggest that when residents exaggerated, fabricated, 
twisted and manipulated facts and arguments to justify their anti-Native positions and actions, 
they could not help themselves.  As pointed out in this chapter, the other part of the problem is 
that these 2,000-3,000 non-Native residents chose to engage in the behaviors that they did 
because they consciously or unconsciously wanted to defend the financial and/or social 
privileges that they enjoyed at the expense of Native peoples (and defend these by virtually any 
means necessary).  However, when they made this choice, they did so according to the status quo 
patterns of thinking and behavior of the society in which they live.  For these residents, for a 
number of reasons discussed in this chapter, following this status quo, however 
psychopathological it is, demonstrated not only self-interest, but obedience within and 
conformity to the norms of Western society.  In this context, it was neither the opposition to 
hearing Haudenosaunee grievances or the racism against Native people that was abonormal, nor 
was the silence of the vast majority of residents abnormal.  Rather, the assertive challenge to the 
colonial status quo of ongoing dispossession of Native peoples from their lands, resources and 
 which has long valued obedience to 
authority and conformity to social expectations over the individuality it so prides itself on 
(supposedly) characterizing (see chapters 2 and 4, as well as: Kelman, 1973: 41; Haney & 
Zimbardo, 1973a & 1973b; Milgram, 1974; Fussell, 1992; Bourdieu, 1986).   
                                                 
578 Particularly in modern Western society, we are constantly bombarded with information, much 
of which tells us we are inadequate so that we will buy products or fashions in an attempt to 
(temporarily) alleviate our alleged inadequacies.  In this environment, many people prefer to 
conform to the external and arbitrary standards of fashion and society over thinking and being 
true to oneself (or even knowing oneself).  While they do this, they often have the illusion of 
expressing themselves individually, but most often this is through consumption of goods already 
mass-manufactured and marketed for the purpose of making the masses feel their purchase 
represents their “individuality” (See also: Horkheimer, 1996; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1997; 
Marcuse, 1964).  
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human rights was incredibly “abnormal,” as was the support that trickled in from sympathetic 
non-Natives living near and far from the protest site.  By assertively challenging their ongoing 
colonial dispossession, Native protesters were challenging the very foundations of Western 
society and the Western cultural worldview, and non-Native residents who responded angrily to 
these challenges were seeking to preserve and protect that foundation from crumbling before 
their eyes.  The fact that the latter saw themselves as patriotic heroes, and as the real Canadians 
who would fight to the end for “their” country by forcing “lesser” others to know their place, is 
far more representative of the psychopathological values of Western society as a whole than it is 
of any individually-based psychopathology. 
     At the same time, though 20-30% of the people in this small town of 10,000 residents 
publicly participated at least some of the anti-protest/anti-Native activities, many non-Native 
residents were supportive of the protest.  Those who supported the Native protesters did so 
because they saw the common collective humanity that all people share. They were able to 
engaged in critical self-reflection, to put themselves in the place of “the other” (see for example, 
Mead, 1962).  As such, they were able to feel sympathy and empathy for others, and to hear the 
grievances of others without feeling overwhelmed by the threat of destruction (of themselves, 
their self-esteem, or their cultural worldview) (Lifton, 1975 & 2002).  In other words, they had 
not dehumanized themselves and others to the extent that they were no longer capable of acting 
as moral beings (Kelman, 1973).  As such, they sought to be honest with themselves about what 
is just and what is unjust, and they sought to speak and/or act out this truth in their behaviors 
despite the norms of the society in which they live.  Perhaps one could say that they interpreted 
the Liberal rhetoric of universality in ways that the Western cultural worldview never fully 
intended, interpreting an inclusive, justice-driven universality that is far more reflective of the 
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collective, communal ideas of Native cultural traditions, such as Haudenosuanee Great Law of 
Peace. John Mohawk (2008) summarizes part of this non-Western universalistic ideal as the 
essential understanding that justice cannot be achieved until everyone’s interests are included: 
The pursuit of peace is not merely the pursuit of the absence of violence. Peace is 
never achieved until justice is achieved. And justice is not achieved until 
everyone’s interests are addressed.  You can’t achieve peace unless it is 
accomplished by a constant striving to address the issues of justice. 
 
     Of course, some would argue that addressing everyone’s interests is nice in theory but 
impractical and impossible in reality, because it takes a considerable amount of time and effort, 
and is messy, difficult, and sometimes painful.  It also requires that the interests of the privileged, 
dominating few are put at par with the interests of the masses, and that the ongoing accumulation 
through dispossession, which has characterized Western society from perhaps its inception, ends.  
So unappealing is this non-Western universalism to holders of Western wealth and privilege that 
the founding fathers of the United States self-interestedly concluded that it could never ‘work’.  
These founding fathers, like many other Western governments, instead chose of model of 
representative democracy, which originally limited the vote or the ability to represent anyone to 
White, Protestant, property-owning males with ancestry from certain European countries.  But 
this type of thinking and structuring of society is destroying the planet, and has been destroying 
other life forms, other human cultures, and other ways of structuring society for too long.  
Westerners have long forgotten how to be part of self-governing, inclusive communities that 
flourish from out individual strengths, interests and abilities and have instead become passive 
and dependent upon distant, dishonest, and self-interested government representatives who are 
more interested in pleasing their corporate partners’ drive for capital accumulation than the 
pursuit of justice or the defense of the moral (and legal) rights of the vast majority of human 
beings not only within their districts but on the planet.  The psychopathology of Western society, 
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thus, really is like a disease or a cancer that is consuming everything last living thing and 
destroying its host in the process.  As a result, our entire planet now suffers form a sickness it 
may not be able to overcome before or until plant and animal and human life have been 
extinguished. This sickness only continues to worsen daily because of Western obedience, 
conformity, complacency, and complicity in it, which has left no room in our worldview or 
imaginations for alternatives to our present, dominating and monoculture that destroys 














How to live in this life? is the real question we all face.  All other subjects are 
insignificant when compared to this one. 
~ Forbes 2008, xxi 
 
Despite the rhetoric of government officials, local authorities and many non-Native residents, the 
Haudenosaunee were correct in their assertions about their land.  Neither the Canadian nor 
Ontario government has ever been able to produce documentation demonstrating that the lands 
under protest in 2006 were legally surrendered. Lacking evidence of legal title to the land, 
government officials launched a public relations campaign to discredit the Haudenosaunee 
protesters and their traditional government.  This campaign characterized the protesters and their 
government as a “radical faction” that acted impulsively and irresponsibly and that allegedly 
used misinformation or fabricated claims to justify the 2006 protest.  In fact, these 
characterizations more accurately represented the behavior of the government officials who 
employed them.  They also more accurately represented the behavior of non-government 
authority figures and the non-Native residents who most vehemently opposed the protest. The 
use of such characterizations further reflect a long-standing pattern in Canada of authorizing and 
routinizing the targeting of Native peoples as “fair game” for attack in the pursuit of policy 
objectives that benefit government, its corporate partners, and virtually all non-Native people to 
some extent.   
     The ongoing perpetration of atrocities against Native peoples in Canada is not an aberrant 
phenomenon in Western society, but is part of the foundation on which this society has been 
built and continues to operate.  Thus, the problematic patterns of thought and behavior displayed 
by government officials, local authorities, and non-Native residents during the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest are part and parcel of the same patterns of oppression and destruction 
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that devastated the European masses and their collective communities in the Middle Ages and 
that continue to destroy communities and dispossess peoples around the globe.  The European 
masses that had once fought so bitterly against these forces of destruction eventually became so 
pacified, tamed, and “civilized” as to embrace the imposed social relations of domination –and to 
be wholly unconcerned with the death and destruction wrought by their society upon other 
peoples and life forms in the world. As numerous scholars have stated, the failure to feel sadness 
or compassion for those who are victimized is a form of sickness, reflecting one’s 
dehumanization of oneself.  The acceptance of this dehumanization, and its imposition upon 
others, only speaks to the power of the devastation and trauma wrought by this society and its 
cultural worldview on its own members, as well as other peoples and life forms. 
     Though Western society continues to justify itself and its foundational behaviors in the name 
of “progress,” “civilization,” and other forms of Western arrogance and delusion, many non-
Western cultures have long viewed Western society as a predatory and destructive form of 
disease that has sought to spread its unhealthy monoculture over the entire planet, destroying 
everything in its path. Unfortunately, these non-Westerners are far more accurate in their 
assessment than many Westerners still care to admit.  But today even growing numbers of 
“civilized” Westerners are beginning to question the value of their society’s constant quest for 
accumulation, which has destroyed large potions of the planet for human habitation, has forced a 
mass extinction of life forms, and has posed an increasingly serious threat to the future existence 
of all life on the planet.  
     Some of the contributions that I hope this dissertation has made to academic literature 
include, first of all, an understanding of the various issues involved in the 2006 Haudenosuanee 
protest, of the Canadian government’s policies towards indigenous peoples within the 
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geographical borders of Canada, and of the legal and historical issues surrounding this protest, 
including international law as it relates to the rights of indigenous peoples.  Further, this 
dissertation has provided a framework for identifying problematic patterns of thought and 
behavior in Western society, and for understanding the historical origins and present-day 
perpetuations of these problematic patterns. This framework may contribute to the literatures of 
cultural studies, and historic sociology, as well as comparative cultural studies, through the 
comparison and contrast of the Western cultural worldview with non-Western, indigenous 
cultural worldviews.  This dissertation has also proposed a theory and framework for the study of 
transgenerational societal trauma including through examples of the ways that unresolved trauma 
is perpetuated, reproduced, and reenacted anew by Westerners upon themselves and other 
Westerners, as well as upon non-Western peoples and other living things.  The examination of 
the psychopathological nature of some forms of unresolved trauma makes a contribution to the 
trauma literature, particularly the small but slowly growing literature on societal trauma, as well 
as the small but growing literature on healing traumatized societies.   
     This dissertation also forges an understanding of many of the psychological and sociological 
dynamics present in settler colonial societies, including the failure of these societies and their 
members to see themselves as complicity in the perpetuation of the colonial oppression of 
indigenous peoples.  Additionally, by considering the various motivations and justifications 
involved in racial, ethnic, cultural, national and, to a lesser extent, gendered assertions of 
domination, this dissertation seeks to make a contribution to the literatures of settler colonial 
studies, racial and ethnic studies, and interracial conflict.  Finally, by contextualizing the ongoing 
human rights violations (atrocities) in Canada within Western society’s historic cultural patterns 
of thought and behavior, this dissertation seeks to contribute to the literature on atrocities and 
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atrocity producing situations.  Certainly a number of other scholars have also examined the 
linkages between historic, unresolved trauma and, for example, the rise of fascism in Nazi 
Germany (see chapter 4 or Appendix 2).  So this part of the dissertation builds upon ideas 
already expressed in the clinical trauma and other literatures and adds to them with an 
examination of historical trauma which goes much further back in time than these other studies 
have.  This portion of the dissertation also adds to the already substantial body of literature 
concerned with unquestioned obedience to authority, by tracing these patterns far back in time in 
Western society, and relying on Sociological theories (such as Elias’ theory on the Civilizing 
Process) to offer some additional, underlying explanations for this phenomenon. 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Those not familiar with settler colonialism literature may have some concerns over, or questions 
regarding my decision to focus on non-Native government and resident responses to the protest, 
as opposed to focusing on examining Haudenosaunee society and reasons for Haudenosaunee 
protest.  Within the context of settler colonialism literature, this is an entirely legitimate line of 
inquiry.  Outside of the realm of settler colonial studies, the most useful analogy I can think of at 
present would be socio-historical studies of slavery in the US south.  There are probably very 
few academics today who would insist that someone studying slavery in pre-civil war south, or 
even Jim Crow segregation in the post-civil war south, needs to look equally at “all sides.”  Few 
people today would sympathetically consider and defend the decisions of slaveholders to hold 
slaves, or of policy makers to justify slaveholding.  Those who do will face harsh criticisms of 
white supremacy and racial bias. Further, it is not very difficult to understand why slaves would 
want to revolt, and their decisions to do so, while interesting in the numerous factors involved, 
are rarely the focus of inquiry.  Rather, what academics study, and what still desperately needs to 
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be explained, is how and why some human beings decided that it was okay to enslave and own 
as property other human beings, and how and why the first group justified and perpetuated this 
practice for several centuries (or how and why the first group vehemently opposed and resisted 
the end of slavery and/or the end of segregation).  
     Likewise, when studying the ongoing colonial oppression of indigenous peoples who are 
surrounded by settler colonial societies, what desperately needs to be understood is not so much 
why indigenous peoples occasionally chose to protest against their ongoing colonial 
dispossession, but how and why the present society, and its members, justifies and perpetuates 
this ongoing dispossession.  As such, insistence that a student of settler colonialism must look 
with equal sympathy upon “all sides” in a conflict between indigenous peoples and the settler 
colonial societies that oppress them is racially, culturally, and nationally charged, and ignores the 
fact that relations among all sides are far from equal.  Just as there was with slavery in the US 
south, there actually is an objectively moral right and wrong on this issue.  But just like historic 
writers such as Toqueville, many living within settler colonial states today have not yet come to 
see it.  Fortunately, international human rights law, created long ago by developing Western 
“nation-states,” has not remained constrained by the Western mentality and continues to 
increasingly recognize the inherent and wide-ranging rights of indigenous peoples worldwide, 
with the support of the majority of nation-states in the world.  For this reason, I suggest that, 
while there probably won’t be a civil war to end ongoing colonial oppressions of indigenous 
peoples in settler colonial states, this colonial oppression will be ended eventually, and will one 
day be looked back upon as another horrifying chapter in human history that is finally clearly 
seen as morally wrong.  I ask readers to consider this, as they form reactions to the dissertation, 
and consider their position in this history. 
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     Sociologists who spend an entire book or dissertation criticizing something are generally 
expected to provide some sort of social policy prescriptions.  Once we know what is wrong with 
something, we become far more interested in the solution(s) than the criticisms. So to this extent, 
I want to offer some “social policy prescriptions” here, though in this particular case “social 
policy prescriptions” is not really the correct term.  This is because, in Western society, the 
concept of social policy generally implies top-down decisions that are made by a handful of 
people who then impose these decisions upon the rest of society.  Particularly when there are 
negative consequences to these policy decisions, those doing the imposing are often not, 
themselves, impacted.  Of course, this procedure fits snuggly into the norm of Western society 
and the Western cultural worldview, but it is exactly this society and cultural worldview, with its 
top-down way of adversely impacting the lives of Westerners and non-Westerners alike, that has 
been problematized in this dissertation.  Thus, something other than prescriptions of the  “social 
policy” sort is in order.  There is much more than can be said than is said here.  Below are just 
some general ideas of where things need to go now.  A fuller discussion of these ideas will have 
to be reserved for a future work. 
     Though this is, in part, a dissertation about a Native land claim in Ontario, Canada, the 
psychopathological patterns of thinking and behaving which have been examined in this 
dissertation have an impact far beyond Ontario, Canada.  For this reason, even those who are 
alienated from themselves and their ability to feel compassion for others should be concerned 
about what happens to the Haudenosaunee in Ontario, as well as all people(s) and all life forms 
around the globe.  The issues discussed in this dissertation impact all of the people and living 
things on the planet, and continue only to the detriment of us all.  
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     To this extent, all people have a responsibility to act now, in whatever fashion possible, to 
stop the mounting destruction spurred on by the psychopathological patterns and processes 
inherent in Western society.  Members of Western society have a particularly large and urgent 
responsibility.  As members of a society that has perpetrated and that continues to perpetrate 
horrible wrongs against other peoples, life forms, and the planet, members of Western society 
have been the prime beneficiaries of these destructive processes and have a moral responsibility, 
to themselves and all other peoples and life forms, to act to stop this destruction from within the 
society that is perpetrating it.  Part of this moral responsibility to end this destruction includes the 
responsibility to heal ourselves collectively and individually from the past societal, group and 
individual traumas that have been inflicted upon us during our lifetimes and that have been 
passed down to us through the generations.  Both our healing as Westerners and our imperative 
transformation from destructive ways of living to a healthy society require that we rediscover our 
own humanity and our connections to others and to the world around us, that we regain our 
ability to act in the world as moral beings, and that we reconstruct new communities and 
identities in ways that nurture and heal rather than oppress and destroy.579
    Key to succeeding in these endeavors is our ability to rediscover and reclaim our self-
determination, as individuals and communities.  In this area we owe a great debt to the 
indigenous peoples of the world who have worked long and hard to wrench the international 
legal concept of self-determination away from the realm of exclusive state-centric thinking and 
acting.  Numerous developments in international human rights law over the last few decades 
have advanced an international recognition that the right to self-determination applies not only to 
   
                                                 
579 On these being requirements for healing from trauma, see: Kelman (1973); McFarlane & van 
der Kolk (2006), Egendorf (1975: 123), Hutchinson & Bleiker (2008: 395), Bar-On et al. (1998: 
395), Hardtmann (1998); Korn (2002: 9), and so on. 
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“nations” of people who are governed by hierarchical, dominating “nation-state” governments, 
but also to indigenous peoples and their traditional forms of self-organization and self-
governance.  While most non-indigenous peoples still do not have an internationally-recognized 
right to self-determination outside of the Western-style nation-state system, our ability to achieve 
this in the future, and to recognize self-determination for a broad range of non-state-centric 
social organizational forms can only be strengthened when we support and promote the self-
determination rights of indigenous peoples around the world. 
     We also need to recognize that, while self-determination is a form of independence, one of its 
most important aspects is the acknowledgement and advancement of our collective 
interdependence with all other peoples, both within our own local communities and between 
these communities and all other Western and non-Western communities.  Indeed, as 
Haudenosaunee and other indigenous cultures have long taught, all peoples and all life forms 
have an equal right to what they need to survive and to share in the natural world that belongs 
equally to all of us.  If we truly want healthy, non-pathological communities and cultures, we 
need adopt non-Western conceptions of universal justice and sovereignty, which not only 
recognize these inherent rights of all people(s) and living things, but that also require active 
striving for the fulfillment of these rights.  Westerners can only hope to begin moving in this 
direction if we abandon our insecure and arrogant need to feel superior to all other peoples and 
living things.  Westerners need to humble ourselves and to begin the process of critical self-
reflection, which requires really listening to and learning from the vast accumulated wisdom of 
non-Western peoples around the world.  In particular, we need to listen to and learn from the 
indigenous peoples around the world whose traditional cultures contain much of the antidote 
Western society so desperately needs to save itself from itself.  These very indigenous peoples 
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have been leading the struggle against Western society’s psychopathological destruction from 
their earliest encounters with it, many centuries before even the most observant Westerners 
recognized it for what it is, and they have managed to survive and maintain their indigenous 
identities and cultures despite several hundred years of plunder, pillage, enslavement, genocide, 
and colonialism.  These are, indeed, cultures containing far more wisdom than Western society 
can claim to have. Thus, the pathway to our liberation lies in our ability to look beyond the 
Western monocultural, hierarchical domination that has robbed us of healthy cultures and caring 
communities and has alienated us from aspects of ourselves, including our shared humanity.  
     Though rebuilding our communities in the image of participatory, self-governing, and even 
self-sufficient entities is time consuming and difficult work, particularly now when so many 
people are suffering from so much past and present trauma, we have few other choices if we 
want our children and grand children to have an environment that can actually sustain life.  The 
alternative, as many Westerners are beginning to learn, is simply not sustainable for life on the 
planet. Westerners,  tamed and “civilized” into their own alienation and oppression, have long 
benefited from the “civilization” (traumatization and domination) of other peoples and life 
forms. But just as unresolved trauma is perpetuated and reproduced in various forms, multiplying 
the pain and destruction suffered through the generations, traumatized Western society’s 
psychopathological obsession with accumulation through dispossession will be (and is) always 
eventually turned back upon the Western masses and non-elites.  What we do or allow to be done 
to other people really is, now and in the future, reenacted upon ourselves. 
I’d like to end with two quotes, the first of which illustrates, in part, the sentiments of this last 
point. 
 
I’m the one who has seen all the genocide first hand 
They couldn’t cheat me fast enough to take what I had 
And now they build their trophy houses right on top of my grave 
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If they have no honor, let me have no shame 
And don’t forget about me 
I’m the voice singing in your head 
And don’t forget about me 
I’ve told the stories that you’ve had 
Don’t forget about me 
Take notice of all they do 
Cause if they do it to me 
Who’s to say they won’t do it to you? 
(Bucher 2007) 
 












March 27th, Confederacy 
Letter to Michael Coyle, and 
April 12 suggestions in 
negotiations   
April 12, Band Council Chief 
David General's Proposal ("A 
Way Forward: Dissolving the 
DCE Blockade").   
April 17th "Joint Offer for a 
New Understanding Among 
Six Nations[,] Canada and 
Ontario." 
          
Moratorium on development on lands under 
claim until there is a broader resolution of 
Six Nations land rights      
Haldimand County will maintain some 
agricultural lands between Caledonia and SN 
Resolve among all Crown agents to not 
criminalize the actions of Six Nations 
protesters 
  
OPP: Limit efforts to maintenance of peace, 
public safety and law and order. Band 
Council: Intervene on behalf of "John and 
Jane Doe" who cause no problems during 
the exit from the DCE.     
An end to the self-dealing, and the 
elimination of the Indian Act (Band) Council 
on all issues related to Six Nations lands. 
  
Confederacy: Provide cleansing for Six 
Nations territory through a reading of the 
Great Law; Explore governance issues with 
the Band Council.  Band Council: 
Acknowledge role of traditional government 
and explore governance options for the Six 
Nations Grand River Territory.   
Canada: Will provide funding for Band 
Council and Confederacy Council to discuss 
governance of community, in order to move 
forward on other initiatives relating to the 
past and future of the Haldimand Tract. 
   
Canada should reinstate funding for Six 
Nations Band Council to research land claims   
Canada commits to re-instate funding to SN 
for research into land and resource claims 
   
Canada should help to fund the Six Miles 
Deep educational campaign   
Canada and Ontario commit to providing 
funding for the public education campaign 
   
Canada: Commit to discussions on 
remaining claims that could involve land 
  
Canada and Ontario commit to further 
accelerating process to resolve SN claims, 
through negotiations with Band Council on 
two previously agreed to claims.  Canada 
commits to fast-track some land claims, 
resulting in settlement payments, if ratified 
by community [[through voting process 
determined by Canada]].  Canada commits 
to facilitating the addition to reserve lands 
that Six Nations acquires over time. 
   
Ontario: Reopen discussions on 30 parcels 
of land previously discussed; 
  
Ontario agrees to reopen discussions on 
these 30 parcels of unsold, surrendered 
lands 
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Ontario: Begin a discussion of all claim lands 
that are currently owned by the province 
and administered by the Ontario Realty 
Corporation.  
  
Ontario has land holdings in the area of the 
Six Nations reserve, notably the former 
Burtch Correctional Facility, the south 
Cayuga lands, and the Townsend land 
assembly.  In recognition of the 
development pressures in the Haldimand 
tract, and to help support the future 
development of Six Nations, Ontario is 
prepared to immediately start discussions 
about how to make these lands available to 
the community.  Ontario proposes that any 
lands made available pursuant to these 
discussions would be credited or set off 
against any lands transferred to any claims 
settlement agreements.  Ontario and 
Canada would provide resources to assist 
Six Nations in developing and maintaining 
the capacity to assemble these and other 
lands as they come into Six Nations hands 
over time. 
    
Band Council: Create a Land Development 
Unit to process Impact Benefit Agreements 
(IBA) immediately.  This unit should look at 
encouraging involvement and capacity 
development within traditional perspective 
by employing qualified options for the 
SNGRT.  Canada: Encourage consultation 
and accommodation with Six Nations by 
provincial and municipal governments.  
Haldimand: Begin discussion regarding 
development on claimed land and seek all 
opportunities to work out joint initiatives 
that will be mutually beneficial to Six 
Nations.  Developers: Commit to coming to 
the table with the Six Nations Land 
Development Unit to discuss an Impact 
Benefit Agreement.    
Canada and Ontario agree to work with the 
SN to put into place appropriate measures 
regarding the implications of SCC rulings, 
and to have a continuing dialogue to discuss 
the impact of development in the Haldimand 
Tract and to gain an understanding of Six 
Nations' views of its rights and interests in 
respect to this development. 
 
Light grey indicates that the item on the right seems to have been a very partial response to the item on the left.   





Trauma, the Individual and Society: An Overview of Trauma Theory 
 
This appendix provides the reader with an overview of individual responses to trauma as 
understood in the clinical literature.  It also attempts to compile a basic working profile of 
traumatized societies by examining the various ways in which some of the psychopathological 
coping mechanisms discussed in chapter 2 come into being and come to be institutionalized in 
societal behavior and cultural worldviews.  This is a much-abbreviated discussion.  In giving the 
reader an overview of the dynamics of individual trauma, and in laying out a beginning working 
profile of societal trauma, this appendix is expected to 1) demonstrate some of the 
psychologically-acknowledged processes behind individual and societal trauma and 2) lay a 
groundwork for the discussion of both: (a) Canadian government policies as they relate to 
atrocity-producing situations (chapter 4), and (b) non-Native responses to the 2006 
Haudenosaunee protest in the context of these government policies and of societal trauma 
(chapter 6). 
     It should be emphasized that the various behaviors and psychological mechanism used to 
psychopathological extremes described below are societal phenomena, and are specific to 
Western society. Other societies may display some of these various patterns of thought and 
behavior, but other societies have not been examined here, Western society has.  Further, these 
patterns of thought and behavior are quite useful in examining various conflicts and issues 
displayed within Western society –particularly by dominant groups in Western society—but they 
cannot be used to make generalizations about individuals. 
 
 476 
TRAUMA AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
Traumatic experiences are those characterized by a sense of physical and psychological threat 
that evokes extreme feelings of fear, terror, helplessness and loss of control that lie “outside the 
range of ordinary emotional experience” (Herman, 1992: 42, see also 33). During the traumatic 
event, these intense feelings overwhelm an individual’s (or society’s) mechanisms for self-
protection, self-defense, self-organization and coping (Herman, 1992: 34; van der Kolk & 
McFarlane, 2006: 4). As they become overwhelmed during the traumatic event, an individual’s 
component responses to danger become severed and fragmented, resulting in a temporary state of 
psychological shock that is often characterized by some combination of disorganization, 
confusion, immobilization, denial and/or dissociation (Williams, 1989: 75; Herman, 1992: 34-
35).  These normal psychological defense mechanisms generally serve to protect an individual by 
lessening the impact of the traumatic event (Goodwin, 1989: 10) and frequently resulting in 
partial or total amnesia surrounding aspects of the traumatic event (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 
2006: 10). 
     After experiencing a traumatic event, most people re-experience parts of the trauma through 
involuntary repetitive memories of the event (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 5, 8), which may 
be accompanied by anger, self-doubt and/or depression (Williams, 1989: 76).  This repetitive 
replaying of the memories, emotions and/ or sensations related to the traumatic event usually 
helps people to modify and build a tolerance to these intense, trauma-related emotions, and to 
eventually integrate these emotions, sensations and memories into the existing schemas that they 
hold about themselves and the world around them (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 3, 5, 8; 
Litz et al. 2009: 698).  However, in a portion of people who experience traumatic events, these 
overwhelming emotions, sensations, and memories cannot be properly modified, tolerated and/or 
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integrated.  Instead, they remain disorganized, fragmented, and disconnected from personal 
schemas, and it is at this point that these overwhelming emotions, sensations, and memories 
begin to “take on a life of their own” (Herman, 1992: 34, 35; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 
8). Small reminders of the traumatic event can trigger sensory, emotional, visual flashbacks, 
which in turn trigger biological/neurological responses as the person’s body reacts as if the 
traumatic event is recurring (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 9-10, 13).580
     Over time, if the trauma and these reactions to it are not resolved, the trauma survivor can 
become progressively sensitized to increasingly generalized environmental cues, or even to 
normal physical sensations and internal emotional states (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 9-
10, 13). This increased sensitization generally is accompanied by prolonged, repeated states of 
hyperarousal in which a trauma survivor’s biological, neurological and psychological resources 
become depleted (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006; 12) and the survivor loses the ability to 
respond normally to non-trauma-related stimuli in the surrounding environment (Ibid: 12, 13). 
Increased sensitization can also result in kindling, or neurological and biological changes that are 
incredibly difficult to reverse (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 8, 9-10, 13; Korn, 1997: 5), 
including changes in the size and functioning of certain brain structures, changes in “normal” 
levels of certain hormones in the blood, and even changes at the RNA
   
581
                                                 
580 For example, van der Kolk and McFarlane (2006: 10) refer to one firefighter who avoids 
watches because these remind him of previous urgent calls in which he had only minutes to 
respond (van der Kolk, 2006: 10). 
 level (van der Kolk et 
al., 1997; Post et al., 1995; Post et al., 1998). These neurobiological changes and the increased 
sensitization that accompanies them cause the traumatic memories to become more firmly 
entrench in an individual’s mind, biology, and nervous system, making it difficult for a trauma 
581 RNA stands for Ribonucleic Acid, and is the genetic material that aids in cell reproduction 
through binding with and transcribing cellular DNA. 
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survivor to pay attention to internal and external stimuli that are not threatening or related to the 
traumatic event, to sort out relevant from irrelevant stimuli, or “to define their needs, anticipate 
how to meet them, and plan for appropriate action” without becoming distressed, overstimulated 
and hyperaroused (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 14, 10, 13).  
     As the processes of sensitization and kindling cause a trauma survivor’s hyperaroused state to 
become associated with an increasingly wide range of internal or external stimuli, the trauma 
survivor begins seeking ways to numb his or her pain and avoid this state of hyperarousal.  The 
latter requires that the trauma survivor avoid an increasingly large range of daily experiences by 
reorganizing his or her life around avoiding specific and more generalized triggers of the trauma 
(van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6, 12), which prevents them from developing larger 
“repertoires of neutral and pleasurable internal and environmental sensations” that could help 
them to begin to reduce the disproportionate impact that past traumatic events continue to have 
on their lives (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 10, 14, 12; Herman, 1992: 47). As their “inner 
life and outer range of activity” become constricted even from neutral or potentially pleasurable 
situations (Herman, 1992: 49; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12), so does the range of 
emotion that a trauma survivor allows him or herself to feel.  Many survivors who are not in a 
state of hyperarousal report feeling emotionally numb, even dead inside, and have difficulty 
experiencing any feelings, including those of love or compassion for others (Herman, 1992: 48-
49; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12; Goodwin, 1989: 10).  Trauma survivors may further 
exacerbate these problems through the extensive use of drugs, alcohol, and/or other forms of 
sensation seeking to numb or cover over intense, painful emotions, sensations, and memories, all 
of which lead to further withdrawal and detachment from the world (Williams, 1989: 79; van der 
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Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12; Korn, 1997: 5).582
     Generally, trauma survivors who develop some form of chronic trauma stress disorder
  Over time these avoidance and numbing 
mechanisms lessen the frequency of intrusive reliving experiences and hyperaroused states, but 
also lead to the maintenance of an “altered relationship with the self and others” and a distorted 
sense of the world and reality, which is sometimes accompanied by magical thinking, and is 
often mistaken as characteristics of a survivor’s personality, rather than symptoms of traumatic 
stress disorder (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 16-17; Herman, 1992: 46-49).   
583
                                                 
582 “THUS, many people with PTSD not only actively avoid emotional arousal, but experience a 
progressive decline and withdrawal, in which any stimulation (whether it is potentially 
pleasurable or aversive) provokes further detachment.  To feel nothing seems to be better than 
feeling irritable and upset” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 12). 
 
alternate between states of isolated avoidance, numbing, depression and hopelessness, on the one 
hand, and on the other hyperaroused states of intense anxiety, fear, anger, panic, restlessness, 
exaggerated startle response and irritability, difficulty concentrating and processing information, 
nightmares and sleep disturbances and intrusive memories, sensations and emotions relating to 
the trauma (Williams, 1989: 77; van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 13, 16-17; Herman, 1992: 1, 
47, 56; Kon, 1997: 5).  In this oscillation between intrusion/hyperarousal and 
avoidance/numbing, the trauma survivor is both unable to process and integrate the traumatic 
memories and to find a balance between these two extremes (Herman, 1992: 47). Further, this 
constant oscillation can multiply a trauma survivor’s sense of unpredictability and helplessness 
(Herman, 1992: 47) and leave him or her more sensitized and vulnerable to new traumas and/or 
less able to cope with the accumulation of additional stress (Williams, 1989: 77-78; van der Kolk 
& McFarlane, 2006: 9).   
583 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders officially recognizes only a small 
number of these, such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  PTSD represents only one 
rather narrow range of symptom combinations, but there is a much broader range of ways in 
which traumatized people respond to, and express, traumatic stress symptoms.  
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     Perhaps in an attempt to gain mastery over incredibly painful intrusive experiences, many 
trauma survivors suffering form chronic forms of traumatic stress engage in various compulsive, 
and often unconscious forms of re-exposure or reenactment of the trauma (van der Kolk & 
McFarlane, 2006: 10-11; Herman, 1992: 39-42). Such reenactment or re-exposure can include 
risk-taking, self-destructive behaviors and various forms of “acting out,” as well as behaviors 
that involve harm to others, such as reenactments of the original trauma in which the survivor 
takes the role of the perpetrator, creating new victims. Van der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 10-11) 
offer some examples of this sort of reenactment: 
…combat soldiers may become mercenaries or join police swat teams; abused 
women may be attracted to men who mistreat them; sexually molested children 
may grow up to become prostitutes. Understanding this seemingly paradoxical 
phenomenon is of critical importance, because it could help clarify many forms of 
social deviance and interpersonal misery. Freud (1920/1955) thought that the aim 
of such repetition is to gain mastery, but clinical experience shows that this rarely 
happens; instead, repetition causes further suffering for the victims and for the 
people around them. In this reenactment of the trauma, an individual may play the 
role of either victimize or victim. 
 
In some cases, this compulsive risk-taking, self-destructive, re-experiencing behavior can be 
directly linked to feelings of guilt that many people who survive traumatic events carry with 
them.584
                                                 
584 Though this is not always the case, and other self-destructive behaviors also have links to 
childhood traumas or “painful encounters with hostile caretakers during the first few years of 
life” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 11). 
  For example, Goodwin (1989: 11) has observed that many combat veterans racked with 
guilt over their survival perpetually  “set themselves up for hopeless physical fights with 
insurmountable odds,” find themselves in repeated auto accidents, or donate blood compulsively. 
Similarly, Williams (1989: 77) noted that trauma survivors often compulsively ruminate over 
various alternate “if-only” scenarios of things that they could have done to prevent the trauma, 
and Herman (1992: 53) noted that rape victims often do the same, blaming themselves for their 
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victimization, perhaps because imagining “that one could have done better may be more 
tolerable than to face the reality of utter helplessness.”  
     Likewise, on the same theme of guilt, Litz et al. (2009) have found that traumatic experiences 
often violate an individual’s most basic sense about him or herself and the world around him or 
her.  One common belief in liberal, individualistic-oriented Western society is the belief that the 
world is just, that individuals control their own fates, and that bad things do not happen to good 
people (Litz et al., 2009: 699; McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 26, 28, 35; Devries, 2006: 399, 
402).  Thus, when people holding these beliefs are traumatized, they may experience intense 
feelings of guilt, shame, confusion and self-blame for the traumas they experienced –feelings 
which may be reinforced by unpredictable states of hyperarousal, including uncontrolled 
expressions of anger. 
Individual Vulnerability to Trauma 
      Though the study and awareness in Western society of psychological responses to traumatic 
events has been characterized by “episodic amnesia” (Herman, 1992: 7), as well as episodic 
attempts to link post traumatic reactions to individual weakness or predisposing factors,585
                                                 
585 Van der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 6) have linked these attempts to the psychological “need to 
deny that all people can be stressed beyond endurance,” noting: 
 the 
fact remains that any one –including “people of the clearest intellect, strongest will, greatest 
character, and highest critical power” can suffer from post traumatic reactions after surviving a 
When the issue of causation becomes a legitimate area of investigation, one is 
inevitably confronted with issues of man’s inhumanity to man, with carelessness and 
callousness, with abrogation or responsibility, with manipulation, and with failures to 
protect.  In short, the study of trauma confronts one with the best and worst in human 
nature, and is bound to provoke a range of intense personal reactions in the people 
involved. 
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traumatic event (Herman, 206: 12, 3).586  There is, however, both a broad range of traumatic 
disorders and a broad range of traumatic experiences precipitating these disorders, and there are 
a number of factors that influence who will suffer from various post-traumatic stress disorders 
and how severely these people will suffer.  Perhaps the most powerful of these factors would be 
the nature of the traumatic event itself, and Herman (1992: 57) has argued that there is a “simple, 
direct relationship between the severity of the trauma and its psychological impact, whether that 
impact is measured in terms of the number of people affected or the intensity and duration of 
harm.” Thus, while virtually everyone exposed to a traumatic event experiences some degree of 
intrusive symptoms in the first few days, weeks, or months following the event, Herman (1992: 
47-48) has suggested that many people who are exposed to a single traumatic event that is 
relatively short in duration are less likely to develop post traumatic symptoms lasting more than 
six months, though they may typically remain fearful and anxious for up to a year after the event.  
However, such an estimated time frame for resolution of post-traumatic symptoms does not 
apply to all survivors of all forms of trauma, and several studies of rape victims have 
demonstrated that intrusive symptoms can sometimes persist for many years.587
     As the duration and intensity of the trauma increases, so does the duration and severity of 
post-traumatic symptomatology, something demonstrated repeatedly in studies of combat 
 
                                                 
586 Here Herman is quoting Bruer and Freud in their studies on what was then referred to as 
hysteria (but is now recognized as a combination of symptoms frequently found in those 
suffering from post-traumatic stress).  
587 Herman (1992: 47-50) reports on a number of studies involving rape victims who were still 
suffering from intrusive thoughts and fears a year later, 2-3 years later, and even 9 or more years 
later. In this last study, post-traumatic symptoms were not examined, but participants were 
reported to have had “more nervous breakdowns, more suicidal thoughts, and more suicide 
attempts than any other group. When prior to the rape they had been no more likely than anyone 
else to attempt suicide, almost one in five (19.2 percent) made a suicide attempt following the 
rape.” 
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veterans (Herman, 1992: 57).588  But other aspects of the traumatic event also influence a 
survivor’s ability to resolve the inevitable intrusive symptomatology after the trauma.  For 
example, man-made traumatic are associated with much higher rates of severe and long-lasting 
post-traumatic symptoms than natural disasters (Herman, 1992: 7). Other factors influencing the 
severity and duration of post-traumatic symptoms include the extent to which --and whether or 
not-- a person is: taken by surprise, trapped, exposed to extreme violence, physically injured, 
witness to the death or injury of others, exposed to dead bodies, brought to the point of 
exhaustion, threatened with death of bodily injury, and/or made to feel hopelessness, 
helplessness, and terror (Herman, 1992: 33-34, 54, 59; Litz et al, 2009). Further, one’s own role 
in the traumatic event, and the responses of others to the event and/or the survivor can have 
lasting impacts on a trauma survivor’s ability to resolve intrusive symptomatology, with acts of 
socially cooperating with others to survive the trauma leading to relatively lower 
symptomatology (Herman, 1992: 59)589
     Probably the second most important factor influencing the severity and duration of an 
individual’s post-traumatic reaction is the subjective interpretation and meaning that a survivor 
 acts of perpetration, killing, and participating in, 
witnessing and failing to stop atrocities result in some of the highest rates of severe and long 
lasting post-traumatic symptoms (Litz et al., 2009: 695, 697-98, 700; Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 
1975, 2002; McNair, 2005; Grossman, 1996; Herman, 1992: 2, 54).   
                                                 
588 Similarly, a study of people who had been held hostage found that the longer a person had 
been held hostage “the more symptomatic they were, and the slower they were to recover” 
(Herman, 1992: 48).  A follow-up study with the participants nine-years alter found that almost 
half were still experiencing symptoms of avoidance and over a third were still experiencing 
intrusive symptoms.  Further, while “general anxiety symptoms tended to diminish over time, 
psychosomatic symptoms actually got worse.” 
589 Herman (1992: 59) notes that high levels of sociability, cooperation with others and internal 
locus of control are factors positively influencing combat veteran’s ability to survive traumatic 
events relatively unscathed, while some of these same factors serve as more of a liability for 
women who survive a sexual assault. 
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attaches to the traumatic event (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 7, 6). Of course, a person’s 
subjective interpretation of an event is very much dependent upon prior experiences, current 
attitudes, beliefs, cultural worldview, and ideas about one’s self worth and one’s place in the 
world around him or her.  Part of what gives traumatic events a long-lasting impact upon 
survivors is that they violate many of these fundamental attitudes, beliefs, ideas and worldviews 
(Litz et al., 2009: 698) --or, in some cases, these events confirm previous beliefs than an 
individual has tried to deny (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 8).  Attitudes and beliefs that are 
commonly violated by traumatic events include the previously-mentioned assumptions 
commonly made by members of Western society --who have long been accustomed to blaming 
individuals for their suffering and to Calvinistic interpretations of good fortune590
                                                 
590 The preachings of Calvinism generally held that our fate is predestined, that personal actions 
on earth could not influence our fate (though clergy members might be able to do so, having a 
more direct line to God), and that only a few, select individuals will enjoy everlasting life after 
death.  According to Weber (1930/1992), these beliefs caused considerable anxiety for followers 
of Calvinism (and Protestants in general), which was so intolerable as to cause Calvinists to 
search –despite their doctrine-- for earthly “signs” that they were among the saved.  Personal 
good fortune came to be one of the main signs of personal salvation after death (good things 
happen to good, “saved” people), and the pursuit of personal wealth became an almost 
compulsive activity for those who could never truly be sure whether they were among the saved 
–or, at least, this already compulsive activity (see chapter 2) was extensively justified and 
promoted by the Calvinist/Protestant religion.  Remnants of these beliefs/justifications have long 
since remained influential in western society, which partially explains why the “just world” 
assumption described in the text is inherent in, but also entirely unique to, western society (see 
the citations in the text). 
-- that good 
things happen to good people and bad things happen to bad people (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 
2006: 26, 28, 35; Devries, 2006: 399, 402; Litz et al., 2009, 698-99). In addition, traumatic 
events frequently violate one’s sense of trust, safety, independence, intimacy, control, self-
esteem, feelings of personal goodness and worth, sense that the world has meaning, and deeply 
held moral beliefs or ideas about law, justice and fairness (Litz 698-99; Herman, 1992: 51-52, 
54). Further, these events frequently “call into question basic human relationships,” and severely 
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challenge or shatter attachments to friends, family and community, as well as an individual’s 
construction of self in relation to others or to oneself (Herman, 1992: 51-53, 55). Often as a 
result, “[d]evelopmental conflicts of childhood and adolescence, long since resolved, are 
suddenly reopened.  Trauma forces the survivor to relive all her earlier struggles over autonomy, 
initiative, competence, identity, and intimacy” as well as to struggle with doubt, betrayal, guilt, 
shame, and a shattered sense of personal agency and connection to a broader community 
(Herman, 1992: 52; see also Kelman, 1973; Litz et al., 2009: 699). 
     The subjective meanings that one attaches to a traumatic event may well be influenced by a 
number of additional factors, including the age, degree of social support, degree of connection to 
others and/or resources needed for resolving post-traumatic symptoms, and the relative degree of 
empowerment or disempowerment one already feels in society.  For example, Herman (1992: 
60) cites an “inverse relationship between the degree of psychopathy and the age of onset of 
abuse among abused children,” and similarly notes that younger, less educated soldiers in 
Vietnam were both more likely to see heavy combat and to have few resources for social support 
upon their return. Most studies on post-traumatic stress have consistently cited the availability of 
appropriate social support resources as a key factor in an individual’s ability to recover from a 
traumatic event with few lasting symptoms (including: Litz et al, 699; McFarlane & van der 
Kolk, 2006: 25, 27; Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975; Egendorf, 1975; DeVries, 2006).  And it is 
clear that individuals and/or communities that are relatively disempowered in society have fewer 
resources available to them and/or have fewer connections to people who can point them to 
appropriate resources (See for example: Wright-Berton & Stabb, 1998; Warner & Weist, 1998). 
     Past traumatic experiences can also have considerable influence on an individual’s 
susceptibility to developing chronic post-traumatic stress symptoms after encountering a new 
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trauma. This is true even in people who were not previously bothered by a past traumatic event, 
as well as among people who have already resolved post-traumatic symptoms relating to such an 
event. For these individuals, the new traumatic event can provoke distressing, intrusive 
memories, sensations, and emotions associated not only with the new trauma, but with these past 
traumas as well (van der Kolk, & McFarlane, 2006: 9; Williams, 1989: 78). In fact, those who 
have already resolved past traumatic symptoms can become symptomatic again in reaction to the 
accumulation of stress in one’s daily life (Williams, 1989: 78), or in response to new information 
pertaining to a past trauma (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6). Further, experiencing 
numerous, severe, and long-term traumatic events has also been linked to the development of 
other increasingly severe psychological problems, including Borderline Personality Disorder, 
Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly known as Multiple Personality Disorder), and 
Schizophrenia –all of which have acknowledged links to childhood trauma.591  Indeed, most 
psychiatric inpatients “have histories of severe (usually intrafamilial) trauma,” and a number of 
studies have documented physical or sexual abuse histories among violent criminals, as well as 
the links between a child’s exposure to abuse or domestic and his or her later victimization of 
animals or other human beings (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 11; Ascione & Arkow, 1999) 
or his or her later vulnerability to repeated victimization.592
                                                 
591 See, for example: Jha, Alok. 2012. Severe abuse in childhood may triple risk of 
schizophrenia. The Guardian. April 21. Online: http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/04/21/severe-
abuse-in-childhood-may-triple-risk-of-schizophrenia/.  This is not a new realization, as R.D. 
Laing talked about the links between family dynamics (not necessarily trauma) and 
schizophrenia in the 1960s.  However, they have almost been treated as such (new observations) 
in western society’s episodic amnesia pertaining to trauma and various post traumatic stress 
symptomatology/ disorders (as mentioned in Herman, 1992).  See: Laing, R.D. 1959/1986. The 
Divided Self. Penguin Books; and Laing, R.D. 1969/1972. The Politics of the Family: and other 
essays. New York: Vintage Books. 
  What’s more, because there is 
592 See the above discussion on re-experiencing/ reproducing/ reenacting traumatic events as a 
common post-traumatic symptom. 
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transmissible and transgenerational aspect of traumatic stress symptoms (through which 
traumatic stress symptoms can be passed from survivors of trauma to family members or 
intimate others who have not experienced a trauma, and can also be passed down in families 
through several generations593), one might also wonder whether familial histories of trauma 
increase one’s vulnerability to new traumatic events.594
     The increased susceptibility one has to developing chronic and/or severe traumatic stress 
symptoms when he or she has experienced previous traumas may be attributable to a number of 
factors.  For example, it may be due, in part, to the subjective meanings that survivors of 
previous traumas attached to new traumatic events: new traumatic events can confirm previous 
beliefs about the world, oneself or others that an individual had struggled to deny (Ibid, 6, 8, 9). 
In addition, new traumatic events may provoke new interpretations of previous traumas. Since 
the subjective meanings attached to traumatic events evolves over time, the receipt of new 
information or the development of new interpretations regarding these events has been shown to 
produce traumatic symptoms in trauma survivors who did not previously experience them. Van 
der Kolk & McFarlane (2006: 6) provide an illustration of this in a rape victim who did not 
 The writer is not aware of any studies on 
this topic as yet (but also has a writing deadline, and cannot spend time searching).  
                                                 
593 Some of the older studies on this include: Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998; Hardtman, 1998; 
Korn, 1997; Catherall, 1998; Williams, 1998; Remer & Ferguson, 1998.  (Due to time 
constraints, I am not able to read any more recent studies, though I am aware that more recent 
studies only reinforce the findings cited here). 
594 Though the question is certainly confused by the fact that traumatized parents may be more 
likely to suffer from trauma-related psychological distress that impacts parenting and/or that 
reproduces past traumas within the present family structure –factors which could constitute new 
traumatic events, rather than simple transgenerational transmission of post-traumatic symptoms 
without traumatic events.  (See, for example, Felsen, 1998, p. 44, who found both patterns in 
which children identified with and learned to “behave and think in disorganized ways similar to 
those of their [traumatized] parents” and/or in which traumatized parents’ disorders prevented 
them from parenting, creating other disorders in their children not necessarily mirroring their 
parents’ trauma).  
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develop post traumatic symptoms after her attack until many months later, when she learned that 
the man who raped her had killed another of his rape victims, and reinterpreted her rape as a life-
threatening event. Further, since the accumulation of stress (mentioned above) can exacerbate 
previously resolved traumatic symptoms, suggesting that intrusive thoughts of previous 
traumatic events may dissipate but may never be fully “resolved,” it is possible that trauma 
survivors must always devote some psychological and biological resources to suppressing 
intrusive thoughts, and that new traumatic events can simply overwhelm an individual’s ability 
to do so.   
     All of the above-discussed possibilities for trauma survivors’ increased susceptibility to 
becoming symptomatic after experiencing new traumatic events involve some level of 
subjective-societal interaction, but societal structures and cultural worldviews may actually have 
a much greater impact upon an individual’s ability to withstand traumatic events without 
developing chronic symptomatology than Westerners generally recognize.595
                                                 
595 On this point, see also: Devries, 2006: 404. 
  This may be 
especially true of Western society and the Western cultural worldview which, as argued in 
chapter 2, was built around countless long-term traumatic events directly impacting large 
portions of that society and indirectly impacting virtually the whole of that society, the impacts 
of which continue to reverberate throughout Western society (and the world) today.  As such, 
Western society and the Western cultural worldview were also built upon numerous maladaptive 
adjustments to, and psychopathological mechanisms for coping with (or, more accurately, 
denying), the impacts of these severe, long-term traumatic events; and many of these 
mechanisms serve not only to perpetuate the adverse impacts of these past traumatic events 
today, but to perpetually reenact these events and to constantly create and inflict new traumas 
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upon Westerners and non-Westerners worldwide. New traumas experienced by Westerners 
victimized by their own society and cultural worldview range from the psychological trauma of 
ecocide;596 to social, political and economic marginalization, disempowerment and 
disconnection597 (including those resulting from austerity programs and resulting in recent unrest 
throughout Europe and North America598); to policies that service larger corporations at the 
expense of the majority of people in a given Western country and that country’s economy as a 
whole;599 to the wide range of structurally and institutionally-perpetuated violent victimization 
and the increasing levels of psychological dysfunction and distress in Western society resulting 
from all of the above.600
                                                 
596 See for example, the various essays in: Roszak, Theodore, Marey E. Gomes and Allen D. 
Kanner. 1995. Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind. San Francisco: Sierra 
Club Books. 
   
597 See, for example, Wright_Berton & Stabb, 1998 (who found that minority males are exposed 
in their neighborhoods and schools to much higher rates of violent crime than any other group, 
and who found that 29% of high school juniors in a major metropolitan area in the south had 
clinical levels of PTSD –which suggests that far more were traumatized by did not exhibit the 
specific complex of symptoms required for the diagnosis); or Warner & Weist, 1998 (who found 
that 75% of male and 70% of female African American urban youth in Chicago had witnessed 
someone being shot, stabbed, robbed or murdered, and were also exposed to much higher rates of 
crime, unemployment, substandard housing, inadequate schools and limited medical or mental 
health resources/care). 
598 See, for example, Harvey’s (2003) chapter on Accumulation by Dispossession. 
599 Such as the recent financial crisis.  See for example the documentary film Inside Job (2010, 
Sony Classics). 
600 For example, looking just briefly at one western country, the United States, van der Kolk & 
McFarlane (2006: 5) cite a number of studies demonstrating that perhaps as many as one fourth 
of all adolescents in the United States have been physically or sexually assaulted, and 76% of 
adults report past or present exposure to extreme stress. Meanwhile, the World Health 
Organization suggests that “one in four people in the United States suffers from chronic anxiety, 
a mood disorder or depression” (Hedges, 2012).  The rates for childhood assault may actually be 
higher, as cited statistics for child sexual abuse (which does not include mere physical assault or 
other forms of childhood trauma and/or abuse) suggests that one in four girls and one in seven 
boys are sexually abused before they turn 18; that the abuse is usually repeated, lasting a number 
of years; that more than 90% of these children are abused by someone they know, love and/or 
trust; that there are more than 39 million survivors of childhood sexual abuse in the United 
States; that childhood sexual abuse makes up only 7.6% of reported types of child abuse; that 
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     Thus, even by providing only a very few examples of the numerous ways in which Western 
society and the Western cultural worldview consistently traumatizes its members, it should be 
clear that this society is failing its members (as well as all other peoples and life forms around 
the world) even before they are exposed to new individual, group, or societal-level traumatic 
events.  What makes this considerably worse is the fact that, as a predatory/ perpetrator society, 
Western society and the Western cultural worldview provides its members with few, if any, 
healthy mechanisms for coping with the numerous traumas this society and worldview 
perpetually create.  Instead, this society and worldview promote –and even require or demand—
that its members engage in only the most harmful and psychopathological mechanisms for 
dealing with (i.e., denying and repressing) the numerous new traumatic experiences to which it 
routinely, perpetually subjects Westerners, non-Westerners and all life on the planet. These 
psychopathological mechanisms have been enshrined in the Western worldview, passed down 
from generation to generation, and encoded in societal, group, and individual expectations and 
codes of behavior; and they require that Westerners (and colonized non-Westerners) adapt 
unrealistic, psychopathological views of their place in the world and their connection to each 
other, to non-Westerners, and to all plant and animal life on the planet.601
                                                                                                                                                             
80% of 21-year-olds abused as children meet the diagnostic criteria for one or more 
psychological disorders; and that an estimated 30% of these abused children will go on to abuse 
their own children as adults. (See, for example, the following advocacy websites: Darkness to 
Light, 2012; Turningpointservices.org,  2012; Childhelp, 2012). Clearly childhood sexual abuse 
is of epidemic proportions in the United States, as it is throughout western society, particularly 
given the role of leading institutions, such as the Catholic (and Christian) church in perpetuating 
the spread of childhood sexual abuse, while also taking a leading role in western society's denial 
and cover up of these crimes. See also the above footnote citing Warner & Weist (1998) and 
Wright-Berton and Stabb (1998). 
 It also requires that we 
601 On this latter point, see also: Metzner, Ralph. 1995.  They Psychopathology of the Human-
Nature Relationship. Pp 55-67 in: Rhodore Roszak, Mary Gomes and Allen Kanner (Eds.) 
Ecopsychology: Restoring the Earth, Healing the Mind. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books; or see 
any number of other essays in the same book. 
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learn, validate and actively submit to rigid hierarchies of dominance, in which some individuals 
are considered to be more worthwhile than others, and are able to abuse or violate the rights of 
these allegedly “lower” others at will and with relative impunity.602
     Given these traits of Western society and the Western cultural worldview, it should be little 
wonder that trauma survivors have the most difficulty reintegrating into, and rebuilding their 
lives around, these problematic Western patterns of thinking and behavior. Traumatic events tear 
holes in the fabric of survivors’ lives, including the Western cultural worldview into which they 
have been indoctrinated. Depending on the size and number of these holes, and the extent to 
  The Western cultural 
worldview also encourages or requires Westerners (and colonized non-Westerners) to be 
intolerant of others and of parts of themselves, to dehumanize other Westerners and non-
Westerners, to employ projection and scapegoating against these others, and to engage in forms 
of magical thinking, cultural amnesia and historical/biblical re-writes that erase the past and 
present reality in favor of Western psychopathology (on the above points about Western society, 
see Chapter 2). 
                                                 
602 Though Hardtmann relates this type of extreme hierarchy of domination to the Nazi era 
(“during the Nazi period, every “Aryan” person—even the children—had the power to persecute 
“non-Aryan” people. Any kind of mischievous, even playful, attitude against minorities was 
legalized and promoted by the authorities. Many people used this empowerment in their 
everyday lives”), it is also reminiscent not only of the Jim Crow era in the United States south, 
but of present day race relations in the United States (as per the recent shooting deaths of 
Trayvon Martin in Florida and Kenneth Chamberlain in White Plains, New York.  On the latter 
and the refusal of a Grand Jury to indict officers responsible for an egregious violation of police 
protocol, see: DemocracyNow! 2012.  Grand Jury Clears White Plains Police in Kenneth 
Chamberlain’s Death, New Tape Shows Fatal Raid. May 4. Online: 
http://www.democracynow.org/2012/5/4/kenneth_chamberlain_sr_as_charges_ruled), and of 
present Native-non-Native relations --and the persistent violation of the human rights of the 
former-- in Canada (and the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and so forth), as outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
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one’s desire to deny or acknowledge them,603 survivors looking through them may glimpse with 
some degree of clarity the false, contradictory, and highly problematic nature of Western 
“civilization.”604 In the face of these critically reflective glimpses –whether they are forcibly 
induced through traumatic events, or purposefully chosen through rational and necessary 
processes of critical self-reflection (processes that are largely discouraged in the Western cultural 
worldview)—the veneer of Western “civilization,” and the cultural worldview around which 
Westerners have constructed their lives begins to erode and fall apart. This dissolution is 
traumatic not only because of the loss of the socially-constructed protections provided by one’s 
cultural worldview (DeVries, 2006), but because what one glimpses beyond the veneer of 
Western “civilization” is an absolutely horrifying combination of destructive and 
psychopathological behaviors: Western “civilization” is --and has long been-- on a murderous, 
suicidal rampage, destroying as much plant, animal and human life, and as much of the planet as 
possible before killing ourselves (and the rest of humanity) in our final, suicidal act.605
                                                 
603 “The conflict between the will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud is 
the central dialectic of psychological trauma. … Remembering and telling the truth about terrible 
events are prerequisites both for the restoration of the social order and for the healing of 
individual victims”(Herman, 1992: 1). 
  As the 
604 After all, as Stanely Diamond (1974: 48) has noted: “it is only in modern civilization that the 
state dynamic compounded by secondary imperialism –is totalitarian, and dissociation from our 
human possibilities, our species being, increasingly acute. ....  Perhaps the most alienated can, by 
confronting and acting on their own condition, free themselves.  Only then can we speak of 
progress, which is always, in part, a primitive return; a reformulation of old impulses in new 
situations and social structures.”  
605 Bauman (2000: viii) made a somewhat similar observation about his study of the Holocaust.  
The more he studied the topic, the more he came to see it as a window, through which he had not 
previously looked, because: 
Like most of my colleagues, I assumed that the Holocaust was, at best, something to be 
illuminated by us social scientists, but certainly not something that can illuminate the 
objects of our current concern.  I believed (by default rather than by deliberation) that 
the Holocaust was an interruption in the normal flow of history, a cancerous growth on 
the body of civilized society, a momentary madness among sanity.  Thus I could paint 
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veneer of Western “civilization” falls away, so do all of the alleged justifications and 
rationalizations for our behavior, and we are left only with the naked truth that we are the enemy 
that we have projected onto countless other peoples and living things (this will be discussed 
further below). 
     Thus, trauma survivors in Western society often come to view social interactions and world 
around them as counterfeit and untrustworthy (Lifton, 1975: 182; see also: Herman, 1992: 51-
52), or they come to feel alienated, disconnected, misunderstood and abandoned by their society, 
their communities, and friends, family and loved ones whose lives are reflective of and built 
around the Western cultural worldview. After all, in a “civilization” that blames individuals for 
their own pain and suffering (Devries, 2006: 402, 404), that provides its members with only the 
most psychopathological mechanisms for dealing with (denying the impact of) traumatic events, 
and that is highly intolerant of criticisms that expose the destructive and psychopathological 
nature it was constructed to deny, survivors of multiple traumas really are abandoned and left to 
their own devices.606
                                                                                                                                                             
for the use of my students a picture of normal, healthy, sane society, leaving the story of 
the Holocaust to the professional pathologists. 
  If they attempt to reintegrate into society and rebuild lives around the 
Western cultural worldview, they are plagued by cynical feelings of counterfeit in all 
However, once he did look, and the more he looked, he developed a quite different image of 
what this event was and meant for western “civlization”: 
Looking through that window, one can catch a rare glimpse of many things otherwise 
invisible.  And the things one can see are of the utmost importance not just for the 
perpetrators, victims and witnesses of the crime, but for all those who are alive today 
and hope to be alive tomorrow. What I saw through this window I did not find at all 
pleasing.  The more depressing the view, however, the more I was convinced that if one 
refused to look through the window, it would be at one’s peril.” 
606 “When culture loses important aspects of its ability to function and becomes incapable of 
guiding grief reactions or to provide support, individuals are left unprotected and left to their 
own devices” (DeVries, 2006: 405) 
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relationships,607 and doubt their ability to be who they are in relation to others (Herman, 1992: 
52) --since Western society largely discourages this.608 On the other hand, if they follow their 
vision and intuition –something that is necessary for healing— and refuse to participate in what 
they see as the lie all around them,609
                                                 
607 An example of how these feelings and emotions may be processed is provided by Herman 
(1992:52), quoting Virginia Wolf’s combat veteran, Septimus Smith: “The secret signal which 
one generation passes, under disguise, to the next is loathing, hatred, despair….  One cannot 
bring children into a world like this.  One cannot perpetuate suffering, or increase the breed of 
these lustful animals, who have no lasting emotions, but only whims and vanities, eddying them 
now this way, now that….For the truth is… that human beings have neither kindness, nor faith, 
nor charity beyond what serves to increase the pleasure of the moment.  They hunt in packs.  
Their packs scour the desert and vanish creaming into the wilderness.”  
 they may find it consistently difficult to be or feel a part of 
the society around them and may attempt to completely withdraw from it, living painful lives of 
misunderstood isolation in order to maintain what they can of their sanity.  In either case, they 
608 “They’re mining us. … [And] the poison, the toxic that is left over from the mining of the 
being part of human … through the intelligence of the human, are in all the fears and doubts and 
insecurities that we have in our lives –without our own personal reality-- about who we are…   
That’s the pollution and the toxic left over from the mining of the being part of human. That’s 
the pollution that’s left over, see, and in that kind of a haze, … we don’t see ourselves clearly.  
We do not see and recognize clearly who we are.  And we’re never encouraged to.  We’re 
encouraged to be “good citizens,” or “good” this religion, or “good” that religion, or good… 
workers, good [whatever].  But we’re never encouraged to be real about human beings.  In a 
way, we’re never really encouraged to be good to ourselves.  See, we’re mentally and 
psychologically oppressed and manipulated so that we seek things to gratify ourselves, but that 
doesn’t mean we’re being good to ourselves. And the mining process to me, you know, it’s the 
civilizing process itself. Because somewhere in there, it’s like someone’s eating the spirit. Our 
spirit is being converted into an energy to run something.  Alright?  And it’s like it’s eating our 
spirit.  See and, you know, everyone has their religions and their stuff, but see it makes me 
wonder, how do we participate in this spiritual reality, if we live in a mechanism now where the 
human has been conditioned and trained to eat its own spirit, and turn it into fuel for this system” 
(Trudell, John.  2008. They’re Mining Us.  Track 6 of: DNA: Descendant Now Ancestor. (Audio 
CD) Effective Records.   See also, Litowitz, 2000, p. 528 (“domination requires the estblishment 
of an entire way of life as standard and expected, the identification of the dominated with the 
dominators, and the subtle establishment of the prevailing ideology as natural and inevitable, 
indeed, commonsensical.  When domination reaches the internal world of actors, resistance is 
almost unthinkable”). 
609 “If every human being woke up tomorrow and said, “I will not enable what I know to be the 
lie, all day today,” it would change.  It could not function.  If every human being got up 
tomorrow and said, “I will not enable it.  I will not participate in the lie today,” it would change” 
(Trudell, op. cit., track 18, What Happened to the Tribes of Europe).  
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may fall prey to severe psychological distress, since reintegration into a society that dismisses or 
reacts violently against criticism may require denial of one’s own traumatic experiences and the 
lessons from those experiences –something which goes against the grain of what is necessary to 
heal from trauma—and failure to fully integrate into Western society is always pathologized by 
Western society.  In all scenarios, traumatized individuals risk being marginalized, pathologized, 
dismissed, or even deprived of their freedom, because the society around them is both fully 
incapable of embracing and healing them, and driven to pathologize and scapegoat any who 
don’t fully conform to it’s norms (as Thomas Szasz has pointed out a number of times).610
 
 
TRAUMA AND SOCIETY 
 
Throughout history, some people have adapted to terrible life events with 
flexibility and creativity, while others have become fixated on the trauma and 
gone on to lead traumatized and traumatizing existences.  Societies that have been 
massively traumatized have followed roughly similar patterns of adaptation and 
disintegration. 
~ Bessel van der Kolk & Alexander McFarlane, The Black Hole of Trauma611
 
 
The knowledge of horrible events periodically intrudes into public awareness but 
is rarely retained for long.  Denial, repression, and dissociation operate on a social 
as well as an individual level. … Like traumatized people, we have been cut off 
from the knowledge of our past. Like traumatized people, we need to understand 
the past in order to reclaim the present and the future. 
~ Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery612
 
 
                                                 
610 See, for example, Szasz, 1970.  See also: Devries (2006: 405: “One formal social response to 
overwhelming stress is the expansion of the medical system itself, which legitimizes the 
reallocation of community resources”).  On the additional profit motive behind this, see also: 
Ridgeway, James. 2011. Mass psychosis in the US: How Big Pharma got Americans hooked on 
anti-psychotic drugs. Aljazeera.net. July 12. (Online: 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/opinion/2011/07/20117313948379987.htm).  Meanwhile, all 
non-westerners who resist the traumatizing encroachments of western society (as well as those 
who don’t resist) are already understood through the constructs and “logic” of western society to 
be inferior, “primitive,” “backwards,” and in the way of “progress.” 
611 Op. cit., 2006, p. 3. 
612 Op. cit., 1992, p. 2. 
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Though the concept of societal trauma has been around in some form at least since the 1970s 
(Kelman, 1973; Lifton, 1975), the topic remains largely understudied, perhaps in part because in 
Western society the topic of trauma itself has been forgotten repeatedly over the past century 
(Herman, 1992:7-8).  After all, the study of trauma ultimately confronts us with “human 
vulnerability in the natural world” (Herman, 1992: 8), “man’s inhumanity to man” and “the best 
and worst in human nature” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006: 6). In many cases these are 
things societies, like individuals who have a choice in the matter, prefer to forget.613
The study of war trauma becomes legitimate only in a context that challenges the 
sacrifice of young men in war.  The study of trauma in sexual and domestic life 
becomes legitimate only in a context that challenges the subordination of women 
and children. Advances in the field occur only when they are supported by a 
political movement powerful enough to legitimate an alliance between 
investigators and patients and to counteract the ordinary social processes of 
silencing and denial. In the absence of strong political movements for human 
rights, the active process of bearing witness inevitably gives way to the active 
process of forgetting.  Repression, dissociation, and denial are phenomena of 
social as well as individual consciousness. (Ibid). 
  Thus, 
remembering is easily resisted unless and until political movements develop that both force these 
issues forward in our collective conscience and provide a social context “that affirms and 
protects the victim[s] and that joins victim[s] and witness[es] in a common alliance.” As Herman 
has further remarked on the topic: 
 
     Though concepts of societal trauma have not found full expression in any academic 
literature,614
                                                 
613 “War and victims are something the community wants to forget; a veil of oblivion is drawn 
over everything painful and unpleasant.  We find the two sides face to face; on the one side the 
victims who perhaps wish to forget but cannot, and on the other all those with strong, often 
unconscious motives who very intensely both with to forget and succeed in doing so. The 
contrast … is frequently very painful for both sides.  The weakest one … remains the losing 
party in this silent and unequal dialogue” (Leo Eitinger, quoted in Herman, 1992: 8). 
 the parallels between individual and societal responses to trauma have frequently 
614 Though a very few articles have worked towards this effort, such as DeVries (2006) and 
Stamm, B. Hundnall, Henry E. Stamm, IV, Amy C. Hundnall, and Craig Higson-Smith. 2003. 
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been noted by some of the most renowned scholars on the effects of trauma –as demonstrated in 
the two introductory quotes to this subsection.  Further, a growing number of studies –
particularly those examining transgenerational trauma—have examined specific aspects of 
traumatic reactions that are displayed in whole groups within society (if not whole societies) and 
passed on through the generations (Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; Felsen, 1998).  Other 
scholars have examined societal responses to traumatic events during the period of a particular 
trauma or after (Lifton, 1975, 2002, 2004; Eisenhardt, 1975; Egendorf, 1975; Kelman, 1973; 
Martinot, 2003; Bauman, 2000; Williams, 2000; Halloran, 2007).  Many of these studies have 
focused on specific traumatic symptoms, such as the denial of guilt and the numerous 
psychopathological mechanisms employed to this effect. In the discussion that follows, I ask the 
reader to keep in mind that when it is said that societies are engaging in certain patterns of 
thought and behavior, what is meant is that whole groups of people within a society –often the 
majority of a society-- are engaging in these patterns of thought and behavior --to some extent-- 
because they have been socialized into them, and because these patterns, though recognized in 
trauma literature as psychopathological, have become normalized and expected ways of thinking, 
behaving and acting in these societies.  It needs to be pointed out that, as with any norm or 
conglomerate of behaviors in society, there is an entire continuum (or more accurately, a web) 
upon which the norm /conglomerate of behaviors is adopted or ignored.  Thus nothing in the 
below discussion is intended to suggest that everyone in a given, traumatized society engages in 
all of the below discussed patterns.  Some people will engage in some and not others.  Some will 
engage in all of the below-discussed patterns of thought and behavior.  Further, though the 
likelihood that one can be born and raised in Western society, or assimilated into it, and not 
                                                                                                                                                             
Considering a theory of cultural trauma and loss. Journal of Loss and Trauma, vol. 9, pp. 89-
111. 
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internalize many of these patterns of thought and behavior to some extent is slim, the extent to 
which individuals in society engage in various patterns of thought and behavior always varies in 
any society. The point to keep in mind is that societies are often characterized by certain 
predominating patterns of thought and behavior, and, I argue, that most of us in Western society 
engage in most of these behaviors to some extent which is not healthy for us or for other people 
and other life forms in the world around us.  In addition, many of the below-discussed patterns of 
thought and behavior (like those discussed in chapter 2) are so prevalent in Western society, are 
prevalent to such a great extent, and are perhaps far more prevalent than other patterns of thought 
and behavior that we mythically attribute to ourselves (freedom, democracy, peace-loving) that 
these patterns –rather than our myths—are much more accurate characterizations of the Western 
cultural worldview and Western society as a whole than are our numerous (in some cases 
narcissistic) myths. (What’s more, many of the overly-favorable, self-serving myths that we have 
created about our society were constructed through some of the very processes described below). 
     It might also be worth nothing here that, while it is certainly true that individuals adopt certain 
of these patterns of thought and behavior to greater or lesser extents depending upon their 
various group identities, these patterns of thought and behavior are intended to analyze societies 
and are not generally suited for analyzing differences in behavior of different groups within a 
given society.  There is a single exception to this general rule, and that is that the patterns of 
thought and behavior laid out below are particularly well suited to analyzing the behavior of 
groups that engage in collective angry and violent behavior directed towards intimidating or 
asserting/maintaining privilege over other individuals or groups within society.  In particular, 
these patterns of thought and behavior are particularly well suited to understanding behavior by 
dominant group members who benefit from historical and/or present day subjugation of non-
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dominant groups, and who are thus actively engaged in the below described defense mechanisms 
as a way of denying their own guilt in the historical or ongoing subjugation of others and/or of 
attempting to find various other ways of justifying this historical or ongoing subjugation.   In 
addition, the below-described patterns of thought and behavior, like those in chapter 2, are quite 
specific to Western society and its particular historical circumstances. Other traumatized, 
predatory societies may well engage in some or all of these behaviors, but have their own 
specific histories and are likely to also have their own history-specific behavior patterns (as Elias 
(1998) has pointed out).  At any rate, as the past several hundred centuries have demonstrated, 
Western society is by far the most predatory of all societies in existence today, and the below 
discussions of pathological patterns of thought and behavior has been specifically tailored to 
Western society and its own unique history with this in mind. 
     Like the conscious awareness and/or study of trauma, there are a number of other unsettling 
things that societies often seek to forget, repress, or reduce to a much more simplified, less 
threatening form.  For the United States, the war in Vietnam was certainly one of these, and a 
number of scholars have written about US society’s “incredible reluctance” to look critically at 
the war, and thus is “insistence that we learn nothing” from it (Lifton, 1975: 189, 184.  See also: 
Kelman, 1973; Eisenhardt, 1975; Egendorf, 1975).  In this same country, the present wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan (and beyond) can join the list of things the country refuses to examine, and 
prefers to forget (Lifton, 2002; Litz et al., 2009; Martinot, 2003), as can the country’s history of 
genocide, colonialism and slavery, which US society denies with a “seemingly glacial amnesia” 
(Martinot, 2003: 407. See also: Williams, 2008).  In German society, the Holocaust is a period in 
history that many would prefer to forget; and despite having been forced to acknowledge and 
face these horrors to some extent after WW II, many Germans today have only a fragmented and 
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faulty understanding of the event (Hardtmann, 1998: 87-88).  A great number also actively avoid 
any understanding or inquiry into the impacts that these past events have had on their present 
lives --though the impacts have been considerable (Hardtmann, 1998; Bar-On et al., 1998; 
Felsen, 1998). But the Germans are not alone in their denial surrounding this event. Much of 
Western society continues to deny its own collective responsibility for this event, as well as its 
continuing vulnerability to (and occasional repetition of) similar events on a lesser or similar 
scale. As Bauman (2000: xii) has noted, “[t]he more ‘they’ are to blame, the more the rest of ‘us’ 
are safe, and the less we have to do to defend this safety.”615
                                                 
615 Unfortunately, most scholars of the Holocaust look form the event, forward towards present 
day, rather than looking back in time to truly understand the origins of this event.  Sven 
Lindqvist (1996: 9, 10) elaborates on this failure: 
 Perhaps to this extent, even many 
Israelis born after WWII have fragmentary understandings of the impacts the Holocaust has had 
on their present lives, and have “tended to simplify the relevance of past events (especially, the 
The idea of extermination lies no further from the heart of humanism than Buchenwald 
lies from Goethehaus in Weimar.  That insight has been almost completely repressed, 
even by the Germans, who have been made sole scapegoats for ideas of extermination 
that are actually a common European heritage.  
     … 
     But in this debate, no one mentions the German extermination of the Herero people 
in southwest Africa during Hitler’s childhood.  No one mentions the corresponding 
genocide by the French, British or the Americans.  No one points out that during 
Hitler’s childhood, a major element in the European view of mankind was the 
conviction that “inferior races” were by nature condemned to extinction: the true 
compassion of the superior races consisted in helping them on their way. 
     All German historians participating in this debate seem to look in the same direction.  
None looks to the west.  But Hitler did.  What Hitler wished to create when he sought 
Lebensraum in the east was a continental equivalent of the British Empire.  It was in the 
British and other western European peoples that he found the models, of which 
extermination of the Jews is, in Nolte’s words, “a distorted copy.” 
See also: Kakel, Carroll P., III. 2011. The American West and the Nazi East. New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
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Holocaust) within their present political and social perspectives” (Bar-On et. al, 1998: 98, 
106).616
     Australian society also has its share of events it wishes to deny, such as the genocide of 
Aboriginal peoples.  And though the collective Australian identity largely recognizes the need 
for (at least some symbolic forms of) reconciliation with Aboriginal peoples (Halloran, 2007: 
14), a large portion of Australian society would simply prefer to forget these crimes of the past, 
to minimize their collective responsibility for making reparations for them, and to avoid at all 
costs any personal responsibility for acting in this regard (Halloran, 2007; Williams, 2000).
     
617
                                                 
616 “While in Germany, students tended to claim that ‘nothing in the Nazi era was relevant’ for 
their present social perspective, in Israel we found the opposite tendency (‘The Holocaust was 
very relevant for our present social contexts’)” (Bar-On et al., 1998: 98).  This over-
simplification also indicates an understandable lack of fully processing and coming to terms with 
the meaning and impact of the event –i.e., a form of denial which may at least partially explain 
Bauman’s (2000: ix) observations: “The Jewish state tried to employ the tragic memories as the 
certificate of its political legitimacy, a safe-conduct pass for its past and future policies, and 
above all as the advanced payment for the injustices it might itself commit.” (Injustices that have 
since been well-documented in both scholarship and international law).  
  
Likewise Williams (2008: 229) has noted the “deep psychological needs” of people in the United 
States to deny past wrongs (including genocide) committed against indigenous peoples in North 
America, preferring to imagine itself as a nation “created through the consent of the people” (at 
230 & 242) which had freed itself from the “darkness of European corruption” (at 230), and was 
thus morally pure (at 231, 247-49). Meanwhile, Canada has sought to see itself as perhaps more 
morally pure than the United States, having had no history of violent revolution or Jim Crow-era 
617 According to Williams (2000: 137) The former Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Howard, 
denied the history of genocide in Australia outright, attributing claims that it occurred to the 
“guilt industry” or a “political conspiracy to generate and manipulate spurious guilt.”  Halloran 
(2007: 14) notes that while some 75% of Australians surveyed “expressed some form of support 
for reconciliation,” less than 30% said they were willing to personally engage in behaviors 
necessary to bring this about (at 13), only 14% expressed some sense of guilt about the past 
treatment of Aboriginal peoples (at 3, citing McGarty et al.), and 48% indicated that they held 
negative and resentful attitudes towards Aboriginal peoples in Australia (at 3). 
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segregation, and imagining itself to have been far more benevolent towards indigenous peoples 
than the violent, genocidal United States.  But Canada has its own history of genocide (See, for 
example: Reid, 1993a & 1993b; Upton, 1977), which it continues to deny vehemently despite its 
being periodically pointed out by a few academics and activists; and the country’s current Prime 
Minister has even gone so far as to deny Canada’s history of colonialism (O’Keefe, 2009; 
Ljunggren, 2009), despite the country’s continued reliance on colonial-era legislation in its 
ongoing dispossession of indigenous peoples from their lands, resources, treaty and human 
rights.618
     Denial is a normal, psychological mechanism for temporarily lessening the impact of 
information or experiences that are extremely difficult to handle and that are likely to overwhelm 
a person or a society’s immediate ability to cope with and process the event or information.  
Denying the reality of an event gives the shocked or traumatized society more time to take in the 
information and to adjust to the drastic life changes that may be involved.  Denial is thus often 
the first stage in the grieving process, and is frequently utilized during traumatic events and their 
aftermath (Williams, 1989: 75-76) as a means of delaying their full psychological impacts. 
However, when denial becomes a permanent state of being, rather than a temporary mechanism 
for coping, it becomes maladaptive, destructive, and psychopathological because it prevents the 
remembering and truth telling about traumatic events that is necessary for healing and for “the 




                                                 
618 Here I am referring to Canada’s Indian Act, which is discussed further in chapter 4. 
 
619 “The conflict between the will to deny horrible events and the will to proclaim them aloud is 
the central dialectic of psychological trauma” (Herman, 1992:1). 
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     In the case of predatory societies, such as Western society, denial is frequently utilized not 
only to avoid the guilt and grief associated with having survived various perpetrations and 
atrocities620 (many of which were perpetrated against Westerners at the hands of Westerners, see 
chapter 2), but also to avoid and/or quickly get rid of grief and “deeply painful emotion[s]” of 
guilt that are associated with witnessing and/or participating in the reenactment of perpetrations 
and atrocities against others (Williams, 2000: 137; Litz et. al., 2009: 697). Unfortunately, for 
those seeking a permanent state of denial, historical facts can be, and frequently are lied away, 
but actions “can neither be revoked or erased by a mere act of the imagination.” They leave 
lingering, “visible and tangible” effects in the external world (Hardtmann, 1998: 91, citing 
Arendt, 1967, 1971; Herman, 1992: 1) that can serve as constant reminders of one’s guilt. In 
addition, the failure to integrate traumatic experiences often leads to increased feelings of “guilt, 
shame and anxiety” (Litz et. al., 2009: 697). Thus, the attempted denial of guilt and guilt-related 
grief often produces new guilt, both through constant reminders of one’s guilt in the external 
world and through the guilt, shame and anxiety these unintegrated reminders produce.621
     It is thus common for societies (or individuals) wishing to deny permanently their guilt and 
guilt-related actions to employ the additional psychological coping mechanisms of repression, 
dissociation, splitting and projection /projective identification (Hardtmann, 1998, 91, 88-89; 
Devries, 2006: 40). Many of these defense mechanisms are like denial in that they either are 
  In 
addition, the failure to integrate memories and emotions related to traumatic, guilt-related events 
can produce other forms of “lingering psychological distress” in the form of intrusive thoughts, 
emotions, sensations and imagery, as well as in avoidance behaviors (Ibid). 
                                                 
620 See Williams, 1989 on survivor guilt and grief. 
621 Litz et al. (2009: 697) have argued that feelings of guilt and demoralization are highly 
correlated with PTSD. 
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commonly utilized in every day life and/or are adaptive mechanisms for temporarily coping with 
overwhelming experiences or information. But when employed on a more permanent basis, all of 
these defense mechanisms lead to further psychopathologies that compound the adverse effects 
of failed integration and healing. Like denial, repression leaves traces of the unpleasant or 
intolerable thoughts, emotions, and memories in the subconscious –traces which constantly 
threaten to resurface and wreak havoc on a society’s otherwise contained, controlled, and above 
all false vision of reality. Meanwhile, though dissociation and splitting offer the subject a cleaner 
break from unpleasant or intolerable parts of itself, by splitting these off from consciousness 
altogether, these defenses are also prone to periodic collapse (see for example, Hardtmann, 1998: 
89) or intrusion from emotions, sensations or memories associated with the repressed reality.  
What’s more, these defense mechanisms are only employed at a hefty price: a loss of identity 
and, through a more full dissociation from emotions, a loss of agency. Hardtmann (1998: 92) has 
explained the loss of identity: 
The subject, however, would try to obtain liberation through oblivion from 
something that actually happened, looses [sic] a part of its history, and therefore a 
part of its identity.  In this way, the subject walks around without a shadow and 
becomes “face- and history-less” and is yet permanently in restlessness and fear 




The subject thereby saves itself froma critical argument with the evil (or good) 
within itself or the other.  It pays for the loss of self with a false, usually idealized, 
self-image and an unrealistic and overweening self-assumption. (91) 
 
     Similarly, the loss of agency can arise from the dissociation and splitting from painful 
emotions and memories relating to past traumatic events. Through dissociation, a subject 
separates from a part of oneself –i.e., certain unpleasant or intolerable thoughts, memories, 
emotions and sensations are split off from consciousness, and placed out of reach in another (or 
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many) separate personalities (or personality fragments) of which the core personality can be 
totally unaware. Also through splitting the good and the bad in people, objects, and events are 
separated and left unintegrated, so that the subject can view the same leader, country, or group of 
people as either all good or all bad, without any conscious awareness of the targets other 
characteristics.622
                                                 
622 See, for example, Lifton (1975: 193), who discusses “ideological totalism” as “an all-or-
nothing stance that impels one toward obliterating perceptions of reality.” Both dissociation and 
splitting are quite common in western society today, which has a long-standing philosophical 
tradition of attempting to separate emotions from “rationality” [despite/ignoring the fact that 
emotions “reside at the core of one’s being, the part of it with which one makes sense of the 
world” (Nussbaum, quoted in: Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008, p. 393)].  And while dissociation can 
be quite normal in everyday life (such as when one does tasks automatically while thinking of 
something else, and later cannot recall the steps he/she took in doing the task), western society 
pushes its members to dissociate to destructive extents, and as a whole has dissociated from past 
memories and emotions to pathological extents.  Splitting has also reached pathological extents, 
in that large portions in the United States are not able to understand, for example, that not all 
Arabs (or people who look Arab) are Muslim and not all Muslims (or people who “look” 
Muslim) are terrorists.  Splitting in this manner has long been an inherent thought process in the 
United States, one that many people engage automatically against any group of people whom 
(they are told) pose an alleged threat.  Splitting is also easily observable in the media, politics 
and pop culture.  People in the public spotlight are expected to be (and treated as if they are) 
either all good or all bad.  Political candidates, pop stars and countless other media targets that 
were once considered “all good” can easily and immediately be brought down by exposing some 
personal flaw, which is generally sensationalized but also generally within the realm of typical 
human behavior (drug abuse, eccentric behavior, stark changes in hairstyles, can turn large 
segments of the public against certain pop stars almost overnight.  Certain types of sexual 
“deviance” (which is often –thought not always-- behavior that is quite normal, but just not 
admitted), or, to a lesser extent, financial scandals and/or lying (which have become so normal 
for politicians as to barely make waves anymore) can destroy a politician within days.  
Interestingly (or frighteningly), actual policy decisions –such as authorizing assassinations of 
foreign and U.S. citizens abroad, or outlawing labor unions—generally do not lead to immediate 
condemnation by large sectors of the public in the way that personal imperfections do. This 
suggests that large portions of the U.S. public frequently judge politicians based on how similar 
the politician is to their moral ideals for personal behavior, and not according to any well-
thought-out analysis of policy –i.e., of what politicians are actually elected to do.  This is perhaps 
largely because most people in the U.S. don’t really pay attention to political issues except when 
their emotions of anger and resentment are mobilized by some political campaign such as the 
Tea Party or Sarah Palin speeches. 
 In both dissociation and splitting directed at oneself, as well as splitting 
directed at others, the subject creates a false construct of moral purity “that promise renewed 
 506 
innocence and guiltless sanctimony” (Egendorf, 1975: 124; see also: Lifton, 1975:194). A typical 
fixture in liberal Western society, this moral purity (or religion-based intolerance) often holds 
that everyone should conform to the subject’s moral code, that one can easily avoid guilt and 
imperfection if one makes the right choices, and if one experiences guilt or is seen to be 
imperfect it is a result of his/her own choices and he/she would be (Litz et al., 2009: 699; 
Williams, 2008: 247).  But the construction of this code places individuals and societies in great 
danger, since neither can ever be morally pure.  As Williams (2008: 246-48) notes, for societies 
like the United States, which has built itself around ideals of being morally pure, the 
“psychological threat is of nuclear proportions”: 
[T]o grant reparations systematically as a matter of right, in recognition of wrongs 
committed, might suggest not merely that the United States is guilty of sporadic 
misdeeds, but that it is rotten at the root.  It is not, after all, a light to the 
enlightened nations.  It was born in blood, and it feeds itself on land chocked with 
the bodies of its victims.  (246) 
 
But herein lies the dilemma, as Williams again points out: 
 
An irredeemably sinful America is not America.  And so in the context of 
American culture, an imperfect origin really does suggest the present illegitimacy 
of the country. … And so Americans will go to great lengths to deny and reject 
any such intimation, not least through implacable hostility to reparations [to 
Native nations] for loss of sovereignty. (248). 
 
     Thus, even after a subject dissociates and splits itself off from the intolerable parts of itself, it 
deals with the ‘permanent restlessness and fear of being caught by its own shadow,’ and/or the 
fear of being revealed in its moral impurity, by projecting these intolerable aspects of itself onto 
scapegoated others.623
                                                 
623 “To save one own’s [sic] skin from the inner persecutor, the other is sacrificed, thereby 
serving as a scapegoat  … The subject thereby saves itself from a critical argument with the evil 
(or the good) within itself or the other.  It pays for the loss of self with a false, usually idealized, 
self-image and an unrealistic and overweening self-assumption” (Hartdmann, 1998: 91). 
  The separation from intolerable emotions, memories and parts of oneself 
not only deprives one of identity, but also of agency, in two senses.  First, the emotional 
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deadness and psychic numbing leaves one in a state of self-alienation and “inner paralysis.”624  
Unable to rely on emotions for guidance in important (or even minor) decisions, the subject is 
left vulnerable to external influences and/or internal, authoritarian political entrepreneurs625 who 
purposefully capitalize on strong negative emotions by offering politically strategic 
interpretations of the “threat” that underlies them (see: Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008).626 Second, 
by using blame and other projective defenses to escape one’s own guilt and moral impurities, a 
society and its members denies and separates itself from its own responsibility and agency.627
     Projection is another psychological mechanisms that is frequently employed through the 
course of daily life; but like the other psychological defense mechanisms, projection can become 
psychopathological and even politically dangerous.  According to Hardtmann (1998: 91) this 
occurs when the target of projection is viewed as either all good or all bad, and is denied 
independence, self-reliance, and the ability to actively resist the projection.  In this case, the 
 
                                                 
624 “The suppression of feelings led to an inner paralysis, a loss of liveliness, and a diffuse 
incapability in situation when difficult decisions in life had to be made. The children remained 
foreign to themselves, felt “alien in their own house,” in their body, and in their soul, in some 
cases developing psychosis-like symptoms and symptoms of a split personality or a false self. … 
Some of them generally perceived emotions and affects as irrational, something that one can 
only fight, suppress, and control, but cannot use in a sensible way to understand more about 
oneself” (Ibid: 89). 
625 In fact, one of the three processes cited by Kelman (1973) as contributing to a group or 
society’s willingness to commit mass atrocities is the process of routinization, which is 
purposefully intended to cause a dissociation from emotions, and thus make individuals and 
groups more susceptible to authoritarian orders that would otherwise appear to be immoral (and 
illegal).  
626 In the aftermath of trauma, it is frequently the case that “[c]ertain forms of emotions –hatred, 
fear and anger—become central tools for political appropriation while others, such as empathy, 
compassion and wonder, become marginalized.  The consequences are often fatal, leacing to new 
sources of hate and thus new forms of conflict” (Hutchinson & Bleiker, 2008: 390). 
627 “[B]laming is both a tactic for gaining political advantage and a projective defence against 
persecutory guilt. …[I]t largely prevents the development of feelings of responsibility” 
(Williams, 2000: 138).  See also, DeVries (2006: 407) on the various “regressive moves to 
release individuals behaviorally and ideologically from an intolerable complexity that cannot be 
managed or used in a more productive way.” 
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projection becomes pathological projective identification, which leaves the realm of fantasy and 
becomes “relevant to action, and produce[s] effects” in the real world. Hardtmann (1998) 
remarks on the difference: 
Fantasies generally, if they are not relevant for action, do not leave traces in the 
outside world.  They can therefore, even if they are important for the self and 
trigger feelings of shame and guilt, be put off easily.  We all know the feeling 
experienced when waking form a nightmare, relieved that we have just dreamt.  
Actions can neither be revoked nor erased by a mere act of the imagination.  They 
are withdrawn from the sole power of the subject by the fact that they cannot be 
renounced and develop a life of their own.  The effects of a violent act, for 
instance, are visible and tangible.  One can erase the traces, as the Nazis tried to 
do, and smear the references, but one cannot make it undone. (P. 91) 
 
     Both the emotional deadness and psychic numbing that can be associated with dissociation, 
and the splitting and projection of undesirable parts of oneself onto scapegoated others, can 
result in further disturbed, psychosis-like thinking structures (Hardtmann, 1998: 89, 92; see also: 
DeVries, 2006: 411). By denying others independence from projective identifications or the 
ability to resist them, the subject dehumanizes others just as it has dehumanized and reduced 
itself to a one-dimensional (false) self, incapable to accepting or even examining its own 
reality.628
                                                 
628 See, for example, Hardtmann (1998: 91): “The person does not manage to deal with faults, 
weaknesses, and good qualities, and to develop a realistic and healthy self-perception” and the 
projective target “is either disparaged or idealized, perceived and treated as the devil and the 
ultimate evil or as the incarnation of divinity and goodness.” Further: “[s]uch splitting becomes 
necessary if the subject cannot accept itself the way it is.”  See also, Kelman (1973) on the 
process of dehumanization. 
  The projective identification leaves the self/ society mutilated and struggling against 
threats internally –from the repressed and denied parts of oneself—and externally –from the 
targeted group’s resistance to the projection (Hardtmann, 1998: 92).  The scapegoated targets’ 
resistance to these projective identifications can lead the subject to lash out in anger, rage and 
violence, experiencing this resistance as a threatened annihilation (and thus imagined 
victimization), because it threatens to disrupt the subject’s fantasy world with reality 
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(Hardtmann, 1998: 92; Lifton, 1975: 194 and 2002: 70, 69).629  In fact, if there is some societal 
acknowledgment of past wrongs committed against the targeted/scapegoated group, their mere 
presence can also be experienced as a threat, since they “represent the memory of suffering, rage 
and pain in a world that longs to forget” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 28).630
     A number of writers have commented on some aspect of these psychopathological defense 
mechanisms.  For example, in examining attempts by European descendants in Australian 
society to evade feelings of guilt for genocide, atrocities and other wrongs committed against 
Aboriginal peoples, Williams (2000: 138-40) draws upon the concept of persecutory guilt, which 
is linked to denial and blame-shifting (or a projective mechanism and  “a political process that 
disguises itself as the objective identification of guilty parties), which lead to feelings of 
 
                                                 
629 For example, Lifton (1975: 194) talks about the “overall psychohistorical response to change 
in United States society during the 1970s, noting:  
…the fearful sense that various forces of change threaten to destroy or kill something in 
the American cultural-ideological essence, a perception that is itself called upon in 
order to ward off the unacceptable feeling that the process of decay is internal 
(nationally and individually).  Broadly speaking, one could say that Watergate and My 
Lai represented desperate last-ditch efforts to maintain a faltering cosmology around the 
American secular religion of nationalism, which was inwardly perceived to be 
collapsing. At such a moment, as many people (notably Hannah Arendt) have said, 
there is a greater likelihood of violence or extreme measures of one kind or another—of 
the kind we saw at Watergate and My Lai. 
See also, Hardtmann, 1998, p. 92 (“The self, mutilated and amputated by projection, is 
permanently threatened from the inside, by the reappearance of the suppressed parts, and from 
the outside by the fact that the object normally resists the projective identification.  It thus lives 
in a two-front war, threatened from both the inside and the outside, cleft and torn from itself.  
Cure would only be possible if an inner reconciliation and a destruction of the false self-image 
took place”). 
630 Western society’s “reactions [to trauma] seem to be primarily conservative impulses in the 
service of maintaining the beliefs that the world is fundamentally just, that people can be in 
charge of their lives, and that bad things happen to people who deserve them. Bearers of bad 
tidings are generally considered dangerous; thus, societies tend to be suspicious that victims will 
contaminate the social fabric, undermine self-reliance, consume social resources, and live off the 
strong. The weak are a liability, and, after an initial period of compassion, are vulnerable to 
being singled out as parasites and carriers of social malaise” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 
35). 
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resentment and contempt.  Similarly, Martinot (2003: 409) has described the paranoid 
projections of slave patrols in the U.S. in the late 1600s, noting that the patrols quickly devolved 
to using gratuitous violence, venting class-based frustrations at the slaves, and gaining social 
approval from their superiors for this behavior.  According to Martinot, this violence induced 
further paranoia (“a self-induced fear generated by their own injustice), which “perpetuated a 
culture of terror,” projected the imagined source of social threat onto the slaves, produced 
demands for social solidarity (conformity) among whites, and created a “sense of well-being and 
self-justification toward slavery.” These various mechanisms, in turn, created the need for and 
fact of white racial identity in the United States.631  For Martinot, all of these mechanisms, 
together, form the foundation of patriotism in the United States, which is exemplified in the Bush 
administration’s war launched on Iraq, “from the paranoia in all the administration’s false 
rationales, through their use in generating consensus, to the absolute violence deployed in the 
invasion” (409-10).  Meanwhile, studying the more general impact of loss of cultural (or 
societal) identity DeVries (2006) has found that the consequences of these losses frequently 
include denial, projection, “narcissistic survival strategies,” “regressive social bonding”(410), 
various conservative impulses and psychopathological reactions (411), and violence and 
aggression (407) in the quest for pathological liberation (410).632
                                                 
631 “Based on a system of oppression and comprised of paranoia, a demand for consensus, and 
violence, the structure of racialization came to be called “race.” …In sum, the foundations of 
patriotism in the U.S. have been, from the beginning, imbued with a solidarity based upon a 
paranoia and a gratuitous violence launched to render that paranoia real”  (Martinot, 2003: 409). 
   
632 Numerous other studies have examined aspects of these dynamics as well, but cannot be 
summarized here.  See, for example, Hutchinson & Bleiker’s 2008 work on reconciliation, which 
discusses tendencies of traumatized societies to build “a sense of identity and political 
community that rests on a stark separation between a safe inside and a threatened outside.  Dealt 
with in this way, trauma can come to inscribe and perpetuate exclusive and often violent ways of 
configuring community” which can produce new antagonisms and forms of violence (386).  See 
also, Lifton, 2004 (on the “ideological vision that equates Iraqi fighters with “terrorists” and 
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     In all of these examples, as well as in other studies of these dynamics, the projective, 
paranoid, and delusional (or near-psychotic) quest for pathological liberation from unpleasant or 
intolerable memories, thoughts, feelings, and parts of oneself leave the self mutilated and 
destroyed, psychologically.  Further, the reenactment of various past traumatic events633 and the 
perpetration of various new traumatic events against scapegoated others, serve as additional 
traumas and moral trepidations, which must also be denied, split-off, projected, and defended 
against consciousness awareness and thus threatened annihilation.634
                                                                                                                                                             
seeks to further justify the invasion”); Lipsitz, 2008 (on the ways in which whiteness “recruits 
people to be defenders of white group position and privilege rather than opponents of 
exploitation and injustice”); Lifton, 2002, p. 68 (“in the act of killing one defines the evil of “the 
enemy” [even when the victim is a civilian] which in turn evokes the necessity of one’s actions 
and one’s own relationship to virtue”); and so on.  
  Through these 
mechanisms, societies and their members entrench themselves into habits of predatory, 
perpetrating thoughts and behaviors which they refuse to acknowledge because doing so could 
open the floodgates to overwhelming memories and unbearable emotions.  These would be 
unbearable not only because of their intolerable emotional content, but also because through the 
cycles of self-mutilation and perpetration, and the striving for moral purity, the self has been left 
with exaggerated and unrealistic expectations and without any loving parts that can accept faults 
633 First, the original traumatic events, including long-standing histories of traumatic events.  
Second, the damage to self from refusing to acknowledge, accept and integrate these traumatic 
events as part of the self, and thus from failing to heal from these first traumas.  Third, the 
damage to self from the various defense mechanisms utilized to maintain the separation and 
splitting off from traumatic memories, traumatic symptoms, intolerable emotions and unpleasant 
or negative aspects of oneself.  Fourth, the perpetration against others in the psychopathological 
attempts to liberate (but the actual mutilation of) the self, which are yet additional traumatic 
events which must be denied and defended against conscious awareness…  And the cycle 
continues and reinforces itself. 
634 On reenactment of trauma, see: van der Kolk & McFarlane, 2006, p. 11; Herman, 1992, pp. 
39-40; McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006.  See also: Lifton, 1975; Martinot, 2003. 
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and weaknesses (Hardtmann, 1998: 91).635
Clinical work has taught us that the ability to tolerate the plight of victims is, as 
least in part, a function of how well people have dealt with their own misfortunes. 
When they have confronted the reality of their own hurt and suffering, and 
accepted their own pain, this generally is translated into tolerance and sometimes 
even compassion for others.  Conversely, as long as people deny the impact of 
their own personal trauma and pretend that it did not matter, that it was not so 
bad, or that excuses can be made for their abuses, they are likely to identify with 
the aggressors and treat others with the same harshness with which they treat the 
wounded parts of themselves.  Identification with the aggressor makes it possible 
to bypass empathy for themselves and secondarily for others.  
  The inability to deal with faults and weakness in 
one’s self leads to an identification with the aggressors and perpetrators and an inability to 
tolerate or have compassion for weakness or faults in others.  McFarlane & van der Kolk (2006: 
36) elaborate:   
 
This identification with the perpetrator is further reinforced in predatory societies by the fact that 
national identification requires its members embrace and identify in some form with the 
perpetrations of the past, as well as the ongoing denial of and/or perpetuation of these 
perpetrations –even if narcissistic (or near-psychotic) delusions of moral purity disguise the acts 
and mentality of perpetration and moral decay. 
     However, society’s inability or unwillingness to come to terms with past traumas and these 
various psychopathological coping mechanisms have dire consequences not only for the targets 
of the projective scapegoating, but also for the society and its members who struggle to maintain 
images of their own moral purity.  McFarlane and van der Kolk (2006: 33-34) elaborate again: 
Failure to deal with the plight of victims can be disastrous for a society.  The costs 
of the reenactment of trauma in society, in the form of child abuse, continued 
violence, and lack of productivity are staggering. Failure to face the reality of 
trauma may have devastating political consequences as well. For example, in the 
aftermath of World War I, the inability to face its effects on the capacity of 
veterans to function effectively in society, and the social intolerance of their 
                                                 
635 And thus the “weak are a liability, and… are vulnerable to being singled out as parasides and 
carriers of social malaise” (McFarlane & van der Kolk, 2006: 35). 
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“weakness,” may have substantially contributed to the subsequent rise of fascism 
and militarism.  The impossible war reparations of the Treaty of Versailles, 
motivated by a lust for revenge by the Allies, humiliated an already humiliated 
Germany.  The German nation, in turn, dealt mercilessly with its own war 
veterans, who were accused of being moral invalids.  This cascade of humiliations 
of the powerless set the stage for the ultimate debasement of human rights under 
the Nazi regime, the extermination of the weak and the different, and the moral 
justification for the subjugation of “inferior” people—the rationale for the ensuing 
war.  
 
Similarly, Hardtmann (1998: 93) has cited the “denial and splitting” as the mechanisms through 
which “the majority of the German people entered an alliance with the Nazis against the Jewish 
minority in 1933” in order to save “themselves from a critical argument with themselves and 
their own failures.” Kelman (1973), Lifton (1975) and others (Egendorf, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1975) 
also identified many of these processes in both the unwillingness of U.S. society to look at the 
reality of the Vietnam War, and in the creation of atrocity-producing situations by U.S. soldiers 
in Vietnam. 
     The combination of these various psychopathological mechanisms are passed on from one 
generation to the next, traumatizing and psychically injuring the children of traumatized parents 
through projections and projective identifications. Because the parents deny and repress 
conscious knowledge of their own traumas, there may be little way for the children to gain the 
awareness of these traumatic events that is needed for healing.  Further, as the parents utilize 
projective defense mechanisms in their denial and splitting, the children are often subjected to 
periodic and unpredictable angry outbursts by parents.636
                                                 
636 “The children of the second generation have become objects of their parents’ splitting and 
projective identification.  They then lived either as projectively distorted, bizarre objects in a 
quasipsychotic world, or they shared these projections and thus became incapable of finding an 
independent identity of their own” (Hardtmann, 1998: 89). 
 This may lead them to feel that they are 
“in an imperceivable world” where the connection between parental guilt-inducing 
communications or angry outbursts and the incidents that allegedly induced them are hidden 
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(Hartdmann, 1998: 89; Felsen, 1998: 46).  Hardtmann (1998: 88) gives an example of this type 
of projective identification, noting a five-year-old who let his dog carry a bag of breakfast rolls 
home. When his father saw this, and saw that the bag had touched the dirt, he burst out in a rage, 
yelling “I shall teach you to drag the one who gives you bread through the dirt,” and then hit the 
child hard enough to break his arm. Through parental projection and the reenactment of societal 
traumas on their children, the original traumatic events remain buried, while the 
psychopathological mechanisms for denying these past traumas become concretized as 
behavioral norms throughout sectors of society, or entire societies. Thus, subsequent generations 
are traumatized and socialized into the psychopathological behavior patterns of previous 
generations, as each individual “in his short history, passes once more through some of the 
processes that his society ha traversed in its long history” (Elias, 1998: 42).  And thus, the cycles 
of defensive denial, repression, splitting, dissociation, projective identification, paranoia, 
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